Ex Parte Efrati

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 16, 2017

14061856 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/061,856 10/24/2013 TZAHIEFRATI 5524-217 4700
96355 7590 06/20/2017
NIXON & VANDERHYE, P.C. / Vonage
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
ANWAR, MOHAMMAD S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2463
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/20/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon @ firsttofile. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TZAHI EFRATI
(Applicant: Vonage Network, LLC)
Appeal 2017-002963
Application 14/061,8561
Technology Center 2400
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—20, the only claims pending in the
application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse and enter a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
141.50(b).
1 The present application lists the inventor as Tzahi Efrati.
Appeal 2017-002963
Application 14/061,856
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s invention generally relates to determining when to
complete a requested telephony communication between a calling and a
called party. Spec. 11. A telephony communication system prevents an
incoming telephony communication directed to a user from being completed
if the user is not authorized to communicate with the calling party. Spec.,
Abstract. The telephony system also prevents completion of an outgoing
telephony communication directed to the user if the calling party is not
authorized to communicate with the user. Id. Claims 1 and 14, which are
illustrative, read as follows:
1. A method of determining whether to complete a telephony
communication, comprising:
receiving a telephony communication setup request from
a calling party;
receiving spoken audio input from the calling party;
determining an identity of the calling party based on the
received spoken audio input;
obtaining profile information for the calling party based
on the determined identity of the calling party; and
determining whether to complete the requested telephony
communication based on the obtained profile information for the
calling party.
14. A method of determining whether to complete a telephony
communication, comprising:
receiving a telephony communication setup request from
a calling party requesting that a telephony communication be
completed to a called party;
receiving spoken audio input from the called party;
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Application 14/061,856
determining an identity of the called party based on the
received spoken audio input;
obtaining profile information for the called party based on
the determined identity of the called party; and
determining whether to complete the requested telephony
communication based on the obtained profile information for the
called party.
Rejections
Claims 1—3, 7, and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being
anticipated by Ranganathan et al. (US 2006/0003750 Al; published Jan. 5,
2006) (“Ranganathan”). Final Act. 3—5.
Claims 14—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being
anticipated by Fellenstein et al. (US 2003/0233231 Al; published Dec. 18,
2003) (“Fellenstein”). Final Act. 5—7.
Claims 4—6, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Ranganathan and Bouchard et
al. (US 2007/0047693 Al; published Mar. 1, 2007) (“Bouchard”). Final
Act. 9-11.
Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Ranganathan and Edwards et al. (US
8,489,068 Bl; issued July 16, 2013) (“Edwards”). Final Act. 11—12.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Ranganathan, Edwards, and Fellenstein. Final Act. 12—
13.
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Application 14/061,856
ANALYSIS
Claim 1
The Examiner finds Ranganathan discloses “determining an identity
of the calling party based on the received spoken audio input,” as recited in
claim 1, because “Ranganathan clearly discloses receiving an audio message
as part of the pending communication” and “Ranganathan discloses [the]
identity of the calling party is determined from [an] audio message which is
part of the pending communication.” Ans. 2—3 (citing Ranganathan H 36,
44, 72, 80).
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding Ranganathan
discloses the disputed limitation because Ranganathan does not disclose
“determining an identity of the calling party based on the received spoken
audio input,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 8—11; Reply Br. 2—5. Appellant
acknowledges that Ranganathan discloses using the identity of a calling
party to determine whether to accept or reject an incoming communication.
App. Br. 9 (citing Ranganathan 136). Appellant contends Ranganathan,
however, “fails to provide any indication about how the identity of the party
that initiated the communication is determined” and, therefore, fails to
disclose the disputed limitation. Id. Appellant also acknowledges that
Ranganathan discloses that the incoming communication may be an audio
message. App. Br. 9 (citing Ranganathan 144); Reply Br. 3. Appellant
contends Ranganathan, however, does not disclose the disputed limitation
because Ranganathan does not disclose that the incoming communication
(e.g., the audio message) is used to determine whether to accept the
incoming communication. Id. Appellant argues Ranganathan, instead,
discloses “by the time the audio message is delivered to the intended
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Application 14/061,856
recipient, the decision to accept the incoming communication has already
been made.” App. Br. 9 (citing Ranganathan 144). Appellant further
argues:
[Paragraphs 36 and 72 of Ranganathan discuss how the
Ranganathan system makes a decision about whether to accept
an incoming communication. As explained in these paragraphs,
Ranganathan’s system compares “identity information” of a
source of the incoming communication to a user’s profile
information to determine if the incoming communication should
be delivered to the intended recipient. However, paragraphs 36
and 72 do not mention what that “identity information” is, or how
it is acquired.
