Ex Parte Cutler et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 31, 201813570809 (P.T.A.B. May. 31, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/570,809 08/09/2012 23908 7590 06/04/2018 RENNER OTTO BOISSELLE & SKLAR, LLP 1621 EUCLID AVENUE NINETEENTH FLOOR CLEVELAND, OH 44115 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Stephen Cutler UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. CUTCP0103USA 2437 EXAMINER ORR,HENRYW ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2145 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/04/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipdocket@rennerotto.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte STEPHEN CUTLER and WILLIAM MACKENZIE, III 1 Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 Technology Center 2100 Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, HUNG H. BUI, and MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges. BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-56. See generally App. Br. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Appellants list Advanced Intellectual Property Group, LLC, as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief 2, filed February 27, 2017 ("App. Br."). 2 Rather than repeat the Examiner's positions and Appellants' arguments in their entirety, we refer to the above-mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the following documents, for their respective details: the Final Action mailed January 29, 2016 ("Final Act.") and the Examiner's Answer mailed July 13, 2017 ("Ans."). Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants describe the present invention as follows: A computer application and method for generating a workspace and navigating therein are disclosed. Code can be used to generate an application workspace for an associated computer application, wherein the application workspace is comprised of a plurality of screens and each screen has dimensions that are generally coextensive with a viewable area defined by the computer application. Code can be used to logically associate a plurality of sub-application windows for displaying viewable content with respective locations of the application workspace. Abstract. Independent claim 1, reproduced below with added emphasis, illustrates the claimed invention: 1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing a computer application workspace generation and navigation tool that comprises: computer code within a main computer application that generates a continuous logical main application workspace that is larger in size than a physically viewable operating system desktop work area displayed on a physical computer system display, the continuous logical main application workspace comprised of a plurality of logical screen areas, wherein: each logical screen has predetermined dimensions that are coextensive with the physically viewable work area on the physical computer system display such that each logical screen has dimensions that are the same as every other logical screen; the logical screens are arranged contiguously in predetermined locations in the logical main application workspace such that the logical main application workspace is a single and functionally continuous logical workspace that is larger in size than the physical computer 2 Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 system display used to display the physically viewable work area; and each logical screen is individually selectable for navigation within the logical main application workspace; and computer code that, by user action, jumps from the physically viewable area in the logical main application workspace to a selected one of the logical screens, the selected one of the logical screens being any logical screen in the logical main application workspace. The following rejections are on appeal: 3 Claims 1-15, 17, 20, 21, 25--43, 45, 48, 49, and 53-56 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I02(b) as anticipated by Dauerer (US 5,841,435; issued Nov. 24, 1998). Final Act. 3-10. Claims 18, 19, 22-24, 46, 47, and 50-52 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as obvious over Dauerer and Anderson (US 2003/0189597 Al; published Oct. 9, 2003). Final Act. 11-13. Claims 16 and 44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as obvious over Dauerer, Anderson, and Goh (US 5,678,015; issued Oct. 14, 1997). Final Act. 14--15. We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential). 3 The Final Rejection first states that the previously issued rejection of claims 1-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is withdrawn (Final Act. 2), but then proceeds to reproduce that rejection (id. at 2-3). Appellants note this discrepancy (App. Br. 18), and the Examiner clarifies that the rejection is withdrawn in the Answer (see Ans. 4). 3 Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 CONTENTIONS Appellants assert In Applicant's system, through user input, there is a jumping from any point on the logical workspace exactly to any one of the predetermined and selected logical screen locations on the logical main application workspace. In other words, Applicant's claims result in jumping directly from point to point, and over any and all points between the start and the end of the jump. No comparable language referencing "quantum" or "jumping" is utilized anywhere in Dauerer. App. Br. 10. Appellants acknowledge that Dauerer teaches discrete movements of the display across the workspace: The only navigation mechanism of Dauerer that is based on a display-sized area is the "Discre[te] Physical Display Movement" function, by which a movement equal to one physical display size may be employed using a pointer in either a vertical or horizontal direction from the current view. (See, e.g., Dauerer at col. 7, lines 32--42.) Even such navigation does not provide for individually selecting a logical screen located at any position within the workspace as claimed, nor jumping to the selected logical screen anywhere in the workspace as claimed. Dauerer at most merely permits adjacent movements across the workspace in display-sized increments. App. Br. 15. But according to Appellants, Whether Dauerer's incremental moves are continuous or discrete, Dauerer teaches dragging the physical display across the virtual workspace from one contiguous location to another contiguous location. Therefore, Dauerer's moving across a virtual workspace is functionally not the same as Applicant's jumping through the virtual workspace. Although sometimes both methods cause the viewable area to end up at the same location on the workspace, Applicant and Dauerer get there using functionally different methods. 4 Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 In contrast to Dauerer, the claimed jumping movements as claimed are neither continuous nor discrete. Jumps are made by adaptively calculating how far the jump needs to take place in order to land exactly over the predetermined boundaries of the selected logical screen. Also, unlike Dauerer, the jumping is not restricted from one area that is contiguous to another area. Id. at 10-11. Appellants summarize In essence, in the claimed invention the end point of the jumping navigation is independent of the start point, because the user can jump from the physically viewable area to any selected logical screen located anywhere in the workspace. The claimed invention thus permits quantum movements from any point in the workspace to any selected logical screen in the workspace. In contrast, in Dauerer the scope of potential end points is always dependent upon the start point because only adjacent movements can be made. Id. at 15. ANALYSIS I. We appreciate the distinctions Appellants outline between their invention, as disclosed, and that of Dauerer. However, Appellants' arguments are not commensurate in scope with their claims. Claim 1 does not require that the computer code contain logic that allows jumps to any logical screen in the logical main application workspace from any starting logical screen. In the event the starting logical screen is the center screen of an array of three-screen-by-three-screen workspace, shown in Dauerer' s Figure 3, the user can jump to any of the remaining eight logical screens by virtue of each of the eight screens being contiguous to the center screen. See Dauerer col. 7, 11. 14--17 (indicating that Dauerer permits movement in 5 Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 vertical, horizontal, or diagonal directions). That particular center-start scenario satisfies the requirements of claim 1. We therefore sustain the Examiner's anticipation rejection of claim 1, as well as that of dependent claims 2-15, 17, 20, 21, and 25-28, which Appellants do not argue separately. See App. Br. 17-18. We likewise sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections of claims 16, 18, 19, 22-24 over Dauerer in view of Anderson and Goh. Appellants do not particularly point out errors in the Examiner's reasoning regarding the additional teachings of Anderson or Goh, but merely reiterate the same arguments that are set forth in relation to independent claim 1 regarding the alleged deficiencies of Dauerer. App. Br. 17-18. II. Independent claim 29 is even broader than independent claim 1. Claim 1 is directed to a computer readable medium with computer code having specified functionality of allowing the jumping to any logical screen. That is, claim 1 specifies functionality that enables jumping to all other functional screens. Claim 29, in contrast, is a method claim that sets forth "by user action, jumping from the physically viewable area in the logical main application workspace to a selected one of the logical screens, the selected one of the logical screens being any logical screen in the logical main application workspace." As such, the "by user action, jumping" step of claim 29 is met when a system causes a jump from any given functional screen to any one of the other functional screens. Anticipation of claim 29 does not require jumping to all of the other functional screens. 6 Appeal 2018-000136 Application 13/570,809 Claim 29, then, is not only anticipated by Dauerer for reasons set forth in relation to claim 1. Claim 29 also is anticipated by additional embodiments of Dauerer that are composed of arrays greater than three-by- three. This is because Dauerer discloses jumps to contiguous functional screens, which is all that the "jumping" step of claim 29 requires. We therefore sustain the Examiner's anticipation rejection of claim 29, as well as that of dependent claims 30-43, 45, 48, 49, and 53-56, which Appellants do not argue separately. See App. Br. 17-18. We likewise sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections of claims 44, 46, 47, and 50-52 over Dauerer in view of Anderson and Goh. Appellants do not particularly point out errors in the Examiner's reasoning regarding the additional teachings of Anderson or Goh, but merely reiterate the same arguments that are set forth in relation to independent claim 1 regarding the alleged deficiencies of Dauerer. App. Br. 17-18. DECISION The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-56 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation