Ex Parte Delachanal

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 9, 2017

13775062 (P.T.A.B. May. 9, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/775,062 02/22/2013 Christophe DELACHANAL DYNG/0004US 7191
26290 7590 05/11/2017
PATTERSON & SHERIDAN, L.L.P.
24 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77046
EXAMINER
CHIN, RICKY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2423
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PS Docketing @ pattersonsheridan .com
pair_eofficeaction@pattersonsheridan.com
jcardenas @pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHE DELACHANAL1
Appeal 2017-000618
Application 13/775,062
Technology Center 2400
Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JOHN F. HORVATH, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4—15.2 App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is the applicant, Myriad
Group AG. See Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claim 3 has been canceled. Claims App’x.
Appeal 2017-000618
Application 13/775,062
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellant, the claimed invention relates to a system and
method for reproducing data. See Spec. 11.3 The system includes a first
electronic device to reproduce audio and video data, a second electronic
device to transmit the data to be reproduced to the first electronic device,
and a third electronic device to store personal information associated with a
user of the third device, to compute personalization parameters from the
personal information, and to transmit the personalization parameters to the
second electronic device without transmitting the personal information
outside the third electronic device, providing better security for the user’s
personal data. Spec. Tflf 1, 100, 101. Claims 1 and 11 are independent.
Claim 1 is representative and is reproduced below with disputed limitations
in italics:
1. An electronic system, comprising:
a first electronic device, the first electronic device to
reproduce data comprising at least one of audio and video data;
a second electronic device, the second electronic device
being connected to the first electronic device via a first data link,
and comprising at least one of software, programmable logic, and
an integrated circuit to transmit data to be reproduced to the first
electronic device;
a third electronic device, the third electronic device being
connected to the second electronic device via a second data link,
3 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to the following documents:
(1) Appellant’s Specification, filed February 22, 2013 (“Spec.”); (2) the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.”), mailed June 5, 2015; (3) the Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.”), filed October 5, 2015; (4) the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”),
mailed August 5, 2016; and (5) the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed October
4, 2016.
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and comprising a memory to store personal information
associated with a user of the third device,
wherein the third electronic device further comprises
computing software to compute personalization parameters of
the data to be reproduced, from the personal information, and
transmission software to transmit the computed personalization
parameters to the second electronic device, without any
transmission of the personalization parameters via an Internet
network, and without transmitting the user’s personal
information outside of the third electronic device, and
wherein the second electronic device further comprises at
least one of software, programmable logic, and an integrated
circuit to select data to be reproduced in relation to the
personalization parameters received from the third electronic
device, wherein the at least one of software, programmable logic,
and the integrated circuit to select data to be reproduced is
connected to the at least one of software, programmable logic,
and the integrated circuit to transmit the selected data to be
reproduced to the first electronic device.
Appeal Br. 16—17 (Claims App’x).
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Ellis et al. (“Ellis”) US 2006/0136965 A1
Nishikawa et al. US 2009/0125935 Al
(“Nishikawa”)
Childress et al. (“Childress”) US 2009/0210898 Al
Ramer et al. (“Ramer”) US 2012/0089996 Al
June 22, 2006
May 14, 2009
Aug. 20, 2009
Apr. 12, 2012
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REJECTIONS
(1) Claims 1, 2, 4, and 7—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Childress and Ramer.
Final Act. 5—11.
(2) Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Childress, Ramer, and Ellis. Final
Act. 11.
(3) Claim 6 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Childress, Ramer, and Nishikawa.
Final Act. 12.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
issues raised by Appellant. We have not considered other possible issues
that have not been raised by Appellant and which are, therefore, not before
us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
ISSUES
1. Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Childress and
Ramer teaches or suggests “a third electronic device . . . comprising a
memory to store personal information associated with a user of the third
device . . . and without transmitting the user’s personal information outside
of the third electronic device,” as recited in claim 1?
2. Does the Examiner err in finding Childress teaches or suggests
“wherein the third electronic device further comprises computing software
to compute personalization parameters of the data to be reproduced, from
the personal information, and transmission software to transmit the
computed personalization parameters,” as recited in claim 1 ?
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CONTENTIONS AND ANALYSIS
We disagree with Appellant’s contentions, and we adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office
Action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3—12) and (2) the reasons
set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 10—13). We highlight the following points
for emphasis.
Issue 1
The Examiner finds the combination of Childress and Ramer teaches
or suggests the limitation “a third electronic device . . . comprising a
memory to store personal information associated with a user of the third
device . . . and without transmitting the user’s personal information outside
of the third electronic device,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 3^4 (citing
Childress H 13, 20, 32, 40-43, Ramer H 1000-1009).
Referring first to Childress, the Examiner relies on “interactions with
media content acquired from tracking and monitoring the user,” logged by
mobile device 102, in Childress, to teach the claimed “personal
information.” Final Act. 3; Ans. 10—11 (citing Childress Tflf 13, 21, 36).
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Childress suggests the
claimed “personal information” because “this information is indeed
transferred outside the mobile device 102 (e.g., the third device) of
Childress, since the access device 104 (e.g., the second device) ‘identifies at
least one content item accessed by the user.’” Appeal Br. 10.
We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive. As an initial matter, we
agree with the Examiner that Appellant fails to demonstrate that “personal
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information” has been explicitly defined in Appellants’ Specification in a
way that is inconsistent with the Examiner’s interpretation. Final Act. 3.
Accordingly, we determine the Examiner’s interpretation of personal
information as “interactions with media content acquired from tracking and
monitoring the user” is not shown to be erroneous. Id. In light of this
interpretation, and as explained below, the Examiner correctly finds that
Childress teaches at least one embodiment in which personal information is
stored in mobile device 102 without transmitting the personal information
outside of the mobile device. Ans. 10—11.
Childress discusses sharing various data between devices such as a
set-top box and a mobile device. Childress 14. In Childress, the “mobile
device can log data relating to a particular user’s content viewing
experience. Such data can include content identifiers, genres, viewing time,
interaction history, etc.” Childress 113. Some or all of this data may be
used to create a user profile. Id.
In one embodiment, the memory 204 [of mobile device 102] is
configured to store user profile data comprising one or more of
records of previously viewed content items and heuristics or
other data indicative of patterns of content items identified as
being of possible interest to a user of the mobile device.
Childress 128 (emphasis added). The Examiner finds Childress’s records of
previously viewed content items (“a content item accessed by the user”)
suggest “personal data,” as claimed. Ans. 11. We, therefore agree Childress
suggests storing personal information when storing user profile data
including records of previously viewed content items. Childress 28. Such
personal data, however, need not be transmitted outside mobile device 102
in Childress. For example, Childress’ mobile device 102 may transmit to
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access device 104 a user profile including “heuristics or other data indicative
of patterns [] identified as being of possible interest to a user.” Id. Thus, the
Examiner distinguishes between the types of user profile information
disclosed in Childress. For example, the Examiner finds “[d]ata indicative
of accessed content and categories associated with the accessed content
items is different from a content item accessed by the user as referenced in
[0043] and is not the accessed content itself.” Ans. 11.
In light of Childress’s “one or more of’ language describing storing
and transmission of user profile data, we agree the “records of previously
viewed content items” need not be included in the user profile and in such
embodiments, are not transmitted outside mobile device 102. Childress
1128,13.
Accordingly, the Examiner correctly recognizes that in some
embodiments of Childress, personal information such as records of
previously viewed content items may be stored and not transmitted with the
user profile while other information such as data indicative of accessed
content may be both stored and transmitted with the user profile. Ans. 11—
12. Appellant, on the other hand, argues that because Childress describes an
embodiment in which “Childress does disclose the transmission of the
interactions” that the entire reference should be interpreted as “supporting]
Applicant’s position.” Reply Br. 2. We find this argument unpersuasive
because the test of obviousness is “whether the teachings of the prior art,
taken as a whole, would have made obvious the claimed invention.” In re
Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Appellant provides
insufficient evidence that Childress requires that all data stored as user
profile data must be transmitted outside of mobile device 102. In contrast,
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the Examiner has identified embodiments in Childress in which personal
data in the form of records of previously viewed content items may be stored
in the mobile device 102 without being transmitted outside the mobile
device 102. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Childress suggests “a memory to store personal information associated with
a user of the third device . . . “without transmitting the user’s personal
information outside of the third electronic device,” as recited in claim 1.
The Examiner finds Ramer also teaches or suggests the limitation “a
third electronic device . . . comprising a memory to store personal
information associated with a user of the third device . . . and without
transmitting the user’s personal information outside of the third electronic
device,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4; Ans. 11—12 (citing Ramer || 6,
51, 58, 108, 475^476, 999—1009). Specifically, the Examiner relies on
Ramer’s use of “the personal information of locations and usage/user
interaction to categorize (creating personalization parameters) a user profile
for behavior preferences for desirable content.” Ans. 12. Thus, by using a
category of content in the user profile, rather than “the personal information
of locations and usage/user interaction,” the Examiner finds Ramer does not
transmit the personal information. Id.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Ramer suggests the
claimed “personal information” because, in Ramer, “the user profile
information is exported from the mobile communication facility 102 (e.g., a
mobile phone) for analysis external to the mobile phone in order to
categorize the user profile.” Appeal Br. 12 (citing Ramer || 475—476,
1001). Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive, however, because Appellant
does not specifically rebut the Examiner’s finding that in some embodiments
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Ramer uses a category of content in the user profile, rather than the personal
information.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of
Childress and Ramer teaches or suggests “a third electronic device . . .
comprising a memory to store personal information associated with a user of
the third device . . . and without transmitting the user’s personal information
outside of the third electronic device,” as recited in claim 1.
Issue 2
The Examiner relies on Childress to teach or suggest “computing
software to compute personalization parameters of the data to be reproduced,
from the personal information, and ... to transmit the computed
personalization parameters” as recited in claim 1. Ans. 11—12 (citing
Childress Tflf 36, 44-46). Specifically, the Examiner relies on Childress’s
calculation and transmission of “data indicative of the accessed content such
as . . . categories and not the [content] interactions itself.” Ans. 11. Thus,
by determining and transmitting a category of content in the user profile,
rather than “the personal information of locations and usage/user
interaction,” the Examiner finds Childress transmits the personalization
parameters but does not transmit the personal information. Id. at 12.
Appellant argues the Examiner errs in finding Childress suggests the
claimed personalization parameters because, the Examiner fails to establish
either the unique identifier or the user’s proximity in Childress equates to the
claimed personalization parameters. Appeal Br. 10 (citing Childress H 13,
43).
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We find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive because Appellant does
not specifically rebut the Examiner’s finding that “the categorizing [in
Childress] is equated to the personalization parameters.” Ans. 12 (citing
Childress 36, 44-46); see generally Reply Br. 2-4.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of
independent claim 11, the patentability of which is argued for similar
reasons as independent claim 1. Appeal Br. 14—15. Dependent claims 2, 4—
10, and 12—15, are not argued separately, or are only nominally argued
separately, so the rejection of these claims are sustained for the reasons
given for their respective independent claims. Appeal Br. 13—14. See
37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, and 4—15
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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