Ex Parte Daniel et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 25, 2009

10521292 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 25, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte THOMAS DANIEL,
ULRICH RIEGEL, and MARK ELLIOTT
____________

Appeal 2008-6014
Application 10/521,292
Technology Center 1700
____________

Decided: February 25, 2009
____________

Before TERRY J. OWENS, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and MARK NAGUMO,
Administrative Patent Judges.
Opinion Dissenting-in-Part filed by Administrative Patent Judge OWENS.
Opinion Dissenting-in-Part filed by Administrative Patent Judge SMITH.

NAGUMO, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-10, which are all of the pending claims. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
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The Invention
The Appellants claim a process for producing a sodium acrylate
polymer from solid sodium acrylate dispersed or dissolved in an aqueous
medium. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A process for producing a sodium acrylate polymer by a
free-radical polymerization of sodium acrylate with or without
other monomers in an aqueous medium, which comprises using
solid sodium acrylate in an aqueous solution or dispersion by
dissolving or dispersing the solid sodium acrylate in the
aqueous medium.

The Reference
Tsubakimoto 4,286,082 Aug. 25, 1981
The Rejections
The claims stand rejected over Tsubakimoto as follows: claims 1-5
and 8-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), and claims 6 and 7 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
OPINION
We reverse the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and affirm the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
“Anticipation requires that every limitation of the claim in issue be
disclosed, either expressly or under principles of inherency, in a single prior
art reference.” Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868
F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
We need to address only the independent claims, i.e., claims 1 and 9.
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Issue
Have the Appellants shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that Tsubakimoto discloses, expressly or inherently, the
process of dissolving or dispersing solid sodium acrylate in an aqueous
medium (claim 1), or dissolving solid sodium acrylate in water (claim 9)?
Findings of Fact
Tsubakimoto discloses (col. 1, l. 53 – col. 2, l. 2):
an adsorbent resin composition obtained by copolymerizing in an
aqueous solution a mixture of 100 parts by weight of an acrylate salt
monomer (B) composed of 0 to 50 mol% of acrylic acid and 50 to
100 mol% of an alkali metal acrylate and 0.001 to 5 parts by weight of
a crosslinkable monomer (C) having 2 to 4 groups selected from the
group consisting of CH2=CHCO-, CH2=C(CH3)CO-, and
CH2=CH-CH2- in the molecule in the presence of at least one
surface-active agent (A) selected from the group consisting of water-
soluble surface-active agents and water-dispersible surface-active
agents in the presence of a water-soluble radical polymerization
initiator while maintaining the initial concentration of said mixture in
the range of from 25% by weight to saturation, and then drying the
resulting gel-like hydrous polymer under heat….

Tsubakimoto’s preferred alkali metal is sodium (col. 3, ll. 46-50). In
Tsubakimoto’s examples, acrylate salt monomer (B) is in an aqueous
solution (col. 7, ll. 32-36).
Analysis
The Appellants argue that “[b]ecause a reference must teach every
element of a claim in order for the reference to anticipate the claim, because
the identical invention must be shown in as complete a detail as is contained
in the claims, and because the ‘082 patent fails to teach or suggest using
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solid sodium acrylate to form the monomer solution, as presently claimed,
the ‘082 patent cannot anticipate claims 1-5 and 8-10 (Br. 12).
The Examiner argues (Ans. 7):
As a matter of fact, there are only two main ways of the preparation of
an aqueous solution of sodium acrylate:
1. mixing aqueous sodium hydroxide with acrylate acid, or
2. dissolving commercially available solid sodium acrylate,
97% [7446-81-3] (acrylic acid, sodium salt), FW 94.05,
mp>300°C in an aqueous medium.
Therefore, as per In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312, 197 USPQ
5 (CCPA 1978), when the reference teaches a small genus (two
species in this application) which [sic, the reference] places a claimed
species in the possession of the public.

In Schaumann, the reference to Hildebrandt disclosed a class of b-
(metahydroxyphenyl)-isopropylamines that encompassed Schaumann’s
claimed DL-1-(3-hydroxyphenyl)-2-ethylaminopropane (HEP). Schaumann,
572 F.2d at 313. Hildebrandt claimed, in claim 1, a compound that differed
from Schaumann’s claimed compound only in an amino group having,
broadly, a lower alkyl radical, rather Schaumann’s specific lower alkyl
radical, i.e., ethyl. Schaumann, 572 F.2d at 314. The court stated:
When we consider also that claim 1 of the Hildebrandt patent,
read in conjunction with the signification given the expression “alkyl
radical” in the specification, embraces a very limited number of
compounds closely related to one another in structure, we are led
inevitably to the conclusion that the reference provides a description
of those compounds just as surely as if they were identified in the
reference by name. Since one of the compounds thus described is
HEP, we agree with the examiner and the majority of the board that
appellants’ right to a patent thereon is barred under 35 USC 102(b).

Schaumann, 572 F.2d at 316-17.
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The Examiner does not explain, and it is not apparent, why the
Court’s rationale in Schaumann regarding the very limited number of
structurally closely related species within “lower alkyl radical” should apply
to Tsubakimoto’s preparation of an aqueous solution containing acrylate salt
monomer, particularly when Tsubakimoto does not actually disclose a genus
of preparative methods but, rather, is silent as to the form of the initial
acrylate salt. The Examiner’s argument that Tsubakimoto “teaches a small
genus (two species in this application)” (Ans. 7) is a conclusion that lacks
evidentiary support on this record that those of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood Tsubakimoto to teach a small genus. Findings of fact must
be based on evidence: accordingly the Examiner’s conclusion is incorrect.
Conclusion of Law
The Appellants have shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that Tsubakimoto discloses, expressly or inherently,
dissolving or dispersing solid sodium acrylate in an aqueous medium
(claim 1), or dissolving solid sodium acrylate in water (claim 9).
Response to Dissent
The dissent errs in stating that “[t]he issue turns on whether the
description of the invention in Tsubakimoto places a person of ordinary skill
in the art in possession of the sodium acrylate containing aqueous medium,
utilized in the process of Tsubakimoto”. The issue is whether Tsubakimoto
describes, expressly or inherently, dissolving or dispersing solid sodium
acrylate in an aqueous medium, see Corning, 868 F.2d at 1255-56, not
whether Tsubakimoto puts one of ordinary skill in the art in possession of
the sodium acrylate-containing aqueous medium disclosed therein.
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The cases relied upon by the dissent pertain to enablement by a
reference of what the reference discloses, not enablement to do something
the reference does not disclose such as, in the present case, use solid sodium
acrylate.
In In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004) the Court
opined that a printed publication that disclosed a reproducible plant variety,
but did not enable making it, was rendered enabling by a foreign sale of the
reproducible plant variety.
In In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543 (CCPA 1973) the Court held that
a published article that disclosed the formula of a class of chemical
compounds, without describing how to make the compounds, was not an
enabling disclosure and, therefore, did not render the compounds “described
in a printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In the portion of
Wiggins relied upon by the Dissent the Court stated in dicta that “a reference
describing an oil refinery need not describe how to make bolts and rivets in
order to be considered ‘enabling’.” Wiggins, 488 F.2d at 543. That dicta is
not applicable to the present case because in the Wiggins dicta the oil
refinery was described in the reference, whereas in the present case the
reference does not disclose solid sodium acrylate.
In In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562-63 (CCPA 1978) the Court held
that the Doran reference that disclosed a structural formula for 1,3-
dimethoxymethyl phenobarbital (DMMP) but did not disclose how to make
it did not put DMMP in possession of the public, but that a combination of
Doran and other references that taught how to make similar compounds put
DMMP in possession of the public, thereby rendering DMMP described in
Doran under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Unlike Samour, the use of solid sodium
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acrylate in Tsubakimoto’s process is not described by Tsubakimoto. Thus,
the Court’s decision in Samour does not indicate that Tsubakimoto puts the
use of solid sodium acrylate in that process in possession of the public even
if it was known in the art how to make solid sodium acrylate.
Hence, we are not persuaded by the dissent of error in our decision to
reverse the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Issue
Have the Appellants shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that Tsubakimoto would have rendered prima facie obvious,
to one of ordinary skill in the art, dissolving or dispersing solid sodium
acrylate in an aqueous medium, where the solid sodium acrylate is
anhydrous (claim 6) or has a water content from 0.1% to 10% by weight
(claim 7)?
Analysis
The Appellants do not rely upon the limitations in claims 6 and 7 for
the patentability of those claims but, rather, argue that Tsubakimoto fails to
suggest the use of solid sodium acrylate required by claim 1 from which
claims 6 and 7 depend (Br. 15). Tsubakimoto, the Appellants argue,
discloses the “standard prior art method of preparing an SAP
[superabsorbent polymer], wherein a solution of AA [acrylic acid] is
partially neutralized with sodium hydroxide to provide a monomer solution
containing sodium acrylate and unneutralized AA” (Br. 11).
Tsubakimoto discloses that if necessary to make the proportion of
alkali metal acrylate 100 mol% and the proportion of acrylic acid zero, “a
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base, such as an alkali metal hydroxide, for neutralizing acrylic acid may be
used in a proportion of at least one mole per mol of the acrylic acid” (col. 3,
ll. 30-33). Tsubakimoto, however, does not disclose that the alkali metal
acrylate other than that formed by neutralizing acrylic acid to raise the
proportion of alkali metal acrylate to 100% is formed in that manner.
Because Tsubakimoto does not limit the form in which the sodium
acrylate originates, Tsubakimoto would have led one of ordinary skill in the
art, through no more than ordinary creativity, to use sodium acrylate in any
form known to be suitable for forming the aqueous sodium acrylate solution.
See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007) (In making
an obviousness determination one “can take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ”). One
such form is solid sodium acrylate which, the Appellants acknowledge, was
described in the literature and is very readily soluble in water (Spec. 2:14-
15, 40). Hence, the use of solid sodium acrylate as the source of the sodium
acrylate in Tsubakimoto’s process would have been prima facie obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art.
The Appellants argue further that their Example 1 and Comparative
Example 1 show that the use of solid sodium acrylate provides an
unexpected reduction in residual acrylic acid monomer and improved white
color compared to sodium acrylate prepared in situ (Br. 14; Reply Br. 4).
For the following reasons the Appellants’ evidence is not effective for
overcoming the prima facie case of obviousness.
First, the Appellants’ showing of unexpected results does not provide
a comparison of the claimed invention with the closest prior art. See In re
Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re De Blauwe,
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736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Tsubakimoto is the closest prior art, and
the Appellants have not established that their Comparative Example 1,
which includes a hydroquinone monomethyl ether stabilizer not disclosed by
Tsubakimoto, is a suitable proxy for Tsubakimoto. Moreover, Comparative
Example 1 does not disclose the relative proportions of sodium acrylate and
acrylic acid resulting from the initial neutralization, and the Appellants have
not shown that Comparative Example 1 is closer prior art than Tsubakimoto.
Second, it is not enough for the Appellants to show that the results for
the Appellants’ invention and the comparative examples differ. The
difference must be shown to be an unexpected difference. See In re
Freeman, 474 F.2d 1318, 1324 (CCPA 1973); In re Klosak, 455 F.2d 1077,
1080 (CCPA 1972). In particular, the Appellants have not established that it
would have been unexpected that a lower level of residual acrylic acid
monomer would have been obtained starting from solid sodium acrylate
monomer, rather than by neutralizing acrylic acid monomer. Ordinary
purification of sodium acrylate would be expected to remove much, if not
all, of the residual acrylic acid. Thus, in the absence of such an explanation,
we find the Appellants’ argument implausible.
Third, the evidence is not commensurate in scope with the claims.
See In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 743 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Clemens, 622
F.2d 1029, 1035 (CCPA 1980). The Appellants’ methods covered by
independent claims 1 and 9 encompass including monomers other than
sodium acrylate; dependent claims 2 to 4 encompass including monomers
other than sodium acrylate and acrylic acid; dependent claim 5 encompasses
including monomers other than sodium acrylate and 0.01 to 5 mol% of a
monomer containing at least two ethylenically unsaturated bonds; and
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dependent claim 10 encompasses including monomers other than another
water soluble salt of acrylic acid. Yet such monomers are not used in the
Appellants’ comparison. We find in the evidence of record no reasonable
basis for concluding that the great number of materials encompassed by the
Appellants’ claims would behave as a class in the same manner as the
particular materials tested. See In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508 (CCPA
1972); In re Susi, 440 F.2d 442, 445-46 (CCPA 1971). Also, the
Appellants’ claim 1 encompasses both dissolving and dispersing the solid
sodium acrylate. The Appellants’ Example 1 includes only dispersing, and
the Appellants have not shown that the results obtained using dispersing are
representative of the results which would be obtained using dissolving.
Fourth, the cause-and-effect relationship is lost in multiple unfixed
variables. See In re Heyna, 360 F.2d 222, 228 (CCPA 1966); In re Dunn,
349 F.2d 433, 439 (CCPA 1965). The Appellants’ Example 1 and
Comparative Example 1 differ not only in the form of the original sodium
acrylate, but also in the hydroquinone monomethyl stabilizer present in
Comparative Example 1 but not Example 1, and possibly in different ratios
of sodium acrylate to acrylic acid in the starting reagent mixtures. The
Appellants have not shown that the allegedly lower level of residual acrylic
acid monomer and improved color number are not due to the particular
conditions used in Example 1 and Comparative Example 1.
Conclusion of Law
The Appellants have not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s
determination that Tsubakimoto would have rendered prima facie obvious,
to one of ordinary skill in the art, dissolving or dispersing solid sodium
acrylate in an aqueous medium, where the solid sodium acrylate is
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anhydrous (claim 6) or has a water content from 0.1% to 10% by weight
(claim 7).
Claim 1 is Unpatentable as a Matter of Law
Claims 6 and 7 depend from independent claim 1. The Appellants do
not contest that Tsubakimoto is prior art to all three claims. Although the
Examiner did not expressly reject claim 1 as obvious in view of
Tsubakimoto, if narrower dependent claims 6 and 7 are unpatentable in view
of Tsubakimoto, broader independent claim 1 cannot be patentable in view
of Tsubakimoto. Cf. Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, 498 F.3d 1307,
1319-1320 (Fed. Cir. 2007) in which the Federal Circuit rejected an
argument that independent claims 1 and 11 of the ‘548 patent were
patentable over prior art notwithstanding an earlier ruling by the court that
dependent claims 10 and 17 were unpatentable over that art. The court
explained: “In Ormco I [Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, 463 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2006)], this court decided that claims 10 and 17 of Align's '548
patent were invalid as obvious. Claim 10 is dependent on independent
claim 1, and claim 17 is dependent on independent claim 11. Because
claims 10 and 17 were found to have been obvious, the broader claims 1
and 11 must also have been obvious.” (Notably, in Ormco I, the Federal
Circuit did not comment on the patentability of claims 1 and 11, as they
were not then at issue. Ormco I, 463 F.3d at 1303.) The present facts are
similar, in that the Appellants have been notified of the basis of rejection of
dependent claims 6 and 7, and, being represented by a practitioner registered
to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office in patent
cases, cannot have failed to notice that the expressly rejected dependent
claims depend from claim 1. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
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the Appellants have not been given effective notice that the subject matter of
claim 1 is unpatentable in view of Tsubakimoto.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the rejection of claim 1 as obvious over
Tsubakimoto.1

OWENS, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting in part.
I disagree with the decision to affirm a rejection of claim 1 that has
not been made. Unlike the court in Ormco, whose task was to decide
patentability in litigation, our task, as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 6(b), is to
“review adverse decisions of examiners upon application for patents”.
Because the Examiner did not make an adverse decision of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103, we should not be affirming an adverse decision of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. A new rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
appears justified, but not an affirmance of a rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 that is not before us.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s view for the following
reasons.
I would affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-5 and 8-10 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Tsubakimoto.

1 As claims 2-5, 8, and 10, which depend from claim 1, have not been
rejected as obvious over Tsubakimoto, on the present record, they are
unaffected by this analysis.
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ISSUE
The Examiner found that Tsubakimoto describes every limitation of
the invention recited in the appealed claims (Ans. 3-5). Appellants, on the
other hand, contend that “[b]ecause a reference must teach every element of
a claim in order for the reference to anticipate the claim, because the
identical invention must be shown in as complete a detail as is contained in
the claims, and because the ‘082 patent fails to teach or suggest using solid
sodium acrylate to form the monomer solution, as presently claimed, the
‘082 patent cannot anticipate claims 1-5 and 8-10 (App. Br. 12).
Thus, the question presented is: Have Appellants established that the
Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting the appealed claims under §102. The
issue turns on whether the description of the invention in Tsubakimoto
places a person of ordinary skill in the art in possession of the sodium
acrylate containing aqueous medium, utilized in the process of Tsubakimoto.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. According to the Specification, the production of solid sodium
acrylate is known. (Spec. 1, ll. 9-17; 2, ll. 14-15).
2. The Specification cites GB-C-1,073,856 as describing the
production of sodium acrylate. GB-C-1,073,856 discloses the
resulting solid sodium acrylate is 98.3 to 99.4 % pure. .
3. GB-C-1,073,856 discloses solid sodium polyacrylates is
prepared from solutions of sodium hydroxide in methanol and
acrylic acid in methanol. The reference discloses that sodium
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hydroxide impurities remain in the mother liquor from which
the sodium acrylate is precipitated. (Page 1, ll. 52-62).
4. Solid sodium acrylate is known to be readily soluble in water. .
(Spec. 2, l. 40).
5. Appellants have not asserted that it was unknown to persons of
ordinary skill in the art to prepare aqueous monomer solutions
or dispersions from solid sodium acrylate. (See Briefs
generally).
6. The Examiner states “there are only two main ways of the
preparation of an aqueous solution of sodium acrylate:
1. mixing aqueous sodium hydroxide with acrylic acid, or
2. dissolving commercially available solid sodium acrylate,
97%... in an aqueous medium.” (Ans. 7; Final Rejection 4).
7. Appellants did not dispute the above statements in the Briefs.
(See Briefs generally).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
On appeal to this Board, Appellants must show that the Examiner
erred in finally rejecting the claims. Cf. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-986
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a
rejection by showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness or by
rebutting the prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of
nonobviousness.”) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
1998)); see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
The proper test of a publication as a § 102(b) bar is “whether one
skilled in the art to which the invention pertains could take the description of
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the invention in the printed publication and combine it with his own
knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be put in
possession of the invention on which a patent is sought.” In re Elsner, 381
F.3d 1125, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 936
(CCPA 1962)). In particular, in view of the publication, one must be able to
make the claimed invention without undue experimentation. Elsner, 381
F.3d at 1128.
It is well settled that prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) must
sufficiently describe the claimed invention to have placed the public in
possession of it. In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562-63 (CCPA 1978).
(Affirming a § 102(b) rejection based on a primary reference disclosing a
claimed compound in conjunction with one or more references which teach
it was known how to make that compound.)
“Every patent application and reference relies to some extent upon
knowledge of persons skilled in the art to complement that disclosed in order
that it be ‘enabling’ within the meaning of § 112 and to satisfy the
requirements of a reference under § 102. For example, a reference
describing an oil refinery need not describe how to make bolts and rivets in
order to be considered ‘enabling.’” In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543
(CCPA 1973).
ANALYSIS
Appellants’ principal argument in this appeal is the identical invention
must be shown in as complete a detail as is contained in the claims, and
because the Tsubakimoto fails to teach or suggest using solid sodium
acrylate to form the monomer solution, as presently claimed, Tsubakimoto
cannot anticipate. (App. Br. 12).
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The proper test of a publication as a § 102(b) bar is “whether one
skilled in the art to which the invention pertains could take the description of
the invention in the printed publication and combine it with his own
knowledge of the particular art and from this combination be put in
possession of the invention on which a patent is sought.” Elsner, 381 F.3d
at 1128. The essences of the evidentiary question here is what the disclosure
of Tsubakimoto patent means to one of ordinary skill in the art. The
Examiner asserted that one of main ways of the preparation of an aqueous
solution of sodium acrylate is to dissolve commercially available solid
sodium acrylate, in an aqueous medium. The Appellants have not refuted
the Examiner's position. Appellants have not asserted that it was unknown
to persons of ordinary skill in the art to prepare aqueous monomer solutions
or dispersions from solid sodium acrylate. (See Briefs generally).
Appellants assert that the presently claimed invention utilizes purified
solid sodium acrylate to produce the sodium acrylate polymer hydrogel.
(App. Br. 8). It appears that Appellants are doing no more than utilizing the
commercially available sodium acrylate discussed by the Examiner or the
product of the GB-C-1,073,856 reference discussed in the background of the
present Specification.2
Contrary to the position of the majority (slip op. 4-5), there is no
requirement for Tsubakimoto to provide a genus of preparative methods for
the initial acrylate salt. It is not inappropriate to rely on the knowledge of
persons skilled in the art to complement that disclosed in a reference in order

2 A person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that pure
sodium acrylate would be absent of impurities that could affect subsequent
reactions with the desired compound.
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for that reference to satisfy the requirements of a reference under § 102.
Samour, 571 F.2d at 562-563. As stated by the predecessor to our reviewing
court “a reference describing an oil refinery need not describe how to make
bolts and rivets in order to be considered ‘enabling.’” Wiggins, 488 F.2d at
543.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims
1-5 and 8-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

DECISION/ORDER
The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) of claims 1-5 and 8-10 over
Tsubakimoto is reversed, and the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of
claims 1, 6, and 7 over Tsubakimoto is affirmed.
It is ordered that the Examiner’s decision is affirmed-in-part.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART

PL Initial:
sld

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