Ex parte Davis

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 31, 2000

07882560 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 31, 2000)

Application for patent filed May 13, 1992.1
1
Paper No. 31
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
(1) was not written for publication in a law journal and
(2) is not binding precedent of the Board.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
_______________
Ex parte GLENN A. DAVIS
______________
Appeal No. 1997-1264
Application 07/882,5601
_______________
ON BRIEF
_______________
Before JERRY SMITH, FRAHM and BARRY, Administrative Patent
Judges.
JERRY SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-16, 18-31, 33-67, 69
and 70, which constitute all the claims remaining in the
application. The disclosed invention pertains to
Appeal No. 1997-1264
Application 07/882,560
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a data processing system. More particularly, the invention
relates to a procedure for initialization of a central
processing unit (CPU) regardless of whether the CPU is
operating in a fault-free mode or in a fault mode.
Representative claim 1 is reproduced as follows:
1. A data processing system, comprising:
a central processing unit (CPU), said CPU having a first
possible operating state of fault-free operation and a second
possible operating state of fault operation;
first means for applying a first signal to said CPU to
provide notice of initialization, said CPU operative to
complete certain processing tasks in response to said first
signal; and
second means for applying a second signal to said CPU
subsequent to said first signal and upon expiration of a
predetermined time interval to cause the initialization of
said CPU regardless of whether the CPU is operating in said
first possible operating state or said second possible
operating state.
The examiner relies on the following reference:
Guziak et al. (Guziak) 4,726,024 Feb. 16, 1988
Claims 1-16, 18-31, 33-67, 69 and 70 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by the
disclosure of Guziak.
Appeal No. 1997-1264
Application 07/882,560
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Rather than repeat the arguments of appellant or the
examiner, we make reference to the briefs and the answer for
the respective details thereof.
OPINION
We have carefully considered the subject matter on
appeal, the rejection advanced by the examiner and the
evidence of anticipation relied upon by the examiner as
support for the rejection. We have, likewise, reviewed and
taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, the
appellant’s arguments set forth in the briefs along with the
examiner’s rationale in support of the rejection and arguments
in rebuttal set forth in the examiner’s answer.
It is our view, after consideration of the record
before us, that the disclosure of Guziak does not fully meet
the invention as set forth in the appealed claims.
Accordingly, we reverse.
Appellant has indicated that for purposes of this
appeal the claims will stand or fall together in the following
three groups: Group I has claims 1-15 and 55-67, Group II has
claims 16, 18-31 and 33-54, and Group III has claims 69 and
70. Consistent with this indication appellant has made no
Appeal No. 1997-1264
Application 07/882,560
4
separate arguments with respect to any of the claims within
each group. Accordingly, all the claims within each group
will stand or fall together. Note In re King, 801 F.2d 1324,
1325, 231 USPQ 136, 137 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Sernaker, 702
F.2d 989, 991, 217 USPQ 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Therefore, we
will consider the rejection against independent claims 1, 16
and 69 as representative of all the claims on appeal.
Anticipation is established only when a single prior
art reference discloses, expressly or under the principles of
inherency, each and every element of a claimed invention as
well as disclosing structure which is capable of performing
the recited functional limitations. RCA Corp. v. Applied
Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 1444, 221 USPQ 385,
388 (Fed. Cir.); cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228 (1984); W.L.
Gore and Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554,
220 USPQ 303, 313 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851
(1984).
With respect to representative, independent claim 1,
the examiner purports to read the invention of this claim on
the disclosure of Guziak [answer, pages 4-5]. Appellant
argues that Guziak does not disclose the notice of
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Application 07/882,560
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initialization and does not disclose an apparatus or method
that resets a CPU regardless of whether the CPU is operating
in a fault-free state or a fault state [brief, pages 9-16].
The examiner asserts that the non-maskable interrupt (NMI) of
Guziak operates as a notice of initialization. The examiner
also argues that the CPU in Guziak is initialized in a fault-
free state because initialization can occur after a transient
fault is detected which is a fault-free state in Guziak
[answer, pages 13-16]. Appellant responds that the examiner
has misconstrued the disclosure of Guziak [reply brief].
We have carefully considered the disclosure of Guziak,
and we generally agree with the position of appellant as
expressed in the briefs. Most importantly, we agree with
appellant that the CPU of Guziak is not initialized or reset
when the CPU is in a fault-free operating state. Guziak
indicates that if a transient fault has been detected and is
corrected by the reinitialization, that fault will not be
detected a second time and the CPU resumes suspended
operations. Thus, reinitialization has occurred as a result
of a transient fault which is a fault state of operation and
not a fault-free state as argued by the examiner. In other
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Application 07/882,560
6
words, the reinitialization occurred due to a fault condition
of the computer even though the error was transient in nature.
The CPU of Guziak is not intended to be reset when the CPU is
operating in a fault-free state because Guziak desires to
resume operations at the point where operations were
interrupted when there is fault-free operation. Hence, we
find that Guziak fails to disclose the initialization of the
CPU regardless of whether the CPU is operating in the fault-
free state or the fault state as recited in claim 1. We also
find that Guziak does not disclose a “notice of
initialization” because the NMI signal of Guziak is not
necessarily followed by an initialization.
Since all the features of independent claim 1 are not
present in Guziak, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1
as anticipated by the disclosure of Guziak. Independent
claims 16 and 69 also recite a “notice of an impending
initialization” and the initialization of the CPU or reset of
the computer in both the fault-free operating state and in the
fault operating state. Therefore, we do not sustain the
rejection of independent claims 16 and 69 for the same reasons
discussed above with respect to claim 1.
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Application 07/882,560
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We have not sustained the rejection of any of the
representative claims 1, 16 and 69. Therefore, we do not
sustain the rejection of any of the claims on appeal before
us. The
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Application 07/882,560
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decision of the examiner rejecting claims 1-16, 18-31, 33-67,
69 and 70 is reversed.
REVERSED
Jerry Smith )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
Eric S. Frahm ) BOARD OF
PATENT
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
Lance Leonard Barry )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 1997-1264
Application 07/882,560
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JS/cam
Donald L. Otto et al.
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