Ex Parte Faith et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 3, 201912953368 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 3, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 12/953,368 11/23/2010 Patrick Faith 66945 7590 07/08/2019 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTONLLP/VISA Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22 1100 Peachtree Street Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 79900-788807 3352 EXAMINER NILFOROUSH, MOHAMMAD A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3685 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/08/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte PA TRICK FAITH, MARK CARLSON, A YMAN HAMMAD, BEN REWIS, and KRIS KOGANTI Appeal2018-000637 Application 12/953,368 1 Technology Center 3600 Before JUSTIN BUSCH, STACEY G. WHITE, and SCOTT B. HOW ARD, Administrative Patent Judges. HOW ARD, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Appellants filed a Request for Rehearing under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(l) on May 20, 2019 ("Request"), seeking reconsideration of part of our Decision on Appeal of March 22, 2019 ("Decision"). In that Decision, we affirmed the Final Rejection of (1) claims 31, 32, 37--41, and 45--47 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sinclair (US 2007/0188323 Al; published Aug. 16, 2007) in view of Zettner (US 7,669,759 Bl; issued Mar. 2, 2010), Fry (US 2007/0223476 Al; published Sept. 27, 2007), and Galvin (US 7,861,985 B2; issued Jan. 4, 2011) and 1 Appellants identify Visa International Service Association as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3. Appeal2018-000637 Application 12/953,368 (2) claims 36 and 48 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Sinclair in view of Zettner, Fry, Galvin, and Lin (US 2007/0109672 Al; published May 17, 2019). ISSUES AND ANALYSIS Appellants argue that our Decision "may have overlooked evidence of record in support of Appellants' argument that the prior art reference Fry (US 2007 /02234 7 6) teaches away from the claimed invention, and may have misapprehended the scope of Appellants' teaching away argument." Request 2. Specifically, Appellants point to evidence in the record that they contends the Board overlooked in determining that acceleration information is an example of gesture information. Id. at 2-3. Additionally, Appellants argue that, although we found that "instead of criticizing or discourage [sic] the use of acceleration information, Fry explicitly teaches using acceleration information," (id. at 3 (citing Decision 8) (emphasis added in Request)), Appellants' argument focused not on whether Fry teaches using acceleration information, but that Fry teaches away from comparing gesture information (id. at 3-5). According to Appellants, Fry criticizes comparing gesture information, including acceleration information, of two devices. Request 5. Appellants' teaching away argument is premised on the assertion that acceleration information is an example of gesture information. See App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 4. The entirety of the argument from the Appeal Brief is reproduced below: As discussed above, communications between two devices in Fry are accomplished "without the need to compare gesture information between devices in order for communication to occur between two devices." (Fry, para. [0020]. Moreover, Fry explicitly disparages the comparison of gesture information 2 Appeal2018-000637 Application 12/953,368 (e.g., acceleration information) to pair devices as adding unnecessary processing overhead. Specifically, para. [0005] of Fry states: "prior uses of synchronous gestures require that some form of gesture information be contributed by each device and brought together for comparison. This necessary comparison step adds unnecessary processing overhead to the device or devices performing the comparisons." Thus, one looking at the teachings of Fry would not have combined the references as proposed in the Final Office Action, because Fry discourages comparing acceleration information. Accordingly, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should be reversed for this additional reason. App. Br. 11 (emphasis added). The Reply Brief also contained a single paragraph discussing the teaching away argument, which, like the Appeal Brief, indicated that acceleration data was a type of gesture information: As pointed out on page 11 of the Appeal Brief, Fry criticizes systems that require a comparison of gesture information (i.e., acceleration data from sensors). For example, para. [0005] of Fry states that "[o]ne drawback is that none of the described methods are scalable . . . In addition, prior uses of synchronous gestures require that some form of gesture information be contributed by each device and brought together for comparison. This necessary comparison step adds unnecessary processing overhead to the device or devices performing the comparisons." Para. [0006] of Fry also states that it would be advantageous to eliminate "the need to compare gesture information between devices in order for communications to occur between two devices." As such, one reading the disclosure of Fry would be discouraged from using a comparison of acceleration data to establish communications between devices, because such technique "adds unnecessary processing overhead" and is not scalable according to Fry. Reply Br. 4 ( emphasis added). As we determined in the Decision, "Appellants provide no evidence to support the argument that acceleration information is a type of gesture 3 Appeal2018-000637 Application 12/953,368 information." Decision 8. Instead, Appellants simply provided ipse dixit attorney argument, which is entitled to little weight. Id. In the Request, Appellants now rely on paragraphs 26 and 27 of Fry to show that tapping is a type of gesture information. See Request 3. Appellants, however, did not rely on those paragraphs in their briefs (see Req. 3 ns. 2, 3 (citing Answer and Decision-but not the Appeal Brief or Reply Brief-as support)), and thus, we could not have overlooked that evidence. 2 Accordingly, we maintain our determination that Appellants' arguments are based on unsupported attorney argument. Moreover, because the remainder of Appellants' Request is dependent on our determining that acceleration information is a type of gesture information (see Request 3-5), we do not find that argument persuasive. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Appellants' contentions have not persuaded us of error in our Decision and Appellants' Request for Rehearing is denied. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.I36(a)(l)(iv). DENIED 2 We have reviewed the three paragraphs cited in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief-Fry paragraphs 5, 6, and 20. Although those paragraphs discuss gesture information, the term "acceleration" is not mentioned. 4 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation