11085647 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2013)

Ex Parte Daniels et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 26, 2013

11085647 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/085,647 03/21/2005 Fonda J. Daniels LOT920050009US1 (090) 3194 46321 7590 03/26/2013 CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & O''''KEEFE, LLP STEVEN M. GREENBERG 7900 Glades Road SUITE 520 BOCA RATON, FL 33434 EXAMINER WOOLCOCK, MADHU ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2451 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/26/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte FONDA J. DANIELS, RUTHIE D. LYLE, and MARY ELLEN ZURKO ________________ Appeal 2010-009388 Application 11/085,647 Technology Center 2400 ________________ Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and DAVID C. McKONE, Administrative Patent Judges. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-15. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellants’ arguments in their entirety, we refer to the following documents for their respective details: the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed February 1, 2010; the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed April 9, 2010; and the Reply Brief (Reply Br.) filed June 9, 2010. Appeal 2010-009388 Application 11/085,647 2 Claims 1, 2, 4-8, 10, 11, and 13-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Quine (US 6,782,415 B1; issued Aug. 24, 2004) and Anonymous (Email Distribution List Checking, RES. DISCLOSURE J. (Aug. 2000)). Ans. 3-9. Claims 3, 9, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Quine, Anonymous, and Le Hors (Arnaud Le Hors, Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) (Nov, 10, 2003) (submission request to W3C)). Ans. 9-11. We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to policy based control of multiple message forwards. Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the key disputed limitation emphasized: 1. A method for policy based control of multiple message forwards, the method comprising the steps of: reviewing a policy associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient to identify a set of recipients limited in accessing the message; and, responsive to a request to forward a substantially unmodified form of said message, detecting based upon said reviewed policy an attempt to forward said substantially unmodified form of said message from the initial recipient to a new recipient identified in the policy who already has received said message, and undertaking remedial measures to enforce limitations imposed upon the new recipient in respect to the message. ISSUE Has the Examiner erred by finding that Quine teaches a policy associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient? Appeal 2010-009388 Application 11/085,647 3 ANALYSIS We agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claim 1, that Quine and Anonymous collectively teach all claim limitations. Ans. 4-5. The Examiner relies on Quine’s message flags for teaching a policy associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient. Ans. 4 (citing Quine, col. 7, ll. 32-40). The Examiner relies on Quine’s setting the message flag in the recipient preference database 230 (Figure 2) and suppressing follow-up messages for teaching detecting based upon the reviewed policy. Ans. 4 (citing Quine, col. 7, ll. 62-64). Appellants argue Quine’s message flags are stored in a recipient database 130 (Figure 1), and are not a policy associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient, as recited by claim 1. App. Br. 10. Appellants further argue, in Quine, the message flags are not associated with any one message, but with a recipient as stored in the recipient database. Id. In response, the Examiner explains Quine teaches defining or selecting recipients for a particular message and initializing message status flags for each of the recipients, and the recipient message status flags are associated with a particular message and therefore directly correlate with a policy associated with a message. Ans. 12. The Examiner further explains Quine goes on to teach that once the particular message has been received, a response would set the message flag in the recipient database. Ans. 13. We agree with the Examiner. Appellants further argue Quine’s message flags store end user contact and address information, preferred mode of communications, and preferred document format. Reply Br. 3. Appellants further argue that the message flags are not associated with a message. Id. Appeal 2010-009388 Application 11/085,647 4 Quine describes Further to a sender defining or selecting recipients and identifying a “campaign” for each set of interrelated documents or messages, wherein a sender creates messages concerning a particular category that are intended to be received by a plurality of recipients as identified by the recipient list created by the sender, communications system 120 initializes message status flags for each of the recipients, the message status flags being stored in the recipient database system 130. Quine, col. 7, ll. 32-40 (emphases added). We are not persuaded that Quine’s message flag (policy) is not associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient. Notably, Quine states that the sender creates messages that are intended to be received by recipients, and Quine states that the message flags are for each of the recipients. Accordingly, a message flag is associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient. Contrary to Appellants’ arguments, the fact that Quine’s message flags are for the recipients does not preclude a finding that a message flag is associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient. Quine elaborates regarding the message flags and describes If the communications system 120 receives a response or feedback from a recipient who has earlier received a message or a document from the sender, such a response would set the message flag in the recipient preference database 230 and follow-up messages or documents would be suppressed which closes the loop of the message delivery system 100. Quine, col. 7, ll. 58-64 (emphasis added). The further elaborating by Quine only bolsters the Examiner’s position. The recipient’s response sets the message flag, and the response is Appeal 2010-009388 Application 11/085,647 5 related to an earlier received message. Thus, the message flag is associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient. Appellants have not persuaded us that Quine does not teach a policy associated with a message delivered to an initial recipient, as recited in claim 1. We are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claim 1. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 2, 4-8, 10, 11, and 13-15, which are not argued separately. We also agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claims 3, 9, and 12 , that Quine, Anonymous, and Le Hors collectively teach all claim limitations. Ans. 10-11. Appellants argue Le Hors does not overcome the deficiencies of Quine and Anonymous. App. Br. 11. Weighing Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 11) against the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 10-11), and in light of our findings and conclusions above regarding claims 1, 7, and 10, we conclude that Appellants have not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 9, and 12. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 9, and 12. ORDER The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-15 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED babc