Ex Parte Cruz-Uribe et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 28, 2008

10620860 (B.P.A.I. May. 28, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte ANTONIO S. CRUZ-URIBE,
DAVID C. COLLINS and JEFFREY ALLEN NIELSEN
__________

Appeal 2008-2387
Application 10/620,860
Technology Center 1700
____________

Decided: May 29, 2008
____________

Before CHUNG K. PAK, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and
MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, Administrative Patent Judges.

COLAIANNI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 the final rejection of claims
1-42. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

INTRODUCTION
Appellants claim a method for producing a three-dimensional object
through solid freeform fabrication comprising selectively depositing
containment material to form a boundary structure and depositing a flowable
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build material within the boundary structure by flowing to the boundary
structure (claim 1).
Claims 1, 7, 8, 17, 18, 27, 29, and 37 are illustrative:
1. A method for producing a three-dimensional object through
solid freeform fabrication comprising:
selectively depositing containment material to form a boundary
structure, wherein said boundary structure defines a surface of said object;
and
depositing a flowable build material within said boundary structure,
wherein said flowable build material forms a portion of said object by
flowing to said boundary structure.

7. A method for producing an object through solid freeform
fabrication comprising:
selectively depositing containment material to form a boundary
structure with a high precision dispenser; and
depositing a flowable object build material into said boundary
structure with a low precision dispenser.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising depositing a sparse
array support structure to support said boundary structure.

17. The method of claim 13, further comprising removing said
boundary structure from said object build material after said solidification of
said object build material.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein said removing said boundary
structure comprises melting said boundary structure.

27. A method of producing an object through solid freeform
fabrication comprising:
selectively depositing containment material to form a plurality of
perimeter structures defining an outer surface of said object with a high
precision dispenser: and
dispensing a volume of fluid build material interior to said perimeter
structures.

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29. The method of claim 27, wherein said dispensing a volume of
fluid build material comprises adjusting said volume with a feedback control
device.

37. A method of producing a porous object though solid freeform
fabrication, said method comprising:
selectively depositing a first material with a high precision dispenser
to form an outer boundary structure;
selectively depositing a smaller, internal boundary structure with said
high precision dispenser; and
filling said outer boundary structure with a solidifiable build material,
wherein said filling is performed by a low precision dispenser.

The Examiner relies on the following prior art references as evidence
of unpatentability:
Greul (as translated)1 DE 19537264 A1 Apr. 10, 1987
Kieronski 6,364,986 B1 Apr. 2, 2002

The rejections as presented by the Examiner are as follows:
1. Claims 1-26, 37, and 39-42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being unpatentable over Kieronski.
2. Claims 1-42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Kieronski.
3. Claims 1-26, and 39-42 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being unpatentable over Greul.
4. Claims 27-38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Greul.

1 We refer to the April 2006 translation provided by Schreiber Translations,
Inc. in the Opinion below. The pagination referenced in the Opinion
corresponds to the translation pagination, not the pagination of the foreign
language document.
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Appellants separately argue claims 1, 7, 8, 18, 27, 29, 37, and 39. Claims
2-6, 9-17, 19-26, 28, 30-36, 38, and 40-42 are not separately argued by
Appellants. Accordingly, with regard to rejections 1 and 2 above, we
address Appellants’ arguments regarding the rejections with respect to
independent claims 1, 7, 27, 37, and 39 for reasons evident below. With
regard to rejection 3 above, we address Appellants’ arguments regarding the
rejection with respect to claims 1, 7, 8, and 39. With regard to rejection 4
above, we address Appellants’ arguments regarding the rejection with
respect to claims 27, 29, and 37.

OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) AND § 103 REJECTIONS OVER KIERONSKI
Appellants argue that Kieronski fails to disclose “selectively
depositing” material with a dispenser as claimed (Br. 8). Appellants contend
that Kieronski discloses using stereolithography, which uses a laser to
selectively cure resin in a tank so as to form the three-dimensional structure
(Br. 8-9). Appellants contend that the definition of “selective deposition” in
Paragraph [0028] of the Specification requires a material dispenser in
contrast to Kieronski’s method (Br. 8-9).
In light of Appellants’ arguments and evidence, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s § 102(b) and § 103 rejections over Kieronski for the reasons
below.
During examination, claim terms are given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci.
Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Patent and
Trademark Office applies to the claim terms the broadest reasonable
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meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood
by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever
enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by
the written description contained in the applicant's Specification. In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
The Examiner contends that giving “selectively depositing” its
broadest reasonable interpretation would include Kieronski’s
stereolithography process (Ans. 6-7). However, the standard applied during
the examination process is not simply to give the broadest reasonable
interpretation, but rather, to give the broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the Specification. Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr, 367 F.3d at
1364.
In the present appeal, Appellants’ Specification indicates that
“selective deposition” (i.e., “selectively depositing” as used in the claims)
“is meant to be understood both here and in the appended claims as a
method whereby the material dispensers (105) selectively deposit structural
material that makes up the object forming boundary (109) using high
precision dispensing methods . . .” (Spec. ¶ [0028]). “Material dispensers”
are exemplified as being a printhead capable of selectively operating either
as a high precision dispenser or a low precision dispenser (Spec. ¶ [0027]).
“High precision dispenser” is defined as any dispensing equipment
configured to perform a high precision process, and “lower precision
dispenser” is defined as dispensing equipment that is configured to eject
material according to a low precision process (Spec. ¶ [0022]).
Accordingly, “selectively depositing” as recited in independent claims
1, 7, 27, 37, and 39 requires material dispensers be used to deposit material.
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In other words, material is ejected (i.e., conveyed) through a dispenser for
deposition. In contrast, Kieronski’s method uses a laser to selectively cure
polymer material in a tank and form the three dimensional part; there is no
dispensing of material using Kieronski’s laser. Moreover, contrary to the
Examiner’s motivation (Ans. 6), we do not find Kieronski to suggest using
material dispensers in lieu of the stereolithography process.
Accordingly, because Kieronski fails to teach “selectively depositing”
the boundary layer as claimed and defined by Appellants, we do not sustain
the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claims 1-26, 37, and 39-42.
Furthermore, because Kieronski fails to teach or suggest the “selectively
depositing” claim feature as defined and claimed by Appellants, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 1-42 over Kieronski.

35 U.S.C. § 102(b) REJECTION OVER GREUL
CLAIMS 1, 7, 39
Appellants argue that Greul does not disclose selective deposition to
form the boundary layer (Br. 11). Appellants contend that their definition of
“selective deposition” (i.e., “selectively depositing” as claimed) excludes
Gruel’s formation of two halves of the hollow mold (i.e., boundary layer) on
a form, which are subsequently united to form a hollow mold (i.e., boundary
layer) (Br. 11).
We have considered Appellants’ arguments and find them
unpersuasive for the reasons below.
Greul discloses that the hollow mold is freeformingly produced in a
rapid prototyping process by means of layered deposition (Greul, 4). Greul
discloses that the hollow mold is formed in various layers in the process of
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freeform molding so that the outermost layers (i.e., the layers that form the
functional surface) fulfill the requirements placed on the component (Greul
5). Gruel discloses that the process used to form the three-dimensional
object includes either forming a positive or negative mold to form the
hollow mold; forming the hollow mold by casting a layer; demolding the
hollow mold; attaching the two halves together if the positive mold is used;
placing the hollow mold in tank surrounded by metal powder; and filling the
hollow mold with molten material to form the three-dimensional object
(Greul 6-7).
As noted above in our discussion of Kieronski, Appellants define
“selective deposition” (i.e., “selectively depositing” as claimed) as requiring
material dispensers to selectively deposit structural material to form the
boundary using high precision dispensing methods (Spec. ¶ [0028]).
Appellants further indicate that “‘high precision dispenser’ is meant to be
understood broadly as any dispensing equipment configured to perform a
high precision process” (Spec. ¶ [0022]).
We note that Appellants have not defined “high precision process.”
Webster’s defines “precision” as “exactness, accuracy.”2 Webster’s defines
“high” as “greater in degree than usual.”3 Accordingly, a “high precision
process” is reasonably understood as a process performed with a greater
degree of accuracy or exactness.
Like the Examiner, we find that Greul’s freeform layered deposition
process to form the hollow mold constitutes using material dispensers to
deposit material in a high precision process. Specifically, the layered

2 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 1131 (4th Ed. 1999).
3 Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 672 (4th Ed. 1999).
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deposition of the material to form the hollow mold uses material dispensers
to deposit (i.e., cast, Greul 5) the material on a mold. Moreover, the process
used is a high precision process in that material is deposited in such a way
on the mold that the outermost layer fulfills the requirements placed on this
component (i.e., the outermost layer form the functional surface of the
finished component) (Greul 5). Greul’s disclosure that the outermost layer
is “so thin” that the properties of the component are not changed and are not
determined thereby further indicates that the hollow mold layered deposition
is preformed with a higher degree of accuracy than usual (Gruel 5).
We find that whether Greul uses a negative (i.e., the hollow mold is
formed as a single piece) or positive mold (i.e., two halves of the hollow
mold are formed which are subsequently united), Greul’s disclosures
indicate that dispensers are used to form the hollow mold with high
precision process (i.e., the hollow mold is formed by “selective deposition”
as defined by Appellants).
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of
claims 1-7, 9-17, 19-26, and 39-42.

CLAIM 8
In addition to the arguments indicated above regarding claim 7,
Appellants argue none of the prior art references teaches or suggests
depositing a sparse array support structure to support a deposited boundary
structure (Br. 13).
Appellants define “sparse” as “widely spaced, scattered, or otherwise
not densely packed” (Spec. ¶ [0022]).
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Contrary to Appellants’ argument, we find that Greul discloses that
the hollow mold (i.e., the boundary material layer) may be embedded in a
heavy metal powder before the filling procedure (Greul 7; Figure 1, Step 5).
The heavy metal powder constitutes a deposited “sparse” array support of
the boundary layer in that the powder is not densely packed. This
interpretation of Greul is supported by the fact that after the molten material
is filled into the hollow mold, the metal powder is removed so that the
finished product may be extracted (Greul 7, Figure 1, Step 7).
Accordingly, we find that Greul discloses the argued claim feature
and we sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claim 8.

CLAIM 18
In addition to the arguments indicated above regarding claim 7,
Appellants further argue that none of the prior art references teaches or
suggests melting the boundary layer as recited in claim 18 (Br. 14).
Claim 18 recites “removing said boundary structure comprises
melting said boundary structure.” Moreover, claim 18 depends on claim 17,
which recites that removing the boundary layer from the build material after
solidification of the build material (Claim 17). Thus, the plain meaning of
claim 18 is that the boundary layer is melted to remove it from the solidified
boundary structure.
The Examiner determines that melting of the boundary layer is either
inherently disclosed in Gruel or would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art in view of Greul (Ans. 7-8). The Examiner’s rejection of
claim 18 is under § 102 alone. Accordingly, the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness is misplaced as obviousness is not the standard under § 102.
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Examiner has not provided further explanation of the facts that led to this
inherency determination. Gruel merely discloses that the hollow mold (i.e.,
the boundary layer) is melted by the molten material (i.e., the build material)
so that it assimilates with the build material to form the functional surface of
the object (Greul 5). Appellants’ Specification clearly indicates that removal
of the containment material (i.e., boundary structure) involves melting the
containment material (i.e., boundary structure) from the three-dimensional
object (i.e., melted off the build material) (Spec. ¶ [0044]). Greul does not
disclose that the hollow mold (i.e., boundary layer) is removed by melting.
Thus, we find that Greul does not inherently disclose the argued claim
feature.
Because the argued claim 18 feature is not taught by Greul, we do not
sustain the § 102(b) rejection of claim 18 over Greul.

35 U.S.C. § 103 REJECTION OVER GREUL
CLAIM 27
Appellants advance the same argument made regarding the § 102
rejection over Greul. Namely, that Greul does not teach or suggest
selectively depositing containment material to form a boundary structure,
wherein the boundary structure forms a surface of the object (Br. 11-12).
However, for the reasons given above, we find that Greul does teach
the argued claim feature. Accordingly, Appellants’ arguments are
unpersuasive.
We sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 27-28, and 31-36
over Greul.

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CLAIM 29
Appellants argue that none of the prior art teaches or suggests a
feedback control device as claimed (Br. 14).
The Examiner finds that using a feedback control loop would have
been either inherent or obvious in Greul because adjustment of the build
material volume is necessary in a solid freeform fabrication process (Ans. 8).
We agree.
Greul discloses that the hollow mold (i.e., boundary layer) is filled
with a molten material (Greul 7; Figure 1, Step 6; Figure 2, Step 6).
Accordingly, to ensure complete filling of the molten material or filling to
the level desired, a feedback control loop would have been obviously used
by one of ordinary skill in the art.
Moreover, Appellants’ claim 29 is not limited to any particular type of
feedback control loop. In fact, Appellants’ Specification indicates that any
type of feedback device may be used to monitor the filling of the build
material, which may reasonably include an operator’s observation of the fill
process and stopping or adding material as necessary (Spec. ¶ [0032]).
Accordingly, it would have been obvious to include a feedback control loop
with Greul’s molten material filling process to ensure proper filling of the
material into the hollow mold (i.e., boundary layer).
We sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 29 and 30 over
Greul.

CLAIM 37
Appellants have not provided any substantive arguments regarding
whether the § 103 rejection over Greul is proper. Rather, based on
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Kieronski’s apparent failure to disclose the “smaller internal boundary
structure” claim feature, Appellants confusingly contend that the rejection of
Greul should not be sustained (Br. 13).
For two reasons we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments. First,
Appellants’ arguments do not indicate why the Examiner’s obviousness
conclusion based on Greul is erroneous. Second, we agree with Examiner it
would have been obvious to selectively deposit internal boundary structures
in Greul in order to manufacture the desired final product. Greul’s Figure 1
and 2 clearly show a part with a non-uniform surface/shape. Accordingly,
shaping the hollow mold to fit the desired part shape, including hollow
cavities formed by the internal boundary structure would have been obvious
in view of Greul.
In view of these circumstances, we sustain the Examiner’s § 103
rejection of claim 37 and 38 over Greul.

DECISION
We do not sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claims 1-26,
37, and 39-42 over Kieronski.
We do not sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claim 18 over
Greul.
We do not sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 1-42 over
Kieronski.
We sustain the Examiner’s § 102(b) rejection of claims 1-17, 19-26,
and 39-42 over Greul.
We sustain the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 27-38 over
Greul.
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The Examiner’s decision is affirmed-in-part.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

tc

HEWLETT PACKARD COMPANY
P.O. BOX 272400, 3404 E. HARMONY ROAD
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