Ex Parte Culter

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 25, 2014

11038379 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 25, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte BRADLEY G. CULTER1
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Appeal 2014-002634
Application 11/038,379
Technology Center 2100
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Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., JASON V. MORGAN, and
JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1–15 and 17–30. Claim 16 is canceled. App. Br. 1.
This appeal is related to Appeal No. 2009-005919 (rejection reversed, a new
ground of rejection entered; Apr. 10, 2013). Id. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.

1 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, LP, a wholly-owned affiliate of
Hewlett-Packard Company, is the Real Parties in Interest. App. Br. 1.
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Application 11/038,379

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Invention
Appellant invented a method that comprises partitioning a computer
system into a plurality of soft partitions that each run an operating system.
Abstract. The method further comprises instantiating a separate firmware
instance for each of the plurality of soft partitions, wherein each of the
firmware instances provides a pre-defined firmware interface for the
operating system of its respective soft partition. Id.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below with key limitations emphasized, is
illustrative:
1. A method, comprising:
partitioning a computer system into a plurality of soft
partitions each of which runs a respective operating system;
instantiating a separate respective firmware instance for
each of said plurality of soft partitions, wherein each of said
firmware instances provides a respective pre-defined firmware
interface for the operating system of its soft partition; and
in accordance with shared logic that interfaces with each
operating system through its respective pre-defined firmware
instance,
subdividing physical memory resources of the
computer system into nonintersecting regions of physical
memory that appear to the operating systems as
individual memory devices in a spanning namespace,
assigning to each of the plurality of soft partitions
a respective set of hardware resources of the computer
system including a respective set of the nonintersecting
regions of physical memory and a respective subset of
the spanning namespace,
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maintaining a configuration database comprising
respective specifications of the sets of hardware
resources assigned to the plurality of soft partitions, and
providing the respective specification of the set of
assigned hardware resources to each of the operating
systems through its respective pre-defined firmware
interface.
Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1–6, 14, 15, 17, 21–23, and 25–30 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Appellant’s Admitted Prior
Art (“AAPA”) and Gulick (US 6,314,501 B1). Final Rej. 2–18.
The Examiner rejects claims 7, 8, 18–20, and 24 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over AAPA, Gulick, and Zalewski (US
6,542,926 B2). Final Rej. 18–20 and 23–26.
The Examiner rejects claims 9 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over AAPA, Gulick, and Noel (US 6,381,682 B2). Final
Rej. 20–21.
The Examiner rejects claims 10–12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over AAPA, Gulick, Noel, and Camble (US 6,715,031 B2).
Final Rej. 21–23.
ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in finding Gulick teaches or suggests
“subdividing physical memory resources of the computer system into
nonintersecting regions of physical memory that appear to the operating
systems as individual memory devices in a spanning namespace,” as recited
in claim 1?
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ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds Gulick’s assignment to partitions of memory
windows within an address space of a main memory teaches or suggests
“subdividing physical memory resources of the computer system into
nonintersecting regions of physical memory that appear to the operating
systems as individual memory devices in a spanning namespace,” as recited
in claim 1. Fin. Rej. 5 (citing Gulick figs. 3–5, col. 8, l. 66-col. 9, l. 15, and
col. 15, l. 66-col. 16, l. 11). Specifically, the Examiner finds Gulick’s
“underlying physical memory namespace that is divided into soft partitions”
teaches or suggests the claimed “spanning namespace.” Ans. 2 (emphasis
added).
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because
Gulick expressly teaches . . . a windowing function maps the
physical address space of the processors in each partition to the
respective exclusive memory windows assigned to those
partitions so that “. . . the exclusive memory window of each
partition are made to appear to their respective operating
systems as having a same base physical address . . . .”
App. Br. 8 (citing Gulick col. 8, l. 66–col. 9, l. 15). Appellant further argues
the claimed “sub-dividing” element “clearly recites that the non-intersecting
regions of physical memory appear to the operating systems (plural) as
individual memory devices in a spanning namespace.” Reply Br. 3
(emphases added).
We find Appellant’s arguments to be persuasive. The Examiner finds
“[t]he claim does not require both the individual memory devices and the
spanning namespace to appear to the operating system[s].” Ans. 3.
However, claim 1 specifically recites the regions of physical memory
“appear to the operating systems as individual memory devices in a
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spanning namespace” (emphasis added). That is, the claim 1’s limitation “in
a spanning namespace” (singular) affects how the regions of physical
memory appear to the operating systems (plural). As Appellant correctly
points out, “in Gulick’s approach, each operating system has its own
namespace (starting at address zero), not a respective subset of the same
spanning namespace.” App. Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 3–4. In other words,
the windowing function mapping hides the underlying physical memory
namespace in Gulick, thus preventing the underlying physical memory
namespace from appearing to the operating systems. Because the Examiner
relies on the underlying namespace, which does not appear to the operating
systems, the Examiner’s findings do not show that Gulick teaches or
suggests “subdividing physical memory resources of the computer system
into nonintersecting regions of physical memory that appear to the operating
systems as individual memory devices in a spanning namespace,” as recited
in claim 1.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejection of claim 1. Independent claims 14 and 21 have similar recitations
and the Examiner does not show that AAPA, or other art elsewhere cited,
cures the noted deficiency. Therefore, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of dependent claims 2–15 and 17–30.
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DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–15 and 17–30.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

REVERSED

msc