Ex Parte Drake et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 20, 2018

13944806 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 20, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/944,806 07/17/2013
94468 7590 11/23/2018
DISNEY ENTERPRISES INC.
c/o Patent Ingenuity, P.C.
9701 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1000
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Edward Drake
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
DISNEY-0710-US 5616
EXAMINER
FENSTERMACHER, JASON B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/23/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ssimpson@patentingenuity.com
patents@patentingenuity.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte EDWARD DRAKE, MARK ARANA, and EV AN ACOSTA
Appeal2018-005056
Application 13/944,806
Technology Center 3600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Illustrative Claim
Illustrative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows;
1. A method comprising:
receiving, at a server, a first key from a mobile device,
the mobile device comprising a mobile device proximity-based
device that receives the first key from a product and/or product
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Disney Enterprises,
Inc. App. Br. 2.
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package proximity-based device associated with a product
and/or a product package when the mobile device is within a
proximity to the product and/or product package proximity-
based device, the product and/ or the product package being a
physical apparatus;
receiving, at the server, a second key from the mobile
device;
receiving, at the server from the mobile device, a third
key that is a hash token of the first key and the second key
generated by a checkout device after purchase of the product
and/or the product package in proximity to the checkout device;
receiving, at the server, the third key from the checkout
device after purchase of the product and/or the product package
in proximity to the checkout device;
determining, at the server, if the third key received from
the mobile device matches the third key received from the
checkout device; and
automatically providing, with the server, a cloud-based
entitlement to media content associated with the product and/or
the product package to a user identifier based upon the third key
received from the mobile device matching the third key
received from the checkout device without a user associated
with the user identifier requesting the cloud-based entitlement.
App. Br. 14 (Appendix A).
Rejections on Appeal
1. The Examiner rejected claims 1-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. 2 See Ans. 3.
2 We select claim 1 as representative. Separate patentability, in compliance
with 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv), is not argued for claims 2-23. See App.
Br. 7-9; see also Reply Br. 2--4. Accordingly, except for our ultimate
decision, the rejection of claims 2-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not discussed
further herein.
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2. The Examiner rejected claims 1-5, 8-16, and 19-23 under
35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being unpatentable over Rosenblatt et al.
(US 2010/0174599 Al; published July 8, 2010) ("Rosenblatt"), Hsu et al.
(US 2003/0069904 Al; published Apr. 10, 2003) ("Hsu"), and Khan
(US 2013/0325718 Al; published Dec. 5, 2003) ("Khan"). 3 See Ans. 3.
3. The Examiner rejected claims 6-7 and 17-18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Rosenblatt, Hsu, Khan, and Schorr et al.
(US 2008/0172306 Al; published July 17, 2008) ("Schorr"). See Ans. 3.
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants'
contention that the Examiner erred. Instead, we concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own the
reasoning set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and
Examiner's Answer.
3 The patentability of claims 2-23 is not separately argued from that of claim
I. See App. Br. 12. Accordingly, except for our ultimate decision, the
rejection of claims 2-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is not discussed further
herein.
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A. Section 101 Case Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework previously
set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in
that analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. Id. The Court
acknowledged in Mayo that "all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. Therefore, we look to whether the claims
focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology
or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and,
otherwise, merely recite generic processes and machinery. See Enfish, LLC
v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are
not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry
proceeds to the second step, in which the elements of the claims are
considered "individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine
whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a
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patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 ( quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 79, 78).
B. Alice/Mayo - Step 1
The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to "the abstract idea of
receiving information/data related to a purchase in order to automatically
provide an extra benefit resulting from the purchase." Final Act. 6.
Appellants contend claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because:
[T]he pending claims are directed toward the tangible
technological problem of preventing mobile devices from
falsely obtaining cloud-based entitlements. For instance, the
Specification states the following: "[a]s a result, a different
mobile device is prevented from posing as the mobile device 106
to obtain entitlement as the different mobile device would not
have the hash token." . . . That particular hash configuration is
specifically recited in the pending claims as being the "third key
that is a hash token of the first key and the second key generated
by a checkout device." The "third key" is received by the server
from both the "mobile device" and the "checkout device," as
recited by the pending claims. A matching of the third key is
performed at the "server," as recited by the pending claims, to
authenticate cloud-based entitlement for the particular mobile
device in question; such authentication solves the technological
problem of mobile devices falsely obtaining cloud-based
entitlements.
Accordingly, the pending claims are directed toward a
tangible, technological solution for authenticating mobile
devices for entitlements that uniquely differs from previous
manual entitlement approaches. Therefore, the pending claims
are not directed toward an abstract idea.
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Further, the Response explained that the pending claims
encompass a rule-based approach that improves the way a
computer operates/or similar reasons as McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed Cir. 2016)
The Advisory Action replied by stating "[t]he fact that the
claims uses a rules-based approach to determine if the
entitlement is provided adds little or nothing in determining the
patentability of the claims as the use of similar/identical rule-
based approaches were used for years in the retail industry." ...
Yet, interestingly enough, the Advisory Action attempted
to combine three prior art references - and even four prior art
references for some claims - to arrive at the pending claims. If
the rules-based approach of the pending claims was as
prevalent as stated by the Advisory Action, a single prior art
reference could have easily been cited by the Advisory Action;
that was not the case.
The Advisory Action's characterization of the rule-based
approach of the pending claims may stem from an inaccurate
interpretation of what the rules are in the pending claims. For
instance, the Advisory Action states that "[t]he 'rule' found in
the claim is merely a requirement that the user submit the
appropriate data required to obtain the entitlement." Yet, such
an interpretation does not fully consider the technological
authentication-based rules of the pending claims that help
prevent a mobile phone from falsely obtaining an entitlement
(e.g., "receiving, at the server from the mobile device, a third key
that is a hash token of the first key and the second key generated
by a checkout device," "receiving, at the server, the third key
from the checkout device after purchase of the product and/ or the
product package in proximity to the checkout device," and
"determining, at the server, if the third key received from the
mobile device matches the third key received from the checkout
device").
As the pending claims provide specific rules for
authenticating a mobile phone to receive a cloud-based
entitlement, the pending claims do not preempt all processes
from performing cloud-based entitlement. Thus, the pending
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claims are directed toward patent eligible subject matter for
similar reasons as McRO.
App. Br. 7-9 (Appellants' citations omitted; panel emphasis added).
The Examiner responds:
Examiner contends, that claims 1-23 are directed to the abstract
idea of receiving information/data related to a purchase in
order to automatically provide an extra benefit resulting from
the purchase. It is a well-established practice in the retail
industry to offer entitlements (i.e. an extra benefit) as a result
of a purchase. A customer may purchase a product, fill in a form
(e.g., a rebate) providing information such as the customer name,
provide proof that they purchased the product, and as a result
obtain an entitlement from a merchant and/or a manufacture. It
is also well-known that in some instances these entitlements can
also be given to a particular individual. For example, an
entitlement could be in the form of a rebate check made payable
to the customer, or an entitlement could be added to a particular
user account (e.g., promotional access to cable channels for a
certain subscriber, a refund added to a subscriber account, or
other benefits added to subscriber accounts, etc.). The instant
claims merely seek to automate the same practice used for years
by individuals in the retail industry. It is important to note that
the various "keys", recited in the claim( s ), are not encryption
keys (e.g., used to encrypt or decrypt data). Rather, the
specification describes that each "key" (i.e. the first, second, and
third key) represents a certain type of data involved in a
transaction and/or in providing the entitlement. The independent
claims do not require that the first or second keys contain, or
represent, a particular kind of data, rather, dependent claims 2-6
and 13-17 further define the data these keys may represent. Thus
the fact that the comparison/matching involves keys (i.e. the
third key) offers no technological improvement by itself as it
merely describes a comparison of data.
. . . . [T]he limitations recited in the claims describe steps
that are highly similar, if not identical, to the steps used by
individuals in the retail industry. Unlike McRO, Appellant[s
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are] ... merely using the server as a tool to automate the same
widely known steps, and there is no indication that the
particular steps recited in the claims are the reason why this
retail practice can now be automated. . . . It is clear that the
instant claims are not directed to a specific improvement to
computer functionality. Rather, they are directed to the use of
conventional or generic technology (i.e. a server) . ... The
specification fails to provide any technical details for the
tangible components, but instead predominately describes the
method in purely functional terms. Put differently, the described
computing device(s) is/are merely a conduit for the abstract idea.
Accordingly, it is concluded that the claims are directed to an
abstract idea and are not directed to an improvement to computer
functionality .
. . . . The position taken by Appellant[ s] that an invention
automatically contains an inventive concept when the prior art
rejection uses multiple references, or is allegedly non-obvious, is
incorrect. . . . In other words, novelty test should not belong in
determining 101. Even if novelty were considered, the
secondary references (i.e. Hsu and Khan) used in the rejection
of claim 1 were only used to teach that the format of the data
sent to the server was known, however, the sending and
comparing of the data was all shown in a single reference.
Further, Appellant[ s are] . . . not claiming a particular way to
generate a hash token, rather, Appellant[ s are] . . . merely
describing the data, or its format, that is received at the server
from the mobile device and/or checkout device.
Ans. 5-8 ( emphasis added).
In response, Appellants continue to contend that claim 1 is not
directed to an abstract idea under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because:
[T]he Examiner's Answer stated that"[ c ]ontrary to Appellant[ s ']
arguments, there is nothing in claim 1, or any claim for that
matter, that prevents one mobile device from falsely obtaining
cloud-based entitlements intended for another device." . . . The
Examiner's contention mischaracterizes claim 1, which clearly
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recites "automatically providing, with the server, a cloud-based
entitlement to media content ... based upon the third key
received from the mobile device matching the third key received
from the checkout device. "
The Examiner's Answer goes on to inaccurately contend,
via mere conjecture, that claim 1 would not prevent false cloud-
based entitlement: " ... any device that has a matching third key
would be able to receive the entitlement because the claim fails
to recite any limitations that verify and/or prevent an entitlement
from being provided based upon information associated with a
mobile device." ... Appellant[s'] Specification says otherwise:
" ... , the mobile device 106 may provide the hash token to the
cloud-based server 202 to obtain entitlement" and "[a]s a result,
a different mobile device is prevented from posing as the mobile
device 106 to obtain entitlement as the different mobile device
would not have the hash token." ...
Accordingly, the Examiner's Answer does not dispute
Appellants' argument that authentication of a mobile device to
prevent false cloud-based entitlement is not an abstract idea.
Rather, the Examiner's Answer contends that claim 1 does not
actually prevent such cloud-based entitlement. As discussed
above, claim 1 recites providing "cloud-based entitlement" with
a server based upon matching a third key received from a mobile
device with a third key received from a checkout device. Such
claim recitation is consistent with the identified problem of, and
solution for, false cloud-based entitlement identified in
Appellant[s '] Specification.
Finally, the Examiner's Answer mischaracterizes the
claims on Appeal as being directed to the " . . . abstract idea of
receiving information/data related to a purchase in order to
automatically provide an extra benefit resulting from the
purchase." . . . As discussed above, claim 1 specifically recites
a "cloud-based entitlement" solution for the mobile device
authentication problem described in Appellant[s']
Specification. In contrast, the abstract idea described by the
Examiner's Answer does not mention such claim recitations or
problem identified in Appellant[s '] Specification.
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[T]he Examiner's Answer stated that "[u]nlike
McRO, Appellant[ s are] ... merely using the server as a tool to
automate the same widely known steps, and there is no indication
that the particular steps recited in the claims are the reason why
this retail practice can now be automated." . . . Again, the
Examiner's Answer ignores the actual claim limitations and
the problem identified in Appellant[s '] Specification. The
Examiner's Answer gives the impression that the claims on
Appeal are merely directed toward automating a rebate process
typically performed by humans. Yet, as discussed above, claim
1 specifically recites providing "cloud-based entitlement" with
a server based upon matching a third key received from a
mobile device with a third key received from a checkout device.
Accordingly, the solution of claim 1 is directed toward
preventing false cloud-based entitlements by mobile devices
rather than automating rebates typically performed by humans.
The Examiner's Answer goes on to contend that "[t]he
specification does not describe a new server, new mobile device,
new checkout device, new device components, or a new physical
combination thereof." Yet, new hardware
devices/components do not have to be described for claims to
be directed toward patent eligible subject matter. For instance,
McRO would not have met the standard set forth by the
Examiner's Answer.
The guidance provided by McRO is best summarized in
two words: broad preemption. . . . The Appeal Brief explained
that claim 1 recites authentication-based rules that are specific
enough to not broadly preempt all, or a large quantity of,
processes from performing cloud-based entitlement. . . . By
way of contrast, the Examiner's Answer did not provide any
reasons as to why the rules of claim 1 would broadly preempt
processes performing cloud-based entitlement.
Reply Br. 2--4 (Appellants' citations omitted; panel emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments. Upon review of
Appellants' claims and Specification, and consistent with the Examiner's
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findings, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea of receiving information/ data
related to a purchase in order to automatically provide a benefit resulting
from the purchase. See Final Act. 6. More specifically, claim 1 is directed
to the collection and comparison of intangible data, which is a purely mental
process that can either be done within the mind or using pen and paper, and,
thus, is an abstract idea. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
654, F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the mere collection and
organization of data regarding credit cards numbers and Internet addresses
was insufficient to impart patent-eligibility on the claims); see also Ans. 5
("it is a well-established practice in the retail industry to offer entitlements
... as a result of a purchase").
Appellants' argument that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea,
and is instead directed toward a tangible technological problem of
preventing mobile devices from falsely obtaining cloud-based entitlements,
is not persuasive. See App. Br. 7-8. Claim 1 does not recite the specific
technological solution argued by Appellants, but instead recites data
manipulation steps performed by a generic computer performing generic
computer functions.
In addition, we also disagree with Appellants' contention that claim 1
improves the way a computer operates, similar to the claims at-issue in
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016), rather than a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invokes generic processes and machinery. See App. Br. 8-9. In
McRO, the court held the claims were patent-eligible because the claims
recited specific computer-implemented rules that allowed a computer to
produce accurate and realistic lip synchronization and facial expressions in
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animated characters that previously could only be produced by human
animators. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313. As previously discussed, claim 1
fails to recite the technical details that distinguishes the claimed process of
providing an entitlement associated with a purchase of a product from prior
processes of providing an entitlement.
Regarding Appellants' argument that claim 1 does not preempt all
processes from performing cloud-based entitlement, this argument is not
persuasive, as the Federal Circuit has made clear that "the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility" of a claim.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015). Regarding Appellants' argument that the elements of
claim 1 are not prevalent in the relevant industry because the Final Office
Action relies upon multiple prior art references rather than a single prior art
reference, this argument is not persuasive either, as the argument conflates
the novelty and non-obviousness tests under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 with the
patent-eligibility test under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In light of the above, we agree with the Examiner's finding that claim
1 is directed to an abstract idea.
C. Alice/Mayo - Step 2
The Examiner determines claim 1 does not include "additional
elements that [ are sufficient to amount to] ... 'significantly more' than the
claimed judicial exception because the additional claim elements are simply
general purpose computer system components which are recited at a high
level of generality which provide general purpose functionality." Final
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Act. 6. Appellants do not provide any specific arguments regarding this step
of the Alice analysis. See App. Br. 7-9.
We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not include additional
elements that are significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final Act. 6.
More specifically, we agree with the Examiner that the devices (i.e.,
"server," "mobile device," "checkout device") recited in claim 1 that are
used in implementing the process are recited at a high level of generality and
are recited as performing generic computer functions (i.e., "receiving ... a
first key," "receiving ... a second key," "receiving ... a third key,"
"determining ... if [a] ... key ... matches [another key] ... ," and
"automatically providing ... a cloud-based entitlement to media content")
routinely used in computer applications. See Final Act. 10. We also agree
with the Examiner that claim 1 does not affect an improvement to another
technology or technical field, and that claim 1 does not amount to an
improvement to the functioning of an electronic device, which implements
the abstract idea. See Final Act. 11. As correctly found by the Examiner,
claim 1 merely links the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment, as claim 1 simply claims the use of a computer system (i.e.,
"server") to implement the abstract idea. See id.
In light of the above, the Examiner correctly concluded that claim 1
does not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea.
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D. Section 103(a) Arguments
Appellants raise the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Appellants respectfully submit that one of ordinary skill
in the art would not be motivated to hash the login information
of a user (denoted the "third key" by the Final Office Action)
as the user may then be unable to recognize that information
upon login. Further, the Final Office Action appears to change
the third key to a "ticket" when discussing the combination of
Rosenblatt and Hsu. . . . Such inconsistency emphasizes why
only the benefit of hindsight - not motivation by those of
ordinary skill in the art - has been used to formulate the Final
Office Action's rationale for the combination of Rosenblatt and
Hsu.
App. Br. 10 (emphasis added); see also Reply Br. 5.
We are not persuaded by this argument. Consistent with the
Examiner's findings, both Rosenblatt and Hsu describe methods of
purchasing and redeeming digital content, where a customer may make a
purchase using one device and subsequently collect their purchase using a
second device. See Ans. 10 (citing Rosenblatt ,r,r 257-258; Hsu ,r 4). To
address this scenario, Rosenblatt discloses receiving user login information
from a kiosk, subsequently receiving user login information from a handheld
device of a customer, and matching the user login information received from
the kiosk with the user login information from the handheld device. See
Ans. 10 (citing Rosenblatt ,r,r 118, 142-145, 157-158, 166,241, 252-259).
To also address this scenario, Hsu teaches a similar matching process, but
adds an additional layer of security by having a content server generate a
hash value, which is embedded into a ticket that is provided to a playback
device of a customer, and by subsequently having the playback device
present the ticket to the server, where the server calculates its own hash to
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validate the inserted hash value of the ticket. See Ans. 10 ( citing Hsu ,r 41 ).
The Examiner provided a sufficient rationale for a person of ordinary skill in
the art to combine Rosenblatt and Hsu: to improve upon the matching
process taught by Rosenblatt by utilizing the hash values taught by Hsu. See
Ans. 10-11. Appellants' argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would
not be motivated to hash login information of a user because the user may
then be unable to recognize that information upon login is merely conclusory
and is not supported by evidence in the record. Such unsupported attorney
argument, is entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Appellants also raise the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Kahn is directed toward sending a PIN code from a server
to a mobile device to " ... inform the merchant/merchant device
110 that the purchase transaction is authorized." . . .
Accordingly, Kahn teaches sending a PIN code from a server to
a mobile device but does not teach receiving the PIN code at the
server from the mobile device. In other words, Kahn is directed
toward generating a hash token in the opposite direction than that
of claim 1 (i.e., "receiving, at the server from the mobile device,
a third key").
The Final Office Action attempts to siphon off just the
hash portion of Khan to combine with Rosenblatt and Hsu in
the direction of Rosenblatt, but how one of ordinary skill in the
art would have known to just take that particular portion from
Khan and adapt it to the direction of the data flow in Rosenblatt
has not been explained by the Final Office Action. As
explained by In re Stepan, varying "all parameters" or trying
"each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at
a success result" is not a reasonable expectation of success.
App. Br 11 (Appellants' emphasis and citations omitted; panel emphasis
added); see also Reply Br. 6.
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We are not persuaded by this argument either. It is well settled that "a
determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references
does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements." In re Mouttet,
686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Nor is the test for
obviousness whether a secondary reference's features can be bodily
incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413,425 (CCPA 1981). Rather, the test is what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art. Id. As found by the Examiner, Rosenblatt teaches receiving
information from both a kiosk and a handheld device and Khan teaches a
PIN code that is a hash of store information, user information, and/ or
product information. See Ans. 11-12 (citing Rosenblatt ,r,r 118, 142-145,
157-158, 166,241, 252-259; Khan ,r 35). The Examiner provided a
sufficient rationale for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine
Rosenblatt and Khan: to improve upon the process taught by Rosenblatt by
allowing multiple information components be hashed into a single
information component used to authorize a transaction. See Ans. 12-13.
Appellants' argument that there is no reasonable expectation of success in
combining Rosenblatt, Hsu, and Khan is not supported by evidence in the
record.
Accordingly, Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
(2) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(3) Claims 1-23 are not patentable.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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