Ex Parte Foster et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 31, 201310926255 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/926,255 08/25/2004 Derek John Foster 3875.0150001 8265 26111 7590 08/01/2013 STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C. 1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, DC 20005 EXAMINER ZHEN, LI B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2197 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/01/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _____________ Ex parte DEREK JOHN FOSTER and LORI YOSHIDA ____________________ Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 2 STATEMENT OF CASE 1 Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1-22 and 34-44. 2 Claims 23-33 were cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Invention The claims are directed to method and system for an application framework for a wireless device to manage applications via an application manager. Specification ¶ [04] Field of Invention. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for managing applications within a Man- Machine Interface (MMI) application framework, the method comprising: creating an active application context upon launching a first application by an application manager; transitioning said active application context into a suspended application context upon suspending said first application by said application manager; storing said suspended application context in an application manager context stack; and acquiring said stored suspended application context from said application manager context stack upon receipt of an exit message by said application manager. 1 Throughout the decision, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed Apr. 23, 2010), and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Aug. 31, 2010), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Jul. 6, 210). 2 The Real Party in Interest is Broadcom Corporation. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 3 References In rejecting the claims on appeal, the Examiner relied upon the following prior art: Hamanaga US 7,024,206 B2 Apr. 4, 2006 Nelson US 2002/0010850 A1 Jan. 24, 2002 Rejection The Examiner rejected claims 1 - 22 and 34 - 44 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Hamanaga and Nelson. Ans. 4-7. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions as to all rejections. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (Ans. 7-23). We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. For emphasis we highlight Appellants’ arguments seriatim as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 11-28. Independent Claim 1 Appellants argue that Hamanaga and Nelson do not teach or suggest “creating an active application context upon launching a first application by an application manager” or “suspending said first application by said application manager” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 12-13. Specifically, Appellants argue that Hamanaga does not disclose an application manager because the mailer P2 is activated directly by the user without using an Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 4 application manager. App. Br. 14. Accordingly, Appellants assert that Hamanaga cannot teach or suggest any of the steps requiring an application manager, such as “creating an active application context … by an application manager” or “suspending said first application by said application manager” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 15. Appellants contend that the ROM in Hamanaga identified as the “application manager” as claimed, merely provides services in response to a user’s push of a button and is not an application manager. App. Br. 17-18. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the program stored on the ROM that is executed in Hamanaga is equivalent to the claimed application manager. Ans. 8-9. We note that Appellants do not argue for any specific definition of “application manager.” We find that Hamanaga expressly teaches that a program stored in the ROM 208 executes, interrupts and resumes applications via the CPU. Hamanaga, col. 19, ll. 62-65; see Hamanaga, col. 9, l. 25-29 and col. 10, l. 18-58; Ans. 8. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the user’s push of a button activates programs. App. Br. 14, 17-18; Reply Br. 8-9. Hamanaga teaches that a user initiates an action, but plainly teaches that the ROM activates and executes programs in response to the user input such that it creates an active application context and suspends a first application. See Hamanaga, col. 10, ll. 18-58, col. 19, ll. 62-65; see Ans. 9-10. With respect to Nelson and Hamanaga, Appellants argue that Nelson also fails to teach or suggest an application manager or “creating an active application context upon launching a first application by an application manager.” App. Br. 18-20. Specifically, Appellants assert that the Examiner erred in finding that Nelson’s program names in the call stack are Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 5 created. App. Br. 20. Appellants essentially argue that Nelson’s program names of active programs (or application parameters) “pre-exist” and are not created when the program is called or launched. App. Br. 20-21 (citing Nelson ¶ [0052] and [0058]); Reply Br. 19. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree with the Examiner that Nelson teaches that the launch of an application creates record entries that include the program name, launch parameters and the state of the calling application. See Nelson ¶[0043], [0045]; Ans. 12-13, 14. We find that Nelson teaches that the stack in Nelson records information about the parameters of the called application including the name of the launched program and other parameters. Nelson ¶[0043], [0045], [0048], [0061]; see Ans. 14. Specifically, we find that Nelson teaches that “[a]t step 302, the caller application pushes a program entry record for the called application launch information onto the stack. The pushed information can then be used (as indicated in step 218 of FIG. 2) for the launched application to properly execute.” Nelson ¶ [0061]. We agree with the Examiner that Nelson teaches creating application context information during the process of executing a program call. App. Br. 12-13. We note that Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s definition of “application context” (Ans. 21), but argue that information is pre-existing and fails to meet the creation “upon launching a first application by an application manager” limitation. See Reply Br. 19. Appellants’ argument is not commensurate in the scope with the claims. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). We find that Nelson’s teachings that stack entries are made in response to a called application reads on the claimed “upon launching” of an application. See, e.g., Nelson ¶ [0061]. Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 6 Appellants also contend that the Examiner erred in finding that the operating system of Nelson corresponds to the application manager. App. Br. 22. Appellants argue that the catalog database in Nelson is discussed in connection with the operating system as the method for collaboration between the running applications and is not an application manager. App. Br. 22-23. Appellants also argue that Nelson fails to teach or suggest “storing said suspended application context in an application manager context stack; . . . upon receipt of an exit message by said application manager.” App. Br. 23. Appellants cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner’s rejection relies on Hamanaga for the application manager launching an application and Nelson for teaching the creation of an application context upon launching of a first application. Ans. 12. The Examiner also relies on Hamanaga, not Nelson, to teach the “storing said suspended application context” and “acquiring said stored suspended application context” limitations of claim 1. Ans. 20. Regardless, we agree with the Examiner that Hamanaga teaches the claimed “application context information” in the history information R17 that contains saved program context data for an application to resume following interrupt (Ans. 20-22 (citing Hamanaga, col. 12, ll. 14-32; col. 8, l. 45 – col. 9, l. 25)) and that Nelson suggests a catalog database and the operating systems that collaborate read on application manager (Ans. 18-19). We also agree with the Examiner that Hamanaga teaches the storing the history information in application stack and acquiring the stored history information upon an exit message. Ans. 20 (citing Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 7 Hamanaga, col. 8, ll. 45-65; col . 20, ll. 55-64. Similarly, Nelson teaches storing and acquiring application context for a suspended application. Nelson ¶[0059], [0061]. It is the combination of Hamanaga and Nelson that teaches the “creating an active application context upon launching a first application by an application manager” and the “storing” and “acquiring” using an “application manager context stack” limitations of claim 1. See Ans. 12, 20. Based on the foregoing, we find that that the Examiner did not err in finding that Hamanaga and Nelson teach or suggest an “application manager” that reads on “creating an active application context upon launching a first application by an application manager” and “suspending said first application by said application manager” as recited in claim 1. Because Appellants rely on the arguments presented for independent claim 1 for dependent claims 2-11, 13-22 and 35-44 (App. Br. 24) and dependent claims 6, 7, 17, 18, 39 and 40 (App. Br. 27), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2-11, 13-22, 35-44 and dependent claims 6, 7, 17, 18, 39 and 40 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent Claims 2, 13 and 35 Appellants contend that the Examiner erred in finding that Hamanaga teaches or suggests that the “application manager context stack comprises a last-in-first-out (LIFO) context stack” as recited in dependent claim 2. Reply Br. 30-33. Appellants assert that the history information R17 discussed in Hamanaga and relied upon by the Examiner is the actual display of data resulting from the execution of the processor and not Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 8 “application context” as recited in the claim. App. Br. 25 (citing Hamanaga col. 8, ll. 45-65). The Examiner found that Hamanaga teaches history information 17 that is typically retained in LIFO fashion as part of the storing and acquiring of application context. App. Br. 20-21 (citing Hamanaga col. 8, ll. 45-65). We agree with the Examiner. Hamanaga teaches that “history information R17” may be “resume information” but is not limited to display related data. Hamanaga col. 8, ll. 45-65. As discussed above, Hamanaga also teaches that the ROM program acting as the application manager, creates the history information R17 that contains saved program context data for an application to resume following interrupt (Ans. 21-22 (citing Hamanaga, col. 12, ll. 14-32; col. 8, l. 45 – col. 9, l. 25)). We find that the Examiner did not err in finding that Hamanaga teaches or suggests that the “application manager context stack comprises a last-in-first-out (LIFO) context stack” as recited in dependent claim 2. Appellants rely on the arguments presented for claim 2 for dependent claims 3, 14 and 36. App. Br. 26. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 14 and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent Claim 4 Appellants argue that the “application activation section 111 [that] activates an application” in Hamanaga fails to teach or suggest “restoring state information associated with the first application” as recited in dependent claim 4. App. Br. 26 (citing Hamanaga, col. 15, ll. 40-46); Reply Br. 33-36. Appellants argue that Hamanaga merely teaches activating the application itself and not the state information. App. Br. 26. Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 9 We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred with respect to dependent claim 4, and agree with the Examiner’s findings that Hamanaga teaches interruption information that corresponds to the state information for resuming applications. Ans. 23 (citing Hamanaga col. 15, lines 40-46). We find that Hamanaga expressly discusses resumption using the particular history information R17 to allow a mobile terminal to resume a previous state before interruption. Hamanaga, col. 18, ll. 21-29; see Ans. 23. Accordingly, Hamanaga teaches restoring an application based on its stored or previous state information. Based on the foregoing, the Examiner did not err in finding that Hamanaga teaches or suggests “restoring state information associated with the first application” as recited in dependent claim 4. Because Appellants argue that claim 4, 15 and 37 together (App. Br. 26), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 15, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent Claims 8-11, 18-22 and 41-44 With respect to the remaining dependent claims, Appellants made no separate arguments for claims 8-11 (that depend from independent claim 1), 18-22 (that depend from independent claim 12) and 41-44 (that depend from independent claim 34). App. Br. 27. These claims stand or fall with their respective independent claims. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8-11, 18-22 and 41-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2011-000525 Application 10/926,255 10 DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-22 and 34-44 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED ELD Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation