Ex Parte Fishman et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 29, 201612877034 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/877,034 09/07/2010 Alex Fishman 2050.171US1 2435 44367 7590 01/03/2017 SCHWEGMAN LUNDBERG & WOESSNER/OPEN TV P.O. BOX 2938 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-0938 EXAMINER TRINH, TUNG THANH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2427 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/03/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@slwip.com SLW @blackhillsip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALEX FISHMAN and CRX K. CHAI1 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 Technology Center 2400 Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 3—11, 13—20, 22, and 23, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 2 and 12 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as OpenTV, Inc. (App. Br. 2.) Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 Introduction Appellants state their “application relates to the fields of media and entertainment and specifically to a smart playlist system.” (Spec. 1.) CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A computer-implemented method comprising: obtaining content utilization data from a plurality of client devices associated with a respective plurality of viewers, wherein the content utilization data for a viewer from the plurality of viewers is indicative of the viewer’s interest in respective content items, and wherein the plurality of viewers comprises other viewers who are not identified as social connections of the viewer; automatically generating, at a server computer system, a list of popular content items that are currently popular among the plurality of viewers based on the obtained content utilization data; for a target viewer from the plurality of viewers, customizing the list of popular content items to generate a customized playlist, the customizing based on a viewing history of the target viewer and on a viewing history of viewers who are identified as social connections of the target viewer; and communicating the customized play list to a client device of the target viewer. (App. Br. 17 (Claims App’x).) References and Rejections Claims 1, 3—5, 7—11, 13—15, 17—20, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Conradt et al. (US 2009/0100469 Al; Apr. 16, 2009) (“Conradt”) and Dunk et al. (US 2011/0060649 Al; Mar. 10, 2011) (“Dunk”). (Final Act. U-9.) 2 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 Claims 6 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Conradt, Dunk, and Logan et al. (US 2003/0093790 Al; May 15, 2003) (“Logan”). (Final Act. 10.) ANALYSIS Based on Appellants’ arguments, the issues before us are whether the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 1,3, and 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). (See App. Br. 9-16.) Claim 1 Appellants argue the Examiner errs by finding Conradt and Dunk teach or suggest claim 1 ’s requirement of collecting “viewing history of viewers who are identified as social connections of the target viewer.” (App. Br. 10—11.) Appellants contend that while Dunk states its “media service provider 16 may be configured to collect subscriber information (e.g. statistics about the viewing habits of each user or a group of users) for use in determining the relevance between particular media content and particular users” (139), “Dunk does not explicitly indicate that a group includes ‘viewers who are identified as social connections of the target viewer,’ as recited.” (App. Br. 10.) We find this unpersuasive. “A reference must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect. On the issue of obviousness, the combined teachings of the prior art as a whole must be considered.” EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). Here, the Examiner’s rejection specifically identifies it is the combination of Conradt and Dunk that teach “the customizing based on a viewing history of the target viewer and on a 3 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 viewing history of viewers who are identified as social connections of the target viewer.” (See Final Act 6 (citing Conradt Fig. 2,150; Dunk Abstract, Figs. 1-3,1139, 47-48, 189-190, and 193).) The Examiner finds, and we agree, that “Conradt teaches generating a media content recommendation for a user based on the compiled media content data for associated users in a social network” and “Dunk teaches providing media content based on relevance between content and [a] user in a social network.” (Ans. 2—3 (citing Conradt Fig. 2, Abstract, H 37, 46—50; Dunk Fig. 3, Abstract, 120).) Dunk’s Figure 3 (described in H 52—60) illustrates a relevance engine 50 coupled to a database 52 that contains metadata such as “preferences indicated by the users” and information to define “clusters or groups of users” (1 58). Figure 3 further shows a social network integrator 54 coupled to database 52 for obtaining information such as user profiles, friends, expressed likes and dislikes, etc. from social networking applications 56 (Facebook, MySpace, etc.), which it can use “to generate additional user metadata” (159). In view of these teachings, we find Appellants’ characterization of groups in Dunk as “having nothing to do with social connections” (App. Br. 11) unpersuasive. An ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood to the contrary in view of Figure 3 and its associated description. Appellants also argue the Examiner errs by finding Conradt and Dunk teach or suggest claim 1 ’s requirement of compiling data for a plurality of viewers “wherein the plurality of viewers comprises other viewers who are not identified as social connections of the viewer.” (App. Br. 11—12.) Appellants contend “Conradt appears to only take into consideration data regarding other viewers within a viewer’s social network.” (Id. at 11.) 4 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 This is unpersuasive. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Conradt teaches collecting content utilization data from multiple device users, not all of which may be in a social network of a particular viewer. (Final Act. 4—5 (citing Conradt Fig. 1, || 20, 33—34, and 49-50); Ans. 3^4 (additionally citing Conradt Fig. 2, || 37, 41—43).) For example, Conradt states “[t]he service manager 132 can . . . form social networks based on the communications data collected from various client devices” (134). In an embodiment for doing so, “the users can be associated based on a threshold” (id.). Because some users may not reach the threshold, this teaches collecting the content utilization data from multiple users, with only a subset of them being in the same social network.2 Accordingly, we agree that Conradt teaches claim 1 ’s “obtaining content utilization data from ... a plurality of viewers . . . comprising] other viewers who are not identified as social connections of the viewer,” as recited by claim 1. (See Ans. 3^4.) Appellants further argue the Examiner errs in rejecting claim 1 because: Neither Conradt, nor Dunk, nor any combination thereof discloses generating a list of popular contents items based on viewers that are not associated via a social network, and then customizing that list for a target viewer based on the viewing history of the target viewer and the viewing history of the viewers identified as social connections of the target viewer (App. Br. 12.) We find this argument unpersuasive because the claim only requires that the plurality of users for which utilization data is obtained “comprises” 2 We also note, as discussed below, the claim does not require that the data from the non-social network users be used in generating the list of popular content items. 5 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 viewers who are not identified as social connections of the viewer, not that it is limited to such users. We agree with the Examiner that Conradt generates a list of items (those popular in a social network), that are popular among a plurality of viewers (among a plurality that includes both those in the social network and those who did not meet the threshold), where the list is “based on” the social network data, which is part of the obtained content utilization data. Appellants also argue in reply that the Examiner errs by finding there would have been motivation to combine Conradt and Dunk, contending that “stating that all references are in the same field of endeavor is not a motivation to combine.” (Reply Br. 7.) We do not consider this argument, which Appellants could have raised in the Appeal Brief, allowing the Examiner to respond. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). We note that although Appellants’ reply argument responds to a statement in the Answer, the rejection includes a similar statement to explain the combination of Dunk with Conradt. (See Final Act. 6 (“However, in the same field of endeavor, Dunk discloses . . . .”).) Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of claims 5—11, 15—20, 22, and 23, for which Appellants present no substantive3 arguments separate from claim 1. 3 Although Appellants do additionally assert that claims 5—11, 15—20, 22, and 23 “are allowable for the particular limitations recited therein” (App. Br. 13), such a contention, without more, fails to constitute an argument on the merits. See 37 C.F.R. 41.37(c)(iv) (2012) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”). 6 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 Claim 3 Claim 3 depends from claim 1 and requires, inter alia, “wherein the customizing comprises selecting at least one of the popular content items for the customized playlist based on the viewing history of the viewers who are identified as social connections of the target viewer.” (App. Br. 17 (Claims App’x).) In arguing the Examiner errs, Appellants state “[t]he Final Office Action asserts that ‘Dunk discloses the relevance engine 50 determining relevance content for user based on ranking in social network (Fig. 3 p. 4 para[0058]: p. 8 para [0126]-[0129]).” (App. Br. 13—14 (citing Final Act. 7 (emphasis added by Appellants)).) Our review of the record does not find Appellant’s quoted assertion in the Final Rejection from which this appeal is taken; instead, we find the rejection relies on the combination of Conradt and Dunk for teaching the requirements of claim 3. (See Final Act. 6—7 (citing Conradt Fig. 2, || 46—50; Dunk Figs. 1—3, 8, 17, 39, 58—59, 126— 27, and 132).) Because Appellants do not address the merits of the pending rejection based on the Examiner’s findings that the combination of Conradt and Dunk teach the added requirements of claim 3 (see App. Br. 13—14), we sustain its rejection. We also sustain the rejection of claim 13, which Appellants argue together with claim 3. Claim 4 Claim 4 depends from claim 1 and recites, inter alia, “generating a score for each item from the list of popular content items based on the viewing history of the target viewer and on the viewing history of the viewers who are identified as social connections of the target viewer.” 7 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 (App. Br. 17 (Claims App’x).) The Examiner finds the combination of Conradt’s “number of communications between particular users as score and priority based on the number to display content in social network recommendation [sic]” and Dunk’s “ranking or ratings . . . based on user feedbacks and engagements or viewing history” teaches claim 4’s requirements. (Final Act. 7—8 (citing Conradt || 35, 37; Dunk || 126—32).) Appellants argue the Examiner errs because neither Conradt’s number of communications between users nor Dunk’s rankings or ratings teach generating a score based on viewing history, as recited. (App. Br. 14—15.) The Examiner responds by finding “Dunk discloses the relevant content for [a] user [is] based on ranking in the social network; the Tike’ or ‘bad’ is based on a particular user viewing history about that type of media content even if the ranking content is not viewed by the particular user.” (Ans. 5.) Appellants reply that Examiner has failed to show the cited references teach or suggest the recited “viewing history of a particular user” (i.e., the recited “target viewer”) used for generating a score. (Reply Br. 10-11.) We agree with Appellants. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 4. For the same reasons, we also do not sustain the rejection of claim 14, which includes similar limitations and stands rejected on the same basis as claim 4, and which Appellants argue together with claim 4. 8 Appeal 2016-001868 Application 12/877,034 DECISION For the above reasons, we affirm the rejection of claims 1,3, 5—11, 13, 15—20, 22, and 23, and reverse the rejection of claims 4 and 14. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation