Ex Parte Davis et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 31, 201613284154 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/284,154 10/28/2011 Adam DAVIS 23852-0018-01 4004 121964 7590 08/31/2016 McNees Wallace & Nurick, LLC/ TAIT Towers Manufacturing, LLC 100 Pine Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 EXAMINER HUANG, FRANK F ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2485 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/31/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ADAM DAVIS AND TYLER KICERA ____________ Appeal 2015-005283 Application 13/284,154 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before JASON V. MORGAN, MELISSA A. HAAPALA, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. HAAPALA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1−6, 8, 9, 11−20, 22, 23, and 25.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 The Final Action’s summary and Appeal Brief’s claims appendix are unclear as to whether claims 7, 10, 21, 24, and 26 are withdrawn or canceled. The Amendment submitted May 21, 2014 confirms these claims are canceled. Appeal 2015-005283 Application 13/284,154 2 INVENTION “The present disclosure relates to movable display systems and structures for supporting the same. More specifically, the present disclosure relates to largescale, lightweight structures for supporting lighting display components and video display systems and systems for moving the lightweight structures.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1 is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A large scale robotically movable video display system comprising: a robotic actuator; a support structure movably attached to the robotic actuator; a plurality of modules mounted on the support structure and being arranged to form a large display area greater than seventy (70) inches measured diagonally, each of the modules including at least one light source; and wherein the modules cooperatively display light to display at least one of video and images. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL Claims 1−3, 6, 8, 9, 11−17, 20, 22, 23, and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Flessas (US 7,545,108 B2; June 9, 2009) and Glynn (US 2005/0060921 A1; March 24, 2005). Final Act. 6−7. Appeal 2015-005283 Application 13/284,154 3 Claims 4, 5, 18 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Flessas, Glynn, and Sandberg2 (US 2007/0064092 A1; March 22, 2007). Final Act. 8. ISSUES Appellants’ contentions present us with the following issue: A) Did the Examiner improperly combine the teachings of Flessas and Glynn? B) Did the Examiner improperly combine the teachings of Flessas, Glynn, and Sandberg? ISSUE A: OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1−3, 6, 8, 9, 11−17, 20, 22, 23 AND 25 OVER FLESSAS AND GLYNN Appellants contend the obviousness rejection of claims 1−3, 6, 8, 9, 11−17, 20, 22, 23, and 25 is improper because: (1) “[a]dding AAPA_Flessas to Glynn would require substantial reconstruction and redesign of the system of Glynn as well as the manner in which the panels forming the screen would be folded compactly into the truck bed” (App. Br. 6; see also Reply Br. 2−3); (2) “one of ordinary skill in the art would not seek the teaching of a robotically controlled display such as that of AAPA_Flessas to add to a deployment system for packaging a large screen optical display that fits into the spatial area of a smaller and significantly more compact consumer truck bed or SUV cargo area” (App. Br. 7; see also 2 The PG Pub. US 2007/0064092 appears to incorrectly spell the first named inventor as Roy Sandbeg because the Inventor’s Oath and the corresponding issued patent (US 7643051 B1) spell the inventor’s name as Roy Sandberg. Both the Examiner and Appellant refer to the reference as “Sandberg.” Appeal 2015-005283 Application 13/284,154 4 Reply Br. 3−4); and (3) “[t]he Examiner’s reasoning to combine the references ‘so that the position of a display may be moved for various purposes, such as for entertainment, for optimizing viewing angle, for directing information to viewers in certain locations or areas’ is creating a problem to provide a reason for combining the references” (App. Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 4). We are not persuaded of error by these arguments. In particular, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments that an ordinarily skilled artisan (herein “artisan”) would not consider Flessas’ robotic actuator a viable replacement for Glynn’s actuator 38 permitting compact storage of the display 24 on the truck bed. See supra (contentions 1 and 2); see also Glynn Fig. 5 (stored display). The Examiner finds that Flessas is relied upon only to teach the actuator taught by Glynn can be a robotic actuator, i.e., that a robotic actuator is known to an artisan and can be used in place of an actuator. Ans. 10–11. Flessas’ relied-upon features need not be bodily incorporated into Glynn’s disclosed embodiment, but rather, consideration is given to what the combined teachings of Flessas and Glynn, knowledge of an artisan, and nature of problems to be solved would have collectively suggested. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Thus, the artisan is not compelled to blindly follow Flessas’ and Glynn’s disclosed examples, i.e., without exercising independent judgment. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1984). We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 6), unsupported by evidence, that replacing the actuator taught by Glynn with a robotic actuator, as taught by Glynn, would necessarily involve any change in size or require “substantial reconstruction and redesign.” Attorney Appeal 2015-005283 Application 13/284,154 5 argument is insufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We are also not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner’s rationale for combining Flessas’ and Glynn’s cited teachings is a problem of Glynn’s system recognized solely in hindsight of Appellants’ invention. See supra (contention 3). The Examiner finds the modification would have been obvious to an artisan at the time of the invention so that the position of a display may be moved for various purposes, such as optimizing viewing angle and directing information to viewers in certain locations, i.e., freely articulated movement of the attached display. See Final Act. 7. Flessas describes that display movement in three dimensions was generally preferred to display movement in one or two dimensions (see e.g., Flessas, col. 2, ll. 64−67; col. 3, ll. 22−24; col. 6, ll. 24−33); even for reasons in addition to control of viewing angles (col. 5, ll. 47−49). The Examiner’s reasoning is supported by evidence of record and is sufficient rationale to support the combination. For the foregoing reasons, Appellants fail to persuade us of error in the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1−3, 6, 8, 9, 11−17, 20, 22, 23, and 25. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection. ISSUE B: OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 4, 5, 18, AND 19 OVER FLESSAS, GLYNN, AND SANDBERG Appellants contend the obviousness rejection of claims 4, 5, 18, and 19 is improper because the Examiner has not articulated how Sandberg’s small display shield: (1) could be configured to cover and un/fold with the Glynn’s display panels 40a−g; and (2) would be contemplated without Appeal 2015-005283 Application 13/284,154 6 hindsight knowledge of Appellants’ invention. App. Br. 8−9; see also Reply Br. 4−5. We are not persuaded of error. Claim 4 merely requires “the support structure includes a transparent shield.” The Examiner finds the motivation to modify the method/apparatus of Glynn and Flessas by adding Sandberg is to obtain the benefit of impact protection with respect to the display screen. Ans. 16. For example, the subject matter of claims 4 can be achieved by, in view of Sandberg, placing a shield on one of Glynn’s panels 40a–g to obtain the benefit of impact protection. See Sandberg ¶ 51 (“shatter resistant sheet 607 (polycarbonate in the preferred embodiment) . . . protects the display screen in the event of a collision”). We are unpersuaded that the Examiner’s articulate reasoning, supported by evidence of record, is an improper rationale for the combination. For the foregoing reasons, Appellants fail to persuade us of error in the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 4, 5, 18, and 19. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1−6, 8, 9, 11−20, 22, 23, and 25. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation