Ex Parte Curey et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 23, 2012

09821537 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
09/821,537 03/28/2001 Randall K. Curey NG (NSD) 018807 US CIP 6434
26294 7590 10/23/2012
TAROLLI, SUNDHEIM, COVELL & TUMMINO L.L.P.
1300 EAST NINTH STREET, SUITE 1700
CLEVELAND, OH 44114
EXAMINER
LEE, PHILIP C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2615
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/23/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RANDALL K. CUREY, DANIEL A. TAZARTES, KENT T.
BANNO, and JOHN G. MARK
____________

Appeal 2010-007352
Application 09/821,5371
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, STANLEY M. WEINBERG, and
JOHN A. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The real party in interest is Northrop Grumman Corporation.
Appeal 2010-007352
Application 09/821,537

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1-49, which are all the claims
pending in the application. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The present invention relates generally to repetitively executing a
plurality of software packages at a plurality of rates utilizing a common set
of computational resources. See Abstract, 22.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for repetitively executing a plurality of
software packages at one or more rates, utilizing a common set of
computational resources, the method comprising the steps:
assigning a sequence of time intervals to each software
package of the plurality of software packages, the sequence of time
intervals assigned to a particular software package of the plurality of
software packages not overlapping the sequence of time intervals
assigned to any other software package of the plurality of software
packages;
executing a subset of the plurality of software packages,
each respective software package in the subset plurality of software
packages being executed during predetermined time intervals defined
by the sequence of time intervals assigned to the respective software
package in the subset of the plurality of software packages.

Appeal 2010-007352
Application 09/821,537

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Appellants appeal the following rejections:

R1. Claims 1-2, 4-9, 19-20, 22-27, 29-34, 44-45, and 47-49 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over Blum (US 4,109,311, Aug. 22,
1978);
R2. Claims 3 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Blum in view of Slivka (US 5,493,649, Feb. 20, 1996);
R3. Claims 10-11 and 35-36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Blum in view of Douceur (US Patent Pub.
2005/0132375 A1, Jun. 16, 2005);
R4. Claims 13-17 and 38-42 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Blum in view of Skagerling (US 5,621,663, Apr.
15, 1997);
R5. Claims 18 and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Blum in view of Herbert (US Patent Pub.
2006/0015719 A1, Jan. 19, 2006);
R6. Claims 21 and 46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Blum in view of Reznak (US 6,223,201 B1, Apr.
24, 2001); and
R7. Claims 12 and 37 stand rejected under under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Blum, Douceur, and Flannery (US 5,826,092,
Oct. 20, 1998).

Appeal 2010-007352
Application 09/821,537

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Claim Groupings
Based on Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide
the appeal on the basis of claims as set forth below. See 37 C.F.R.
41.37(c)(1)(vii).

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 2, 4-9, 19, 20, 22-27, 29-34, 44-45, and 47-49
Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding that Blum discloses
“assigning a sequence of time intervals to each software package,” as
claimed in claim 1?

Appellants contend that “in Blum, no sequences of time intervals are
assigned. Instead, in Blum a sequence of program execution is defined for a
set of time slices” (App. Br. 8-9). Appellants further contend that “in claims
1 and 26, a particular sequence of time is assigned to a particular software
package” (id.). We disagree.
As indicated in our prior Decision issued September 18, 2008, and
still applicable with the present case, there is no requirement in claims 1 and
26 that “a particular sequence of time be assigned to a particular software
package.” (See Decision, 19.) For example, claim 1 recites, inter alia,
“assigning a sequence of time intervals to each software package.” We find
that the recited “assigning” step merely requires associating a sequence of
time intervals with a software package. However, it does not matter what
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Application 09/821,537

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particular interval, i.e., 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. interval, the software is assigned. In
other words, Appellants’ clam language still has not indicated a “particular
time interval” for a particular software package, e.g., software package A
being assigned the 1st interval, for example. All that is required in the
argued limitations is that a software package is assigned an execution time
interval, any time interval. We further add that the act of
allocating/assigning a time interval inherently introduces the concept of
being “predetermined,” albeit right before execution.
Here, the Examiner found that “Blum teaches a plurality of software
programs (e.g., programs 0, 1 and 2 in figs. 2 and 3). Blum further teaches
each program is sequentially allocated time slices for the duration of which
all the resources of the processing unit are made available to one program”
(Ans. 17). We agree.
Specifically, Blum discloses a “time slicing technique” whereby “each
program . . . is sequentially allocated time slices for the duration of which all
the resources of the processing unit are made available to one program. For
the duration of the subsequent time slice, the processing unit is exclusively
available to the next program in the sequence” (col. 3, ll. 37-46). Blum
further discloses that “[t]he time slices in any given processing unit can be
allocated either rigidly, that is, the machine time available is divided equally
among the different programs, or dynamically” (col. 3, ll. 47-50). In other
words, Blum sequentially allocates time slices to the programs either in an
equal fashion beforehand or dynamically in real time. Therefore, for at least
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Application 09/821,537

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the reasons noted above, we find Appellants’ arguments that Blum fails to
assign a sequence of predetermined time intervals to each software package
unpersuasive.
Based on the record before us, we find that the Examiner did not err in
rejecting representative claim 1 and claims 2, 4-9, 19, 20, 22-27, 29-34, 44-
45, and 47-49 for similar reasons. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s
§ 102(b) rejection of claims 1, 2, 4-9, 19, 20, 22-27, 29-34, 44-45, and 47-
49.

Claims 21 and 46
Issue 2: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings
of Blum and Reznak discloses “determining when the execution of any one
of the respective software packages . . . extends into a time interval defined
by the sequence of time intervals assigned to at least one different software
package,” as claimed in claim 21?

Appellants contend that “[s]ince in Blum, programs are selected to be
executed in real time, there is never a time that a program is being executed
in a time slice that is associated with a different program” (App. Br. 12).
Appellants further contend that combining Blum with Reznak “would
constitute a substantial redesign and reconstruction of Blum” (id.).
The Examiner found that “Blum teaches dynamically changing the
time slice assignment” (Ans. 18.) We agree with the Examiner.
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Application 09/821,537

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Specifically, Blum discloses that “the individual programs can
automatically add to or reduce their share of the computing time. When a
program adds to its computing time, the additional time is taken from one or
more of the other programs” (col. 5, ll. 18-22). In other words, Blum
discloses a mechanism for extending into a time interval assigned to another
software program. Similarly, Reznak discloses a “self managing application
program, which automatically controls the amount of processing time
utilized by its subtasks” (col. 6, ll. 25-27). In other words, Reznak, like
Blum, controls the amount of processing time assigned to tasks. As such,
we find Appellants’ argument that combining Blum with Reznak “would
constitute a substantial redesign and reconstruction of Blum” unpersuasive
given that both references contemplate controlling processing time for tasks.
Therefore, we find that the recited “extends into a time interval”
limitation is strikingly similar (at least conceptually) to Blum and Reznak
teachings noted above, and the Examiner’s reliance on these functionalities
are therefore persuasive.
For these reasons, and for the reasons previously discussed regarding
claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 21 and 46.

Claims 3, 10-18, 28, and 35-43
Appellants have not presented separate arguments for dependent
claims 3, 10-18, 28, and 35-43, as Appellants have merely argued that the
various cited secondary references do not make up for the deficiencies of
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Blum (see App. Br. 9-11 and 13). Therefore, these claims fall with the
claims from which they depend. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 102 and § 103 rejections.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
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