Ex Parte Danan

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 5, 2009

10196652 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 5, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________________

Ex parte ITAI DANAN
____________________

Appeal 2008-001219
Application 10/196,652
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Decided:1 August 6, 2009
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, Vice-Chief Administrative Patent Judge,
JEAN R. HOMERE, and JAMES R. HUGHES, Administrative Patent
Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The two month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)
(2002).
We AFFIRM.

Appellant’s Invention
Appellant invented a data processing system, method, and apparatus
for initializing and maintaining data definitions in an application (computer
program). One embodiment of the invention is a method of processing data
where a process thread (program) causes a first data processing module to
supply data (output data) of a predetermined type to a second data
processing module. Dependencies provide that the data output by the
second data processing module is dependent upon the data output by the first
data processing module. The process thread causes the second data
processing module to determine (access type data and identify) a type of
data the second data processing module expects to receive from the first data
processing module. The second data processing module modifies its output
data where the actual type of data received from the first data processing
module differs from the expected type of data. (Spec. ¶¶ [0014]-[0015].)2

2 We refer to Appellant’s: Specification (“Spec.”), Supplemental Appeal
Brief (“App. Br.”) dated October 20, 2006, and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”)
dated July 2, 2007. We also refer to the Supplemental Examiner’s Answer
(“Ans.”) mailed May 8, 2007.
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Claims
Independent claims 1 and 24 further illustrate the invention.3 They
read as follows:
1. A computer implemented method of processing
data including a plurality of data processing modules equipped
with dependencies and a process thread, wherein:
said dependencies provide that output data of a second
data processing module is dependent upon output data of a first
data processing module;
said process thread causes the first data processing
module to supply the output data of a predetermined type to the
second data processing module;
said process thread causes said second data processing
module to access type data identifying a type of data the second
data processing module expects to receive from said first data
processing module; and
said second data processing module is configured to
modify its output data if an actual type of data that is received
from said first data processing module differs from said
expected type of data.

24. A computer readable medium having computer
readable instructions executable by a computer, wherein said
instructions configure said computer to perform the steps of:

3 We note that the claims provided in the Claim Appendix (App. Br. 16-21)
include amendments made after the Examiner’s final rejection and not
entered by the Examiner. Accordingly, we review the claims as they stood
at the time of the Examiner’s final rejection. See Appellant’s Amendment
dated October 19, 2005. The claims (above) show the non-entered
amendments struck through.
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at a first of a plurality of data processing modules
equipped with dependencies, supplying output data of a
predetermined type to a second data processing module,
wherein said dependencies provide that output data of the
second data processing module is dependent upon the output
data of the predetermined type of the first data processing
module;
at said second data processing module, accessing type
data identifying a type of data the second data processing
module expects to receive from said first data processing
module; and
at said second data processing module, modifying its
output data if an actual type of data that is received from said
first data processing module differs from said expected type of
data.

References
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability:
Gajda US 6,546,365 B1 Apr. 8, 2003

Matson US 6,668,254 B2 Dec. 23, 2003

Appellant’s Admitted Prior Art (AAPA)

Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which Appellant regards as the invention.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 11, 12, 19, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Matson.
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The Examiner rejects claims 2-6, 13-17, 20-23, and 25 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Matson and Gajda.
The Examiner rejects claims 7-10 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Matson and AAPA.

ISSUES
Issue 1: Rejection of Claim 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd Paragraph
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-25 is
moot in view of Appellant’s amended claims.4 Appellant does not contend
that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph. (App. Br. 4-5.)

4 Appellant also contends that the claim amendments should be
entered into the record because they merely clarify the claims and do not
require additional consideration, and that the Examiner’s refusal to enter the
claim amendments was improper. (App. Br. 3-5.) The Examiner’s refusal
to enter an amendment after final rejection (App. Br. 3-5; Reply Br. 8-11) is
discretionary. Decisions within the Examiner’s discretion, such as whether
or not to enter an amendment after final rejection, are reviewed only by way
of petition, not appeal. See In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984-85 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (Examiner’s refusal to enter amendment after final may be the subject
of a petition, but may not be reviewed by the Board); 37 C.F.R. § 1.127
(“From the refusal of the primary examiner to admit an amendment, in
whole or in part, a petition will lie to the Director under § 1.181.”). Because
the Examiner’s refusal to enter an amendment after final is a petitionable,
rather an appealable matter, this issue is not before us and we express no
opinion as to its propriety.
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Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
The Examiner sustained the previous indefiniteness rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. (Ans. 7-8.)

Issue 1: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph?

Issues 2 and 3: Rejection of Claims 1, 11, 12, 19, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant contends that the Examiner improperly rejected
independent claims 1, 11, 19, and 24. Specifically, Appellant contends that
the Examiner failed to establish a proper prima facie case of obviousness for
claims in that the Matson reference does not teach: (1) “processing modules
that are dependent on the output of other processing modules;” (2)
“comparing an expected type of data to an actual type of data received;” and
(3) “modifying output data if the actual type of data received is different
from the type expected.” (App. Br. 6-10.) Appellant also contends that
Matson does not teach data processing modules equipped with dependencies
require initialization, as recited in claim 12. (App. Br. 14.)

Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
The Examiner found that Matson teaches each feature of Appellant’s
invention (as claimed in independent claims 1, 11, 19, and 24, and
dependent claim 12), except for “dependencies.” (Ans. 4-5, 8-9.) The
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Examiner found that dependencies were suggested by Matson because
Matson teaches an import manager receiving data from a supplier to
generate statistics. The Examiner determined that it would have been
obvious to one of an ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made “to have recognized that the import manager is implicitly depending
on the supplier to supply data in order to generate statistics related to the
data received.” (Ans. 4.) The Examiner also found that Matson teaches an
Import Manager implemented as a software module, which inherently
requires initializing. (Ans. 12.)

Issue 2: Did Appellant demonstrate that the Examiner erred in
establishing a proper prima facie case of obviousness for claims in that the
Matson reference does not teach or suggest: (1) processing modules
dependent on data output from other processing modules; (2) comparing an
expected type of data to an actual type of data received; and (3) modifying
data output from a processing module where the actual type of data received
is different from the type expected?

Issue 3: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson reference teaches initializing a processing
module?

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Issues 4-8: Rejection of Claims 2-6, 13-17, 20-23, and 25 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant contends that the Examiner improperly rejected claims 2-6,
13-17, 20-23, and 25. (App. Br. 10-15.) Specifically, Appellant contends
that the Examiner failed to establish a proper prima facie case of
obviousness for claims in that the Matson and Gajda references do not teach:
(1) a second processing module modifying its output data with stored default
data if the data received from the first data processing module cannot be
processed at the second data processing module; (2) the first and second data
processing modules store type data and default values for the type data
within a data type register; (3) the first and second data processing modules
access the data type register utilizing a process thread; and (4) the first and
second data processing modules store actual data in the data type register
utilizing a process thread. (App. Br. 10-13.) Appellant also contends that
Matson and Gajda do not teach initializing a processing module, or
generating and storing a data type register, as recited in claim 13. (App. Br.
14.)

Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
The Examiner found that Matson teaches each feature of Appellant’s
invention (as claimed in 2-6, 13-17, 20-23, and 25), except Matson does not
specifically teach: (1) modifying the output data of the second data
processing module with stored default values if the data from the first data
processing module cannot be processed at the second data processing
module; (2) storing the type data and default values thereof within a data
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type register; (3) accessing the data type register; and (4) storing actual data
in the data type register. (Ans. 5.) The Examiner found that Matson does
teach storing records and comparing received data to the previously stored
records, as well as modifying output data when a match is not found. (Ans.
5.) The Examiner also found that Matson teaches a software module
inherently requiring initializing. (Ans. 12.) The Examiner found that Gajda
teaches displaying a default message if a failure or corruption occurs in the
message translation table or actual data. The Examiner determined that it
would have been obvious to one of an ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made to combine “the teaching of Matson with the teaching of
Gajda to enhance the reliability of Matson's system in the situation where an
output is expected from the second processing module.” (Ans. 5-6.)

Issue 4: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach modifying the
output data of a processing module with stored default values if the received
data cannot be processed?

Issue 5: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach storing type data
and default values within a data type register?

Issue 6: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach accessing the data
type register utilizing a process thread?
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Issue 7: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach storing actual data
in the data type register utilizing a process thread?

Issue 8: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach initializing a
processing module, and generating and storing a data type register?

Issue 9: Rejection of Claims 7-10 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant contends that the Examiner improperly rejected claims 7
and 18 because neither Matson nor Appellant’s admitted prior art (AAPA)
teach a task processing sequence. (App. Br. 10-13.)

Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
The Examiner found that Matson teaches each feature of Appellant’s
invention (as claimed in claims 7-10 and 18), except Matson does not
specifically teach a task processing sequence. (Ans. 6.) The Examiner
found that Matson does teach an Import Manager that processes supplier
data to generate statistics. The Examiner found that Appellant’s admitted
prior art (AAPA) teaches a process cycle including parent and child nodes,
where the parent node depends on the output data of a child node. (Ans. 6.)
The Examiner determined that it would have been obvious to one of an
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to recognize that
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Matson’s Import Manager implicitly depends on the supplier data to
generate statistics related to the (supplier) data received, and that combining
the teaching of Matson with the teaching of AAPA would “further enhance
the processing capability of Matson’s data processing system by reducing
the complexity of the applications involved.” (Ans. 6-7.)

Issue 9: Did Appellant establish that the Examiner erred in
determining that the Matson and AAPA references teach a task processing
sequence?

FINDINGS OF FACT (FF)
We find that the following enumerated findings are relevant to the
rejections under review and are supported by at least a preponderance of the
evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the
Office).

Appellant’s Invention – Appellant’s Admitted Prior Art
1. Appellant explains that “it is established good engineering
practice for applications to comprise a large number of small sets of
instructions or modules.” (Spec., ¶ [0007].) Appellant’s disclosed modules
comprise computer instructions, i.e., software or computer code.
2. Appellant explains that “any complex application can be
broken down into sufficiently small individual modules so that complexity,
at the module level” is reduced. (Spec., ¶ [0008].)
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3. Appellant describes threads as concurrent processes. (Spec., ¶
[0114].)
4. Appellant’s Specification teaches that concurrent processes
(threads) may create a single processing pipeline or processing cycle
including a parent node and child nodes. Input data of the parent node is the
output data provided (called or pulled) from the child nodes. The output
data of the parent node is dependent on the output data of the child nodes.
(Spec., ¶¶ [0114]-[0118]; Fig. 16.)

Matson Reference
5. Matson teaches a system and method for automated importing
of data from a supplier’s computer system where the data may have a variety
of formats. (Col. 1, ll. 7-25, 54-61.) Matson teaches a computer process, an
Import Manager, that automates the importation of data from various data
sources. (Col. 3. ll. 21-28; col. 4, ll. 16-33; Fig. 1, element 107.)
6. Matson teaches independent processes or process threads, e.g.,
differential analysis, conversion to XML, Normalize Company, Product
Lookup. (Abstract; col. 4, ll. 49-50; col. 5, ll. 22-26; col. 7, ll. 9-10, 42-47;
Figs. 2-4.)
7. Matson’s Import Manager downloads supplier data, compares
the downloaded data with a database to determine if there are any concerns
with the data, and then converts the data into a standard format. (Abstract;
col. 2, ll. 5-13; col. 4, ll. 16-63; col. 5, ll. 16-26.)
8. Matson teaches accessing data identifying the type of data
supplied in the downloaded supplier data. Specifically, Matson teaches
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compares product attributes in the supplier provided input data to existing
(known) product attributes saved in Matson’s database. The attributes relate
to the type of product. (Col. 8, ll. 34-65; col. 9, ll. 18-29; col. 10, ll. 24-40;
col. 10, l. 48 to col. 11, l. 12.)
9. Matson’s Import Manager utilizes differential analysis to split
the input data into different data files (categories of data) and provides
statistical results that change depending on the input data values and
formats. The Import Manager provides (outputs) product information to the
database for import into the database. (Col. 2, ll. 5-10; col. 3, ll. 21-28; col.
4, ll. 16-63; col. 6, ll. 1-65; Fig. 2.)
10. Matson’s Import Manager’s output product information also
changes depending on the input data, e.g., Matson teaches deleting duplicate
data. (Col. 6, ll. 5-28.)
11. Matson further teaches converting or modifying product
attribute data supplied with the input data to match existing (known) product
attributes. (Col. 8, ll. 1-65; col. 9, ll. 18-29; col. 10, ll. 24-40; col. 10, l. 48
to col. 11, l. 12.)
12. Matson teaches previously stored records, and comparing the
previously stored records with input data provided by a supplier. The Input
Manager uses the previously stored data instead of the newly acquired data
where the data is missing, faulty or there is a low confidence in the accuracy
of the new data. The Input Manager then provides the data to the database.
(Col. 4, ll. 34-44; col. 7, l. 52 to col. 9, l. 52; col. 10, ll. 24-40; col. 10, l. 48
to col. 11, l. 12.)

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Gajda Reference
13. Gajda teaches a system and method for automated language
support for a program application operating in a multi-language
environment. (Col. 1, ll. 7-48.) Gajda teaches selecting a language type,
opening a corresponding translation file, and if the translation cannot be
processed (because of failure or corruption), a default message (default
value) is displayed. (Col. 1, ll. 52-55; col. 5. ll. 1-7; Fig. 9, elements 916-
922.)
14. Gajda teaches a computer system including memory and
external storage (memory) in which translation files are stored and accessed
according to Gajda’s method. (Col. 1, l. 45 to col. 2, l. 8; col. 2, l. 40 to col.
3, l. 13; Fig. 1.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Burden on Appeal
Appellant has the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error
in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“‘On appeal to the Board, an applicant can overcome a rejection by
showing insufficient evidence of prima facie obviousness or by rebutting the
prima facie case with evidence of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.’”)
(quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

Obviousness
A claimed invention is not patentable if the subject matter of the
claimed invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill
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in the art. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
406 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized “the need for caution in
granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior
art,” and stated that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to
known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield
predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 415-16. The Court explained:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill.
Id. at 417. The operative question is thus “whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” Id.
Consistent with KSR, the Federal Circuit recently recognized that
“[a]n obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula
disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the
common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some
combinations would have been obvious where others would not.” Leapfrog
Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 416). The Federal Circuit relied in part on the fact
that Leapfrog had presented no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in the
combined device was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary
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skill in the art” or “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Id. at
1162.

ANALYSIS
Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellant or the Examiner, we
refer to the Briefs and the Answer for their respective details. In this
decision, we have considered only those arguments actually made by
Appellant. Arguments which Appellant could have made but did not make
in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Issue 1: Rejection of Claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2nd Paragraph
The Examiner rejects claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph as indefinite.
Appellant does not substantively dispute the Examiner’s findings as to
the Section 112, second paragraph rejection. Accordingly, Appellant fails to
demonstrate error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-25, and we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection.

Issue 2: Rejection of Claims 1, 11, 19, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant demonstrates that the
Examiner erred in establishing a proper prima facie case of obviousness for
claims because Matson does not teach or suggest: (1) processing modules
dependent on data output from other processing modules; (2) comparing an
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expected type of data to an actual type of data received; and (3) modifying
data output from a processing module where the actual type of data received
is different from the type expected. We will affirm the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1, 11, 19, and 24 for the reasons that follow.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Matson does not
teach processing modules dependent on data output from other processing
modules. Appellant does not explicitly define a “module” or a “processing
module” in the Specification. Appellant does, however, explain that a
module is a self-contained software program. (FF 1, 2.)
We determine the scope of the claims in patent applications not solely
on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims “their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification” and “in light of
the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the
art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).
Accordingly, giving the term “processing module” its broadest
reasonable interpretation, we agree with the Examiner that a processing
module means the manipulation of data within a computer system by a self-
contained software component that can provide a complete function to a
system and can be interchanged with other modules that provide similar
functions. (See Examiner’s Office Action (Final Rejection) dated January 9,
2006, p. 7 (citing Microsoft Computer Dictionary, Fifth Edition).)
Similarly, Appellant does not explicitly define “dependent” or
“dependencies.” Giving the term “dependency” its broadest reasonable
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interpretation, we find that a dependency is the state of being dependent –
i.e., controlled, determined, or relying on something else.
Matson expressly teaches automating importing of data from a
supplier’s computer system, and an Import Manager downloading supplier
data. (FF 5, 7.) As explained by the Examiner (Ans. 4), Matson discloses
relying on supplier to supply data. The data output from supplier’s system is
input into Matson’s Import Manager. Thus, Matson teaches a module (the
Import Manager) dependent on the data output from other modules (the
supplier’s computer system).
Appellant also contends that Matson does not teach a process thread
as recited in claims 1, 11, and 19. (App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 14.) Appellant,
however, explains that a process thread is merely a concurrent process. (FF
3, 4.) We note that this definition is consistent with what is well known in
the software arts, that a thread is a set of code that serves as an additional
linkage structure in a program and allows different portions of a
program/process to operate independently of each other. Matson teaches a
number of concurrent processes or threads. (FF 6.) Accordingly, we find
that Matson teaches a process thread.
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Matson does
not teach comparing an expected type of data to an actual type of data
received. We note at the outset that, as a general proposition, merely
reciting that data corresponds to a particular “type” (as opposed to some
other unique identifier) essentially constitutes non-functional descriptive
material as it does not further limit the claimed invention either functionally
or structurally. Such non-functional descriptive material does not patentably
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distinguish claims over the prior art that otherwise renders the claims
unpatentable.5
Each of claims 1, 11, 19, and 24 recites “type data,” “type of data,”
and “data of a predetermined type.” Giving these terms their broadest
reasonable interpretation, we find that “type data,” “type of data,” and “data
of a predetermined type” refer to the kind, classification, nature, form, or
category of data. We also note that these terms refer to Appellant’s
disclosed data definition register. (Spec., ¶¶ [0089]-[0090]; Fig 9.)
Accordingly, comparing data “types” merely means comparing data in a
particular portion (location) of memory. Matson stores data relating to
various product attributes, categories, or types, and Matson’s Import
Manager compares supplier data with a database to determine the type of
data (category, attribute, format, and values) the Import Manager expects to
see. (FF 6, 7.) Thus, Matson teaches comparing an expected type of data to
an actual type of data received.
Lastly, we find unavailing Appellant’s argument that Matson does not
teach modifying data output from a processing module where the actual type
of data received is different from the type expected. For the reasons supra,
Matson teaches comparing data types. Matson’s Import Manager utilizes
differential analysis to split the input data into different data files. These
different data files are output to Matson’s database, and duplicate data is
deleted. Matson’s Import Manager also utilizes differential analysis to
provide statistical results that change depending on the input data values and

5 See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Ex parte
Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1887-89 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (discussing
cases pertaining to non-functional descriptive material).
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formats. (FF 9, 10.) Matson further teaches converting or modifying
supplier product attribute data to match previously stored (existing) product
attributes. (FF 11.) Therefore, Matson’s Import Manager modifies its
output data based on the input data, where the input data is different than the
type expected.
Thus, in light of KSR and Leapfrog, the evidence provided by the
Examiner supports a finding that combining familiar elements according to
known methods is obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results. The Examiner presents a prima facie obviousness rejection. For all
the reasons noted above, Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 11, 19, and 24. Accordingly, we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection claims 1, 11, 19, and 24.

Issue 3: Rejection of Claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson reference teaches initializing
a processing module. We will affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12
for the reasons that follow.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Matson does not
teach that data processing modules equipped with dependencies require
initialization. Initially we note that claim 12 depends on independent claim
11, an apparatus claim. Accordingly, merely reciting that an apparatus
component (a processing module) requires “initialization” – a process that
results in the previously described module – essentially constitutes non-
functional descriptive material as it does not further limit the claimed
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invention either functionally or structurally. Such non-functional descriptive
material does not patentably distinguish claims over the prior art that
otherwise renders the claims unpatentable. As explained by the Examiner
(Ans. 12) Matson teaches an Import Manager implemented as a software
module, which inherently requires initializing. (Ans. 12.) Thus, for all the
reasons noted above, Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 12, and we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection.

Issue 4: Rejection of Claims 2, 3, 17, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach
modifying the output data of a processing module with stored default values
if the received data cannot be processed. We will affirm the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 2, 3, 17, and 23 for the reasons that follow.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Matson and Gajda
do not teach modifying the output data of a processing module with stored
default values if the received data cannot be processed. Matson teaches
previously stored records used for comparison with input data, and
modifying the output of Matson’s Input Manager to replace newly acquired
supplier (input) data with previously stored (default) data when a match
can’t be found (where the data is not provided or faulty), i.e., when the
particular data cannot be processed. (FF 12.) Gajda teaches providing a
default data value (a default display message) if a translation cannot be
processed (because of failure or corruption). (FF 13.) Thus Matson and
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Gajda teach the limitations of claims 2, 17, and 23. Appellant does not
argue claim 3. (App. Br. 11.)
Appellant asserts for the first time in the Reply Brief that there is no
suggestion or motivation to modify Matson in view of Gajda. This argument
is waived as untimely. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Even so, we note
that the Examiner provides ample evidence of reasons to combine or modify
the references. Accordingly, we find the Examiner has “articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning” for the combination of the
references. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Thus, in light of KSR and Leapfrog, the
evidence provided by the Examiner supports a finding that combining
familiar elements according to known methods is obvious when it does no
more than yield predictable results. The Examiner presents a prima facie
obviousness rejection.
For all the reasons noted above, Appellant fails to demonstrate error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 17, and 23. Accordingly, we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 17, and 23.

Issue 5: Rejection of Claims 4, 14, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach
storing type data and default values within a data type register. We will
affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 14, and 20 for the reasons that
follow.
We find unavailing Appellant’s argument that Matson and Gajda do
not teach storing type data and default values within a data type register. As
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set forth supra, merely reciting that data corresponds to a particular “type”
does not further limit the claimed invention. We note that data registers are
a well known component of memory and storage circuits. Accordingly,
storing data in memory inherently requires storing data in data registers.
Therefore, storing type data and default values in a data type register merely
refers to storing particular data (values) in a specific data storage location of
memory. Matson teaches previously stored (default) data used for
comparison with input data. (FF 12.) Gajda teaches storing a default data
value (a default display message) in memory. (FF 13, 14.) We find that
these teachings meet the limitations of claims 4, 14, and 20, particularly in
view of Matson’s teaching of storing attribute (product type) data.
For all the reasons noted above, Appellant fails to demonstrate error in
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 14, and 20. Accordingly, we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 14, and 20.

Issue 6: Rejection of Claims 5, 15, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach
accessing a data type register utilizing a process thread. We will affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 5, 15, and 21 for the reasons that follow.
For the reasons set forth for Issue 5 (supra), we find accessing a data
type register merely refers to accessing particular data (values) in a specific
data storage location of memory. Matson teaches process threads. (FF 6.)
Matson also teaches its Import Manager accessing stored attribute (product
type) data. (FF 8.) Thus, Matson and Gajda teach the limitations of claims
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5, 15, and 21, and Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s
rejection. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5,
15, and 21.

Issue 7: Rejection of Claims 6, 16, 22, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach
storing (actual) data in a data type register utilizing a process thread. We
will affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 16, 22, and 25 for the
reasons that follow.
For the reasons set forth for Issues 5 and 6 (supra), we find that
storing “actual” data in a data type register merely refers to storing particular
data in a specific data register (storage location of memory), and that Matson
teaches storing product type data. (FF 8-11.) Accordingly, Appellant fails
to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we will sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 16, and 22.
Claim 25 includes the limitations discussed previously with respect to
Issues 4-6, as well as Issue 7. For the reasons set forth therein, Matson and
Gajda teach all of the limitations of claim 25. Accordingly, Appellant fails
to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we will sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 25.

Issue 8: Rejection of Claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson and Gajda references teach
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initializing a processing module, and generating and storing a data type
register. We will affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 for the reasons
that follow.
For the reasons set forth for Issues 3 and 5-7 (supra), we find
Appellant’s arguments unavailing. Claim 13 depends on dependent claim 12
and on independent claim 11, an apparatus claim. Appellant’s “wherein”
clause – “wherein a data type register is generated and stored in said storage
means as a result of the initialisation of a first of said data processing
modules” – merely recites that an apparatus component (a storage means)
includes particular data in a specific data register (storage location of
memory). The entire claim essentially constitutes non-functional descriptive
material that does not patentably distinguish it over the prior art that
otherwise renders the claim unpatentable. Matson teaches memory and an
Import Manager implemented as a software module, which inherently
requires initializing. Thus, for all the reasons noted above, Appellant fails to
demonstrate error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 13, and we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection

Issue 9: Rejection of Claims 7-10 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
We decide the question of whether Appellant established that the
Examiner erred in determining that the Matson and AAPA references teach a
task processing sequence. We will affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims
7-10 and 18 for the reasons that follow.
As explained with respect to Issue 2, Matson’s Import Manager (a
module) utilizes differential analysis to provide output data (data files and
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statistics) to a database. The output data of the Import Manager is dependent
on the data output from the supplier’s computer system (a module). Matson
also describes comparing newly received and previously received (stored)
data from the same suppliers. Suppliers, therefore, would understand the
data that Matson desires and would supply that data (increasing the
reliability thereof). (Matson, col. 8, ll. 1-19; col. 10, l. 48 to col. 11, l. 5.)
Thus, the data provided (output) from the suppliers is at least in part affected
by the data output from Matson’s Import Manager. The AAPA teaches that
such a process cycle is known. (FF 4.) Thus, Matson and AAPA teach a
task processing sequence as recited in claims 7 and 18. Appellant does not
argue claims 8-10. (App. Br. 14.)
Thus, in light of KSR and Leapfrog, the evidence provided by the
Examiner supports a finding that combining familiar elements according to
known methods is obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results. The Examiner presents a prima facie obviousness rejection. For all
the reasons noted above, Appellant fails to demonstrate error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 7-10 and 18. Accordingly, we will sustain
the Examiner’s rejection.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
On the record before us, we find that Appellant does not demonstrate
that the Examiner erred: (1) in determining that claims 1-25 are indefinite
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph; (2) in establishing a proper prima
facie obviousness rejection for claims 1, 11, 12, 19, and 24 in that Matson
teaches: (a) processing modules dependent on data output from other
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processing modules, (b) comparing types of data, (c) modifying data output
from a processing module based on the type of data received, and (d)
initializing a processing module; (3) in establishing a proper prima facie
obviousness rejection for claims 2-6, 13-17, 20-23, and 25 in that Matson
and Gajda teach: (a) modifying the output data of a processing module with
stored default values if the received data cannot be processed, (b) storing
type data and default values within a data type register, (c) accessing the
data type register utilizing a process thread, (d) storing actual data in the data
type register utilizing a process thread, and (e) initializing a processing
module and generating and storing a data type register; and (4) in
establishing a proper prima facie obviousness rejection for claims 7-10 and
18 in that Matson and AAPA teach a task processing sequence.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-25 under §§ 112 and
103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

msc

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