Ex Parte Fetterman et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 13, 201713476825 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/476,825 05/21/2012 Michael FETTERMAN NVDA/MA-11-0403-US2 3218 102324 7590 02/15/2017 Arte.ois T aw Omim T T P/NVTDTA EXAMINER 7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104 Houston, TX 77095 WONG, TITUS ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2184 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/15/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): kcruz @ artegislaw.com ALGdocketing @ artegislaw.com mmccauley @ artegislaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MICHAEL FETTERMAN, SHIRISH GADRE, JOHN H. EDMONDSON, OMKAR PARANJAPE, ANJANA RAJENDRAN, ERIC LYELL HILL, RAJESHWARAN SELVANESAN, CHARLES McCARVER, KEVIN MITCHELL, and STEVEN JAMES HEINRICH Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,8251 Technology Center 2100 Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Technology The application relates to “scheduling of common resource access requests.” Spec. Abstract. 1 Appellants state the real party in interest is NVIDIA Corp. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 Illustrative Claims Claims 1 and 7 are illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at issue emphasized: 1. A method for tracking the ages of different requests for common resources in a processing pipeline, the method comprising: receiving a plurality of requests for one or more common resources; storing a different entry in a buffer for each request in the plurality of requests, wherein the entries are stored in a temporal order; upon determining that a first common resource is available, searching the entries stored in the buffer to identify a subset of entries corresponding to requests that are associated with at least the first common resource; identifying one or more entries included in the subset of entries that indicate that all common resources, including the first common resource, associated with the requests corresponding to the one or more entries are available; reading a first entry included in the one or more entries that is the oldest of the one or more entries in order to execute a first cycle of a first request that corresponds to the first entry. 7. The method of claim 6, wherein storing the new entry comprises adding the new entry to a newest position in the buffer, and shifting each entry in the buffer that resides between the bubble and the newest position one entry such that an existing entry in the buffer replaces the bubble. Rejection Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Accapadi et al. (US 2004/0216112 Al; Oct. 28, 2004). Final Act. 2. 2 Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 ISSUES 1. Did the Examiner err in finding Accapadi discloses “identifying one or more entries included in the subset of entries that indicate that all common resources, including the first common resource, associated with the requests corresponding to the one or more entries are available,” as recited in claim 1, and commensurately recited in independent claims 10 and 19? 2. Did the Examiner err in finding Accapadi discloses “shifting each entry in the buffer that resides between the bubble and the newest position one entry such that an existing entry in the buffer replaces the bubble,” as recited in dependent claims 7 and 16? ANALYSIS Claims 1—6, 8—15, and 17—20 Claim 1 recites “identifying one or more entries included in the subset of entries that indicate that all common resources, including the first common resource, associated with the requests corresponding to the one or more entries are available.” Independent claims 10 and 19 recite commensurate limitations. The Examiner relies on Accapadi for disclosing this limitation. Ans. 3. Accapadi discloses “a FIFO queue used to store information about processes waiting for a lock that controls access to shared resource.” Accapadi 124. When the lock later becomes available, “the requesting process receives access to shared resource.” Id. 125. Appellants contend in the claims at issue, “the entries themselves are source of the indication that all common resources are available,” whereas “Accapadi discloses that a lock control structure, external to the FIFO queue, maintains data about the lock.” Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added). 3 Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 However, we agree with the Examiner that “Applicant is not specific on what this ‘indication’ is” and therefore the term “‘indication’ is interpreted as any sign that is shown or implied.” Ans. 3. The claims require “one or more entries . . . that indicate that all common resources [requested for those entries]... are available,” but do not specify how the entries must indicate such availability. In addition, neither Appellants’ argument nor its summary of supporting written description identify any portion of the Specification requiring the entries themselves comprise the entire indication. See App. Br. 7 (citing Spec. 1125, Fig. 10). Given the record before us and the broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed limitation, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding Accapadi’s FIFO queue, which identifies the process and the lock which the process is waiting for, discloses “identifying one or more entries included in the subset of entries that indicate that all common resources, including the first common resource, associated with the requests corresponding to the one or more entries are available.” Ans. 2—3 (citing Accapadi 124, Fig. 2). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1,10, and 19, and their dependent claims 2—6, 8, 9, 11—15, 17, 18, and 20, which Appellants argue are patentable for similar reasons. See App. Br. 12; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claims 7 and 16 Dependent claims 7 and 16 recite “shifting each entry in the buffer that resides between the bubble and the newest position one entry such that an existing entry in the buffer replaces the bubble.” 4 Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 The Examiner contends “a fifo queue inherently shifts entries as they are processed.” Ans. 3 (emphasis omitted). However, no matter how obvious shifting to fill a vacated position in a queue may be, we agree with Appellants that such shifting is not inherent. “Anticipation by inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the reference discloses prior art that must necessarily include the unstated limitation.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Inherency “may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also MPEP §2112. Here, Appellants have set forth evidence demonstrating a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would have known some FIFO queues used bubbles and shifting whereas other FIFO queues were “bubble free” or use pointers rather than shifting. App. Br. 14 (citing, e.g., http://www.cypress.com/?id=4&rlD=31578 and http:// www. cl. cam. ac.uk/teaching/1213 /SysOnChip/materials/sp 1 rtl/zhpc7 d6 28484.html). Thus, we agree with Appellants that a FIFO queue may use bubbles and shifting, but does not necessarily do so. Because of this, FIFO queues do not inherently use bubbles and shifting. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 16 as anticipated. REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) In a new ground of rejection using our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we reject claims 7 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over 5 Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 Accapadi, the admitted prior art, and Lofgren et al. (US 7653807 B2; Jan. 26, 2010). As discussed above, Accapadi discloses a FIFO queue but does not specify whether the queue is implemented using bubbles and shifting. Accapadi 124. Notably, Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Accapadi discloses “retiring the first entry from the buffer” (claim 4); “the first entry is not the oldest entry in the buffer” (claim 5); and “creating a bubble in the buffer to replace the first entry when the first entry is retired” (claim 5). Final Act. 4. Moreover, Appellants admit a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have known FIFO queues could be implemented either with or without shifting and bubbles. App. Br. 14; Reply Br. 6. For example, “[i]n a bubble-through FIFO, after ... a first word is read from the FIFO, each word in the FIFO then moves up a position,” i.e., iteratively replacing the bubble next to it. App. Br. 14 (citing http://www.cypress.com/?id=4&rlD=31578). As the Supreme Court has found, “when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Here, implementation of a FIFO queue either with or without shifting and bubbles may entail some trade-off between simplicity, speed, and space, but based upon Appellants’ own admissions, those trade-offs were known and predictable. Although we believe the admitted prior art sufficient for teaching the additional limitation of claims 7 and 16, Lofgren further discloses an example of “Removing a Pipeline Bubble.” Lofgren Title. For example, Figures 4A through 4C depict the process of eliminating bubbles with three 6 Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 invalid data entries in the middle of a FIFO queue via shifting each valid data entry by one slot. Id. at 6:30-7:40 (e.g., “[Registers 408 and 412 (which are associated with bubbles) are replaced with valid data which originates from registers 406, and 410. Consequently, bubbles 420 and 424 are removed.”). Lofgren’s removal of pipeline bubbles teaches or suggests the disputed limitation of claims 7 and 16. It would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to utilize Lofgren’s bubble removal method with the teachings of Accapadi and the admitted prior art since “[pipeline bubbles are undesirable because they increase data latency and prevent the system from achieving the maximum possible throughput.” Lofgren 1:51—54. Moreover, as discussed above for the admitted prior art, shifting to eliminate bubbles was a known technique that yields no more than a predictable result. Accordingly, in a new ground of rejection, we reject claims 7 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Accapadi, the admitted prior art, and Lofgren. DECISION For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—6, 8—15, and 17—20. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7 and 16. In a new ground of rejection, we reject claims 7 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). TIME TO RESPOND This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides: 7 Appeal 2016-006349 Application 13/476,825 When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant, within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart. (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b) 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation