Ex Parte Demos

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 19, 2017

14827830 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/827,830 08/17/2015 Gary A. Demos 07314-0013011 1058
143308 7590 12/21/2017
FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (Dolby)
PO BOX 1022
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022
EXAMINER
LEE, Y YOUNG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2485
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/21/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PATDOCTC@fr.com
patents @ dolby.com
mguo @ dolby. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GARY A. DEMOS
Appeal 2017-008025
Application 14/827,8301
Technology Center 2400
Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., and
BETH Z. SHAW, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 2—7. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest is Dolby Laboratories Licensing Corporation.
App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2017-008025
Application 14/827,830
RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES
Appellant identifies a number of related appeals and interferences.
App. Br. 1.
INVENTION
The invention is for improving compressed image chroma information
in MPEG-like video compression systems. (Spec. 14.)
Claim 2 is representative and reproduced below, with the disputed
limitation emphasized:
2. An encoder for video coding, the encoder
comprising:
an input configured to access a video image comprising a
luminance channel, a first chroma channel, and a second
chroma channel; and
a processor configured to:
generate a compressed bitstream of a first image region
in the video image, comprising:
compressing the luminance channel of the first image
region using a first luminance quantization parameter;
compressing the first chroma channel of the first image
region using a first chrominance quantization parameter; and
compressing the second chroma channel of the first
image region;
generate a compressed bitstream of a second image
region in the video image, comprising:
compressing the luminance channel of the second image
region using a second luminance quantization parameter,
wherein the first luminance quantization parameter is different
from the second luminance quantization parameter;
compressing the first chroma channel of the second
image region using a second chrominance quantization
parameter; and
compressing the second chroma channel of the second
image region; and
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Application 14/827,830
signal the compressed bitstream of the first image region
and the second image region, the first luminance quantization
parameter, the second luminance quantization parameter, and
a first quantization bias to a decoder,
wherein the first quantization bias indicates a difference
between the first chrominance quantization parameter and the
first luminance quantization parameter, and wherein the first
chrominance quantization parameter is less than or equal to a
predetermined maximum value.
REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 2—7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Haskell et al. (US 2006/0002467 Al, published Jan 5,
2006) and Gillard (GB 2,226,635 A, published Nov. 3, 1993). Final Act. 2—
3.
The Examiner rejected claims 2—7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Reininger et al. (US 5,426,463, issued June 20, 1995) and
Gillard. Final Act. 3.
The Examiner rejected claims 2—7 on the ground of nonstatutory
double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 2 of U.S. Patent
No. 7,961,784 and 8,737,466. Final Act. 4.
The Examiner provisionally rejected claims 2—7 on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 19, 20, and
36 of copending Application No. 12/913,045; claims 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, and 15 of
copending application 13/197,211; claims 1—10 of copending application
13/197,248; claims 1, 3, 4, 13—16, and 21 of copending application
13/325,695; claims 1, 5-7, 10—12, 15, and 19-22 of copending application
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Application 14/827,830
13/272,316; claims 16 and 17 of copending application 13/325,773; and
claims 2—7 of copending application 14/827,731. Final Act. 4.
ANALYSIS
SECTION 103 REJECTION
Appellant presents multiple arguments as to why the Examiner has
erred. In particular, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
1 because Gillard fails to teach or suggest "signal the compressed bitstream
of the first image region, [... ] the first luminance quantization parameter, [
... ] and a first quantization bias to a decoder," where "the first quantization
bias indicates a difference between the first chrominance quantization
parameter [for a first image region] and the first luminance quantization
parameter [for the first image region]." App. Br. 7.
The Examiner responds that Gillard illustrates that it is well known in
the art to separately transmit, receive, and adjust the QP values for the
luminance and chrominance channels. Ans. 4. The Examiner also
concludes that Gillard inherently teaches the claimed “difference” because
the same QP value may be used for both channels. Id. at 6.
We agree with Appellant, however, that the Examiner has not
established inherency because the Examiner has not established that the
same QP value must necessarily be used for both channels. Reply Br. 5. “It
is well settled that a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim
limitations not expressly found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in
it. Under the principles of inherency, if the prior art necessarily functions in
accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations, it anticipates.” In re
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Application 14/827,830
Cruciferous SproutLitig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Inherency, however, may not
be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain
thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.” In re
Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, Gillard describes that the
quantization scaling factor Qs (which the Examiner refers to as QP) is varied
separately for the luminance and chrominance channels. Id. at 5—6 (citing
Gillard, Fig. 9, pp. 14—15). Thus, the Examiner has not established that the
same QP value must necessarily be used for both channels.
Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that on this record, the
Examiner has not shown sufficiently that Gillard teaches a quantization bias
that indicates "a difference between the first chrominance quantization
parameter and the first luminance quantization parameter," as recited in
claim 2.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Haskell and Gillard.
For the same reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim 6,
which contains a similar limitation. For the same reasons, we do not sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 2 and 6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Reininger and Gillard. We also do not sustain
the § 103 rejection of dependent claims 3—5 and 7 for the same reasons.
DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTIONS
Because we reversed the prior art rejections, the only remaining
rejections are (1) the provisional obviousness-type double patenting
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Application 14/827,830
rejections and (2) the obviousness-type double patenting rejections.
PROVISIONAL REJECTION
First, regarding the Examiner’s provisional obviousness-type double
patenting rejections, we do not reach the provisional obviousness-type
double patenting rejections of the claims over copending applications
13/325,695, 13/272,316, 13/325,773, and 14/827,731. See Ex Parte Monda,
Appeal No. 2009-006448) (“it was premature for the original Board panel to
address the Examiner’s provisional rejection of the claims”). App. Br. 18.
Because applications 12/913,045, 13/197,211, and 13/197,248 have
each now matured into a patent, these provisional obviousness-type double
patenting rejection are now moot, and we leave it to the Examiner to
determine whether the claims of the corresponding issued US Patents should
serve as the basis for an obviousness-type double patenting rejection.
DOUBLE PATENTING REJECTION
Regarding the obviousness-type double patenting rejections,
Appellant contends the Examiner erred. App. Br. 17—19. However, rather
than explaining the Examiner’s specific errors, Appellant makes general
allegations that the obviousness-type double patenting rejections are
improper because the claims are allegedly “narrower” than the claims in the
referenced patents. App. Br. 18—19. Mere assertions with no meaningful
explanations are unpersuasive. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
By failing to identify, with sufficient particularity, an error in the
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Examiner’s double patenting rejections, Appellant’s argument amounts to
nothing more than a request for a de novo review of the Examiner’s
findings, which we decline to perform. As such, the Examiner’s double
patenting rejection of claims 2—7 is sustained.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 2—7.
We affirm the Examiner’s double-patenting rejection of claims 2—7.
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 2—7. 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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