Ex Parte Freire et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 22, 201811697926 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 11/697,926 04/09/2007 96227 7590 08/24/2018 Bell & Manning, LLC 2801 West Beltline Highway Ste. 210 Madison, WI 53713 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Juliana Freire UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 00800-0013 7305 EXAMINER PADOT, TIMOTHY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/24/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@bellmanning.com mmanning@bellmanning.com pporembski@bellmanning.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JULIANA FREIRE, CLAUDIO T. SILVA, STEVEN P. CALLAHAN, EMANUELE SANTOS, CARLOS E. SCHEIDEGGER, and HUY T. VO Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697,926 1 Technology Center 3600 Before MURIEL E. CRAWFORD, ROBERT L. KINDER, and CARLL. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 4--23, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 Appellants state that the real party in interest is The University of Utah Research Foundation. App. Br. 4. Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 The invention relates to managing workflows. Abstract; Spec., ,r,r 2, 5, 7. Claim 20, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal ( emphasis added): 20. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon computer-readable instructions that when executed by a computing device cause the computing device to: receive a modified workflow process, the modified workflow process created by modifying an evolutionary workflow process, wherein modifying the evolutionary workflow process includes performing a modify action to modify the evolutionary workflow process, wherein the evolutionary workflow process includes one or more existing actions; identify a unique identifier of the modify action; identify a plurality of action parameter values associated with the unique identifier; compare the identified unique identifier to unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions included in the evolutionary worliflow process; when the identified unique identifier matches one of the unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions included in the evolutionary worliflow process, define a second unique identifier for the modify action, wherein the second unique identifier is unique to the evolutionary worliflow process; add the identified plurality of action parameter values in association with the defined second unique identifier to the evolutionary worliflow process; and store a map associating the unique identifier with the defined second unique identifier. App. Br. 46 (Claims App.). 2 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 Rejections2 Claims 4--23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Final Act. 8-11. Claims 5-10 and 12-23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Etchemendy (US 5,999,182, iss. Dec. 7, 1999) ("Etchemendy") in view ofKupkova (US 2004/0103124 Al; pub. May 27, 2004 Al) ("Kupkova"). Final Act. 11-20. Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Etchemendy, Kupkova, and Buch (US 2005/0119988 Al; pub. June 2, 2005) ("Buch"). Final Act. 20-21. Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Etchemendy, Kupkova, and Kogan (US 2005/0132048 Al; pub. June 16, 2005) ("Kogan"). Final Act. 21-22. ANALYSIS Rejection of Claims 4-23 Under 35 us.c. § 101 Appellants argue the Examiner errs in finding the claims are directed to an abstract idea and failing to find "the present claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology." App. Br. 20-31; Reply Br. 22-37. According to Appellants, "the purpose of the claims is to provide a 2 The 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection of claims 12, 14, 19 was withdrawn in the Final Office Action. Final Act. 2. 3 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 collaborative workflow development environment that merges a plurality of workflows created at different computing devices" and "[ e ]ven if providing a collaborative workflow development environment that includes a plurality of workflows is properly considered an abstract idea, independent3 Claims 4- 23 recite limitations that add significantly more to the abstract idea and are more than a mere computer implementation of the abstract idea." App. Br. at 20-21. Appellants argue the Examiner provides inadequate support that the claims are directed to a fundamental economic practice because the claims do not "describe concepts relating to the economy and commerce, such as agreements between people in the form of contracts, legal obligations, and business relations" at all and certainly not any that are "foundational or basic." Id. (citing July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 4 (2015). Appellants further argue the Examiner errs in finding the claims are directed to "the comparison of new and stored information" and "using rules to identify options." Id. at 22-25. According to Appellants, cited cases and the USPTO guidelines do not support the Examiner. Id. Appellants argue the present claims are not merely directed to steps that can be performed without a computer as in the claims evaluated in SmartGene or to mental steps previously routinely performed. The current claims are directed to a system that captures workflow processes used to derive data products in a collaborative environment. The recited operations were not previously performable using mental steps or pen and paper. 3 Only claims 20-22 are independent. See Claims App. 46-48. 4 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 Id. at 25. Appellants argue that claims 4--23 are analogous to those considered in DDR because: The present claims 4-23 are necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome the problem arising in co- development of an evolutionary workflow process. The claimed subject matter is an improvement to the functioning of a computer in allowing multiple users to simultaneously collaborate in the development of one or more analytic data products that provide insight to and an understanding of digital data generated to solve real world problems while maintaining a single provenance associated with the various workflows examined to create the data product. Previously, multiple users have not been able to simultaneously experiment with different workflows to create an analytic data product. The claimed invention solves a real-world problem that arises as a result of the use of computers to create analytic data products from digital data. For example, the present specification describes the significant scientific and engineering challenge associated with the ability to effectively understand and leverage the growing wealth of digital data that is being generated by numerous diverse sources such as sensors. Id. at 27 Appellants also argue the claims are analogous to claims found eligible in Research Corporation Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) because the claims go beyond simply retrieving and combining data using a computer. Id. at 29--30. In particular, the claims recite the processing of unique identifiers. Id. Appellants argue claims 4--23 further tie the claimed subject matter to a collaborative workflow development environment involving multiple users and multiple computing 5 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 devices (i.e., claims 7, 11, 13, 15, and 17) and execution of a workflow to create a data product (i.e., claim 8). Id. at 31. The Examiner determines independent claim 20 is directed to two abstract ideas: (1) a fundamental economic practice and (2) comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options. Ans. 2-3. The Examiner states that Appellants' argument that the claims are directed to "a collaborative workflow process that includes a plurality of workflow" "is similarly abstract because the practice collaborative workflow processes are in fact longstanding commercial practices, and moreover, this concept is so broad and abstract that it fully envelopes the abstract idea noted in Alice." Id. at 3. Specifically, the Examiner observes that the concept of Alice was deemed abstract by the U.S. Supreme Court. Notably, the abstract idea of "intermediated settlement" is a specific type or species of "collaborative workflow process" since the intermediated settlement concept discussed in Alice clearly requires collaboration between two parties and an intermediary, along with a worliflow in the form a defined sequence of exchanges/activities to process a transaction between two parties. Id. The Examiner finds Appellants have not shown a technological improvement and Appellants acknowledge a general purpose computer is employed to implement the claims such that, at most, "a computer is relied upon to improve/modify a workflow, which cannot be equated with an improvement to the actual computer." Id. at 4. In particular, the computer performs the basic functions for which it is intended: receiving input/data, 6 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 processing the data, outputting/storing data but without making any improvement to the computing device. Id. at 5. The Examiner finds, in contrast to DDR, the claims before us require only a general purpose computer. Id.; see Spec. ,r 40). Moreover, the Examiner observes Id. at 5. neither the concept of receiving and storing modified workflow data, nor the concept of "a collaborative workflow process that includes a plurality of workflows," as described by Appellant, can be reasonably understood as being rooted in, or providing a solution for, a problem specific to computer technology given that problems and solutions related to collaborative workflow processes are found throughout antiquity Regarding Appellants' arguments directed to collaboration employing computers, the Examiner finds networked computers are simply performing conventional functions for which they are intended and there is no showing that the claimed invention improves the networked computer technology for facilitating collaboration. Id. at 6. The Examiner further notes much of Appellants' arguments describing features and fields of use are not recited in the claim and do not refute the finding that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. Id. The Examiner disputes Appellants' argument that "the claims 'can be analogized to example 3 (Research Corporation Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., 627, F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (RCT)) of the §101 analysis examples."' Id. at 7. In particular, the claims before us recite modifying 7 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 workflows at high level, in contrast to Research Corp 's digital image halftoning improvement. Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue McRO, Enfzsh, and DDR support the eligibility of the claims. Reply Br. 2 8-3 7. As discussed below, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments and agree with the Examiner's conclusion that the claims are patent ineligible. The Supreme Court in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) reiterated the framework set out in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012) for "distinguishing patents that claim ... abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in the analysis is to determine if the claim is directed toward a patent-ineligible concept and, if so, the second step is to determine whether there are additional elements that transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible application. Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). The second step searches for an inventive concept that is sufficient to ensure that the patent amounts to significantly more than a patent on the patent- ineligible concept. Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The question is not whether claims mention a computing environment but what they are "directed to." The "directed to" inquiry applies a stage- one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether "their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter." Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376, (Fed. Cir. 2016) (inquiring into "[t]he focus of the claimed advance over the 8 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 prior art"); Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335. "The 'abstract idea' step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the 'focus of the claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's 'character as a whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). "In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). We conclude each of Appellants' claims on appeal is distinguishable from the type of claim considered by the court in Enfish and DDR. We conclude none of Appellants' claims is "directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer," as was found by the court regarding the subject claim in Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1338. To the extent that the recited steps or acts may be performed faster or more efficiently using a computer, our reviewing court provides applicable guidance: While the claimed system and method certainly purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general- purpose computer, rather than the patented method itself See Bancorp Servs., L.L. C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter."). FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). See also Electric Power Grp., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), to the extent that Appellants' claims similarly collect 9 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 information, analyze it in some fashion, and present or communicate the result. Applying this reasoning to Appellants' claims on appeal, we similarly find any purported faster or more efficient performance of the claimed steps or acts merely comes from the capabilities of a general-purpose computer and/ or computer related elements, rather than from Appellants' claimed steps or functions. We note, despite Appellants highlighting the collaborative nature of the invention, the term "collaborative" appears only in claim 22. Moreover, there is no showing that the term requires a magnitude of collaboration that would require a computer for implementation - something "collaborative" may be produced by two or more parties working together. Appellants' reliance on DDR is unpersuasive because the claims provide no improvement of the operation of a computer system commensurate with improvement to computer technology, and there is no ordered arrangement set forth which is non-conventional. The Specification supports the view that the elements recited in the claims are conventional. See, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 40, and 91, "[t]he components of evolutionary workflow processing system 100 may be implemented using one or more computing devices, which may be a computer of any form factor such as a laptop, a desktop, a server, etc.;" "[t]he exemplary embodiments may be implemented as a method, apparatus, or article of manufacture using standard programming and/or engineering techniques to produce software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof to control a computer to implement the disclosed embodiments." 10 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 In DDR, the claims at issue involved, inter alia, "web page[] displays [with] at least one active link associated with a commerce object associated with a buying opportunity of a selected one of a plurality of merchants." DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claim 18 of US 7,818,399). The Federal Circuit found the claims in DDR to be patent eligible under step two of the Mayo/Alice test because "the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." Id. at 1257. Specifically, the Federal Circuit found the claims addressed the "challenge of retaining control over the attention of the customer in the context of the Internet." Id. at 1258. The rejected claims are dissimilar to DDR's web page with an active link, and the Specification does not support the view that the computer related claim elements are unconventional, supra. The claims before us are dissimilar to McRO 's technical improvement because, in contrast to McRO, these claims cover a process that was previously performed in the same way by humans. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d (Fed. Cir. 2013). We additionally conclude Appellants' claims are analogous to the method claim considered by the court in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), at least to the extent that Appellants' claims are similarly directed to "merely selecting information, by content or source, for collection, analysis, and display [which] does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes." Id. at 1355. The claims do not require any nonconventional computer or network components, or even a "non-conventional and non- generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces," but merely call for 11 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 performance of the claimed information collection, analysis, and display functions on generic computer components and display devices. Id. Applying the first step of Alice, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to the identified abstract ideas. In addition, we agree the Examiner has considered the abstract ideas in the aggregate. Accordingly, we find that the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Having determined that the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, step 2 of the analysis considers whether the claims contain an inventive concept such as additional limitations that add significantly more to the claim so that it does not fully cover the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Here, we agree with the Examiner that no inventive concept is present. Moreover, the hardware features are the type of generic element that has been determined to be insufficient by the Supreme Court to transform a patent-ineligible claim into one that is patent-eligible. