Ex Parte Etchegoyen

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 29, 2017

13692843 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/692,843 12/03/2012 Craig S. ETCHEGOYEN UN-NP-DA-078 8844
96051 7590
Uniloc USA Inc.
Legacy Town Center
7160 Dallas Parkway
Suite 380
Plano, TX 75024
EXAMINER
FIELDS, COURTNEY D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2436
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
sean.burdick@unilocusa.com
tkiatkulpiboone@unilocusa.com
kris.pangan@unilocusa.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CRAIG S. ETCHEGOYEN
Appeal 2016-008427
Application 13/692,843
Technology Center 2400
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, THU A. DANG, and CATHERINE SHIANG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35U.S.C. § 134 from the Final Rejection of
claims 1—15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
The claims are directed to a data repository authentication. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for limiting access to a collection of data to one
or more authorized computing devices, the method comprising:
receiving a request for access to the collection of data from
a remote computing device through a computer network;
1 Appellant indicates that Uniloc Luxembourg S.A. is the real party in interest.
Appeal 2016-008427
Application 13/692,843
receiving a digital fingerprint of the remote computing
device;
retrieving one or more digital fingerprints associated with
respective authorized computing devices;
comparing the digital fingerprint of the remote computing
device to the digital fingerprints associated with respective
authorized computing devices; and
upon a condition in which at least one of the digital
fingerprints associated with respective authorized computing
devices is matched by the digital fingerprint of the remote
computing device, granting the remote computing device access
to the collection of data.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Porras et al. US 2007/0025265 A1 Feb. 1, 2007
Kley US 8,694,434 B1 Apr. 8, 2014
REJECTION
The Examiner made the following rejection:
Claims 1—15 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over Porras in view of Kley.
ANALYSIS
With respect to independent claims 1, 6, and 11, Appellant does not
set forth separate arguments for patentability. (App. Br. 8—9). As a result,
we select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and
will address Appellant’s arguments thereto. Appellant contends that
“Porras and Kley Fail to Teach the Claim Limitation, ‘Receiving a Request
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Application 13/692,843
for Access to a Collection of Data from a Remote Computing Device
Through a Computer Network. [”] (App. Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 3—5).
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant and maintains that although
claims are interpreted in light of the Specification, limitations are not read
into the claims. (Ans. 2-4).
“In the patentability context, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretations . . . limitations are not to be read into the claims
from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Any special meaning assigned to a term
“must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from
common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the
field of the invention.” Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133
F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Helmsderfer v. Bobrick
Washroom Equip., Inc., 527 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A patentee
may act as its own lexicographer and assign to a term a unique definition
that is different from its ordinary and customary meaning; however, a
patentee must clearly express that intent in the written description”). Absent
an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the words take
on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of
ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,
334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Applicant always has the opportunity to amend the claims during
prosecution and broad interpretation by the examiner reduces the possibility
that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified.
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 140A-05 (CCPA 1969).
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Application 13/692,843
We agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the language of representative independent claim 1 is met
by the combination of the Porras and Kley references.
We further find that the language of representative independent claim
1 does not define or interpret the context of the claimed “receiving a request
for access,” “receiving a digital fingerprint,” or “granting the remote
computing device access to the collection of data.” In particular, we find the
language of independent claim 1 sets forth no parameters or context of the
data in the received request, the received fingerprint, nor the collection of
data. Given the broadest, reasonable interpretation of the claims, we
disagree with Appellant’s contention and find that the Porras reference
discloses a “request” and ultimately “receives” a “fingerprint.” Appellant
has not identified how the claimed method distinguishes from the combined
teachings of the Porras and Kley references. Consequently, Appellant’s
argument does not show error in the Examiner’s factual findings or the
conclusion of obviousness of the method of representative independent
claim 1.
Appellant further contends that “In Porras, the data from which the
fingerprint is later generated is raw data extracted from an RF signal, in
contrast to the present invention, which transmits a fully developed digital
fingerprint.” (App. Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 5—6). We find Appellant’s
argument is not commensurate in scope with the language of method claim
1, where claim 1 does not recite “transmits a fully developed digital
fingerprint.”
In the Reply Brief, Appellant presents similar arguments advanced in
the Appeal Brief and contend that the Porras reference generates the
fingerprint rather than receiving the fingerprint. (Reply Br. 5—6). As
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Application 13/692,843
discussed above, we find Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive of error
regarding the Examiner’s factual findings or the conclusion of obviousness
of the method of representative independent claim 1.
Appellant further contends “Kley Fails and to Teach the Limitation,
‘Upon a Condition . . . Granting the Remote Computing Device Access to
the Collection of Data.’” (App. Br. 13—14).
The Examiner disagrees with Appellant and finds:
Kley discloses granting access of data to one or more client
devices based upon conditional authorization criteria for
determining if the device fingerprint extracted from the unlock
code is compared to the device fingerprint that identifies the
computing device fingerprint match. If the extracted device
fingerprint matches, the device fingerprint is verified and the user
is granted access to the software product data stored on the
remote device as shown in Col. 4, lines 7-15. Therefore, the
device fingerprint is matched by another device fingerprint for
granting access to the user.
(Ans. 4—5). We agree with the Examiner that the Kley reference teaches and
fairly suggests granting access to data. As a result, Appellant’s argument
does not show error in the Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion of
obviousness.
With respect to dependent claims 2, 7, and 12, Appellant repeats the
language of claim 2 and presents similar arguments advanced with respect to
independent claim 1. We select independent claim 2 as the representative
claim for the group. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Because we found
Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive with respect to representative
independent claim 1, we similarly find the same arguments unpersuasive
with respect to dependent claim 2. Appellant additionally contends “the
referenced teachings from Porras disclose that if its method does not receive
enough information to generate such RF fingerprint the method of Porras
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Application 13/692,843
can result in an endless loop wherein the method never receives sufficient
information to generate a fingerprint. Porras, [52].” (App. Br. 16—17). We
find Appellant’s speculation regarding an endless loop does not show error
in the Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion of obviousness of
dependent claim 2. Asa result, we sustain the rejection of representative
dependent claim 2.
With respect to dependent claims 3,8, and 13, Appellant repeats the
language of dependent claim 3 and provides similar arguments advanced
with respect to dependent claim 2. (App. Br. 16—17). We select dependent
claim 3 as the representative claim for the group. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellant additionally contends “Porras as modified by
Kley fails to explicitly disclose any methods which can provide tight multi­
factor authentication as described by applicant.” App. Br. 18. Again, we
find Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the express
language of representative dependent claim 3. As a result, we sustain the
rejection of representative dependent claim 3.
With respect to dependent claims 4, 9, and 14, Appellant repeats the
language of dependent claim 4 and provides similar arguments advanced
with respect to dependent claim 2. (App. Br. 19-20). We select dependent
claim 4 as the representative claim for the group. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellant additionally presents generalized arguments to
a qualitative difference between the Porras reference and the claimed
invention and the possibility of failure. (App. Br. 19-20). Again, we find
Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the express
language of representative dependent claim 4 and does not show error in the
Examiner’s findings or conclusion of obviousness of representative
dependent claim 4.
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With respect to dependent claims 5, 10, and 15, Appellant repeats the
language of dependent claim 5 and provides similar arguments advanced
with respect to dependent claims 1 and 2. (App. Br. 21—22). We select
dependent claim 5 as the representative claim for the group.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellant additionally presents generalized
arguments to “Applicant's invention which explicitly contemplates requests
for data access from trusted computing devices.” (App. Br. 21—22). Again,
we find Appellant’s argument does not show error in the Examiner’s factual
findings and the conclusion of obviousness of representative dependent
claim 5 regarding the “method” of claim 5. We find Appellant’s arguments
to the label of the source of the data as “trusted” does not change the method
steps. Consequently, we find Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive of
error in the Examiner’s finding of obviousness of representative dependent
claim 5.
With respect to dependent claims 2—5, 7—10, and 12—15, Appellant
relies upon the arguments advanced with respect to the respective parent
independent claims. Because we found Appellant’s arguments to be
unpersuasive of error with respect to independent claims 1, 6, and 11, we
similarly find Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive of error in the
Examiner’s factual findings and conclusion of obviousness of the dependent
claims.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—15 based upon
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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DECISION
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1—15 based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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