Reply Br. 3. We agree.
We have reviewed the cited portions of Ranganathan and are unable
to identify any disclosure of how information identifying a source of a
pending communication is determined. Instead, Ranganathan merely
discloses that the information identifying the source of the pending
communication is included in information describing the pending
communication (Ranganathan H 28—29) and is analyzed along with a
communication acceptance/rejection profile (e.g., information indicating
which communications should be accepted (Ranganathan 116)) to
determine whether to accept or reject the pending communication
(Ranganathan 136). As such, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in
finding Ranganathan discloses “determining an identity of the calling party
based on the received spoken audio input,” as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1;
independent claims 7 and 8, which recite corresponding limitations; and
claims 2 and 3, which depend from claim 1.
Claims 4—6, 9, and 10 depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1
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and 8 and stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Ranganathan
and various additional references. The Examiner does not find these
additional references cure the deficiencies in the disclosure of Ranganathan
discussed supra with respect to claim 1. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 4—6, 9, and 10 for the reasons discussed with
respect to claim 1.
Claim 14
Appellant contends Fellenstein fails to disclose “determining an
identity of the called party based on the received spoken audio input,” as
recited in claim 14. App. Br. 11—12; Reply Br. 5—9. In particular, Appellant
contends “Fellenstein fails to disclose or suggest any methods in which the
identity of a called party is determined based on spoken audio input received
from the called party.” App. Br. 11. Appellant contends Fellenstein,
instead, discloses determining an identity of the calling party. App. Br. 11—
12.
The Examiner finds Fellenstein discloses the disputed limitation
because Fellenstein discloses:
[Sjervice provider extracts the called party identification
information in the subscriber database 155 (see Fellenstein’s
para. 26), voice prints of called identity are stored in database
155 (see Fellenstein’s para. 30), these voice prints are audio of
called parties that are compared against calling party (see
Fellenstein’s para. 34).
Ans. 4. We disagree.
We have reviewed the cited portions of Fellenstein and agree with
Appellant that Fellenstein fails to disclose determining an identity of the
called party, as required by claim 14. Instead, as correctly argued by
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Appellant, Fellenstein discloses determining the identity of the calling party
and not of the called party, as required by claim 14. See Fellenstein 133
(“Thus, the present invention provides an improvement over known
announcement-type systems in that voice prints are matched to not only
verify the identity of the calling party but also to provide automation with
regard to acceptance or rejection of calls.” (Emphasis added)); see also
Fellenstein, Abstract; Fig. 3; Tflf 30-32. Contrary to the Examiner’s findings
(Ans. 4), Fellenstein discloses “a double check of the calling party’s identity
is performed by looking up the textual representation of Rick Hamilton in
the calling party list stored in the subscriber database 155 and also
determining if there is a matching voice print in the calling party list”
(Fellenstein 134).
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14
and claims 15—20, which depend therefrom.
New Ground of Rejection
Under the provisions of 37 C.F.R. 141.50(b), we enter the following
new ground of rejection: Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as
being anticipated by Fellenstein. We leave it to the Examiner to review the
patentability of claims 2—13 over Fellenstein and the previously applied
references.
Fellenstein discloses a method of determining whether to complete a
telephony communication. Fellenstein, Abstract; 126. Fellenstein discloses
the method comprises receiving a telephony communication setup request
from a calling party (Fellenstein, Fig. 3, item 310; 126) and receiving
spoken audio input from the calling party (Fellenstein, Fig. 3, item 325;
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129). Fellenstein discloses the method also comprises determining an
identity of the calling party based on the received spoken audio input.
Fellenstein, Fig. 3, item 330; 1 30. Fellenstein further discloses obtaining
profile information for the calling party based on the determined identity of
the calling party; and determining whether to complete the requested
telephony communication based on the obtained profile information for the
calling party. Fellenstein 130. As such, Fellenstein discloses all of the
limitations recited in claim 1.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—20.
A new ground of rejection is entered pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
We newly reject claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by
Fellenstein.
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded
to the examiner. . . .
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(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record.
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
REVERSED
37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b)
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