Ex Parte Drexler

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 27, 2008

09974222 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 27, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte JEROME P. DREXLER
____________

Appeal 2007-2951
Application 09/974,2221
Technology Center 2100
____________

Decided: February 27, 2008
____________

Before LANCE LEONARD BARRY, HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, and
JEAN R. HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1 through 29. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We affirm.

1 Filed on October 09, 2001. Honeywell International Inc. is the real party in
interest.
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Application 09/974,222

The Invention
Appellant invented a method for transferring data from an electronic
mail (e-mail) message to a relational database. (Spec. 1.) As depicted in
Figures 1 and 2, upon receiving an incoming e-mail message (10), a
database import utility program (40) examines the received message to
determine whether it meets certain predefined selection criteria (50). If it
does, the utility program (40) concludes that the e-mail is in a predefined
format, and parses it into a plurality of data strings (44). (Spec. 6.)
Subsequently, a string association block (64) associates the parsed data
strings with corresponding fields in the database (80). The relationships
between the parsed data strings and associated database fields are
subsequently stored (68). (Spec. 4-7.)
An understanding of the invention can be derived from exemplary
claims 1, 3, and 11, which read as follows:
1. A method of recording data to a database that has a number of
database locations, the method comprising the steps of:
receiving an electronic mail message, the electronic mail message
including a set of data elements;
selecting a first subset of the data elements;
saving the first subset of data elements to a first location of the
database;
selecting a second subset of the data elements; and
saving the second subset of data elements to a second location of the
database.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the step of determining whether an
electronic mail message is in a predefined format includes the steps of:
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counting the number of times a predetermined delimiter character
appears in the electronic mail message; and
comparing the number of times that the predetermined delimiter
character appears in the electronic mail message to an expected number.

11. A method of recording data to a database that has a number of
database fields, the method comprising the steps of:
parsing an electronic mail message into a number of parsed data
strings;
providing a correspondence between selected parsed data strings and a
database field in the database; and
saving each of the selected parsed data strings to the corresponding
database field in the database.

The Examiner relied upon the following prior art to reject the claims
on appeal:
Payne US 6,092,090 Jul. 18, 2000
Barnishan US 6,654,950B1 Nov. 25, 2003

The Examiner rejected the claims on appeal as follows:
A. Claims 1, 2, and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Payne.
B. Claims 3 through 9 and 11 through 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Payne and
Barnishan.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The following findings of fact (FF) are supported by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Payne
1. Payne discloses a method and system for indexing electronic
documents to effectively manage the documents in a paperless office
environment. (Abstract.) Incoming documents are received in the form of
hardcopy (periodicals and correspondence that are scanned), facsimile, or
email. (Col. 2, ll. 47-48.) Upon receiving the document, a module (210)
determines the type or format of the document (i.e. an e-mail, a fax, or
other). The received electronic document is parsed to extract therefrom key
attributes that are stored as text based records in one or more pre-engineered
database to separately index the associated documents. (Col. 2, ll. 50-55,
col. 5, ll. 50-55.) The actual image of the document is separately stored in
an image database server (40). (Col. 5, ll. 56-59.)
2. Upon receiving a facsimile document, it is parsed to separate
the address information from the actual text of the document. In other
words, the addressee of the fax inputs into the database select data about the
received fax including the subject, author, date, etc. The system
subsequently indexes the received facsimile document by creating an index
card entry for the fax in one or more databases. (Col. 3, ll. 55-65.) Each of
the databases includes a series of indices that separately delineate key
attributes for a particular category of documents. (Col. 4, l. 66- col. 5, l. 8.)
3. A single image file is also created for the fax. The image file is
stored in a database file server (image server 40) that includes a plurality of
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file entries representing pointers to the address location for each of the
documents stored therein. (Col. 4, ll. 1-3.)
4. Payne indicates that the disclosed system handles e-mail and
facsimile documents in a similar fashion. Upon receiving an e-mail, the
system parses the e-mail address from the associated text. It then stores the
text of the e-mail in a text based file. Finally, it stores and indexes the
address entries of the e-mail in a separate database. (Col. 6, ll. 10-22.)
5. As depicted in Figure 5, Payne discloses a resident database
that classifies various document types. The resident database uses a form
structure (510) to allow a user to input data in the database for each
document type. (Col. 7, ll. 16-27.)
6. As shown in Figure 6, the form (610) includes several fields
specific to the data associated with the document type being indexed. These
fields allow documents to be formatted in accordance with the user-input
data in the form structure. (Col. 8, ll. 1-26.)

Barnishan
7. Barnishan discloses a method and system for translating a
dialect in a legacy program into another target dialect. (Abstract.)
8. As shown in Figures 12A, 12B, upon loading the code of the
legacy dialect (220) into a database, a re-host program (210) pre-formats and
parses the code into branches and sub-branches of a tree as determined by
delimiters and separators used in the dialect. The parsed code is stored in the
database in a tree structure. (Col. 10, ll. 26-40.)
9. As shown in Figures 15A, 15B each branch or sub-branch of
the formatted dialect code is compared with previously created statements in
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a translation model (404) for the target dialect. Upon matching each line in
the formatted dialect code with a corresponding line in the translation model
(404), the translated dialect code is stored in a text box. (Col. 10, ll. 46-61.)
10. Barnishan discloses post processing activities, such as adding
the number of lines, delimiters, and any other features of the target dialect.
(Col. 10, l. 66 - col. 11, l. 3.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
1. ANTICIPATION
“It is axiomatic that anticipation of a claim under § 102 can be found
only if the prior art reference discloses every element of the claim.” See In
re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “a single prior art reference
that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a claim
invalidates that claim by anticipation.” Perricone v. Medicis
Pharmaceutical Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976
F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). “Anticipation of a patent claim requires
a finding that the claim at issue ‘reads on’ a prior art reference.” Atlas
Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In other
words, if granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow the
patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art, then that claim is
anticipated, regardless of whether it also covers subject matter not in the
prior art.”) (internal citations omitted).
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2. OBVIOUSNESS
Appellant has the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error
in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection
[under § 103] by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness
or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of
nonobviousness.”) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,
1734 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of
underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the
prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the
prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called
secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1966). See also KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734 (“While the sequence of these
questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors
continue to define the inquiry that controls.”)
“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
Leapfrog Enter., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (quoting KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007)).
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Discussing the obviousness of claimed combinations of elements of
prior art, KSR explains:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida [v. AG
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)] and Anderson's-Black Rock[,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)] are
illustrative-a court must ask whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740. Where the claimed subject matter cannot be fairly
characterized as involving the simple substitution of one known element for
another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art
ready for the improvement, a holding of obviousness can be based on a
showing that there was “an apparent reason to combine the known elements
in the fashion claimed.” KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740-41. Such a showing
requires “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id., 127 S. Ct. at 1741
(quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
The reasoning given as support for the conclusion of obviousness can
be based on interrelated teachings of multiple patents, the effects of demands
known to the design community or present in the marketplace, and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the
art. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740-41. See also Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H.
Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) which states:
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[A]n implicit motivation to combine exists not only when a
suggestion may be gleaned from the prior art as a whole, but
when the “improvement” is technology-independent and the
combination of references results in a product or process that is
more desirable, for example because it is stronger, cheaper,
cleaner, faster, lighter, smaller, more durable, or more efficient.
Because the desire to enhance commercial opportunities by
improving a product or process is universal—and even
common-sensical—we have held that there exists in these
situations a motivation to combine prior art references even
absent any hint of suggestion in the references themselves. In
such situations, the proper question is whether the ordinary
artisan possesses knowledge and skills rendering him capable
of combining the prior art references.
Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162 (holding it “obvious to combine the Bevan
device with the SSR to update it using modern electronic components in
order to gain the commonly understood benefits of such adaptation, such as
decreased size, increased reliability, simplified operation, and reduced
cost”).
Also, a reference may suggest a solution to a problem it was not
designed to solve and thus does not discuss. As stated in KSR:
Common sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have
obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases
a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. . . . A person
of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
The prior art relied on to prove obviousness must be analogous art.
As explained in Kahn,
the “analogous-art” test . . . has long been part of the primary
Graham analysis articulated by the Supreme Court. See Dann
[v. Johnston,] 425 U.S. [219,] 227-29 . . . [1976], Graham,
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383 U.S. at 35. . . The analogous-art test requires that the
Board show that a reference is either in the field of the
applicant's endeavor or is reasonably pertinent to the problem
with which the inventor was concerned in order to rely on that
reference as a basis for rejection. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d [at]
1447 . . . References are selected as being reasonably pertinent
to the problem based on the judgment of a person having
ordinary skill in the art. Id. (“[I]t is necessary to consider ‘the
reality of the circumstances,’—in other words, common
sense—in deciding in which fields a person of ordinary skill
would reasonably be expected to look for a solution to the
problem facing the inventor.” (quoting In re Wood, 599 F.2d
1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
Kahn, 441 F.3d at 986-87. See also In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (“[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a
different field from that of the inventor's endeavor, it is one which, because
of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to
an inventor's attention in considering his problem.”).
In view of KSR’s holding that “any need or problem known in the
field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can
provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed,”
127 S. Ct. at 1742 (emphasis added), it is clear that the second part of the
analogous-art test as stated in Clay, supra, must be expanded to require a
determination of whether the reference, even though it may be in a different
field from that of the inventor's endeavor, is one which, because of the
matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an
artisan’s (not necessarily the inventor’s) attention in considering any need or
problem known in the field of endeavor. Furthermore, although under KSR
it is not always necessary to identify a known need or problem as a
motivation for modifying or combining the prior art, it is nevertheless
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always necessary that the prior art relied on to prove obviousness be
analogous. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740 (“The Court [in United States v.
Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966)] recognized that when a patent claims a
structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere
substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination
must do more than yield a predictable result.”) (emphasis added). See also
Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 280 (“Our independent examination of that evidence
persuades us of its sufficiency to support the District Court's finding ‘as a
fact that each and all of the component parts of this patent . . . were old and
well-known throughout the dairy industry long prior to the date of the filing
of the application for the Gribble patent.’”).

ANALYSIS
A. 35 U.S.C § 102(b) REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, and 10
Independent claim 1 recites in relevant part saving a first subset and a
second subset of an electronic mail message respectively in a first location
and a second location of a database. (App. Br., Claims Appendix.)
Appellant argues that Payne does not teach an electronic mail message that
includes set of data elements (excluding the address lines (From…To), and
the subject line of the e-mail) that are stored in different locations of the
database. Therefore, Appellant argues that Payne does not anticipate
independent claim 1. (App. Br. 14.)2

2 This decision relies and refers to the Appeal Brief filed on Sep. 29, 2005.
We have not considered the substitute Brief filed on Feb 02, 2006 since it
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In response, the Examiner avers that Payne’s address lines are subsets
of the electronic mail message that are stored separately in one or more
databases. Therefore, the Examiner concludes that Payne anticipates
independent claim 1. (Ans. 14.)
Thus, the precise issue before us turns on whether Payne’s address
lines qualify as subsets of the e-mail message that are stored in separate
locations of a database. We answer this inquiry in the affirmative.
We begin by considering the scope and meaning of “email message”
which must be given its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with
Appellant’s disclosure, as explained in In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1997):
[T]he PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the
broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary
usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of
definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written
description contained in the applicant's specification.
Id. at 1054. See also In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating
that claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow.”
Appellant’s Specification states the following:
The email message 10 may be of various types and formats. A
typical email message 10 may include information such as the address
of the sender, the address of the recipient, and message text. Such an
email message 10 could also include an attachment, such as a file or
program or header lines such as the subject line, a CC line, a BCC
line, etc. (Emphasis Added.)
(Spec. 4-5.)

was refused entry by the Examiner, and Appellants failed to timely petition
the Examiner’s refusal to enter the brief.
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Our reviewing court further states, “[t]he ‘ordinary meaning’ of a
claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire
patent.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Upon reviewing Appellant’s Specification, we find that “email
message” can be reasonably construed to include information such as the
addresses of the sender and recipient of the email.
As set forth in the Finding of Fact (FF) section above, Payne discloses
parsing a received email into its address entries and the text of the email.
(FF 4.) Payne further discloses storing and indexing the address entries in
one or more databases. (FF 1-4.) Additionally, Payne discloses storing the
text of the email in a separate image database. (Id.) We find that one of
ordinary skill would readily recognize from Payne’s disclosure that,
consistently with Appellant’s Specification, the disclosed address entries and
text are integral subsets of the email message that are stored in different
locations. Particularly, the ordinarily skilled artisan would aptly appreciate
that Payne’s address entries are stored and indexed as separate records in a
database. It follows that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
finding that Payne anticipates independent claim 1.

Regarding claim 2, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection
lacks specificity, and that Payne does not teach determining whether the
email is in a predefined format. (App. Br. 15-16.) In response, the
Examiner explains that Payne teaches the predefined formats by providing
particular forms to input data in order to create documents of corresponding
types. (Ans. 16-17.) We agree with the Examiner.
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Payne discloses a mechanism for identifying various types of
documents. Particularly, Payne provides certain forms that include various
fields into which a user inputs data pertaining to each incoming email
document to thereby classify said document in the database according to its
type. (FF 5-6.) The ordinarily skilled artisan would readily recognize that
the choice of a previously structured form as an aid to index an incoming
email document in the database is indicative of the type, as well as the
predefined format of said document. The rationale behind this conclusion is
that the number of fields in the input forms for a particular database dictate
the number of strings and corresponding delimiters in the parsed document
that are needed to be filled in that database. Further, we note that Payne’s
disclosure of whether an incoming document is a fax or an email (see Figure
3) suggests that a determination is made of whether an email meets certain
predefined format before it can be identified as such. We are therefore
satisfied that the Examiner did make a sufficient prima facie case of
anticipation, which Appellant failed to successfully rebut. Thus, Appellant
has failed to show that the Examiner erred in finding that Payne anticipates
dependent claim 2.

Appellant did not provide separate arguments with respect to the
rejection of dependent claim 10. Therefore, we select independent claim 1
as being representative of the cited claim. Consequently, claim 10 falls
together with representative claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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B. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) REJECTIONS
Claims 3 through 9
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 through 9
lacks specificity, and therefore it fails to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness. (App. Br. 16.) Further, Appellant argues that neither Payne
nor Barnishan teaches the limitations of claims 3 and 4. (App. Br. 16-17.)
However, beyond these mere allegations, Appellant has not even attempted
to show any deficiencies in the portions of Payne and Barnishan upon which
the Examiner relied to reject the cited claims. Such allegations are
insufficient to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. A
statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Further, as explained by the Examiner at pages 17
and 18 of the Answer, we note that the fields in Payne’s input forms for
entering attributes of a document are indicative of an equal number of
delimiters and strings contained in the parsed document. Additionally,
Barnishan explicitly discloses using delimiters to parse a dialect into data
strings, and subsequently comparing the strings in the dialect to previously
generated strings by a translation model in a second dialect, and finally
adding the number of delimiters in a translated dialect. (FF. 9-10.)
Therefore, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have readily recognized that
Payne’s email, taken in combination with Barnishan’s dialect translation
model, would have predictably resulted in counting delimiters in an email
document and comparing them with previously computer delimiters
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generated by the translation model.3 On this record, we are therefore
satisfied that the Examiner did make a sufficient prima facie case of
obviousness, which Appellant failed to successfully rebut. It follows that
Appellant has failed to show that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Payne and Barnishan renders claims 3 and 4 unpatentable.
Appellant did not provide separate arguments with respect to the
rejection of dependent claims 5 through 9. Therefore, we select dependent
claim 3 as being representative of the cited claims. Consequently, claims 5
through 9 fall together with representative claim 3. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Claims 11 through 29
Independent claim 11 recites in relevant part parsing a message into a
number of data strings that are saved into corresponding database fields.
(App. Br., Claims Appendix.) Appellant argues that the combination of
Payne and Barnishan does not teach the cited limitation. (App. Br. 17.)
Further, Appellant argues that the proffered combination is improper since
Payne and Barnishan are non-analogous prior art. Particularly, Appellant
argues that Payne indexes an entire document including an email; and even
though Barnishan teaches parsing a legacy code into a tree structure, it has
nothing to do with an email message. (App. Br. 18-19.)

3 The Supreme Court has held that in analyzing the obviousness of
combining elements, a court need not find specific teachings, but rather may
consider "the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art" and "the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ." See KSR Int’l, at 1740-41. To be
nonobvious, an improvement must be "more than the predictable use of prior
art elements according to their established functions." Id. at 1740.

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In response, the Examiner asserts that Payne’s disclosure of custom
forms with a predetermined number of fields for inputting data strings of a
parsed document to be indexed in a database teaches the claimed limitation.
(Ans. 19.) Further, the Examiner submits that both Payne and Barnishan are
directed to processing text files. Therefore, they are analogous.
We agree with the Examiner.
As discussed above, Payne’s teaching of forms with predefined fields
are indicative of the number of parsed strings for the email document that
will be indexed in the database. Further, Payne discloses storing the email
address lines in at least one database record, which by definition spans at
least two fields. Therefore, the ordinarily skilled artisan would readily
recognize that each instance (intersection between the row and a field) in the
database record stores one of the parsed strings (address lines) therein.
Additionally, as discussed above, Barnishan explicitly discloses parsing a
text into strings that are subsequently stored in a database in a tree structure
(FF 8.) The ordinarily skilled artisan would have readily recognized that
Payne’s email, taken in combination with Barnishan’s text parsing scheme,
would have predictably resulted in parsing an email into data strings that are
stored in corresponding fields in a database.
Appellant’s argument that the cited references are not analogous is not
persuasive. Both references, as noted by the Examiner, reasonably pertain to
the problem of parsing a textual document for storage in a database. The
ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized that the references disclose
known elements that perform known functions to produce a predictable
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result.4 We further note that Payne teaches all the limitations of independent
claim 11. As discussed above, Payne teaches parsing the email document
into data strings that are stored as a database record spanning a plurality
fields. It follows that Appellant failed to show that the Examiner erred in
concluding that the combined teachings of Payne and Barnishan renders
claim 11 unpatentable.
Appellant did not provide separate arguments with respect to the
rejection of dependent claims 12 through 15. Therefore, we select
dependent claim 11 as being representative of the cited claims.
Consequently, claims 12 through 15 fall together with representative claim
11. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
Regarding the rejection of claims 16 through 29, Appellant
substantially repeats the same arguments proffered for independent claims 1
and 11 above. In other instances, Appellant merely alleges that the
combination of Payne and Barnishan does not teach the limitations of certain
claims. (App. Br. 20-21.) We have addressed these arguments and
allegations in great detail in our earlier discussion above. We find these
arguments unpersuasive. Similarly, we find these allegations unsupported
by the facts in the record before us. Consequently, it is our view that
Appellant has failed to show that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 16
through 29 over the combination of Payne and Barnishan.

SUMMARY
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner failed to establish that:
A. Claims 1, 2, and 10 are anticipated by Payne under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

4 Id.
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B. Claims 3 through 9 and 11 through 29 are unpatentable over the
combination of Payne and Barnishan under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1 through 29.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

ce

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