Ex Parte Elkasevic et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 17, 2017

13470449 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 17, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/470,449 05/14/2012 Suad Elkasevic 2012P00938US 3822
46726 7590 10/19/2017
RS»H Home. Ann1ianrp.s Pomoratinn
EXAMINER
100 Bosch Boulevard
NEW BERN, NC 28562
MORGAN, EMILY M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3677
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/19/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MBX-NBN-IntelProp@bshg.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SUAD ELKASEVIC and GEORGE MAY
Appeal 2015-0003241
Application 13/470,4492
Technology Center 3600
Before KEVIN W. CHERRY, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHERRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Suad Elkasevic and George May (Appellants) seek review under
35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a Final Rejection of claims 1—23, the only claims
pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Br.”), filed
May 28, 2014, the Final Action (“Final Act.”), mailed February 25, 2014,
and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”), mailed July 23, 2014.
2 Appellants’ Appeal Brief identifies BSH Home Appliances Corporation as
the real party in interest for this appeal (Appeal Br. 4).
Appeal 2015-000324
Application 13/470,449
Appellants’ claimed invention “is directed to a hinge assembly for a
domestic appliance that reduces or eliminates the noise and damage caused
by a spring inside a cylinder” (Spec. 11).
Claims 1, 9, and 16 are independent claims. Claim 1 is illustrative of
the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below.
1. A hinge assembly for pivotably attaching a door to a
domestic appliance, the hinge assembly comprising:
a hinge body configured to attach to the door such that the
hinge body is fixed relative to the door;
a damper cylinder attached to the hinge body and having
an inside surface;
a foot attached to the hinge body and the cylinder, the foot
being configured to engage a foot receiving portion of the
domestic appliance such that the hinge body and the door pivot
relative to the domestic appliance;
a rod partially located inside the cylinder and partially
located outside the cylinder, the rod having an outer surface and
being slidable relative to the cylinder in a reciprocating motion
between a fully contracted position and a fully extended position;
and
a coil spring having an inner core and an outer coating, and
positioned inside the cylinder and around the rod such that the
rod extends through a center of a coil of the coil spring, the coil
spring having an inner surface that is an inside surface of the coil
of the coil spring, and an outer surf ace that is an outside surface
of the coil of the coil spring.
(Br. 16, Claims App.).
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Application 13/470,449
Rejection3
Claims 1—23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over White et al. (US 2011/0017191 Al, pub. Jan. 27, 2011),
and Rubin et al. (US 2009/0049646 Al, pub. Feb. 26, 2009).
ANALYSIS
Claims 1—23
Appellants argue that Rubin is non-analogous art to the claimed
invention (Br. 10—11). In particular, Appellants assert that Rubin relates to
“the electronic communication and computation device art,” not the
domestic appliance art, as the claimed invention does (id. at 10). Appellants
further contend that Rubin is not reasonably pertinent to the problem
Appellants faced because Appellants argue they were concerned with “the
problem of contact between the spring with and the rod and/or between the
spring and the cylinder causing noise and wear in a domestic appliance”
(id.). Appellants assert that Rubin “is concerned with the completely
different and unrelated problem of providing a robust sliding assembly on a
mobile phone” (id. (citing Rubin | 8)).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention that Rubin is not
analogous art (id. at 10—11). “A reference qualifies as prior art for an
obviousness determination under § 103 only when it is analogous to the
claimed invention.” In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
“Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the
art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed
and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor,
3 Claims 3,7, 11, 14, 18, and 19 were also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112
12 as indefinite (Final Act. 2). In view of explanations made by Appellants
in their Appeal Brief, the Examiner has withdrawn this rejection (Ans. 2).
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Application 13/470,449
whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
with which the inventor is involved.” Id. (quoting In re Bigio, 381 F.3d
1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
Here, we agree with the Examiner that Rubin qualifies as analogous
art (see Ans. 3). The record establishes that Appellants were concerned with
noise/damage problems in a hinge assembly having a spring; as the
Specification states that the invention was “directed to a hinge assembly for
a domestic application that reduces or eliminates noise and damage caused
by a spring inside a cylinder” (Spec. 11). The Examiner finds that Rubin
“teaches using coatings” as lubricants in a hinge assembly having a spring;
and the Examiner finds that “a lubricant is commonly utilized for the
purpose of mitigating noise and wear” (Ans. 3). Appellants do not challenge
these findings in a Reply Brief. Thus, this situation is similar to the situation
that confronted the Federal Circuit in In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir.
1994). In Paulsen, the Federal Circuit concluded that an inventor
considering a hinge and latch mechanism for portable computers would
naturally look to references employing other “housings, hinges, latches,
springs, etc.,” which in that case came from areas such as “a desktop
telephone directory, a piano lid, a kitchen cabinet, a washing machine
cabinet, a wooden furniture cabinet, or a two-part housing for storing audio
cassettes.” Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1481—82; see also Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic
Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 314 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (affirming invalidation
of a patent for a hinged pen arm because a person skilled in pen art would
have looked to hinge and fastener art for a way to attach a pen to a pen
arm). And although Appellants stress that their hinge assembly was
developed for domestic appliances (see Br. 10-11); Appellants have not
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Application 13/470,449
identified anything in the record showing that problems of wear and noise
are unique to domestic appliance hinges. See In re ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming Board and finding that
“[njothing about [patentee’s] folding mechanism requires any particular
focus on treadmills; it generally addresses problems of supporting the weight
of such a mechanism and providing a stable resting position. Analogous art
to [patentee’s] application, when considering the folding mechanism and gas
spring limitation, may come from any area describing hinges, springs,
latches, counterweights, or other similar mechanisms.”). As such, the record
establishes that Rubin is reasonably pertinent to the hinge-related problems
faced by Appellants, and thus qualifies as analogous art.
Appellants also argue that the combination of White and Rubin fails
to teach or suggest the claimed invention because Rubin fails to teach or
suggest using a coating on a coil of a coil spring (Br. 12—13). We are not
persuaded by this argument. As the Examiner explains, although Rubin only
discusses coating only places on the spring that contact the post, a person of
ordinary skill would understand that Rubin does so because those are the
only parts of Rubin’s spring that contacts other components (Ans. 4.). The
Examiner finds that a person of ordinary skill would understand that this
teaching can be applied wherever a spring in a hinge assembly comes in
contact with other parts of the hinge assembly (id.). The Examiner further
explains that a person of ordinary skill would understand that many surfaces
in the spring used in White’s hinge assembly would contact other metal
surfaces (id.). Thus, the Examiner reasons that, in the combination, a person
of ordinary skill would use the suggestion of Rubin of coating surfaces of
the spring that come into contact with other parts to coat the entire spring of
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White (id. ). In view of this reasoning, we do not find Appellants’ arguments
persuasive, because they fail to show that the Examiner’s finding that a
person of ordinary skill would “coat any surface that might touch either
article as taught by Rubin” is incorrect or unsupported. Thus, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of White
and Rubin would teach or suggest coating the entire spring.
Finally, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s analysis is driven by
hindsight (Br. 11—12). We disagree. As the Examiner found and Appellants
do not dispute, White teaches all the limitations a hinge assembly as claimed
by Appellants, except for the coating on the spring (Final Act. 3—4). The
Examiner further found that Rubin taught such a coating on a spring (id.
at 4). As we explained above, the Examiner found that Rubin would suggest
coating any surfaces that come into contact. The Examiner further found
that person of ordinary skill would have recognized that given the small
clearance between the spring and rod and the spring and cylinder as taught
by White, there would be a substantial risk of the parts coming in contact
and causing wear and tear on the spring, rod, and cylinder (id.). The
Examiner further found that lubricating surfaces of metal parts to reduce
wear was well known (id. at 4—5 (citing Frick4134). We find this reasoning
sufficiently articulated with rational underpinnings to support the
combination of White and Rubin. The use of a lubricating coating on metal
parts in a moving mechanism is precisely the sort of “combination of
familiar elements according to known methods” that “yields no more than
predictable results” that is “likely to be obvious.” See KSR Int 7 Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Moreover, Appellants do not
4 Frick, US 2009/0226802 Al, pub. Sept. 10, 2009.
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Application 13/470,449
identify any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only
from Appellants’ disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of
ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d
1392 (CCPA 1971). As such, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ assertion
that the Examiner relied on impermissible hindsight in reaching the
determination of obviousness. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2,
4-6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, and 21-23.
Claims 3, 8, 11, 15, 18, and 20
In addition to the arguments considered above, claims 3, 8, 11, 15, 18,
and 20 all include the limitation that the outer surface of the rod is in contact
with the inner surface of the coil spring when the rod is in the fully extended
position (Br. 13). Appellants argue that “White does not recognize this
condition” (id.). As the Examiner persuasively explains, however, White is
structurally identical to the hinge disclosed in Appellants’ Specification
(Ans. 4—5; compare Spec. Figs. 2—3, with White, Figs. 4, 5, 4A, 6, 7).
Specifically, White’s hinge includes a damper including a long spring
mounted inside a cylinder with a rod passing through the center of the spring
and cylinder that moves relative to the cylinder when the damper is operated
(see White, Figs. 4, 5, 4A, 6, 7). Appellants’ Specification makes clear that
in known hinges, such as White’s, the movement of the rod relative to the
cylinder compresses the spring and can result in the spring moving a
direction perpendicular to the direction of the compression (Spec. 1 5). And
that this lateral movement can result in the outside of the spring contacting
the inside wall of the cylinder or the inside of the spring contacting the
outside surface of the rod, or both (id.). Indeed, Appellants’ Specification
characterizes the invention as recognizing this existing condition with
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Application 13/470,449
existing hinges is what causes the noise associated with such hinges {id 16).
Given the identical structures and operating conditions for the White’s hinge
and Appellants’ hinge, we find adequate support for the Examiner’s finding
that White’s spring will contact the rod when in fully extended position.
Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 3,8, 11, 15, 18, and 20.
Claims 7, 14, and 19
Claims 7, 14, and 19 all include the limitation that the outer surface of
the coil spring is in contact with the inner surface of the cylinder when the
rod is in the fully extended position (Br. 14). Appellants argue that “White
does not recognize this condition” {id.). As the Examiner persuasively
explains, however, White is structurally identical to the hinge disclosed in
Appellants’ Specification (Ans. 4—5; compare Spec. Figs. 2—3, with White,
Figs. 4, 5, 4A, 6, 7). Specifically, White’s hinge includes a damper
including a long spring mounted inside a cylinder with a rod passing through
the center of the spring and cylinder that moves relative to the cylinder when
the damper is operated {see White, Figs. 4, 5, 4A, 6, 7). Appellants’
Specification makes clear that in known hinges, such as White’s, the
movement of the rod relative to the cylinder compresses the spring and can
result in the spring moving a direction perpendicular to the direction of the
compression (Spec. | 5). And that this lateral movement can result in the
outside of the spring contacting the inside wall of the cylinder or the inside
of the spring contacting the outside surface of the rod, or both (id.). Indeed,
Appellants’ Specification characterizes the invention as recognizing this
existing condition with existing hinges is what causes the noise associated
with such hinges {id 1 6). Given the identical structures and operating
conditions for the White’s hinge and Appellants’ hinge, we find adequate
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Application 13/470,449
support for the Examiner’s finding that White’s spring will contact the inside
of the cylinder when in fully extended position. Thus, we sustain the
rejection of claims 7, 14, and 19.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—23 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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