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. The claims include no limitations that prevent it from covering the abstract idea itself. Therefore, we are unpersuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims constitute an inventive concept that is significantly more than a patent on the patent-ineligible concept. Regarding preemption, "[ w ]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility .... Where a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 13 59, 13 62---63 ("that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or 12 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract"). In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 20, and independent claims 21 and 22 which are argued together claim 20 and which Appellants state recite "similar features." App. Br. 24. We also sustain the rejection of dependents claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, and 23 as these claims are not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants argue dependent claims 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, and 17, "further tie the claimed subject matter to a collaborative workflow development environment involving multiple users and multiple computing devices (i.e., claims 7, 11, 13, 15, and 17) and execution of a workflow to create a data product (i.e., claim 8)." App. Br. 31; Reply Br. 36 In particular, these dependent claims add detail to the collaborative development performed by multiple users employing multiple computing devices. The Examiner provides no rebuttal. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, and 17. Rejections of Claims 4-23 Under 35 us.c. § 103 Appellants argue, inter alia, the Examiner errs in finding Kupkova teaches the claim 20 limitations compare the identified unique identifier to unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions included in the evolutionary worliflow process; when the identified unique identifier matches one of the unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions included in the evolutionary worliflow process, define a second unique identifier for 13 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 the modify action, wherein the second unique identifier is unique to the evolutionary worliflow process; add the identified plurality of action parameter values in association with the defined second unique identifier to the evolutionary worliflow process; and store a map associating the unique identifier with the defined second unique identifier. App. Br. 38. According to Appellants, Kupkova teaches comparing documents by identifying the differences and producing a differential document that indicates the differences in a single list of differences indicated by "change", "add", or "remove." Reply Br. 39-41 (citing Kupkova ,r,r 23, 28-30). Appellants argue that the differential document does not include a unique name and is not associated with any claim element. Id. at 41. According to Appellants, Kupkova does not teach "compare ... " because "even though the differential document may include a list of differences between the source and target versions of a document, there is only one differential document, and its content is not compared to anything even if the differential document included an identifier." Id. at 41--42. Appellants argue "[t]here are further no unique identifiers taught by Kupkova" and "[t]here is no need because there are not two sets of changes to integrate." Id. According to Appellants, "[ t ]here is one list of changes so there is no need to compare it to another list of changes or to give it a name or a new name if the name matches." Id. Appellants further argue Kupkova does not teach a map nor is there any need to do so because there is a single list of actions captured in the differential document. Id. at 45. 14 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 The Examiner finds the combination of Etchemendy and Kupkova teaches the claim 20 limitations and relies on Kupkova for the limitation "compare the identified unique identifier to unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions included in the evolutionary workflow process;" and the following limitations ("when the identified unique identifier matches ... ; add the identified plurality of action parameter values ... ; and store a map .. " Final Act. 11-15. As set forth in the Final Office Action: The Examiner notes that following limitations are only operative TydenKylaAliya2 "when the identified unique identifier matches one of the unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions, " such that the claim, in accordance with a broadest reasonable interpretation, fully encompasses an embodiment where the method terminates if the unique identifier does not match one of the unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); See also, In re Zietz, 893 F.2d 319,321, 13 USP02d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow.") Final Act. 13. The Examiner finds Kupkova "comparing first and second documents," regardless