Ex Parte Ekpenyong

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 30, 2017

14450931 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/450,931 08/04/2014 Anthony Edet EKPENYONG TI-74130 9796
23494 7590 09/01/2017
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED
P O BOX 655474, M/S 3999
DALLAS, TX 75265
EXAMINER
SONG, REBECCA E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2414
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/01/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
uspto@ti.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANTHONY EDET EKPENYONG
Appeal 2017-002488
Application 14/450,9311
Technology Center 2400
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 30-75, which are all pending claims. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 Appellant’s Brief (“App. Br.”) identifies the real party in interest as Texas
Instruments Incorporated. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2017-002488
Application 14/450,931
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to dynamic signaling of the downlink and
uplink subframe allocation for a time division duplex (“TDD”) wireless
communication system. Spec. 126. Claim 30, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
30. An apparatus for use in a wireless communication
network comprising:
a processor configured to:
determine a time interval for periodic time division duplex
(TDD) IJplink/Downlink (UL/DL) reconfiguration;
generate a UL/DL reconfiguration command to indicate a
dynamic TDD UL/DL configuration change; and
encode the UL/DL reconfiguration command in a physical
downlink control channel (PDCCH) data; and
a radio frequency (RL) interface coupled to the processor
and configured to cause the encoded UL/DL reconfiguration
command to be transmitted in subframe 0 at the time interval.
App. Br. (Claims Appendix 1).
RELERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Gao US 2013/0336177 A1 Dec. 19, 2013
Wang US 2014/0119261 A1 May 1,2014
He US 2015/0029910 A1 Jan. 29, 2015
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Application 14/450,931
REJECTIONS
Claims 30, 31, 33, 40, 54, 55, and 57 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Gao. Final Act. 2—9.
Claims 32, 34, 37-39, 41^19, 52, 53, 56, 58, 61-71, and 7A-75 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Gao and Wang.
Final Act. 9—28.
Claims 35—36 and 59-60 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Gao and He. Final Act. 28—31.
Claims 50-51, and 72—73 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Gao, Wang, and He. Final Act. 31—34.
ISSUE
Has the Examiner erred in finding the “configuration period”
described in Gao discloses “a time interval for . . . reconfiguration,” as
recited in claim 30?
ANALYSIS
Claim 30 recites the limitation “determin[ing] a time interval for
periodic time division duplex (TDD) Uplink/Downlink (UL/DL)
reconfiguration.” App. Br. (Claims Appendix 1). In rejecting claim 30 as
anticipated by Gao, the Examiner finds Gao’s use of a configuration period
discloses this limitation. Final Act. 3 (citing Gao Tflf 48, 56). Appellant
contends the Examiner’s finding is insufficient to establish anticipation
because the Examiner relies on an unreasonably broad interpretation of the
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Appeal 2017-002488
Application 14/450,931
phrase “time interval... for reconfiguration,” to expand the claim to cover
Gao’s configuration period. According to Appellant, the “time interval. . .
for reconfiguration” is the time interval during which the reconfiguration
command may be sent, and does not encompass, as determined by the
Examiner, the length of time over which a configuration is applied. App.
Br. 14. In light of these arguments, the issue before us is whether or not the
Examiner’s interpretation of “time interval. . . for reconfiguration” is
unreasonably broad in the context of Appellant’s Specification and claims.
The appropriate starting point for claim construction “is always with
the language of the asserted claim itself.” Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster,
Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, claim 30 recites the “time
interval” is for “periodic time division (TDD) IJplink/Downlink (UL/DL)
reconfiguration.” Claim 30 further recites “the encoded UL/DL
reconfiguration command to be transmitted in subframe 0 at the time
interval.” Thus, according to the language of the claim, the reconfiguration
command must be transmitted “in subframe 0 at the time interval.” Under
the Examiner’s interpretation, however, the reconfiguration command would
only be transmitted after the reconfiguration specified in the command was
already to have taken place. Moreover, the Examiner’s interpretation is
inconsistent with the embodiments disclosed in the Specification, in which
the reconfiguration command is transmitted in a reconfiguration window
which always closes prior to the reconfiguration command taking effect.
See, e.g., Spec. 1 58, Fig. 6—7 (showing the reconfiguration taking effect
after the reconfiguration window has passed). On-Line Techs., Inc. v.
BodenseewerkPerkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
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Application 14/450,931
(“[A] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the
scope of the claim is rarely, if ever, correct.”).
Appellant’s interpretation of “time interval. . . for reconfiguration” as
the time interval during which the reconfiguration command may be sent is
consistent with the Specification and aligns with the language of the claims.
For example, as noted above, the language of the claim requires the
“reconfiguration command to be transmitted in subframe 0 at the time
interval.” Unlike the interpretation proposed by the Examiner, Appellant’s
interpretation is consistent with this requirement. Moreover, the
Specification includes various examples of time intervals during which
reconfiguration parameters are transmitted, and in each case, the
reconfiguration command is not sent during the time period in which the
parameters will be active. Rather, in each case, the reconfiguration
commands are transmitted during a reconfiguration window, and the
reconfiguration takes effect subsequent to the reconfiguration window being
closed. Spec. 28 (“transmit at least one TDD UL/DL reconfiguration
command ... to signal a TDD UL/DL allocation change . . ., for example,
beginning at a next TDD UL/DL reconfiguration window boundary”), 58
(“TDD UL/DL configuration may begin at the boundary of the next
reconfiguration window”).
Our reviewing court instructs that “[t]he construction that stays true to
the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of
the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328—29 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Here, as
explained above, Appellant’s interpretation of “time interval” is consistent
with both the claim language and the Specification. Accordingly, we
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Application 14/450,931
conclude the Examiner has interpreted “time interval” in an unreasonably
broad manner, and that a “time interval... for reconfiguration” is properly
understood as the time period during which the reconfiguration command
may be sent.
The Examiner’s finding of anticipation is premised upon the overly
broad construction of “time interval. . . for reconfiguration.” Because we
conclude the Examiner’s interpretation is erroneous, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). For the same reason, we
do not sustain the rejections of independent claims 41, 54, and 63, which
each recite substantially similar limitations, nor of the remaining claims
which depend therefrom.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 30—75 are reversed.
REVERSED
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