Ex Parte Cudak et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 23, 2016

13613265 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/613,265 09/13/2012 Gary D. Cudak RPS920120066US1 (156) 9161
50594 7590
CRGO LAW
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
7900 Glades Road
SUITE 520
BOCA RATON, EL 33487
12/28/2016 EXAMINER
GRIJALVA LOB OS, BORIS D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2446
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GARY D. CUDAK, CHRISTOPHER J. HARDEE,
RANDALL C. HUMES, RUTHIE D. LYLE,
and
ADAM ROBERTS
Appeal 2016-003487
Application 13/613,2651
Technology Center 2400
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and
JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection (“Final Act.”) of claims 1—15, which are all the
claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The real party in interest is identified as Lenovo Enterprise Solutions
(Singapore) PTE. Ltd. (App. Br. 2.) Throughout this opinion we refer to the
corrected Appeal Brief filed September 14, 2015.
Appeal 2016-003487
Application 13/613,265
Claimed Subject Matter
The invention generally relates to “frequent content retrieval in a
content browser” by “visually emphasiz[ing] a frequently accessed portion
of the retrieved requested content in response to a threshold difference
between the retrieved requested content and the cached version.” (Abstract.)
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative:
1. A method for frequent content retrieval in a content
browser, the method comprising:
retrieving requested content from a content server from
over a computer communications network;
comparing the retrieved requested content to a cached
version of the requested content;
computing whether or not the retrieved requested content
differs from the cached version by at least a threshold amount;
annotating the retrieved requested content to visually
emphasize a frequently accessed portion of the retrieved
requested content in response to computing that the retrieved
requested content differs from the cached version by at least the
threshold amount; and,
returning the annotated retrieved requested content to a
content browser for display therein.
Examiner’s Rejection & References
Claims 1—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Farshad, Track Changes to Websites in Internet Explorer with Diff-IE (Add­
on) (2010), available at http://www.addictivetips.com/intemet-tips/track-
changes-to-websites-in-intemet-explorer-with-diff-ie-add-on (last visited
August 20, 2014), and Amacker (US 8,224,823 Bl; issued July 17, 2012).
(Final Act. 3—12.)
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Application 13/613,265
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner erred (App. Br. 5—9; Reply Br. 2—7). We are
not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. We adopt as our own the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken and as set forth by the Examiner in the Answer (Ans. 2 4). We
highlight and address specific arguments and findings for emphasis as
follows.
Appellants argue Farshad fails to teach or suggest “annotating the
retrieved requested content to visually emphasize a . . . portion of the
retrieved requested content in response to computing that the retrieved
requested content differs from the cached version by at least the threshold
amount,” as recited in claim 1. (App. Br. 5—9; Reply Br. 2—7.) Rather,
Appellants contend, Farshad teaches “a threshold above which changes are
not highlighted on a website.” (App. Br. 8 (citing Farshad p. 1); see also
Reply Br. 5—6 (citing Farshad p. 2, figure showing Diff-IE Settings for
“% Change threshold above which diffs are not shown”).) Therefore,
Appellants contend, “Farshad only stands for the proposition that
highlighting changes does not occur once a threshold number of changes is
detected between web pages—the opposite of Appellants’ claimed
invention” (Reply Br. 6—7) in which “only the differences in a cached
version of requested content and new version of the same content are
annotated if enough changes have occurred” (App. Br. 8).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments, which do not address
the Examiner’s findings regarding what Farshad would have suggested to
one of ordinary skill in the art. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that
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Application 13/613,265
annotating content when the content differs from its cached version by at
least a threshold amount is not beyond the abilities of the skilled artisan in
view of Farshad’s tracking of website changes. (Ans. 3; Final Act. 2, 4.)
In particular, the Examiner finds Farshad’s Diff-IE extension
highlights all differences between current and cached website versions,
teaching or at least suggesting an annotation threshold amount of “at least
one change since any differences are highlighted.” (Ans. 3 (citing Farshad
p. 1); see also Final Act. 3^4 (citing Farshad p. 3 (“All changes can be
differentiated by the highlighted text.”)).) According to the Examiner, “any
one change in the document may trigger [Farshad’s] highlighting while a
lack of changes will not trigger the highlighting thus any one change can be
considered a minimum threshold at which the highlighting occurs.” (Final
Act. 4 (emphasis added and bold omitted).) During prosecution before the
PTO, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the Specification. In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367
F.3d 1359, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, the claimed “threshold” is
not expressly defined in Appellants’ Specification. In the absence of such a
definition, the Examiner’s interpretation of “threshold amount” according to
its plain meaning to encompass “at least one change” that triggers Farshad’s
highlighting is reasonable. (Ans. 3; Final Act. 4.) Thus, Farshad at least
suggests “annotating the retrieved requested content to visually emphasize a
. . . portion of the retrieved requested content in response to computing that
the retrieved requested content differs from the cached version by at least the
threshold amount,” as recited in claim 1. Appellants do not persuasively
rebut the Examiner’s findings or reasoning regarding Farshad.
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Application 13/613,265
We further agree with the Examiner (Ans. 2—3) that the separate
“threshold” taught in Farshad does not undermine the findings relying on the
minimum threshold of at least one change. One of ordinary skill in the art
would recognize that Farshad’s system is designed to encounter
circumstances falling within the two thresholds — above the minimum of at
least one change and below the maximum set by the user. In addition,
Farshad’s teaching of a dialog box for customizing a threshold above which
changes are not shown, which Appellants emphasize is not the same type of
threshold claimed, would suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art that a
minimum threshold could be adjusted in a similar manner, instead of or in
addition to a maximum threshold.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Farshad and Amacker. Thus, we
sustain the rejection of independent claim 1, independent claims 6 and 11
argued for substantially the same reasons as claim 1, and dependent claims
2—5, 7—10, and 12—15 not separately argued. (App. Br. 6.)
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—15.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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