of the use of a differential document, must uniquely identify each respective document in order to facilitate the comparison and output the results. Ans. 8 ( citing Kupkova ,r,r 2, 5, 23, 30; Figs. 2, 3). The Examiner observes: It is clear From Fig. 3 of Kupkova that a user enters input into a computer that identifies a source version and target version of a document, which in tum triggers the computing device to execute a comparison of the documents and, pursuant thereto, construct a differential 15 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 Id. document and report changes as between the source and target versions. Therefore, receipt of the user input identifying both the source version and target version of a document evinces the use of unique identifiers for the documents, whereas Kupkova's feature for reporting changes/actions requires uniquely identifying the changes/actions in order to describe such changes/actions to a user. Appellants disagree with the Examiner's claim construction that the claim 20 limitations following the "compare ... " limitation are entitled to no patentable weight. Reply Br. 39. According to Appellants, the claim requires "the computer-readable instructions must be configured to cause the computing device to perform the following limitations. Id. Appellants argue "[i]f a prior art reference teaches only a method performed when the unique identifier does not match one of the unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions, it cannot teach the computer-readable instructions as claimed that are embodied on a computer-readable medium nor can it teach a computing device that performs the claimed actions." Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue the Examiner errs by "importing unsubstantiated findings into his reading of Kupkova." Reply Br. 43. According to Appellants, Kupkova teaches only one differential document with a single list of differences between two versions of the document. Id. at 42. Appellants further argue Kupkova doesn't teach the additional limitations following "compare ... " because there are no unique identifiers in Kupkova, noting changes between two documents does not require unique identifiers, and Kupkova simply teaches creation of a single comparison document. Id. at 43. According to Appellants, Kupkova does not teach integrating changes. Id. 16 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 We note the claim term "when" is conditional and, in a method claim, is entitled to no patentable weight. Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013- 007847, at 9--10 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential) ("A conditional limitation in a method claim [is] afford[ ed] ... no patentable weight."). Here, claims 20-22 are not method claims and, therefore, we agree with Appellants' construction that the limitations that follow "compare" are entitled to patentable weight. Initially we note, prior to "compare ... " the claim recites "identify a unique identifier of the modify action. ( emphasis added). Although the term "identified unique identifier" is not defined in the Specification, the Specification provides guidance on its meaning. Claim terms in a patent application are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For example, the Specification describes "[ w ]orkflows are uniquely identified by the 'time' element." Spec. ,r 75. The Specification describes an evolutionary workflow process in which first, second, and third users modify the workflow process and timestamps (unique identifiers) that are associated with the modifications. Spec. ,r 78, Fig. 16. In the synchronization of the users' modifications, the Specification describes that, in the case of a third user adding time stamps 5 and 6, which are the same time stamps as the second user time stamps, the timestamps 5 and 6 of the first user are re-labeled 7 and 8. Spec. ,r 78, Fig. 16. We are persuaded by Appellants arguments that Kupkova does not teach "compare the identified unique identifier to unique identifiers of the one or more existing actions included in the evolutionary workflow process" 17 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 because, even if each Kupkova document (source and target versions being compared and a differential document) is considered "an identified unique identifier," as offered by the Examiner, there is only one differential document (modify action) that includes a list of differences between the source and target versions of a document, and its content is not compared to anything. As discussed supra, the unique identifier is recited as "a unique identifier of the modify action" in a preceding limitation. Moreover, the Examiners' findings regarding Kupkova are inconsistent with the Specification. Crish, 393 F.3d 1256. Moreover, we are persuaded by Appellants' arguments that Kupkova does not teach the limitations that follow the compare limitation because, Kupkova does not teach the compare limitation, and there would be no reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to pursue the limitations that follow compare. In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 20, and independent claims 21 and 22 as these claims are commensurate in scope with claim 20. See App. Br. 32. We also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 4--19 and 23. Cf In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[D]ependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious .... "). DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18- 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 18 Appeal2017-001670 Application 11/697 ,926 We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 4--23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 19 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation