Ex Parte Dutta

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Dec 26, 2007

09726268 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 26, 2007)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

__________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________

Ex parte RABINDRANATH DUTTA
__________

Appeal 2007-2268
Application 09/726,268
Technology Center 2100
__________

Decided: December 26, 2007
__________

Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, JAY P. LUCAS, and
ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3-7, 9-13, 15-19, 21-25, 27-31, and 33-36.
Claims 2, 8, 14, 20, 26, and 32 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal 2007-2268
Application 09/726,268

THE INVENTION
The disclosed invention relates generally to a method, system, and
program for providing access time information when displaying network
addresses. More particularly, Appellant’s invention is directed to providing
access time information when displaying network addresses in a web
browser program (Spec. 1).
Independent claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for rendering network addresses of files
capable of being downloaded over a network on an output
device, comprising:

generating a list of previously accessed network
addresses;

for each listed network address, determining a time to
download a page and any embedded files in the page from the
network address over the network in response to downloading
the page and any embedded files from the network address;

storing each determined time with the network address
for which the time was determined;

determining an access time indicator for the network
addresses based on the determined times stored with the
network addresses, wherein the determined access time
indicator is capable of indicating at least two different access
times with respect to one network address; and

rendering the access time indicator when rendering the
network address on the output device.

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THE REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following references as evidence in
support of the rejections:
Barrett US 5,727,129 Mar. 10, 1998
Killian US 6,438,592 B1 Aug. 20, 2002
Barrick US 6,625,647 B1 Sep. 23, 2003
Schneider US 6,760,746 B1 Jul. 6, 2004
International Business Machines Corporation, Research Disclosure No.
438161, Kenneth Mason Publications Ltd., (“Research Disclosure”) (2000).

THE REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, 31, and 36 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. §102(a) as being anticipated by Research Disclosure.
2. Claims 4, 6, 16, 18, 28, and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
as being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett.
3. Claims 5, 9, 17, 21, 29, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
as being unpatentable over Research Disclosure, in view of Barrett,
and further in view of Barrick.
4. Claims 11, 23, and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Schneider.
5. Claims 10, 22, and 34 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Killian.

Anticipation
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “[a] single prior art
reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a
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claim invalidates that claim by anticipation.” Perricone v. Medicis Pharm.
Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Claims 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, 31, and 36
We consider the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 19,
24, 25, 27, 31, and 36 as being anticipated by the Research Disclosure
reference. Since Appellant’s arguments with respect to this rejection have
treated these claims as a single group which stand or fall together, we will
select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2006).
Appellant contends that Research Disclosure does not disclose the
claim limitations of “determining a time to download a page and any
embedded files in the page . . . ;” (App. Br. 9; see claim 1).
Specifically, Appellant contends that Research Disclosure does not disclose
that the time to download includes both the time to download the page and
any embedded files (Id.).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner contends that web pages
were known at the time of the Research Disclosure reference to be linked
together with hyperlinks. Therefore, the Examiner concludes that the
download time of a web page as disclosed in the Research Disclosure
reference must (i.e., inherently) include the time to download any linked
embedded files referenced within the web page (Ans. 15).
We begin our analysis by noting that “[i]n relying upon the theory of
inherency, the Examiner must provide a basis in fact and/or technical
reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the allegedly inherent
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characteristic necessarily flows from the teachings of the applied prior art.”
Ex parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (BPAI 1990) (emphasis in original).
Here, the Examiner, as finder of fact, has determined that the download time
of a web page as disclosed in the Research Disclosure reference inherently
includes the time to download any linked embedded files referenced within
the web page, such as images (see Ans. 15).
After considering the record before us, we find the evidence supports
the Examiner’s position. We agree with the Examiner that embedded files
(e.g., images) must be downloaded to completely render the contents of a
web page. Therefore, we find the “time value” disclosed by Research
Disclosure inherently includes the time to download the web page and any
embedded files referenced by the web page. Thus, we find the Examiner has
provided a rationale in the answer that reasonably supports the Examiner’s
finding of inherent anticipation. “[A]fter the PTO establishes a prima facie
case of anticipation based on inherency, the burden shifts to appellant to
‘prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess
the characteristic relied on.’” In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13 (CCPA 1971)). See
also MPEP §§ 2112 (IV.), (V.). Here, while we have fully considered
Appellant’s arguments, we find Appellant has not met the burden of proving
with evidence that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not
possess the characteristic relied on by the Examiner.
Appellant further submits that Research Disclosure does not disclose
the claim limitation of “determining an access time indicator for the network
addresses based on the determined times stored with the network addresses,
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wherein the determined access time indicator is capable of indicating at least
two different access times with respect to one network address . . . ;” (App.
Br. 9; see claim 1). In particular, Appellant contends that “[t]he time value
and running average times mentioned in the cited Research Disclosure
[reference] can have only one value, their actual calculated value.” (App. Br.
9).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner notes that the example
disclosed in the Research Disclosure reference indicates a time
value of 60 seconds with respect to one of the links. However, the
Examiner, as finder of fact, has determined that the Research Disclosure
time value is not limited to just one time value (i.e., not limited to just one
access time). The Examiner reasons that the time value associated with a
given link (URL) must be capable of indicating different time values as a
web site improves or degrades its web servers over time. Thus, the
Examiner finds the Research Disclosure time value must be capable of
indicating at least two or more different access times with respect to one
network address. Moreover, the Examiner notes that the Research Disclosure
reference also discloses keeping a running average of the transfer times in
the personal bookmarks of the user’s web browser (Ans. 15).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant counters that the claimed “access time
indicator” indicates two different access times at once, instead of merely
being capable of indicating just one of two values as argued by the Examiner
(Reply Br. 3).
We find no limitation in independent claim 1 requiring the “access
time indicator” to indicate two different access times at once, as argued by
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Appellant (see Reply Br. 3). To the contrary, we note that claim 1 merely
recites: “wherein the determined access time indicator is capable of
indicating at least two different access times with respect to one network
address; . . . .” We broadly but reasonably construe the words “capable of”
to also read on future access times, as interpreted by the Examiner. We note
that patentability is based upon the claims. “It is the claims that measure the
invention.” SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107,
1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). Here, we agree with the Examiner, and
find that Research Disclosure discloses a displayed time value (i.e., access
time indicator) that is capable of indicating at least two or more different
access times with respect to one network address for successive accesses of
the same network address.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues for the first time that the claimed
“access time indicator” and “access times” are not identical because they are
used in close proximity in the claim, as supported by Bancorp Servs., L.L.C.
v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (see Reply
Br. 2). In response, we note that Bancorp Servs. L.L.C. is not an intervening
case. Additionally, we decline to consider this new argument that was not
previously raised in the Brief. See Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam
Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (an issue not raised in
an opening brief is waived).
For at least the aforementioned reasons, we conclude Appellant has
not established that the Examiner erred with respect to establishing a prima
facie case of anticipation. Because we find the Research Disclosure
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reference discloses all that is claimed, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
representative claim 1 as being anticipated by Research Disclosure.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii), we have decided the appeal
with respect to the remaining claims in this group on the basis of the selected
claim alone. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3,
7, 12, 13, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, 31, and 36 as being anticipated by Research
Disclosure for the same reasons discussed supra with respect to
representative claim 1.

Obviousness
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“What matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends
to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007). To be nonobvious, an improvement must be
“more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.” Id. at 1740. Appellant has the burden on appeal to
the Board to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an
applicant can overcome a rejection [under § 103] by showing insufficient
evidence of prima facie obviousness or by rebutting the prima facie case
with evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.”) (quoting In re
Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Therefore, we look to
Appellant’s Briefs to show error in the proffered prima facie case.

