Ex Parte Elliott

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 18, 2017

13477692 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 18, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/477,692 05/22/2012 Christopher Elliott 709381 (11-0121) 1645
70507 7590 07/20/2017
Caterpillar c/o LEYDIG, VOIT & MAYER, LTD
TWO PRUDENTIAL PLAZA SUITE 4900
180 N. STETSON AVE
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, NGA X
CHICAGO, IL 60601 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Chgpatent @ ley dig. com
us_docket_clerk@cat.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHER ELLIOTT
Appeal 2015-004998
Application 13/477,6921
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
ASTORINO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Christopher Elliott (“Appellant”) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from
the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—6, 8—14, and 16—20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Doering et al. (US 2005/0145415 Al,
published July 7, 2005; hereinafter “Doering”) and Grawey et al. (US
RE38,858 E, reissued Nov. 1, 2005; hereinafter “Grawey”). We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 According to the Appellant, the real party in interest is Caterpillar Inc.
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2015-004998
Application 13/477,692
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Subject Matter
The subject matter of the Appellant’s invention “relates generally to
controlling wheel/track slippage (e.g., slip percentage) by machines and,
more particularly, to limiting power supplied to propulsive continuous tracks
or wheels on machines,” for example “bulldozers, earth movers, etc. Spec.
Tflf1—2. Notably, “slippage” refers to the “drive interface between a machine
and a surface (e.g., the pavement, ground, etc.) upon which the machine
travels.” Id. 14. Claims 1, 12, and 17 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative.
1. A programmed controller-implemented method of managing
excessive slippage at a physical interface between a machine and
a traveled surface, the method comprising:
determining a track force, the track force being indicative
of a propulsive force exerted by the machine on the traveled
surface;
determining a modeled slippage based, at least in part,
upon the track force and a slippage model; and
conditionally causing, by a programmed controller, a
reduction of power output to propulsive drive components, by a
motor, based upon a comparison, by the programmed controller,
between the modeled slippage and a slippage limit.
ANALYSIS
The last limitation of independent claim 1 recites, “conditionally
causing, by a programmed controller, a reduction of power output to
propulsive drive components, by a motor, based upon a comparison, by the
programmed controller, between the modeled slippage and a slippage limit.”
Appeal Br, Claims App. This recitation is similar to recitations in
independent claims 12 and 17. See id.
2
Appeal 2015-004998
Application 13/477,692
The evidence relied upon by the Examiner to reject the above-
mentioned recitations of the independent claims is from Doering’s disclosure
in paragraphs 38 and 41 44. Final Act. 4, 7; Ans. 4—5. From this evidence,
the Examiner finds Doering’s control and adjustment of a normal force
corresponds to a reduction of power output to propulsive drive components,
which is comparable to a reduction in propulsive force. See Ans. 4—5.
The Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding that Doering
discloses “a reduction of power output to propulsive drive components,” as
recited in independent claims 1, 12, and 17. See Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 3—
5. The Appellant supports this argument by distinguishing Doering’s
adjustment of a normal force due to slippage from a reduction of power
output to propulsive drive components due to slippage. See Appeal Br. 9—
10.
Doering’s invention involves traction control of a downhole tractor
positioned in a borehole by applying a normal force to at least one drive
unit.2 Doering 19. Doering’s downhole tractor includes a drive unit that
uses a propulsive force to move the tractor within the borehole. See id. 13.
For example, Doering uses drive unit 36, which includes drive motor 54,
transmission wheel 58, transmission chain 60, arm 62, and multiple sprocket
wheels 64, to displace (i.e., propel) tractor 12. See id. 1 56, Fig. 10.
Doering’s propulsive force is enabled by the application of a normal force;
2 Downhole tractors are associated with the petroleum exploration and
production industry and are capable of crawling or moving within a
“borehole.” Doering, para. 2. “The term ‘borehole’ . . . includes any
underground hole, passageway or area .... A ‘non-vertical borehole’ is a
borehole that is at least partially not vertically oriented, such as a horizontal
or deviated well.” Id.
3
Appeal 2015-004998
Application 13/477,692
i.e., a force that is applied perpendicular to the borehole wall. See id. In
particular, Doering uses extension arm 62 to apply a normal force to
borehole wall 10a. See id. ]Hf 57—58, Fig. 10. Doering’s application of this
normal force may require adjustment due to the amount of traction needed
for the downhole tractor to move, otherwise slippage can occur. Id. Tflf 6, 42;
see Appeal Br. 9 (citing Doering, Figs. 3, 4, block 148).
In light of the foregoing, we are persuaded by the Appellant’s
argument that “Doering’s ‘controlling the normal force’ applied against the
walls of a downhole is NOT equivalent to Appellant’s claimed ‘reduction of
power output to propulsive drive components.’” Reply Br. 5. In other
words, Doering’s control of a normal force is not the same as the control of
the propulsive force as required by the independent claims. Further, the
Examiner’s findings with regard to Grawey’s teachings do not remedy the
errant finding discussed above. See Appeal Br. 10.
Thus, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 12, and 17, and dependent claims 2—6, 8—11, 13, 14, 16, and 18—
20, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Doering and Grawey.
DECISION
We REVERSE the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—6, 8—14,
and 16—20.
REVERSED
4