Ex parte Flasck

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Nov 27, 2000

08324540 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 27, 2000)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not
written for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 69
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte RICHARD A. FLASCK
____________
Appeal No. 1998-0495
Application No. 08/324,540
____________
HEARD: October 25, 2000
____________
Before BARRETT, DIXON, and GROSS, Administrative Patent Judges.
GROSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal from the examiner's final
rejection of claims 8, 10 through 12, 14 through 18, 21, 24
through 28, 30 through 36, and 39 through 44, which are all of
the claims pending in this application.
Appellant's invention relates to a reflective, wafer
based, active matrix, polymer dispersed liquid crystal
(hereafter, PDLC) display used for projection. Claim 42 is
illustrative of the claimed invention, and it reads as
follows:
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Application No. 08/324,540
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42. A wafer based active matrix, said matrix comprising:
a single crystal semiconductor wafer;
an active matrix formed on said wafer including a
plurality of specular reflective electrodes for forming a
reflected light beam from light directed thereto and for
imparting information onto said reflected light beam;
a liquid crystal-type material formed onto said active
matrix, said liquid crystal-type material comprised of a
polymer matrix having a plurality of liquid crystal droplets
suspended therein and having an orientation which can be
activated and oriented by an electric field applied thereto,
whereby said wafer based active matrix can be used in a
projection display system to display images therewith.
The prior art references of record relied upon by the
examiner in rejecting the appealed claims are:
Soref 3,807,831 Apr. 30,
1974
Lloyd 4,239,346 Dec. 16,
1980
Yamazaki 4,470,060 Sep. 04,
1984
Doane et al. (Doane) 4,688,900 Aug. 25,
1987
Erb 4,745,454 May 17,
1988
Castleberry 4,804,953 Feb. 14,
1989
Yokoi et al. (Yokoi) 4,818,074 Apr. 04,
1989
Kikuchi et al. (Kikuchi) 4,908,692 Mar.
13, 1990
(filed Jan. 27, 1989)
Appeal No. 1998-0495
Application No. 08/324,540
We note that on page 10 of the Answer, the examiner withdraws the1
rejection of claims 36, 43, and 44 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
3
Claims 8, 10 through 12, 14 through 18, 21, 24 through
28, 30 through 36, 39 through 41, 43, and 44 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable. As evidence of
obviousness, the examiner applies Lloyd, Yamazaki, Doane, and
Yokoi against all of the claims, with the addition of Erb for
claims 8 and 25, Kikuchi for claims 12 and 28, Castleberry for
claims 14 through 16 and 30 through 32, and Soref for claims
39 and 41.1
Claim 42 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Lloyd in view of Doane and Yokoi.
Reference is made to the Examiner's Answer (Paper No. 60,
mailed June 9, 1997) for the examiner's complete reasoning in
support of the rejections, and to appellant's Brief (Paper No.
59, filed March 18, 1997) for appellant's arguments
thereagainst.
OPINION
We have carefully considered the claims, the applied
prior art references, and the respective positions articulated
by appellant and the examiner. As a consequence of our
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Application No. 08/324,540
4
review, we will affirm the obviousness rejections of claims 42
and 43 and reverse the obviousness rejections of claims 8, 10
through 12, 14 through 18, 21, 24 through 28, 30 through 36,
39 through 41, and 44.
Regarding the rejection of claim 42, appellant contends
(Brief, page 11) that the references do not teach how to
substitute PDLC for the liquid crystal material of Lloyd since
they function differently. However, Lloyd discloses (column
1, lines 18-24) that in the absence of an applied potential,
the liquid crystal material is clear, and the reflective cell
appears black, whereas in the presence of an electric
potential, the liquid crystal scatters light, and the cell
appears white. Doane teaches (column 2, line 61-column 3,
line 1) that PDLC scatters light when no electric field is
applied, thereby appearing white, and transmits light when an
electric field is applied. Further, Doane explains (column
12, lines 50-52) that a reflective background improves the on-
off visual contrast. (With a reflector, the display will
appear black when the electric field is applied.) Thus, the
two visual states are the same as for the liquid crystal of
Lloyd, except that a PDLC's white state appears in the absence
Appeal No. 1998-0495
Application No. 08/324,540
5
of an applied field whereas the other liquid crystal's white
state appears with an electric field.
In addition, Lloyd states (column 7, lines 2-8) that the
cell may be slightly modified for utilization of twisted
nematic liquid crystal. Thus, Lloyd implies that the skilled
artisan would know that slight variations may be necessary to
employ a different type of liquid crystal and that such an
artisan would know how to modify the cell to accommodate the
alternative material. Furthermore, Doane discusses (column 1
and column 2, lines 7-16) all of the benefits of PDLC,
including uniformity in cell thickness, simplicity of
preparation and cell fabrication, improved brightness since
polarizers are not required, and improved responsive features.
Accordingly, we agree with the examiner that it would have
been obvious to one skilled in the art to substitute PDLC for
the liquid crystal of Lloyd.
Appellant further asserts (Brief, page 12) that it was
previously thought that the voltages available with a wafer
based active matrix were not high enough for PDLC. However,
the claims are directed to a device, not a driving method.
For such a device, Doane suggests the obviousness of using
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PDLC, regardless of the driving structure. Also, appellant
has not disclosed any new wafer, new PDLC, or new way of
implementing the PDLC to overcome any problems with the
voltages. Therefore, we find appellant's argument
unpersuasive.
Next appellant essentially argues (Brief, page 14) that
Doane only discloses using PDLC for thermally responsive
applications and therefore does not suggest the claimed
application for PDLC. Appellant apparently has overlooked all
of Doane's references to use as an electrically responsive
material, such as in the last paragraph beginning in each of
columns 2 and 3. In fact, in column 4, lines 9-29, Doane
suggests that PDLC has a fast switching time, and in column 5,
lines 10-12, Doane states that PDLC has a field-alignment
phenomenon which allows it to be used as a switchable light
polarizer when used as an electrically responsive material.
Although Doane does not specify projection as an application
for PDLC, the skilled artisan would expect the listed benefits
to be equally applicable to projectors. One cannot forget
that the standard under
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7
35 U.S.C. § 103 is what would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art, and the level of the skilled
artisan should not be underestimated. See In re Sovish, 769
F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Appellant further contends (Brief, page 15) that Yokoi
merely teaches using a liquid crystal, and not PDLC, for a
projection device, and therefore is irrelevant to the claimed
invention. However, Yokoi (column 1, lines 24-35) discusses
the problem of decreased light transmission in projectors
which use twisted nematic liquid crystal with two polarizers.
As explained above, Doane teaches that PDLC should be used to
eliminate the need for polarizers and thus brighten the
display. In other words, the combined teachings of Yokoi and
Doane would suggest to one skilled in the art that PDLC is
ideal for use in a projector such as Yokoi's. Accordingly, we
will sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 42 over Lloyd,
Doane, and Yokoi.
The examiner rejects claim 43 over Lloyd, Doane, and
Yokoi, as applied to claim 42, and further in view of
Yamazaki, although the only limitation in claim 43 that is not
present in claim 42 is the description of how the PDLC
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Application No. 08/324,540
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material is known (as explained in Doane) to function.
Therefore, we find Yamazaki to be merely cumulative. Since we
have affirmed the rejection of claim 42, we likewise will
sustain the rejection of claim 43.
Claims 8, 10 through 12, 14 through 18, 21, 24 through
28, 30 through 36, 40, and 44 all recite that each pixel
electrode "is formed over an intersection of the bit and word
lines." The examiner relies on Yamazaki's Figures 15, 18, and
22 as illustrating pixel electrodes each formed over an
intersection of a data line and a gate line. The examiner
states (Answer, pages 4, 7, and 11) that the motivation for
using such a structure is to improve the size and the quality
of the display.
For a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the examiner is
required to provide a reason from some teaching, suggestion or
implication in the prior art as a whole, or knowledge
generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, why
one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have been
led to modify the prior art to arrive at the claimed
invention. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley, 837 F.2d 1044,
1052, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
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U.S. 825 (1988). These showings by the examiner are an
essential part of complying with the burden of presenting a
prima facie case of obviousness. Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Furthermore, "[o]bviousness may not be established using
hindsight or in view of the teachings or suggestions of the
inventor." Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int’l,
Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087, 37 USPQ2d 1237, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
1995), citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721
F.2d 1540, 1551, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 311, 312-13 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
We find no disclosure or suggestion in Yamazaki or any of
the other applied references of the examiner's stated
motivation, and the examiner has pointed to none. The only
place we find such reasoning appears in appellant's own
specification at page 8, for example. Although the examiner
adds Erb, Kikuchi, and Castleberry in rejecting claims 8 and
25, claims 12 and 28, and claims 14 through 16 and 30 through
32, respectively, none of the additional references cures the
deficiencies of the primary combination of Lloyd, Doane,
Yokoi, and Yamazaki. Accordingly, the examiner has failed to
Appeal No. 1998-0495
Application No. 08/324,540
10
establish a prima facie case of obviousness for all of claims
8, 10 through 12, 14 through 18, 21, 24 through 28, 30 through
36, 40, and 44.
Instead of requiring each pixel electrode to be formed
over the intersection of the bit and word lines, claims 39 and
41 recite that the common electrode is formed substantially in
the same plane as the pixel electrodes. The examiner adds
Soref to the primary combination of references as an example
of the additional limitation. The examiner's reason for
modifying Lloyd to include such a structure is (Answer, page
8) "because this is a conventional way to form a common
electrode in an LCD." However, the mere existence of such a
structure in a single reference hardly suffices for a showing
of conventionality. Further, the examiner has pointed to no
teaching or suggestion in any of the references which would
indicate the desirability of forming the common electrode in
the same plane as the pixel electrodes. Consequently, the
examiner again has failed to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness, and we cannot sustain the rejection of claims 39
and 41.
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11
CONCLUSION
We have affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims 42
and 43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and reversed the examiner's
rejection of claims 8, 10 through 12, 14 through 18, 21, 24
through 28, 30 through 36, 39 through 41, and 44 under 35
U.S.C. § 103. Accordingly, the decision of the examiner
rejecting the claims is affirmed-in-part.
Appeal No. 1998-0495
Application No. 08/324,540
12
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
LEE E. BARRETT )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
JOSEPH L. DIXON ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
ANITA PELLMAN GROSS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 1998-0495
Application No. 08/324,540
13
JOHN T. WINBURN, ESQUIRE
MORRIS, MANNING & MARTIN
1600 ATLANTA FINANCIAL CENTER
3343 PEACHTREE ROAD, N.E.
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