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Combinability under 35 U.S.C. § 103
With respect to each obviousness rejection before us, Appellant
contends the Examiner has provided insufficient evidence of motivation to
combine the references (see App. Br. pp. 11, 13-15, 17, and 18-19).
In view of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., our analysis here does not turn upon whether the Examiner has
provided an adequate teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the
references. Instead, we view the question before us to be whether sufficient
difference exists between the prior art and Appellants’ claims to render the
claims nonobvious. In KSR, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[w]hen a
patent ‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same
function it had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would
expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” KSR,
127 S. Ct. at 1740 (quoting Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282
(1976)).
This reasoning is applicable here. Regarding the combinability of the
Research Disclosure reference with Barrett, we find the Research Disclosure
web browser (that tracks download time) and Barrett’s network addresses or
URLs (Fig. 6) are merely familiar elements combinable according to known
methods in a manner that would have yielded predictable results. Our
reviewing court has reaffirmed that “[t]he combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” Leapfrog Enter., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.,
485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739).
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We find this reasoning applies to each of the obviousness rejections
on appeal. The Examiner merely relies on Barrick for its teaching of
associating colors with various download times (see Barrick, col. 8, ll. 7-20).
The Schneider reference is merely relied on for its teaching of a URL
autocomplete feature (see Schneider, col. 7, ll. 18-20). Lastly, the Killian
reference is merely relied on for its teaching of HTML tags (see Killian, col.
12, l. 59). For each of the Examiner’s obviousness rejections, we find the
cited references have complementary features (i.e., familiar elements) that
would have reasonably led an artisan having ordinary skill and common
sense to combine their teachings in the manner suggested by the Examiner.1
On page 14 of the Brief Appellant further contends that the Examiner
has engaged in hindsight in formulating the rejection of claims 5, 17, and 29.
We see no evidence of impermissible hindsight. Instead, we see
familiar elements (i.e., color indicators on a display) combinable according
to known methods in a manner that would have yielded predictable results
(see claims 5, 17, and 29).
With respect to all claims on appeal, Appellant has not shown that the
claimed combination of familiar elements produces any new function.
Moreover, Appellant has not provided any factual evidence of secondary
considerations, such as unexpected or unpredictable results, commercial
success, or long felt but unmet need. Thus, we find Appellant’s arguments

1 See In re Hoeschele, 406 F.2d 1403, 1406-07 (CCPA 1969) (“[I]t is
proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the references but
also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
expected to draw therefrom . . . .”).

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unpersuasive that the cited references have been improperly combined by
the Examiner.
Elements under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Dependent claims 4, 16, and 28
We consider the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4 as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett.
Appellant contends that changing the order of displaying URLs based
on their number of visits (as taught by Barrett) does not teach or suggest the
claim requirement of altering the display of the network address itself to
render an access time indicator. Instead, Appellant contends that the cited
columns 8 and 10 of Barrett discuss altering the order in which URLs are
displayed based on the number of previous visits to the page (App. Br. 11).
After considering the record before us, we find Appellant’s arguments
are directed to the individual references in isolation rather than the
combination of references as a whole. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has determined that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking
references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of
references. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Here, Barrett must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in
combination with the prior art as a whole. The Examiner relies upon the
Research Disclosure reference for teaching an access time indicator (see
Ans. 6). The Examiner looks to the Barrett secondary reference for its
teaching of altering the display of a network address on a display monitor
(Id.). We find the claim language “altering the display of the network
address” broadly but reasonably encompasses arranging or ranking network
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addresses (URLs) according to the frequency of previous visits, as shown by
Barrett in Figure 6. The Examiner’s rejection is based upon the combination
of the Research Disclosure reference with Barrett.
For at least the aforementioned reasons, we conclude Appellant has
not established that the Examiner erred with respect to establishing a prima
facie case of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 4 as being unpatentable over the teachings of Research Disclosure in
view of Barrett. Because claims 16 and 28 recite essentially the same
limitations as claim 4, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims as
being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett for the same
reasons discussed above regarding claim 4.

