Ex Parte Del Prado Pavon et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 8, 201711570447 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/570,447 12/12/2006 Javier Del Prado Pavon 2004P01324WOUS 1069 24737 7590 11/13/2017 PTTTT TPS TNTFT T FfTTTAT PROPFRTY fr STANDARDS EXAMINER 465 Columbus Avenue SHEN, QUN Suite 340 Valhalla, NY 10595 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2643 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/13/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patti. demichele @ Philips, com marianne. fox @ philips, com katelyn.mulroy @philips .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAVIER DEL PRADO PA VON, KIRAN CHALLAPALI, and ZHUN ZHONG Appeal 2015-006700 Application 11/570,447 Technology Center 2600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and BARBARA A. BENOIT, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2015-006700 Application 11/570,447 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1—9 and 11—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. The claims are directed to a method to achieve coexistence between centralized Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) Medium Access Control (MAC) and a second MAC in wireless communication systems. (Title). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of wireless communication, the method comprising: providing a first wireless network comprising at least one first host configured to communicate with a plurality of first devices, wherein the first wireless network is configured to operate according to a first protocol; providing a second wireless network, which is configured to operate according to at least a second protocol, said second wireless network comprising a plurality of second devices, at least one second device being within a range of the first wireless network; negotiating, by the at least one second device, with said first host for allocation of a time slot of one of the plurality of first devices in accordance with the first protocol; and assigning the time slot of said one of the plurality of first devices in a service interval of the first wireless network to the second wireless network, wherein during said assigned time slot the at least one second device of the second wireless network is configured to communicate with at least one other second device of the second wireless network. 2 Appeal 2015-006700 Application 11/570,447 REFERENCE The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Ketseoglou et al. US 6,130,886 Oct. 10, 2000 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Claims 1—9, 11—18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ketseoglou. Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ketseoglou. ANALYSIS Anticipation With respect to independent claims 1 and 11, Appellants set forth a similar arguments to each of the independent claims. (App. Br. 11—12). We find independent claims 1 and 11 have a similar limitation. As a result, we address independent claim 1 as the illustrative claim. With respect to illustrative independent claim 1, Appellants contend the claimed invention requires: the negotiation operation is said to take place “in accordance with the first protocol.” That is, the second device in the second wireless network negotiates with the host of the first wireless network using the rules set forth in the first protocol, which is a different protocol from the second protocol used by the second device in its network. These features are not taught or shown by Ketseoglou. 3 Appeal 2015-006700 Application 11/570,447 (App. Br. 9). Appellants further contend: The Examiner appears to be missing the point at issue. The Examiner continues to provide more of Ketseoglou's teachings concerning the protocol obeyed by a time slot. The cited portions of Ketseoglou merely show that time slots being allocated from one network to another network follow the protocol of the allocating network, prior to being allocated. But none of the cited portions of Ketseoglou prove that the reference teaches, show[s], or suggests [] “negotiating ... in accordance with the first protocol.” (Reply Br. 8). We agree with Appellants and further find Appellants identify in the Summary of the Claimed Subject Matter the corresponding support in the Specification for the “negotiating” step. (App. Br. 5). The Specification discloses “[t]he negotiation for a time slot between a device 105 of the second network with the host 101 follows the rules of the TDMA protocol used in network 100.” (Spec. 8). We note that the Board is a reviewing body and not a place of initial examination. Moreover, it is our view that the rigorous requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 essentially require a one-for-one mapping of each argued limitation to the corresponding portion of the reference, which the Examiner must identify with particularity. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, in that the Examiner’s anticipation rejection is not well supported by the express disclosure of the Ketseoglou reference and relies on conjecture, such conjecture would require us to resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions, or hindsight reconstruction. See In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). In this anticipation rejection, we find the Examiner’s attempts to rely upon inherency (“first of all, resources allocation/sharing between one 4 Appeal 2015-006700 Application 11/570,447 network and another always involves negotiation” (Ans. 11)) are mere assumptions not properly supported by the evidence of record. The Examiner further errs in basing the anticipation rejection on speculation (“it is a common and typical practice that, in resources allocation or sharing for network interworking, the borrowing base station (e.g. the second network) may only be granted to the resources as defined by the lending base station (e.g. the first network)” (Ans. 12)), and knowledge of the skilled artisan (“[i]t is well known to an ordinary skill in the art that communications” (Ans. 13)). We will not resort to such speculation or assumptions to cure the deficiencies in the factual basis in order to support the Examiner’s anticipation rejection. Consequently, we cannot sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 and its corresponding dependent claims 2—9. We find a similar deficiency with respect to the rejection of independent claim 11 and dependent claims 12—18 and 20. Obviousness With respect to dependent claim 19, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection is based upon the Ketseoglou reference and official notice [Tjhat one of ordinary skill in the art would appreciate that beacon is a common way of triggering an event or synchronizing a time interval, and that the TDMA communication system disclosed by Ketseoglou would have the capability of generating and utilizing a beacon to commence each of the plurality of service intervals because it is well within the teaching scope of the disclosed invention as an alternative. 5 Appeal 2015-006700 Application 11/570,447 (Ans. 10). Moreover, the Examiner makes no additional findings regarding the obviousness of the claimed invention and expressly identifies that “Referring claim 19, Ketseoglou teaches claim 7.” (Id.) Appellants rely upon the arguments advanced with respect to illustrative independent claim 1. (App. Br. 13). We agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not identified how the reliance upon official notice remedies the deficiency noted with respect to the Ketseoglou reference under the anticipation rejection. Consequently, we reverse the Examiner’s rejection for the same reasons discussed above. CONCLUSIONS The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—9, 11—18, and 20 based upon anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 19 based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION For the above reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1—9, 11—18, and 20, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 19. REVERSED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation