Ex Parte Duluk et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 27, 2016

13442730 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/442,730 04/09/2012 Jerome F. DULUK JR. NVDA/SC-11-0313-US1 7469
102324 7590 12/29/2016
Arte.ois T aw Omim T T P/NVTDTA
EXAMINER
7710 Cherry Park Drive Suite T #104
Houston, TX 77095
KIM, DONG U
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2196
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/29/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
kcruz @ artegislaw.com
ALGdocketing @ artegislaw.com
mmccauley @ artegislaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JEROME F. DULUK JR., JESSE DAVID HALL,
PHILIP ALEXANDER CUADRA, and
KARIM M. ABDALLA
Appeal 2016-002024
Application 13/442,7301
Technology Center 2100
Before LARRY J. HUME, NORMAN H. BEAMER, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1,2, 10, 11, 19, and 20. The Examiner indicates
claims 3—9 and 12—18 are drawn to allowable subject matter. Final Act. 8.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is NVIDIA Corp. App.
Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-002024
Application 13/442,730
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants' disclosed and claimed inventions "generally relate[] to
resource management, and more specifically to methods and apparatus for
auto-throttling encapsulated compute tasks." Spec. 11.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal (emphasis added to contested limitation):
1. A method for auto-throttling encapsulated compute
tasks, the method comprising:
receiving one or more tasks to be scheduled for execution
by a processor that includes a plurality of parallel processing
units, wherein the processor may be configured in a non-
throttled mode in which a first number of the plurality of
parallel processing units are active for processing tasks or a
throttled mode in which a second number of the plurality of
parallel processing units are active for processing tasks, the
second number being smaller than the first number;
determining whether at least one of the tasks scheduled
for execution may be executed only when the processor is
configured in the throttled mode\ and
if none of the tasks require the processor to be configured
in the throttled mode, then configuring the processor to activate
the first number of parallel processing units, or if at least one of
the tasks require the processor to be configured in the throttled
2 Our decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
May 11, 2015); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Nov. 30, 2015); Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Sept. 28, 2015); Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Oct. 6, 2014); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed
Apr. 9, 2012).
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mode, then configuring the processor to activate the second
number of parallel processing units.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Goudy et al. ("Goudy") US 7,747,842 B1 June 29, 2010
Nickolls et al. ("Nickolls") US 2011/0087860 Al Apr. 14, 2011
Rejection on Appeal
Claims 1,2, 10, 11, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Nickolls and Goudy.
Final Act. 4.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 11—12), we decide the
appeal of the obviousness rejection of claims 1,2, 10, 11, 19, and 20 on the
basis of representative claim 1.
ISSUE
Appellants argue (App. Br. 11—12; Reply Br. 5—8) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Nickolls and Goudy is in error. These contentions present us
with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests "[a] method for auto-throttling encapsulated compute tasks" that
includes, inter alia, the step of "determining whether at least one of the tasks
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scheduled for execution may be executed only when the processor is
configured in the throttled mode," as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments that
Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1, 2,
10, 11, 19, and 20, and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own: (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's
Answer in response to Appellants' arguments. We incorporate such
findings, reasons, and rebuttals herein by reference unless otherwise noted.
However, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments
regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows.
Appellants contend "Nickolls does not teach or suggest determining
whether a task that is scheduled for execution may be executed only when a
processor is configured in a throttled mode, as required by claim 1." App.
Br. 11. Further, "Nickolls simply discloses the typical tradeoff between
processing resource availability and the amount of work that can be
processed at any given time. By contrast, claim 1 recites determining
whether a particular task scheduled for execution may be executed only
when a processor is configured in a throttled mode." Id.
Appellants allege the Examiner is mapping the contested limitation
"to the portion of Nickolls that discloses determining whether a core has
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'sufficient resources' to execute 'another [cooperative thread arrays] CTA.'"
Id. Appellants urge, however, that determining whether a core has sufficient
resources to execute a CTA is not the same as determining whether a
particular task may be executed only when a processor is configured in a
throttled mode, as required by claim 1. "Nickolls does not teach a throttled
mode of a processor, much less that the throttled mode has a specific number
of active parallel processing units that is less than a number of active parallel
processing units in another mode." App. Br. 12. Appellants further allege
Goudy does not make up for the alleged deficiencies of Nickolls with
respect to the contested limitation of claim 1. Id.
In the Reply Brief (1), Appellants reiterate their argument by stating
"the Examiner still has not provided any teaching from Nickolls of
determining whether a particular task scheduled for execution may be
executed only when a processor is configured in a throttled mode.
Consequently, Nickolls cannot be properly interpreted as meeting the
[argued] limitations of claim 1."
As an initial matter of claim construction, we give the claim its
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In
re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "In the patentability
context, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretations . . .
limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification." In re
Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Utilizing Appellants' Specification, the Examiner interprets "throttled
mode" as "limiting a number of CTAs that can execute concurrently based
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on resource availability." Ans. 3 (citing Appellants' PGPub 171,
corresponding to Spec. 1 69).
When a TMD 322 needing multiple CTAs that each require
large amounts of memory are ready to be scheduled for
execution, the task/work unit 207 may limit (i.e., throttle) the
number of CTAs that execute concurrently so the CTAs do not
attempt to consume more memory than is available for access
by the TMD 322. Examples of parameters related to the amount
of memory available for each thread of a CTA include a size of
one or more local memory regions, a number of registers, size
of memory that may be directly addressed by the TMD 322
through an LI cache, an amount of shared memory for a single
CTA, and a number of barrier operations for each CTA.
Spec. 1 69.
The Examiner reads the recited "one or more tasks" of claim 1 onto
the disclosed cooperative thread arrays (CTA) of Nickolls. Final Act. 4—5;
Ans. 3. We note Appellants have not cited to a definition of "task" in the
Specification that would preclude the Examiner's broader reading.3
The Examiner finds, with respect to the teachings and suggestions of
the Nickolls reference:
[T]he act of throttling is clearly evident within the Nickolls
disclosure, Nickolls teaches one of the tasks scheduled for
3 While Appellants' Specification does provide an exemplary embodiment
detailing how tasks may be stored and utilized in the system, e.g., "a task
table 345 that includes slots for each task scheduled on each of the SMs
310," and "[a]t step 714, work distribution unit 340 determines whether any
scheduled tasks require PPU 202 to be run in a throttled mode" (Spec.
1100), we decline to import such limitations into the claims. While we
interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we
nonetheless must not import limitations from the Specification into the
claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc) (citations omitted).
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execution may be executed only when the processor is
configured in the throttled mode. In other words, [cooperative
thread array] CTA which require the use of all 16 barrier points
can only run when the system limits other CTAs from running
to make resources available to assign it to the CTA which
requires the use of all barrier points. Therefore, CTA which
requires all barrier point can only run on a processor that has
the throttle mode configured.
. . . [I]f throttled mode was not available a CTA which
requires all 16 barrier points with total of 16 barriers available
would not be able to execute until no other CTAs are running
with the processing system.
Ans. 4.
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, we agree with the
Examiner's finding that the combination of Nickolls and Goudy teaches or at
least suggests all the limitations of claim 1, and particularly agree that
Nickolls' disclosure of CTA processing in the manner described teaches or at
least suggests the contested limitation of claim 1.
Accordingly, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
not persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the combined teachings
and suggestions of the cited prior art combination to teach or suggest the
disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error in the Examiner's
resulting legal conclusion of obviousness. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 2, 10, 11, 19, and 20 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping,
supra.
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REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 5—9) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in
the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised
in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the
Examiner's Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37
CE.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellants have not shown.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err with respect to the obviousness rejection of
claims 1,2, 10, 11, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior
art combination of record, and we sustain the rejection.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1,2, 10, 11, 19,
and 20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. §41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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