Dependent claims 6, 18, and 30
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6 as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett.
Appellant contends that Barrett does not teach or suggest rendering an
access time indicator of network addresses included in a page to display that
are embedded in the page to display. Instead, Appellant contends the cited
columns 8 and 10 of Barrett mention a web page providing information on a
current page and previously visited pages, including statistical information
on previously visited web pages (Fig. 6). Appellant contends that the cited
columns 8 and 10 of Barrett do not teach the “network addresses of pages
within a displayed page are rendered with the access time indicator of the
page.” (App. Br. 12).
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We disagree for essentially the same reasons discussed above
regarding the rejection of claim 4. Here, the Examiner again relies upon the
Research Disclosure reference for its teaching of an access time indicator
(See Ans. 7). The Examiner looks to the secondary Barrett reference for its
teaching and/or suggestion of “a network address included in the page to
display within the displayed page” (see claim 6; see also Barrett, Fig. 6; col.
8, ll. 49-61, col. 10, ll. 19-27; see also Ans. 7). We agree with the Examiner
that the URLs (network addresses) shown in Barrett’s Fig. 6 reasonably
teach and/or suggest the limitations of “a network address included in the
page to display within the displayed page” (see claim 6; see also Barrett, Fig.
6). We note again that the Examiner’s rejection is based upon the
combination of the Research Disclosure reference with Barrett.
For at least the aforementioned reasons, we conclude Appellant has
not established that the Examiner erred with respect to establishing a prima
facie case of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 6 as being unpatentable over the teachings of Research Disclosure in
view of Barrett. Because claims 18 and 30 recite essentially the same
limitations as claim 6, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims as
being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett for the same
reasons discussed above regarding claim 6.

Dependent claims 5, 17, and 29
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5 as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett, and further in
view of Barrick.
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Appellant contends that although the cited Barrick reference discusses
associating colors with different download performance levels, nowhere
does Barrick, or other references, teach or suggest altering the display of the
network address by displaying the network address in a color,
such that the color provides an access time indicator. Instead, Appellant
contends the cited Barrick reference concerns providing a qualitative
assessment of the download performance for a page and that this information
may be conveyed as information relative to an absolute scale, such as a
color. Appellant contends there is no teaching, suggestion or mention in the
cited Barrick reference of displaying network addresses in different colors as
part of rendering an access time indicator for a list of previously accessed
network addresses (App. Br. 14).
We disagree. We again find that Appellant’s arguments are directed
to the individual references in isolation rather than the combination of
references as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., Inc. at 1097. Here, we find
Barrick clearly teaches a “qualitative assessment” of green, yellow, and red
colors associated with download speeds that are fast (less than 2 seconds),
medium (greater than 2 seconds), and slow (greater than 4 seconds),
respectively (see Barrick, col. 8, ll. 7-20). Given that Research Disclosure
teaches an access time indicator (time value) that shows how many seconds
it took to download a page, we agree with the Examiner that the cited
combination of Research Disclosure, Barrett, and Barrick reasonably teaches
and/or suggests altering the display of the network address by displaying the
network address in a color, such that the color provides an access time
indicator.
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For at least the aforementioned reasons, we conclude Appellant has
not established that the Examiner erred with respect to establishing a prima
facie case of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 5 as being unpatentable over the teachings of Research Disclosure in
view of Barrett and Barrick. Because claims 17 and 29 recite essentially the
same limitations as claim 5, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these
claims as being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Barrett
and Barrick for the same reasons discussed above regarding claim 5.

Dependent claims 9, 21, and 33
Appellant contends that claims 9, 21, and 33 are patentable over
Research Disclosure in view of Barrett and Barrick for the same reasons
previously argued regarding claims 6, 18, and 30 (see App. Br. 15). Since
we have found Appellant has failed to show error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 6, 18, and 30, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 9, 21, and 33 for the same reasons previously discussed regarding
claims 6, 18, and 30 as being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view
of Barrett.

Dependent claims 11, 23, and 35
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Schneider.
Appellant contends that although the cited column 7 mentions
“autocomplete,” nowhere does the cited Schneider reference teach or
suggest the combination of requirements of rendering access time indicators
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for each network address in a list that begins with the receive characters the
user entered. Appellant further contends that the cited references do not
teach or suggest displaying access time indicators with addresses suggested
by the “autocomplete” feature (App. Br. 16).
We disagree. We note the Examiner again relies upon the Research
Disclosure reference for its teaching of an access time indicator (See Ans. 9).
The Examiner looks to the secondary Schneider reference for its teaching of
an “autocomplete feature [generated] from the URL history as text is entered
into the location field” (see Schneider, col. 7, ll. 19-20; see also Ans. 10).
The Examiner’s rejection is based upon the combination of the Research
Disclosure reference with Schneider. Given that Research Disclosure
teaches an access time indicator (time value), we agree with the Examiner
that the cited combination of Research Disclosure and Schneider reasonably
teaches and/or suggests rendering access time indicators for each network
address in a list that begins with the receive characters the user entered (i.e.,
an auto-completion feature), as well as displaying such access time
indicators with addresses suggested with the “autocomplete” feature.
For at least the aforementioned reasons, we conclude Appellant has
not established that the Examiner erred with respect to establishing a prima
facie case of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 11 as being unpatentable over the teachings of Research Disclosure in
view of Schneider. Because claims 23 and 35 recite essentially the same
limitations as claim 11, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims
as being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Schneider for the
same reasons discussed above regarding claim 11.
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Dependent claims 10, 22, and 34
We consider next the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 as being
unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of Killian.
Appellant contends that nowhere does the cited column 12 of Killian,
or any other cited reference, teach or suggest generating nodes for each
network address included in a page and then generating an attribute for each
network address node implementing the access time indicator for the
network address. Instead, Appellant contends the cited column 12 portion of
Killian merely discusses that a page being downloaded may have tags (App.
Br. 18).
The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner notes that Appellant
claims, in pertinent part: “generating a document object including nodes for
the tagged elements; [and] generating a node for each network address
included in the page;” (see Ans. 22, ¶1; see also claim 10). In particular, the
Examiner points out that the language of the claim does not require the
nodes generated for each network address to be the same nodes associated
with the tagged elements included in the generated document object (Id.).
In the Reply Brief Appellant “transverse[s] the Examiner’s finding
that the claims do not claim that the generated node is for each network
address because the claims recite ‘generating a node for each network
address included in the page.’” (Reply Br. 7; see also claim 10).
After considering the record before us, we find Appellant has
apparently misunderstood the Examiner’s position. The Examiner has
construed the language of the claim as not requiring the nodes generated for
each network address to be the same nodes associated with the tagged
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elements included in the generated document object (see Ans. 22, ¶1).
Because Appellant has not directly addressed the Examiner’s point of
argument in the Reply Brief, we find Appellant has failed to traverse the
Examiner’s legal conclusion of obviousness by responding to the
Examiner’s argument and explaining why the Examiner erred. We note that
a statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2006). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 10 as being unpatentable over the teachings of Research
Disclosure in view of Killian. Because claims 22 and 34 recite essentially
the same limitations as claim 10, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
these claims as being unpatentable over Research Disclosure in view of
Killian for the same reasons discussed above regarding claim 10.

OTHER ISSUE
In the event that prosecution is reopened in this application, we leave
it to the Examiner to consider a 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 25, 27-
31, and 33-36 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. From the
Specification it is clear that the scope of the claimed “article of manufacture
compis[ing] a computer readable medium including code” (independent
claim 25) broadly encompasses “wireless transmission media, signals
propagating through space, radio waves, infrared signals, etc.” (Spec. 11, ll.
1-3). This technology has been found to be non-statutory.
A claim directed to computer instructions embodied in a signal is not
statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357
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(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“A transitory, propagating signal like Nuijten’s is not a
‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.’ Those four
categories define the explicit scope and reach of subject matter patentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101; thus, such a signal cannot be patentable subject
matter.”).

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the findings of facts and analysis above, we conclude that
Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3, 7, 12,
13, 15, 19, 24, 25, 27, 31, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) for anticipation.
Likewise, we conclude that Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 4-6, 9-11, 16-18, 21-23, 28-30, and 33-35 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) for obviousness.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1, 3-7, 9-13, 15-19, 21-
25, 27-31, and 33-36 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ce

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