Ex Parte Doroshenko

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 31, 2018

13777997 (P.T.A.B. May. 31, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/777,997 02/26/2013 Sergii Doroshenko
91230 7590 06/04/2018
Baker Botts L.L.P./Facebook Inc.
2001 ROSS A VENUE
SUITE 900
Dallas, TX 75201
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
079894.5688 9981
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, KIM T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2153
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/04/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptomaill@bakerbotts.com
ptomail2@bakerbotts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SERGI! DOROSHENKO
Appeal2018-000953
Application 13/777,997
Technology Center 2100
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.
SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Non-final Rejection of claims 1-22. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part.
1 According to Appellant the real party in interest is Facebook, Inc. (App.
Br. 3).
Appeal2018-000953
Application 13/777,997
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention relates to a data search system handling an
incremental data search (Spec. ,r 1). Exemplary claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 11
under appeal read as follows:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving a first search query from a user;
obtaining a plurality of first search results in response to
the first search query from an index server;
determining whether the plurality of first search results are
a substantially exhausted list of results for the first search query;
and
caching the plurality of first search results in a cache
storage if the plurality of first search results are the substantially
exhausted list of results for the first search query.
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further
compnsmg:
receiving a second search query from the user;
determining whether the second search query is a refined
query of the first search query; and
searching the first search results in response to the first
search query cached in the cache storage for at least one second
search result in response to the second search query, wherein the
at least one second search result is a subset of the cached plurality
of first search results.
5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein
the step of determining whether the plurality of first search
results are a substantially exhausted list of results for the first
search query further includes:
determining whether a number of the first search results is
less than or equal to a predetermined proportion of a number of
results requested from the index server.
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7. The computer-implemented method of claim 6, wherein
the prefix hashes are calculated based on symbolic expressions
for the prefix queries, and the hash of the first search query is
calculated based on a symbolic expression for the first search
query.
11. A method for incremental search comprising:
receiving a plurality of initial keystrokes from a user
device;
obtaining, from an index server, a plurality of first search
results based on a first search query including the initial
keystrokes;
caching the plurality of first search results in a cache
storage;
receiving one or more additional keystrokes from the user
device;
generating one or more second search results by searching
the first search results in the cache storage based on a second
search query including the initial keystrokes and additional
keystrokes; and
transmitting the second search results to the user device in
real time.
REFERENCES and REJECTIONS
Claims 1-5 and 9-10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Gutt et al. (US 8,370,329 B2; issued Feb. 5, 2013)
("Gutt") and Lee et al. (US 2011/0320441 Al; published Dec. 29, 2011)
("Lee").
Claims 11-15, 17-18, and 20-22 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § I02(e) as anticipated by Gutt.
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Claims 6-7, 16, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Gutt and Ko et al. (US 2012/0166182 Al; published June
28, 2012) ("Ko").
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as unpatentable over
Gutt and Hinkle et al. (US 2008/0133864 Al; published June 5, 2008)
("Hinkle").
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Claim Construction
A claim under examination is given its broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the underlying specification. See In re
American Acad. of Science Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In the absence of an express definition of a claim term in the specification or
a clear disclaimer of scope, the claim term is interpreted as broadly as the
ordinary usage of the term by one of ordinary skill in the art would permit.
See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Obviousness
The mere existence of differences between the prior art and the claim
does not establish non-obviousness. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219,
230 (1976). Instead, the relevant question is "whether the difference
between the prior art and the subject matter in question is a [difference]
sufficient to render the claimed subject matter unobvious to one skilled in
the applicable art." Dann, 425 U.S. at 228 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear that when considering
obviousness, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
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specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account
of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007).
ANALYSIS
Independent Claim 1
Appellant contends the combination of cited references fails to teach
or suggest "determining whether the plurality of first search results are a
substantially exhausted list of results for the first search query" and "caching
the plurality of first search results in a cache storage if the plurality of first
search results are the substantially exhausted list of results for the first
search query," as recited in claim 1 (see App. Br. 6-7). More specifically,
Appellant argues Lee merely describes generating an exhaustive list of
topics associated with a set of search results, and fails to teach or suggest a
substantially exhausted list of results for a search query, much less
determining whether a plurality of search results are a substantially
exhausted list of results for the search query (see id.; see also Reply Br. 2).
Appellant further argues the Office Action acknowledges Gutt fails to teach
or suggest determining whether a plurality of search results are a
substantially exhausted list of results for a search query, and thus, Gutt also
fails to teach or suggest caching the plurality of search results in a cache
storage if the plurality of search results are the substantially exhausted list of
results for the search query (see App. Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 3--4).
This contention is not persuasive of Examiner error. Claim 1 does not
define, or otherwise limit, the term "substantially exhausted list of results."
Appellant's Specification discloses that, in an example embodiment, a
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"substantially exhausted list of results" is a list of search results where a
number of search results "is less than or equal to a predetermined proportion
of a number of results requested from [an] index server" (Spec. ,r 65).
However, we decline to import a limitation described in Appellant's
Specification that is not recited in the claim. See SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Though
understanding the claim language may be aided by the explanations
contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim
limitations that are not a part of the claim."). Thus, under the broadest
reasonable interpretation, a "substantially exhausted list of results"
encompasses any set of search results, including the set of search results
disclosed in Lee (see e.g., Lee ,r 33).
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the claimed "substantially
exhausted list of results" was limited to a set of search results where a
number of search results is less than or equal to a predetermined proportion
of a number of results requested from [a] index server, Appellant's
contention still does not persuade us that the Examiner erred. This is
because "a predetermined proportion" is not limited to a specific proportion
and can be any proportion, including a one-to-one proportion. That is, a
"substantially exhausted list of results" can simply be the original set of
search results. In other words, a "substantially exhausted list of results" is
not limited to a set of search results that is smaller than an original set of
results. Thus, even under this alternate interpretation of "substantially
exhausted list of results," the claimed "determining whether [a] plurality of
first search results are a substantially exhausted list of results" reads on Lee,
as Lee discloses identifying an original set of search results and comparing
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topics associated with the original set of results with interested topics
indicated by a user's social profile (see e.g., Lee ,r 33).
Further, the Examiner did not rely solely on Lee as teaching or
suggesting "caching the plurality of first search results in a cache storage if
the plurality of first search results are the substantially exhausted list of
results for the first search query," as recited in claim 1. Instead, the
Examiner relied upon the combination of Gutt and Lee as teaching the
aforementioned element of claim 1 (see Final Act. 3--4 ( citing Gutt 2:55-
3:45, 9:23-50; Lee ,r 33)). Appellant's argument does not address the
Examiner's finding that Gutt teaches storing a user's search history,
including previously selected search results, and thus, is not persuasive. 2
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Gutt and
Lee teaches or suggests the aforementioned elements of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Claim 2
Appellant contends the combination of cited references fails to teach
or suggest "searching the first search results in response to the first search
query cached in the cache storage for at least one second search result in
response to the second search query, wherein the at least one second search
result is a subset of the cached plurality of first search results," as recited in
claim 2 (see App. Br. 7-9). More specifically, Appellant argues Gutt merely
describes providing suggested search queries and results as a user
2 Although not necessary to our analysis and decision, we also note that Koh
teaches caching predicted search results locally at a client device (see
Koh ,I 76).
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incrementally enters characters of a search query, where a new search is
merely performed in response to a new search query, and where previous
search results are disregarded (see App. Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 4--5).
Thus, as argued by Appellant, Gutt fails to teach or suggest searching a
previous set of search results for satisfying the new search query (see App.
Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 4--5).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's contention. We agree with the
Examiner that Gutt teaches incrementally adding keystrokes to a search
query, where search results are continually returned as keystrokes are
incrementally added (see Final Act. 4 (citing Gutt 16:43-17: 12)). Consistent
with the Examiner's findings, Gutt teaches that each subsequent set of
search results is a subset of a previous set of search results, as the search
results included within each subsequent set of search results become more
relevant to the search query as keystrokes are incrementally added to the
search query (see Ans. 5-7) Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Gutt
teaches or suggests searching a previous set of search results for at least one
search result this is a subset of the previous set of search results. 3
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Gutt and
Lee teaches or suggests the aforementioned elements of claim 2.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
3 Although not necessary to our analysis and decision, we also note that Koh
teaches searching a set of predicted search results cached at a client device
for at least one predicted result as keystrokes are incrementally added to a
search query, where the at least one predicted result is a subset of the
original set of predicted search results (see Koh ,r,r 75-76).
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Claim 5
Appellant contends the combination of cited references fails to teach
or suggest "determining whether a number of the first search results is less
than or equal to a predetermined proportion of a number of results requested
from the index server," as recited in claim 5 (see App. Br. 9-10). More
specifically, Appellant argues Gutt merely describes presenting a search
result to a user if the search result meets a predetermined threshold, which is
based on a number of times the user has selected the search result (see App.
Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 5---6). As argued by Appellant, such a
predetermined threshold neither teaches nor suggests a predetermined
portion of a number of results requested from an index server (see App.
Br. 9-10; see also Reply Br. 6).
Claim 5 depends upon claim 1. Consistent with the aforementioned
embodiment disclosed in Appellant's Specification (see Spec. ,r 65), claim 5
limits the claimed "determining whether [a] plurality of first search results
are a substantially exhausted list of results" to "determining whether a
number of the first search results is less than or equal to a predetermined
proportion of a number of results requested from [a] index server." As
previously discussed, "a predetermined proportion" can be any proportion,
including a one-to-one proportion, and thus, a "substantially exhausted list
of results" can simply be an original set of search results.
Thus, Appellant's contention is not persuasive of Examiner error for
reasons similar to the reasons previously discussed regarding claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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Claim 7
Appellant contends the combination of cited references fails to teach
or suggest "wherein the prefix hashes are calculated based on symbolic
expressions for the prefix queries, and the hash of the first search query is
calculated based on a symbolic expression for the first search query," as
recited in claim 7 (see App. Br. 10). More specifically, as argued by
Appellant, even assuming arguendo that Ko teaches generating a fingerprint
for a prefix by applying a hash function to the prefix and subsequently
mapping the fingerprint to a "chunked" query completion table, the Office
Action has failed to prove that the prefix or hash function is calculated based
on a symbolic expression for a prefix query (see id.; see also Reply Br. 6).
We are persuaded by Appellant's contention that the Examiner erred
in rejecting claim 7. Appellant's Specification discloses that a "symbolic
expression" is defined as a "notation for nested list data (i.e., tree-structured
data)" (Spec. ,r 68). The Examiner's analysis fails to persuasively establish
that Ko' s application of a hash function to a prefix is calculated based on a
symbolic expression (i.e., tree-structured data or other notation for nested list
data), as recited in the claim. Therefore, on this record, we do not sustain
the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Independent Claims 11 and 17
Appellant contends the combination of cited references fails to teach
or suggest "generating one or more second search results by searching the
first search results in the cache storage based on a second search query
including the initial keystrokes and additional keystrokes," as recited in
claims 11 and 17 (see App. Br. 11 ). More specifically, Appellant argues the
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aforementioned element of claims 11 and 1 7 is similar to "searching the first
search results in response to the first search query cached in the cache
storage for at least one second search result in response to the second search
query, wherein the at least one second search result is a subset of the cached
plurality of first search results," as recited in claim 2 (see id.; see also Reply
Br. 6). Therefore, as argued by Appellant, for the reasons previously argued
with respect to claim 2, independent claims 11 and 17 are patentable over the
cited references (see App. Br. 11; see also Reply Br. 6).
Appellant concedes that the aforementioned element of claims 11 and
17 is similar to the aforementioned element of claim 2. Therefore,
Appellant's contention is not persuasive for reasons similar to the reasons
previously discussed regarding claim 2. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claims 11 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
Remaining Claims
No separate arguments are presented for the remaining dependent
claims (see App. Br. 6-11 ). We therefore sustain their rejections for the
reasons stated with respect to independent claims 1, 11, and 1 7.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 11-15, 17-18, and 20-
22 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1---6, 8-10, 16, and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 7 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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