Ex Parte Cuddihy et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 13, 2018

14208203 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/208,203 03/13/2014 Mark A. Cuddihy 83413517(65080-1142) 8367
113140 7590 02/15/2018
Bejin Bieneman PLC
Ford Global Technologies, LLC
2000 Town Center
Suite 800
Southfield, MI 48075
EXAMINER
CHEN, SHELLEY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3663
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/15/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket @ b2iplaw .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK A. CUDDIHY, THOMAS EDWARD PILUTTI,
MANOHARPRASAD K. RAO, ANDREW WALDIS,
ROGER ARNOLD TROMBLEY, MATTHEW Y. RUPP,
and WILFORD TRENT YOPP
Appeal 2017-0066371
Application 14/208,2032
Technology Center 3600
Before KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, AMEE A. SHAH, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the rejection of
claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 Our decision references the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed July 26,
2016) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Mar. 17, 2017), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Jan. 19, 2017) and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 25, 2016).
2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-006637
Application 14/208,203
BACKGROUND
The Specification relates to vehicles with “at least one autonomous
driving sensor and an autonomous mode controller configured to receive
signals generated by the autonomous driving sensor” in which “the
autonomous mode controller is configured to shade at least one vehicle
window when the vehicle is operating in an autonomous mode.” Spec. 1 6.
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed claims and recites:
1. A vehicle system comprising:
at least one autonomous driving sensor;
an autonomous mode controller configured to receive
signals generated by the autonomous driving sensor and control
at least one vehicle subsystem based at least in part on the
signals received;
wherein the autonomous mode controller is programmed
to selectively shade at least one vehicle window when the
vehicle is operating in an autonomous mode and in accordance
with an ambient light signal.
Appeal Br. 12.
REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Disley3 in view of Popat.4
2. The Examiner rejects claims 5, 12, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Disley in view of Popat and Snider.5
3 Disley, US 2014/0168608 Al, pub. June 19, 2014.
4 Popat, US 5,663,621, iss. Sept. 2, 1997.
5 Snider et al., US 2014/0097636 Al, pub. Apr. 10, 2014.
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Application 14/208,203
DISCUSSION
Disley in view of Popat
Claims 1—5, 7—12, and 14—20
With respect to this group of claims, Appellants raise arguments only
with respect to independent claim 1 and indicate that the remaining claims
will stand or fall with claim 1. See Appeal Br. 7—10. Accordingly, we
discuss only claim 1 below, and claims 2—5, 7—12, and 14—20 fall with
claim 1.
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds that Disley discloses a
system as claimed except that Disley does not disclose shading “in
accordance with an ambient light signal.” Final Act. 3 (citing Disley 6,
10, 11). The Examiner finds that Popat teaches shading based on an ambient
light signal, and the Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to
modify Disley based on Popat, “in order to maintain a comfortable light
level inside the vehicle under all external light conditions and times of day,
with predictable results.” Id. at 3^4 (citing Popat Fig. 4).
For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded of reversible
error with respect to the rejection of claim 1 by Appellants’ arguments.
Appellants first argue that the proposed modification of Disley would
render it unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. Appeal Br. 7. In support,
Appellants assert that “Disley seeks to make its vehicle as dark and
reflective as possible when projecting images” and that “[ajdmitting diffuse
daylight, as advocated by Popat, will make it harder for the occupants of
Disley’s vehicle to view the projected images.” Id. (citing Disley 121;
Popat col. 9,11. 16—19). Thus, Appellants assert that “the proposed
modification undermines Disley’s goal of providing in-vehicle
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Application 14/208,203
entertainment, thereby rendering Disley’s system unsatisfactory for its
intended purpose.” Id. We disagree.
First, we note that the rejection does not appear to rely on a bodily
incorporation of Popat’s system into Disley’s. Rather, the rejection relies on
Popat, to the extent that Popat teaches shading a window based on an
ambient light signal. See Final Act. 3. Thus, the proposed modification
does not require that the resulting system allows the admission of diffuse
daylight in windows that are screened/shaded. Second, we disagree that
Disley’s intended purpose would be circumvented if any light were admitted
into the vehicle. Disley does not expressly state that the vehicle need be “as
dark and reflective as possible when projecting images” as Appellants assert.
In fact, we see no express indication of the level of darkness required for
Disley’s system to operate, either in paragraph 21 cited by Appellants, or
any other portion of Disley. Further, Disley appears to contemplate that
light may be admitted while the windows are made to function as screens.
See, e.g., Disley 1 8 (“However, if it is acceptable to allow light to enter
through the window glass, the screen made by the sheet material could also
be somewhat smaller than the actual area, e.g if it is considered to be
relevant to be able to at least get a glimpse of the outside from the vehicle
through the window”), 111 (indicating that some windows may
automatically function as screens while others may require manual control
when the vehicle is in autonomous mode). Thus, Disley provides no
indication that allowing light into the vehicle would prevent operation of the
screened windows.
Next, Appellants argue that Disley does not disclose selective shading
of at least one vehicle window. Appeal Br. 8. In support, Appellants assert
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Application 14/208,203
that “Disley’s system does not make any decisions about which windows to
shade” and that “Disley requires that all windows be darkened so that
images can be projected onto one or more of the windows.” Id. Thus,
Appellants indicate that the claim requires that the autonomous mode
controller makes decisions about which window to shade. Appellants also
assert that the Specification provides “examples of various subsets of
windows selected for shading based on the orientation of the vehicle relative
to the sun” and the scope of the term “selectively” must be determined in
view of this portion of the Specification. Id. at 9.
We are not persuaded of error by this argument. First, to the extent
Appellants argue that Disley requires that all windows must be darkened, we
disagree for the reasons discussed with respect to the previous argument.
Second, we agree with the Examiner that the Specification does not provide
a limiting definition for the term “selectively.” Rather, the Specification
provides only examples of how the shades may be controlled. For example,
the Specification states that “the autonomous mode controller 135 may
control the shades 120 to cover any combination of’ windows. Spec. 118
(emphasis added). This example suggests that the controller may selectively
shade one window, all windows at once, or no windows based on the current
conditions. Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s interpretation (Ans. 4) that
“selectively shading” could mean selecting one, all windows at once, or no
windows at all, which is consistent with the Specification.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of reversible error and
we sustain the rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of claims
2—5, 7—12, and 14—20, which fall with claim 1.
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Claims 6 and 13
With respect to claims 6 and 13, Appellants argue that “[t]he Final
Office Action does not present any reasons for the rejection” and “claims 6
and 13 are not substantively addressed at all in the Final Office Action or in
the Advisory Action.” Appeal Br. 7. We agree and determine that the
Examiner has failed to set forth a prima facie showing of obviousness with
respect to these claims. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of
claims 6 and 13.
Disley in view of Popat and Snider
Appellants do not raise separate arguments with respect to the
separate rejection of claims 5, 12, and 20, and Appellants indicate that these
claims will stand or fall with their respective independent claims. Appeal
Br. 10. Accordingly, because we sustain the rejection of independent claims
1, 8, and 15 above, we sustain the rejection of claims 5, 12, and 20 here.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the rejections of claims 1—5, 7—12, and 14—20. We
REVERSE the rejection of claims 6 and 13.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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