Ex Parte Dobrusskin

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 30, 2013

11995710 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte CHRISTOPH DOBRUSSKIN
____________________

Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD, JR., ERIC S. FRAHM, and
ANDREW J. DILLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-15. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Exemplary Claim
Exemplary independent claim 1 under appeal reads as follows, with
emphasis added:
1. A remote controlled light device comprising a light
emitting element, which light device is arranged to provide, in
response to a control signal from a remote control, an
adjustment of a first property of the light emitting element and a
temporary change of a second property of the light emitting
element, wherein said temporary change of the
second property is communicated as a feedback signal to an
operator of the light device.
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1-7 and 9-14 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Bryde (U.S. Patent No. 6,169,377
B1). Ans. 3-6.
(2) The Examiner rejected claim 8 as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bryde and Morrissey, Jr. (U.S. Patent No.
6,028,396). Ans. 6-7.
(3) The Examiner rejected claim 15 as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bryde alone. Ans. 7-8.
Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

3
Appellant’s Contentions1
(1) Appellant contends (App. Br. 4-9; Reply Br. 1-5) that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-7 and 9-14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
for numerous reasons, including:
(a) Bryde’s disclosure of going from one lamp intensity level to
another does not meet claims 1 and 12, which require a temporary change of
a second property of the light emitting element (App. Br. 4-9; Reply Br.
1-5);
(b) Bryde fails to disclose “a temporary change of the light intensity
from the lamp, and thus there is no disclosure of the temporary
illumination of any of the indicators,” or that “a temporary change of the
illumination is communicated to the operator” (App. Br. 5), because no
temporary change is made after a control signal to change the brightness is
received (App. Br. 9); and
(c) Bryde discloses that intensity level indicators 14 represent the
current light intensity of the one or more lamps, and not a temporary change

1 Appellant presents arguments as to the merits of Bryde regarding the
anticipation rejection of claims 1-7 and 9-14 and only argue claims 1 and 12
in the Briefs (see App. Br. 4-9; Reply Br. 1-5). Separate patentability is not
argued for claims 2-7, 9-11, 13, and14, and Appellant relies on the
arguments as to claim 1 (rejected for anticipation) with regard to the
obviousness rejections of claims 8 and 15 (App. Br. 10). We select
independent claim 1 as representative of the group of claims rejected under §
102(b) consisting of claims 1-7 and 9-14, pursuant to our authority under 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). We decide the appeal of dependent claims 8 and
15 on the basis of independent claims 1 and 12, from which they ultimately
and respectively depend. In view of the foregoing, our analysis will only
address the substance of representative claim 1.

Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

4
of a second property of the light emitting element as recited in claims 1 and
12 (App. Br. 6); and
(d) Bryde fails to disclose “communicating a change of any property
of the light emitting device itself, but rather from a separate element
(intensity level indicators 14)” (Reply Br. 3).
(2) Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 8
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bryde and Morrissey,
Jr. for the same reasons provided with regard to the anticipation rejection of
claim 1 (App. Br. 10); and
(3) Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 15
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bryde alone for the
same reasons provided with regard to the anticipation rejection of claim 1
(App. Br. 10).
Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 4-10)
and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 1-6), the principal issue presented on appeal
is:
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-15 as being anticipated or
obvious because Bryde fails to disclose a remote controlled light device
“arranged to provide, in response to a control signal from a remote control,
an adjustment of a first property” of a light emitting element of the light
device, along with “a temporary change of a second property of the light
emitting element, wherein said temporary change of the second property is
communicated as a feedback signal to an operator of the light device,” as
recited in representative claim 1?

Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

5
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 4-10) and the Reply Brief (Reply
Br. 1-6) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
contentions. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Ans. 3-8), as
well as the Advisory Action mailed October 29, 2010, and (2) the reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s
Appeal Brief (see Ans. 8-12). We concur with the conclusions reached by
the Examiner, and highlight and address specific arguments and findings
regarding Bryde for emphasis as follows.
“During examination, ‘claims . . . are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . . claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.’” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Bond, 910 F.2d
831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1053-54
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
In our view, claims 1 and 12 read on any remote-controlled Light
Emitting Device (LED) television with a remote control that allows a user to
adjust volume, contrast, screen values, etc. where the changes are indicated
to the user on the screen (a level bar on the screen, e.g., representing the
amount of volume).
The Examiner relies upon Bryde as teaching the remote controlled
light device recited in representative claim 1. We agree with the Examiner
(Ans. 4 and 8-10) that Bryde’s light emitting element 114 (see col. 7, ll. 35-
Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

6
60 and col. 9, ll. 28-43) and intensity level indicators 14 (see col. 11, l. 30
through col. 12, l. 2) meet the broadly recited subject matter of independent
claims 1 and 12. We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 3-6 and 8-12), that
Bryde teaches or suggests the remote control light device recited in claims 1
and 12 (see Bryde, Figs. 1-5 and 10; col. 7, ll. 35-60; col. 9, ll. 28-34; and
col. 11, l. 30 through col. 12, l. 2), and that Bryde as modified meets the
recitations of claims 8 and 15 (see Ans. 11-12).
Appellant’s argument that Bryde’s disclosure of going from one lamp
intensity level to another does not meet claims 1 and 12 (App. Br. 4-9; Reply
Br. 1-5), is not persuasive. More specifically, Appellant’s argument that
Bryde fails to disclose “a temporary change of the light intensity from the
lamp, and thus there is no disclosure of the temporary illumination of any
of the indicators,” or that “a temporary change of the illumination is
communicated to the operator” (App. Br. 5), is not persuasive because
intensity level indicators 14 are “used to provide feedback to the user of the
control unit 10 regarding how the control unit 10 is responding to the various
actuations of control switch actuator 13 and selection switch actuator 12”
(Bryde, col. 11, l. 66 to col. 12, l. 2). And, because the intensity level
indicators 14 “represent[] a range of light intensities of the one or more
lamps controlled by the control unit 10,” (Bryde, col. 11, ll. 31-32), the user
has the capability of changing the input, output, and thus the intensity level,
of the indicator 14 by pressing buttons, and thus there is a temporary change
communicated to the operator as recited in claims 1 and 12.
Appellant’s argument that Bryde fails to disclose “communicating a
change of any property of the light emitting device itself, but rather from
a separate element (intensity level indicators 14)” (Reply Br. 3), is
Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

7
unpersuasive inasmuch as it is not commensurate in scope with the language
of claims 1 and 12 on appeal. Claim 1 only requires a “temporary change of
a second property of the light emitting element,” while claim 12 only
requires “temporarily changing a second property of the light emitting
element.” In other words, neither claim 1 nor claim 12 requires that the
second property of the light emitting element be anything in particular, and
leave open what could constitute the “second property of the light emitting
element” (claims 1 and 12), other than (i) the second property must
somehow relate to or be concerned with “the light emitting element,” and (ii)
a change in the second property must be “communicated as a feedback
signal to an operator of the light device” (claim 1 and similarly recited in
claim 12).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of representative claim 1, independent claim 12 reciting similar
limitations, as well as claims 2-7, 9-11, 13, and 14 depending therefrom.
With regard to the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 8 and
15, both also based on Bryde, we sustain these rejections for the same
reasons as provided for representative claim 1.

CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-7 and 9-14 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Bryde.
(2) Appellant has not adequately shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 8 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
combination of Bryde and Morrissey, Jr.
Appeal 2011-011061
Application 11/995,710

8
(3) Appellant has not adequately shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 15 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Bryde alone.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-15 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

llw