Ex Parte Dharwada et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 23, 2016

13013247 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/013,247 01/25/2011 Pallavi Dharwada H0028636.216471 8397
92689 7590
HONEYWELL/SLW
Patent Services
115 Tabor Road
P.O. Box 377
MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950
12/28/2016 EXAMINER
KARIM, ZIAUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2127
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentservices-us @ honey well, com
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte P ALLA VI DHARWADA and JASON LABERGE
Appeal 2015-007413
Application 13/013,247
Technology Center 2100
Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, AARON W. MOORE, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
Appellants seek rehearing of the September 22, 2016 Decision on
Appeal (the “Decision”), wherein we affirmed the rejection of claims 1—6
and 8—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Brunetti and
Morgan, and affirmed the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Brunetti, Morgan, and Cressy.
We have reconsidered the Decision in light of Appellants’ Request for
Rehearing (the “Request”) but are not persuaded any points were
misapprehended or overlooked. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.52.
Appeal 2015-007413
Application 13/013,247
ANALYSIS
Appellants make the following argument:
There is a difference in [the] claim language (“drawing”) and the
disclosure in Morgan (“pointing”), and .. . this difference should
be given effect, because every word in a claim should be given
effect. There is a difference between a “simple pointing] to” an
area on the screen as in Morgan, and drawing an area or path on
a screen as is recited in the claims. This is so even if the drawing
is a small circle or a short line, because a small circle or a short
line is still different than a simple pointing. Such small circles
and short lines are still drawings, and a simple pointing at a single
point is not a drawing.
(Request 2.)
Appellants’ contention that there is no drawing in Morgan because the
pointing touches just a single point on the screen was already addressed in
the Decision. (See Decision 5.) We find nothing in the Specification, or
elsewhere, to limit the term “drawing” to require “mak[ing] a picture or
image by making lines on a surface,” “movement along the screen while
touching the screen,” and/or “different processing logic,” as Appellants
variously argue. (See Request 1,2.) We have not failed to “give effect” to
the term “drawing”; to the contrary, we give it effect and construe it as broad
enough to include a single point, i.e., we interpret it as not being limited to
lines or movement along a screen. Appellants’ argument that “there is a
difference in their claim language (‘drawing’) and the disclosure in Morgan
(‘pointing’)” is unpersuasive because “[t]he specific limitation need not be
disclosed in haec verba in the reference.” In re Bode, 550 F.2d 656, 660
(1977). Both Morgan’s system and Appellants’ system operate by a user
touching a screen to indicate a location of interest.
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Appeal 2015-007413
Application 13/013,247
DECISION
We grant Appellants’ request to reconsider our Decision, but deny the
request that the Decision be modified. Our decision is final for purposes of
judicial review. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
DENIED
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