Ex Parte Fadell et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 14, 2017

13356762 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 14, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/356,762 01/24/2012 Anthony Michael Fadell 94021-827439 (017600US) 6101
125802 7590 12/18/2017
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
Google LLC - Nest Labs, Inc.
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
STITT, ERIK V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2145
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/18/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
googlepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com
KT S Docketing2 @ kilpatrick. foundationip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANTHONY MICHAEL FADELL, MATTHEW LEE ROGERS,
DAVID SLOO, MICHAEL J. MATAS, and MICHAEL PLITKINS
Appeal 2016-001972
Application 13/356,762
Technology Center 2100
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 21—40. Claims App’x. Claims 1—20 have been canceled. Id. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We heard oral arguments in this
appeal on October 24, 2017.
We reverse.
1 Appellants identify Google Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-001972
Application 13/356,762
Introduction
Appellants describe the invention as “relating] to user interfaces for
control units that govern the operation of energy-consuming systems,
household devices, or other resource-consuming systems, including user
interfaces for thermostats that govern the operation of heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning (HVAC) systems.” Spec. 1 6. Appellants explain that
“a dizzying array of switches and controls” for programmable thermostats
intimidate users, and, as a result, “the thermostat may frequently resort to
default programs, thereby reducing user satisfaction and/or energy-saving
opportunities.” Id. 1 8.
Claim 21 is illustrative of the claimed invention:
21. A computer implemented method comprising:
displaying, on an electronic display of a thermostat
device, a plurality of tick marks in a tick mark range area,
wherein the plurality of tick marks includes a plurality of
background tick marks representing a plurality of temperatures,
a prominent ambient tick mark representing an ambient
temperature, and a prominent setpoint tick mark representing a
setpoint temperature;
displaying a background color on the electronic display,
wherein the displayed background color varies according to a
type of call in effect, and wherein the type of call includes a
heating call and a cooling call;
receiving input corresponding to a selection of a new
setpoint temperature;
updating the prominent setpoint tick mark to represent
the new setpoint temperature;
determining the type of call in effect;
updating the electronic display according to the new
setpoint temperature, wherein updating includes displaying an
animated sweep highlighting one or more tickmarks
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Application 13/356,762
sequentially along the tick mark range area between the
prominent ambient tick mark and the updated prominent
setpoint tick mark, said animated tick sweep further
characterized by a respective sequential unhighlighting of tick
marks previously highlighted along the tick mark range area as
subsequent tick marks are highlighted; and
concurrently displaying one or more background colors
according to the type of call in effect.
App. Br. 19 (Claims App’x) (disputed limitation in italics).
Rejections
Claims 21—23, 25, 26, 28—30, 32, 33, 35—37, 39, and 40 stand rejected
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over de Pauw (US 2007/
0084941; Apr. 19, 2007), Gray (US 2007/0045444 Al; Mar. 1, 2007), and
Dagci (US 2007/0001830 Al; Jan 4, 2007). Final Act. 3-7.
Claims 24, 31, and 38 stand rejected under § 103(a) as unpatentable
over de Pauw, Gray, Dagci, Ho (US 6,726,112 Bl; Apr. 27, 2004), and
Knight (US 2008/0245480; Oct. 9, 2008). Final Act. 7-8.
Claims 27 and 34 stand rejected under § 103(a) as unpatentable over
de Pauw, Gray, Dagci, Ho, Knight, and Chapman (US 2007/0050732 Al;
Mar. 1, 2007). Final Act. 8—9
ANALYSIS2
In rejecting claim 21, the Examiner finds the combined disclosures of
de Pauw and Gray teach a thermostat device displaying prominent tick
marks that represent ambient and setpoint temperatures on an electronic
display and then “updating the electronic display according to [a] new
setpoint temperature,” as recited. Final Act. 3^4. The Examiner then relies
2 Because we have identified a disputed limitation that is dispositive for our
decision, we do not address all of Appellants’ arguments.
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Application 13/356,762
on Dagci to teach or suggest the disputed requirement of “wherein updating
includes displaying an animated sweep highlighting one or more tickmarks
sequentially along the tick mark range area between the prominent ambient
tick mark and the updated prominent setpoint tick mark.” Id. at 4—5 (citing
Dagci 132, Fig. 3).
Appellants argue the Examiner errs because “Dagci’s description fails
to teach or suggest an animated sweep between two established tick mark
end points,” as required by the disputed limitation. App. Br. 9. We agree
with Appellants. Claim 21 requires display of both an “ambient tick mark,”
which represents ambient temperature, and a “setpoint tick mark,” which
represents an updated target temperature. Claim 21 then requires the
animated sweep to “highlight[] one or more tickmarks sequentially along the
tick mark range” between the established ambient and setpoint tick marks.
Thus, we agree with Appellants that claim 21 requires an animated sweep of
tickmarks between two established tick mark end points.
Dagci teaches a vehicle speed monitoring system for alerting a driver
based on a specified maximum speed. Dagci 11; see also id. Figs. 2—3. The
cited disclosure of Dagci teaches the use of an animated tick mark to show
an update of that tick mark’s value from an old speed limit to a new speed
limit. Id. 132. The Examiner responds to Appellants’ argument by finding
that Gray teaches the recited tick mark end points and that Dagci teaches
animated sweeping of tick marks to new positions. Ans. 3^4. The
Examiner’s determination of obviousness is unpersuasive as conclusory,
because it does not articulate a sufficient rationale for why an ordinarily
skilled artisan would have used the teaching of an animated sweep that
updates a tick mark end point, as taught by Dagci, for an animated sweep of
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Application 13/356,762
an intermediate tick mark between two established end point tick marks, as
required by the disputed limitation. We agree with Appellants that
combining Dagci with the teachings of de Pauw and Gray would result “at
best [in] an animated movement of a setpoint tick mark from an old setpoint
tick mark to a new setpoint tick mark and not a sweep of tick marks between
two established and updated tick marks.” App. Br. 9.
Certainly it is appropriate for an obviousness rejection to “take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ,” because the skilled artisan “is also a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 418, 421 (2007). An obviousness rejection, however, “cannot be
sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2006); accord KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (quoting Kahn). An obviousness
rejection must explain the reasoning by which those findings support the
Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA,
Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328-30 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, the rejection fails to
meet the required standard because it does not articulate why the skilled
artisan, absent hindsight, would have modified the teachings of the prior art
as necessary to achieve the disputed limitation. As Judge Learned Hand long
ago explained, it is insufficient simply to find the claimed elements in the
prior art:
[a]ll machines are made up of the same elements; rods, pawls,
pitmans, journals, toggles, gears, cams, and the like, all acting
their parts as they always do and always must. All compositions
are made of the same substances, retaining their fixed chemical
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Application 13/356,762
properties. But the elements are capable of an infinity of
permutations, and the selection of that group which proves
serviceable to a given need may require a high degree of
originality. It is that act of selection which is the invention ....
B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1935).
Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of claim 21.
For the same reason, we also do not sustain the rejections of independent
claims 28 and 35, both of which recite limitations commensurate with claim
21’s disputed limitation and stand rejected on the same basis. See App. Br.
21—24 and Final Act. 7. We also, accordingly, do not sustain the rejections
of dependent claims 22—27, 29-34, and 36-40.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the rejections under § 103(a) of
claims 21—40.
REVERSED
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