Ex Parte Endo et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 27, 2010

10661152 - (D) (B.P.A.I. Jul. 27, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
________________

Ex parte NORIKAZU ENDO and BENJAMIN K. REAVES
________________

Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, and
MAHSHID D. SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judges.

HAIRSTON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, or for filing a request for rehearing,
as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 41.52, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE”
(paper delivery mode) or the “NOTIFICATION DATE” (electronic delivery
mode) shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision.

Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152

2
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b) and 134(a) from the final
rejection of claims 1, 3 to 15, 17 to 28, 30 to 40, and 42 to 61. Claims 2, 16,
29, and 41 have been canceled.
We reverse.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The disclosed invention relates to a system and method for adjusting a
voice prompt based on a state (e.g., emotions) of a user of the system
including obtaining a user’s utterance, utterance parameters indicating a
user’s state, determining the user’s state based on the utterance parameters,
and adjusting a voice prompt (Spec. ¶ [0001], [0005]-[0011]; Abstract;
claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53). Utterance parameters are obtained by (i)
partitioning an utterance into segments, and (ii) assigning a classification to
each segment, where each classification corresponds to at least one user state
(e.g., emotion) (claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53; Spec. ¶¶ [0020]-[0023]).
Claim 1 is representative of the claimed invention, with emphasis
added to argued portions, and reads as follows:

1. A method of adjusting a voice prompt of a system based upon a
state of a user of the system, the method comprising:

receiving an utterance of the user;

obtaining utterance parameters from the utterance, the utterance
parameters indicating the state of the user;

determining the state of the user based upon the utterance parameters;
and

Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152

3
adjusting the voice prompt by adjusting at least one of a tone of voice
of the voice prompt, a content of the voice prompt, a prosody of the voice
prompt, and a gender of the voice prompt based upon the determined state of
the user, wherein obtaining utterance parameters comprises:

partitioning the utterance into segments; and

assigning one of a plurality of classifications to each segment,
each classification corresponding to at least one of a plurality of
states of the user.

(Claim 1 (emphasis added)).
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Pelland US 2002/0029203 A1 Mar. 7, 2002
Cooper US 6,757,362 B1 June 29, 2004
(filed Mar. 6, 2000)
Millie, Driver-Friendly Assistance System Interface, March 14, 2002,
pp. 1-89.

(i) The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3 to 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17 to 19, 21,
23, 24, 28, 30 to 32, 34, 36, 40, 42 to 46, 48, 49, 53 to 56, 58, and 60 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) based upon the teachings of Cooper.
(ii) The Examiner rejected claims 7, 9, 20, 22, 33, 35, 47, 57, and 59
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Cooper and Pelland.
(iii) The Examiner rejected claims 12 to 14, 25 to 27, 37 to 39, 50 to
52, and 61 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Cooper and
Millie.
With regard to the anticipation rejection of claims 1, 3 to 6, 8, 10, 11,
15, 17 to 19, 21, 23, 24, 28, 30 to 32, 34, 36, 40, 42 to 46, 48, 49, 53 to 56,
58, and 60, the Examiner relies upon Cooper as disclosing the features
Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152

4
recited in these claims of obtaining utterance parameters by (i) partitioning
an utterance into segments, and (ii) assigning classifications corresponding
to a user state to each segment (Ans. 3-4). Specifically, the Examiner cites
column 2, lines 58 to 64 and column 43, line 52 to column 44, line 6 of
Cooper (see Ans. 3-4 and 8-10) as disclosing the recited step of obtaining
utterance parameters by partitioning utterances into segments and assigning
classifications to them. The Examiner also contends that generating an
utterance parameter vector is inherently disclosed in Cooper (Ans. 10). The
Examiner concludes that training data is stored in a database in Cooper in
the form of vectors (Ans. 10).
Appellants argue, inter alia, (App. Br. 14-19; Reply Br. 2-6) that the
applied reference to Cooper fails to teach or suggest (i) how a user’s
emotional state can be determined based on utterance information, (ii) that
each segment of an utterance is assigned a classification indicating a user’s
state, and (iii) that obtaining utterance parameters indicating a user’s state by
partitioning utterances into segments and assigning a classification to a
segment is not inherent in the disclosure of Cooper. More specifically,
Appellants argue (App. Br. 18) that Cooper fails to disclose that each
segment of an utterance is assigned to a classification indicating a user’s
state as recited in claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53.
Although Cooper discloses a method (col. 1, ll. 11-17), which is
similar to Appellants’ disclosed invention for adjusting a voice prompt
(Spec. ¶¶ [0005]-[0011], [0020]-[0023]), Cooper is silent as to obtaining
utterance parameters by partitioning utterances into segments and then
assigning a classification corresponding to a user’s state to each segment as
set forth in claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53 on appeal. The Examiner has not
Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152

5
sufficiently shown how or why Cooper’s determination of an emotional state
is the same, whether inherently or expressly, as breaking an utterance up into
constituent pieces and then operating on each piece.
Based on our finding with respect to Cooper, we agree with
Appellants (App. Br. 18) that Cooper fails to disclose that each segment of
an utterance is assigned to a classification indicating a user’s state as recited
in claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53. Cooper’s determination of an emotional
state based on a single utterance does not anticipate Appellants’ partitioning
of utterances into segments and subsequent assignment of a user state
classification to each segment. The features of (i) partitioning an utterance
into segments, and (ii) assigning classifications corresponding to a user state
to each segment, are simply missing from Cooper, and the Examiner has not
shown that such a feature is inherent in the operation of Cooper.
Thus, with respect to the voice prompt adjusting method and system
recited in independent claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53, Cooper fails to teach the
limitation common to each of these claims of obtaining utterance parameters
including assigning each segment a classification to assist with determining
a user’s state. It follows that the Examiner has not established anticipation,
because Cooper does not disclose each and every limitation of the claimed
invention set forth in independent claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53. Atlas
Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re
Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The Examiner has not established a prima facie case of obviousness of
the claimed subject matter set forth in dependent claims 7, 9, 12 to 14, 20,
22, 25 to 27, 33, 35, 37 to 39, 47, 50 to 52, 57, 59, and 61, since the
teachings of Pelland and Millie fail to cure the noted shortcomings of
Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152

6
Cooper as set forth above with respect to claims 1, 15, 28, 40, and 53 from
which these claims respectively depend. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The anticipation rejection of claims 1, 3 to 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17 to 19,
21, 23, 24, 28, 30 to 32, 34, 36, 40, 42 to 46, 48, 49, 53 to 56, 58, and 60 is
not sustained because Cooper does not teach (i) partitioning an utterance into
segments, and (ii) assigning classifications corresponding to a user state to
each segment. The obviousness rejections of (i) claims 7, 9, 20, 22, 33, 35,
47, 57, and 59 over Cooper and Pelland, and (ii) claims 12 to 14, 25 to 27,
37 to 39, 50 to 52, and 61 over Cooper and Millie are not sustained because
the Examiner’s articulated reasoning concerning the teachings of Cooper and
Pelland does not support a legal conclusion of obviousness (KSR Int’l., v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).

CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3 to 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17 to
19, 21, 23, 24, 28, 30 to 32, 34, 36, 40, 42 to 46, 48, 49, 53 to 56, 58, and 60
under 35 U.S.C. §102(e).
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7, 9, 12 to 14, 20, 22, 25 to 27,
33, 35, 37 to 39, 47, 50 to 52, 57, 59, and 61 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a).

Appeal 2009-007203
Application 10/661,152

7
ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3 to 15, 17 to 28, 30 to
40, and 42 to 61 is reversed.

REVERSED

KIS

Patent Law Works LLP/Toyota ITC
165 South Main Street
Second Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84111