Ex Parte DeLuca et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 29, 201412647769 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 29, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte LISA SEACAT DELUCA and PAMELA A. NESBITT ____________ Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,7691 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a computer program for requesting emails from an email message database and particularly for downloading email from the database to an email client in accordance with download instructions specifying a priority order. (Claim 1.) 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is International Business Machines Corporation. (Appeal Br. 2.) Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 2 Claims 1, 9, and 16 are the only independent claims. Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below: 1. A computer implemented method for requesting e-mail messages, comprising: receiving, by an e-mail messaging system, download instructions for sending e-mail messages from an e-mail message database storing a plurality of e-mail messages to an e- mail client; and the e-mail messaging system sending e-mail messages from the e-mail message database to the e-mail client in accordance with the download instructions, wherein the download instructions specify a priority order in which the e- mail messages are to be sent from the e-mail message database to the e-mail client. REJECTION Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)2 as being unpatentable over Sivakumar (US 2007/0124390 A1, pub. May 31, 2007) and Sood (US 2008/0126951 A1, pub. May 29, 2008). ANALYSIS Claims 1–3, 8–11, 16, and 17 Claim 1–3, 8–11, 16, and 17 are argued together. (Appeal Br. 912.) Therefore, these claims stand or fall together. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011). Appellants argue that the cited art does “not describe receiving download instructions that specify a priority order. Instead, a pre-existing 2 Now 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 3 prioritization engine assigns a priority to a message after it has been received (Sood paragraph 0045).” (Appeal Br. at 11.) The Examiner argues that “Sivakumar discloses the email database and store and forward mechanism of email from host server to email client.” (Answer 6.) The Examiner further argues that “Sood teaches specify a priority order in which the e-mail messages are to be sent to the e-mail client . . . .” (Id.) Sivakumar describes a “message manager” that specifies how emails are to be downloaded to an email client. (Sivakumar ¶ 22.) The message manager can be set to block emails “from particular users or domain names.” (Id.) The message manager operates before the email is downloaded to the email client. (Id.) Exceptions and options can be set to limit downloads during peak pricing, while roaming, etc., thus specifying priorities for some email messages over others.3 (Id.) Sood describes a priority order system for emails. (Sood ¶¶ 3637.) Citing paragraph 45 of Sood, Appellants argue that the Sood system operates on the email after the email has been downloaded to the client, i.e., that the Sood system is located at the email client. (Appeal Br. 11.) We note, however, that Sood also teaches that its “system can reside anywhere on the network” which would include residing before the email client. (See Sood ¶¶ 46 and 48.) Regardless, the Examiner argues (Answer 6) that it would have been obvious to combine Sivakumar and Sood and that the combination would 3 The exceptions and options referenced in paragraph 22 of Sivakumar are shown in Figures 9 and 10 as including deciding whether and when to download certain messages, i.e., to prioritize some messages over others. Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 4 provide a system for managing download e-mail message [sic] that enables an e-mail client to automatically format and limit e- mail messages according to current communication characteristics and assigned prioritization score and category to e-mail message [sic] received or sent by a user. Appellants next argue that “the priority [described in Sood] is used to ‘arrange and present’ messages to a user, and is not described as being priority for which the e-mail messages are to be sent, as claimed.” (Appeal Br. 11.) Appellants further argue that “the Sood priority is assigned to an email message after the message has already been received by the client (Sood paragraph 0045, lines 1-2).” (Id.) As discussed above, Sood teaches a priority order system for emails and Sivakumar teaches downloading messages according to specific instructions received from the email client. (Sood ¶¶ 3637; Sivakumar ¶¶ 22 and 27.) It is the combination of these references, not Sood or Sivakumar individually, upon which the Examiner relies in asserting obviousness. (See Answer 18.) The Examiner has presented a prima facie case that the combination of Sivakumar and Sood teaches receiving download instructions that specify a priority order for which the emails are to be sent. We conclude that Appellants have not rebutted the Examiner’s prima facie case that the combination would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reason, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 8–11, 16, and 17 which were not separately argued. Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 5 Claims 4 and 12 Claim 4 recites: 4. The computer implemented method of claim 1, wherein the download instructions further specify a number of the e-mail messages to be sent to the e-mail client at a time. Claim 12 contains similar language. Appellants argue that the “communication profile” described in Sivakumar as “provid[ing] instructions as to how e-mail messages are to be selected, formatted, and limited . . .” (Sivakumar ¶ 38) “does not specify a number of actual e-mail messages that are to be sent at a time . . . .” (Appeal Br. 16.) The Examiner does not indicate why it would have been obvious from the combination of Sivakumar and Sood to “specify a number of the e-mail messages to be sent to the e-mail client at a time.” Therefore, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 5 and 13 Claim 5 and 13 are argued together. (Appeal Br. 1618.) Claim 5 recites: 5. The computer implemented method of claim 1, wherein the download instructions further specify one of e-mail messages to be sent to the e-mail client and e-mail messages not to be sent to the e-mail client. Appellants argue that even though Sood teaches setting priorities based on keywords in an email or contacts, this is “very different from what is recited in Claim 5. For example, [Sood ¶¶ 8384] does not describe Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 6 (1) receiving download instructions, or (2) received download instructions that specify e-mail messages to be sent/not to be sent. Instead, this cited passage describes that a user manually selects a priority for a keyword or contact.” (Appeal Br. 18.) Arguably, claim 5 is limited to either “email messages to be sent to the e-mail client” or “email messages not to be sent to the e-mail client,” but not both. However, Appellants do not argue this. Their argument indicates that they are reading the claim to include either or both options. (See Appeal Br. 1718.) Applying a broadest reasonable interpretation leads to the same conclusion. Sivakumar teaches specifying emails not to be sent, e.g., blocking emails from particular users. (Sivakumar ¶ 22.) And Sood teaches specifying emails to be sent (Sood ¶¶ 8384). Applying the broadest reasonable interpretation, we conclude that Appellants have not rebutted the Examiner’s prima facie case. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 6, 14, and 19 Claim 6, 14, and 19 are argued together. (Appeal Br. 18.) Claim 6 recites: 6. The computer implemented method of claim 1, wherein the download instructions further specify one of e-mail messages to be sent from certain parties only and e-mail messages not to be sent from certain parties. For the reasons discussed with regard to claims 5 and 13, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 14, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 7 Claims 7, 15, and 20 Claim 7, 15, and 20 are argued together. (Appeal Br. 19.) Claim 7 recites: 7. The computer implemented method of claim 1, wherein the priority comprises one of a priority based on historical factors, a priority based on an organizational structure, a priority based on a specified priority of the e-mail messages, or a priority based on one or more keywords in a subject line of the e-mail messages. The Examiner argues that “Sivakumar is silent about priority comprises one of a priority based on a specified priority of the e-mail messages.” (Answer 8.) But, the Examiner further argues, “Sood teaches specify a priority in which the e-mail messages are to be sent to the e-mail client . . . .” (Id.) Appellants, again arguing that Sood relates to prioritizing emails already received at the email client, argue that Sood does not teach “a priority order in which the e-mail messages are to be sent to the e-mail client.” (Appeal Br. 19, citing Sood ¶ 37.) As discussed above with regard to claim 1, the combination of Sivakumar and Sood address a priority order based on a specified priority of the message. For example, priority may be based on keywords. (See Sivakumar ¶ 22 and Sood ¶¶ 8384.) Thus, we conclude that Appellants have not rebutted the Examiner’s prima facie case. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 15, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2012-009129 Application 12/647,769 8 Claim 18 Claim 18 recites: 18. The apparatus of claim 16, wherein the download instructions further specify one of a number of the e-mail messages to be sent to the e-mail client at a time, e-mail messages to be sent to the e-mail client, and e-mail messages not to be sent to the e-mail client. Appellants’ argument with regard to claim 18 reads, in its entirety (Appeal Br. 1920): Appellants initially urge error in the Rejection of Claim 18 for reasons given above with respect to Claim 16 (of which Claim 18 depends upon). Appellants further traverse the rejection of Claim 18 for similar reasons to those given above with respect to Claims 4 and 5. For the reasons discussed with regard to claims 1 and 5, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–3, 5–11, and 13–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART llw Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation