Ex Parte Cotter et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 17, 2017

12487396 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 17, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/487,396 06/18/2009 Robert Cotter CCN-15 7095
26875 7590 11/21/2017
WOOD, HERRON & EVANS, LLP
2700 CAREW TOWER
441 VINE STREET
CINCINNATI, OH 45202
EXAMINER
MARKOFF, ALEXANDER
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1711
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/21/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptodock@whe-law.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ROBERT COTTER, RANDY POUND, and JOHN MILLIGAN
Appeal 2017-004016
Application 12/487,396
Technology Center 1700
Before BEVERLY A. FRANKLIN, WESLEY B. DERRICK, and
JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges.
SNAY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 15, 20-25, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 41, and 44-48.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 We cite to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed June 18, 2009; Final Office
Action (“Final Act.”) dated June 29, 2015; Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.”) dated January 7, 2016, as amended April 29, 2016; Examiner’s Answer
(“Ans.”) dated December 9, 2016; and Appellants’ Reply Brief (“Reply
Br.”) dated January 17, 2017.
2 Appellants identify Cintas Corporation as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 3.
Appeal 2017-004016
Application 12/487,396
BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to methods for cleaning mats,
such as floor mats. Spec. H 2, 3. Claim 15—the sole independent claim on
appeal—is reproduced from the Claims Appendix of Appellants’ Appeal
Brief below, with italics added to highlight the recitation in dispute:
15. A method for cleaning a mat having an underside and a
pile side, the method comprising the following steps:
(a) loading the mat onto a loading module;
(b) vibrating the mat in a vibration module, wherein
vibrating includes rotating a shaft of a beat roller assembly
about a first axis to sequentially engage the underside of the
mat with a plurality of generally cylindrical beat rollers, the
beat roller assembly including a shaft and a first support plate
and a second support plate, the first support plate and the
second support plate being operatively coupled for rotation with
the shaft, and a first plurality of generally cylindrical beat
rollers positioned around the shaft and coupled between the first
support plate and the second support plate;
(c) washing the mat in a washing module;
(d) drying the mat in a drying module, wherein the drying
step further comprises using at least one vacuum;
(e) discharging the mat from a discharge module; and
(f) inspecting the mat for wear or damage;
wherein the mat is wetted during the washing step and
maintained in a generally planar configuration while being
wetted during at least the washing step;
wherein the mat is maintained in a generally planar
configuration and not trained around a majority of the
circumference of a roller during at least the washing step.
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Application 12/487,396
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 15, 21—24, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39, 41, and 44-48 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Heilman,3 Felty,4 Kuma,5 and
Weir.6
II. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Heilman, Felty, Kuma, Weir, and Brazier.7
III. Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Heilman, Felty, Kuma, Weir, Koellisch,8 and Felton.9
OPINION
Appellants argue the claims as a group in connection with Rejection I,
and do not separately argue either Rejection II or III. See App. Br. 5—12;
Reply Br. 3—8. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), we select
claim 15 as representative, and decide the appeal based on Rejection I as
applied to the representative claim.
Relevant to Appellants’ arguments on appeal, the Examiner finds that
Heilman discloses a rug cleaning method which includes vibrating a rug
using a plurality of flails carried on a beater drum. Final Act. 2 (citing
Heilman, Fig. 1). Heilman’s Figure 1 is reproduced below:
3 US 3,518,710, issued July 7, 1970 (“Heilman”).
4 US 1,883,851, issued October 18, 1932 (“Felty”).
5 US 5,548,905, issued August 27, 1996 (“Kuma”).
6 US 3,424,324, issued January 28, 1969 (“Weir”).
7 US 2006/0008612 Al, published January 12, 2006 (“Brazier”).
8 US 3,747,155, issued July 24, 1973 (“Koellisch”).
9 US 1,925,377, issued September 5, 1933 (“Felton”).
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Application 12/487,396
Figure 1, reproduced above, depicts a rug cleaning machine
comprising a rotatable beater drum 22 having a plurality of pliable flails 28
which are arranged to impact the backing 8 of a rug 6 to dislodge grit, dirt,
and dust from the rug. Heilman 2:17—21, 37-46, 53—55. The Examiner
further finds that Felty discloses a rug beater assembly comprising
cylindrical beat rollers rotatably positioned around a rotatable shaft. Final
Act. 3. The Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
had a reason to substitute Felty’s rug beater assembly for that of Heilman
because “they are both known for use in the cleaning of carpets and one of
ordinary skill would have achieved the predictable result of removing dust
and debris from a carpet by impacting the carpet.” Final Act. 3; see also
Ans. 11 (characterizing the substitution as a “predictable use of the prior art
elements according to their established function”).
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Application 12/487,396
Appellants argue that Heilman requires that the rug beating operation
occurs at the back side of the rug, whereas Felty purportedly involves
impacting the disclosed rug beaters against the rug nap. App. Br. 7—8. On
that basis, Appellants contend that Heilman “teaches away from beaters
contacting the upper face of the rug as disclosed in [Felty],” id. at 9, and that
modifying Felty’s process to beat the nap-side of a rug “would change the
principle of operation,” id. at 11.
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. As the
Examiner makes clear, the combination of Heilman and Felty in the
rejection does not involve modifying the position of the rug during cleaning.
Ans. 10. Rather, the Examiner’s articulated reasoning involves substituting
Felty’s rug beater assembly for Heilman’s, such that the beating operation in
Heilman’s process still would occur at that backside of a rug, albeit with
Felty’s rollers instead of Heilman’s flails. Thus, we are not persuaded that
Felty’s requirement that the beaters impact the backside of a rug teaches
away from substituting Felty’s beater assembly for that of Heilman. Nor are
we persuaded that such a substitution would change any principle of
operation in Felty’s process.
In the Answer, the Examiner identifies an additional reason for the
substitution—namely, that use of Felty’s beat rollers would avoid friction
and thereby reduce wear of the carpet. Ans. 11—12. Felty teaches that
because the beaters are rotatably mounted, “there is no appreciable friction
between the surface of the beaters and the rug and, hence, no wearing of the
rug in that way.” Felty 1:69-73. Appellants argue in their Reply Brief that
Felty’s teaching of reduced wear would not serve as a reason to combine
Felty with Heilman because Felty’s beaters contact only the backside of a
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Application 12/487,396
mg, which Appellants characterize as being significantly more robust than
the nap-side. Reply Br. 6—7. However, the fact that a mg’s backside might
be less susceptible to wear does not negate the Examiner’s finding that one
skilled in the art would have been motivated to reduce the amount of wear
imposed by the beating process.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ arguments do not identify
reversible error in the Examiner’s Rejection I as applied to representative
claim 15. Accordingly, we sustain Rejection I as well as each of Rejections
II and III which Appellants do not separately contest.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 15, 20-25, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37, 39,
41, and 44-48 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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