Ex Parte Corner et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 27, 201914010369 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 27, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/010,369 17169 7590 Stephen M. De Klerk MatterLight IP 2033 Gateway Place 5th Floor San Jose, CA 95110 08/26/2013 07/01/2019 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Katherine Ann Corner UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. BOKU-P092 4252 EXAMINER BRIDGES, CHRISTOPHER ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3695 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/01/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ariana@matterlightip.com s tephen @matterlightip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KATHERINE ANN CORNER, JOHN P. BROWNE, DANIEL KEEGAN FLANIGAN and SAMANTHA ELENA NEBRICH Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Technology Center 3600 Before KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, SCOTT B. HOW ARD, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1--4 and 21, i.e., all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Boku, Inc. Br. 3. Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Invention According to the Specification, the invention relates to "a method and system for processing a sale of an article, a virtual article, a service or a functionality such as a game using redeemable codes." Spec. ,r 1. 2 The Specification explains that a "merchant may offer the sale of a unique code that can be redeemed for the user to obtain access to the item." Id. ,r 2. Hence, the invention endeavors to "allow for merchants to more easily sell codes to users." Id. Exemplary Claim Independent claim 1 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as follows (with formatting added for clarity): 1. A method of processing a sale of an article, a virtual article, a service, or a functionality with a billing server remotely connected to a merchant server, comprising: receiving, with a billing server, a first message from a user device, the first message being a request for a code; transmitting, with the billing server, a charge request to an account server to charge an account of a user for a value of a code, the charge request being in response to the first message; receiving, with the billing server, a confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged; transmitting, with the billing server, a request for the code to the merchant server 2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: "Spec." for the Specification, filed August 26, 2013; "Final Act." for the Final Office Action, mailed May 26, 2017; "Br." for the Appeal Brief, filed October 2, 2017; and "Ans." for the Examiner's Answer, mailed January 25, 2018. 2 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 wherein the billing server is configured to transmit the request for the code in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged, wherein the merchant server has a plurality of codes stored that are available for distribution, the merchant server receiving the request for the code from the billing server, the merchant server marking a selected one of the codes stored by the merchant server as reserved, the merchant server transmitting the code that is marked as reserved to the billing server; receiving, with the billing server, the code that is transmitted from a merchant server in response to transmitting the request for the code; transmitting, with the billing server, the code to the user device of the user, the user device being operable to redeem the code with the merchant server and the merchant server marking the code as redeemed, redemption of the code allowing access to the user device to the article, virtual article, service, or functionality; receiving, with the billing server, payment from the account server in response to the charge request; and transmitting, with the billing server, a payment to the merchant server in response to receiving the payment from the account server. Br. 31-32 (Claims App.). The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal As evidence ofunpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Examiner relies on the following prior art: Quirk et al. ("Quirk") Foth et al. ("Foth") US 2009/0089116 Al US 7,647,278 Bl 3 Apr. 2, 2009 Jan. 12,2010 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Hirson et al. ("Hirson") US 2011/0217994 Al Sept. 8, 2011 The Re} ections on Appeal Claims 1--4 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2-8. Claims 1--4 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Hirson, Quirk, and Foth. Final Act. 9-17. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections in light of Appellants' arguments that the Examiner erred. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the Examiner's conclusion concerning ineligibility under § 101. We adopt the Examiner's findings and reasoning regarding the§ 101 rejection in the Final Office Action and Answer. See Final Act. 2-8; Ans. 3-9. But we disagree with the Examiner's conclusion concerning unpatentability under § 103. We provide the following to address and emphasize specific findings and arguments. The§ 101 Rejection of Claims 1--4 and 21 INTRODUCTION The Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter broadly: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. In Mayo and Alice, the Supreme Court explained that § 101 "contains an important implicit exception" for laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012); 4 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); see Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In Mayo and Alice, the Court set forth a two-step analytical framework for evaluating patent-eligible subject matter. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77-80; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18. Under Mayo/Alice step one, we "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to" a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Step one involves looking at the "focus" of the claims at issue and their "character as a whole." SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In January 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance for determining whether claims are directed to a judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 Guidance"). The 2019 Guidance applies to the Board. Id. at 50-51, 57 n.42; see 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (investing the Director with responsibility "for providing policy direction" for the PTO). Neither the Examiner nor Appellants had the benefit of the 2019 Guidance when advocating their respective positions concerning subject-matter eligibility. The 2019 Guidance specifies two prongs for the analysis under Mayo/Alice step one (PTO step 2A). 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55. Prong one requires evaluating "whether the claim recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural phenomenon." Id. at 54. "If the claim does not recite a judicial exception, it is not directed to a judicial exception," and it satisfies § 101. Id. "If the claim does recite a judicial exception, then it requires further analysis" under prong two. Id. Prong two requires evaluating "whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception." Id. "When 5 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 the exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception," and it satisfies § 101. Id. "If the additional elements do not integrate the exception into a practical application, then the claim is directed to the judicial exception," and it "requires further analysis" under Mayo/Alice step two (PTO step 2B). Id. Under Mayo/Alice step two, we "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements" add enough to transform the "nature of the claim" into "significantly more" than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221-22 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). Step two involves the search for an "inventive concept." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221; Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2019). "[A]n inventive concept must be evident in the claims." RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG ONE For Mayo/Alice step one, the Federal Circuit has noted that "[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction." Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to "a method for processing a sale," which "is considered to be a fundamental economic practice and method of organizing human activity such as performing transactions between people similar to creating a contractual relationship." Final Act. 3. According to the Examiner, the claimed invention "is a business solution to a problem rooted in the abstract idea of processing a sale." Ans. 4. 6 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Appellants assert that the Examiner characterizes the claims at an improperly "high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims." Br. 15. Appellants also assert that "the claims are not simply directed to any form of a method of processing a sale, but instead are specifically directed to intermediary controlled payment based code request and release." Id. We disagree. In determining that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the Examiner accurately assesses the "focus" of the claims and their "character as a whole." See, e.g., Final Act. 3--4, 6-7; Ans. 4--9; see also SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1167. Moreover, we determine that the claims recite abstract ideas falling within the three groupings of abstract ideas specified in the 2019 Guidance: mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 51-52. As relevant here, the Guidance identifies "marketing or sales activities or behaviors" as among the enumerated methods of organizing human activity. Id. at 52. As explained in the following paragraphs, each independent claim recites "marketing or sales activities or behaviors" in various limitations. Specifically, claim 1 recites the following limitations: • "receiving ... a first message ... the first message being a request for a code"; • "transmitting ... a charge request ... to charge an account of a user for a value of a code, the charge request being in response to the first message"; • "receiving ... a confirmation ... indicating that the account has been charged"; 7 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 • "transmitting ... a request for the code ... transmit[ ting] the request for the code in response to receiving the confirmation ... indicating that the account has been charged"; • "wherein ... a plurality of codes [are] stored that are available for distribution"; • "receiving the request for the code"; • "marking a selected one of the codes stored ... as reserved"· ' • "transmitting the code that is marked as reserved"; • "receiving ... the code that is transmitted ... in response to transmitting the request for the code"; • "transmitting ... the code to ... the user"; • "marking the code as redeemed, redemption of the code allowing access to ... the article, virtual article, service, or functionality"; • "receiving ... payment ... in response to the charge request"; • "transmitting ... a payment ... in response to receiving the payment." Br. 31-32. Claim 21 recites similar limitations. Id. at 33-34. The above-identified limitations encompass "marketing or sales activities or behaviors" because they specify purchasing a redeemable code for access to goods or services, redeeming the code, and transferring a payment from a buyer's account to a seller's account through a third-party intermediary. In Alice, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t ]he use of a third-party intermediary (or 'clearing house') is ... a building block of the modem economy." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Also, as noted above, the 2019 Guidance identifies "marketing or sales activities or behaviors" as among the enumerated methods of organizing human activity, and thus an abstract 8 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deciding that the claimed concept of "offer-based price optimization" is an abstract idea "similar to other 'fundamental economic concepts' found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and this court"). MAYO/ALICE STEP ONE: PTO STEP 2A PRONG Two Because we determine that each independent claim recites abstract ideas, we consider whether each claim as a whole integrates the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55. "Only when a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application, is the claim 'directed to' a judicial exception .... " Id. at 51. As additional elements, claim 1 recites computer-system components, i.e., a "user device," an "account server," a "merchant server," and a "billing server." Br. 31-32. Claim 21 recites a "billing server" with certain hardware components, i.e., a "processor," a "computer-readable medium," and a "network interface device." Id. at 33-34. Claim 1 specifies using the computer-system components as follows: • "receiving, with a billing server, a first message from a user device, the first message being a request for a code"; • "transmitting, with a billing server, a charge request to an account server to charge an account of a user for a value of a code, the charge request being in response to the first message"; • "receiving, with a billing server, a confirmationfrom the account server indicating that the account has been charged"; 9 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 • "transmitting, with a billing server, a request for the code to the merchant server wherein the billing server is configured to transmit the request for the code in response to receiving the confirmationfrom the account server indicating that the account has been charged"; • "wherein the merchant server has a plurality of codes stored that are available for distribution, the merchant server receiving the request for the code from the billing server, the merchant server marking a selected one of the codes stored by the merchant server as reserved, the merchant server transmitting the code that is marked as reserved to the billing server"; • "receiving, with a billing server, the code that is transmitted from a merchant server in response to transmitting the request for the code"; • "transmitting, with a billing server, the code to the user device of the user, the user device being operable to redeem the code with the merchant server and the merchant server marking the code as redeemed, redemption of the code allowing access to the user device to the article, virtual article, service, or functionality"; • "receiving, with a billing server, payment from the account server in response to the charge request"; • "transmitting, with a billing server, a payment to the merchant server in response to receiving the payment." Br. 31-32. Claim 21 recites similar limitations. Id. at 33-34. We determine that each independent claim as a whole does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application because the additional elements do not impose meaningful limits on the abstract ideas. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 53-54. The recited computer-system and hardware components constitute generic computer components that perform generic computer functions, i.e., collecting, manipulating, and communicating data. 10 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 See Final Act. 4--6; Ans. 3--4, 5-9; see also Spec. ,r,r 22-30, 44--50, 55---61, 62-66. Appellants argue that the claims focus "on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity." Br. 13. Specifically, Appellants assert that the claims are "directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in intermediary controlled payment based code request and release." Id. at 13; see id. at 15. In addition, Appellants analogize the claims here to the claims in Enfzsh. See id. at 8-10, 23 (citing Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In particular, Appellants contend that the claims here have "a specific technical benefit that extends beyond simply the abstract idea of an intermediate broker." Id. at 23. Enfish does not aid Appellants. The claims in Enfzsh recited a "self- referential table" as "a specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1339. Hence, the claims in Enfzsh were "directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality." Id. at 1338. Further, the Federal Circuit has explained that the claims in Enfzsh "did more than allow computers to perform familiar tasks with greater speed and efficiency" and "actually permitted users to launch and construct databases in a new way." Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Unlike the claims in Enfzsh, the claims here do not improve computer functionality. See Final Act. 4; Ans. 3--4, 5-8. As the Examiner determines, the claims "do not involve any improvements to another technology, technical field, or improvements to the functioning of the computer itself." 11 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Ans. 3--4; see id. at 5-9. According to the Examiner, the argued "intermediary controlled payment based code request and release" merely provides "a generic server between the merchant server and the buyer computer to execute the fundamental well-known economic practice of confirming that the user's account has been charged prior to issuing the purchased product" and "does not provide improved functionality to the generic computer components claimed." Id. at 4. For instance, the claims do not recite an advance in hardware or software that causes a computer itself to operate faster or more efficiently. Instead, the claims use conventional computer-system and hardware components in their ordinary capacities to collect, manipulate, and communicate data, e.g., "receiv[ e] ... a request for a code," "transmit[] ... a charge request," "receiv[ e] a confirmation ... indicating that the account has been charged," "transmit[] . . . a request for the code," "receiv[ e] ... the code," "transmit[] ... the code," "receiv[ e] ... payment," and "transmit ... a payment." See Br. 16, 31-32, 33-34; Spec. ,r,r 22-30. Appellants assert that Specification paragraph 27 explains how the claimed invention achieves benefits "over conventional systems, such as the ability for an intermediate billing server to perform payment based code request and delivery in a manner that integrates with code availability and redemption notations that are primarily controlled by a merchant server." Br. 16 (emphasis omitted). But paragraph 27 does not describe an improvement in the functioning of a computer itself. Instead, it describes how a billing server acts as an intermediary by receiving a redeemable code from a merchant server and then transmitting the redeemable code to a user device: 12 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 The merchant server 16 ... has a plurality of codes ( codes 1 to 7). . . . The merchant server 16 ... sends or transmits one of the codes, in the present example code 4, to the billing server 14. . . . The billing server 14 receives the code from the merchant server 16 and then automatically ... sends or transmits the code to the user mobile phone 12. Spec. ,r 27. In contrast to Appellants' assertions about improving computer functionality, Specification paragraph 2 explains that the invention endeavors to "allow for merchants to more easily sell codes to users." Id. ,r 2. Appellants also analogize the claims here to the claims in McRO. See Br. 20-21 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In particular, Appellants contend that the claims recite "an improvement in computer-related technology" based on "a teaching in the specification about how the claimed invention improves a computer or other technology." Id. at 21. Appellants also contend that the claims recite "a particular solution to a problem or a particular way to achieve a desired outcome." Id. McRO does not aid Appellants. The claims in McRO recited a "specific ... improvement in computer animation" using "unconventional rules" that related "sub-sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets" to automatically animate lip synchronization and facial expressions for three-dimensional characters that only human animators could previously produce. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1302---03, 1307---08, 1313-15. In McRO, "the incorporation of the claimed rules" improved an existing technological process. Id. at 1314. 13 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Unlike the claims in McRO, the claims here do not improve an existing technological process. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (explaining that "the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process"); see also Final Act. 4; Ans. 3--4, 5-8. As the Examiner determines, the claimed invention "is a business solution to a problem rooted in an abstract idea." Ans. 7. And as the Examiner explains, the claimed functions "such as 'receiving and transmitting' between multiple servers are conventional functions of a computer system which add nothing more than the abstract idea itself," and the "computer is merely a platform on which the abstract idea of processing a sale is implemented." Id. at 7-8. Appellants further analogize the claims here to the claims in BASCOM. Br. 21-22 (citing BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). In particular, Appellants argue that the claimed additional elements should be considered "in combination, as well as individually, when determining whether a claim as a whole amounts to significantly more, as this may be found in the nonconventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional elements." Id. at 22. Appellants misplace their reliance on BASCOM. There, the claims recited a "specific method of filtering Internet content" requiring "the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end- users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user." BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1345--46, 1350. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the claims covered "a technology-based solution ... to filter content on the Internet that overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering systems" and "improve[ s] an existing technological process." Id. at 13 51 14 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223); see Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (explaining that "the claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process"). Unlike the claims in BASCOM, the claims here do not cover a technology-based solution that improves an existing technological process. See Final Act. 4; Ans. 3--4, 8-9. As the Examiner determines, the claimed invention "is a business solution (helping merchants sell codes) to a problem rooted in an abstract idea of processing a sale." Ans. 9; see Spec. ,r 2. As the Examiner also determines, the claimed invention "does not involve any improvements to another technology, technical field, or improvements to the functioning of the computer itself." Ans. 9. Hence, the claims here do not resemble the claims in BASCOM. The 2019 Guidance identifies exemplary considerations indicating that additional elements in claims "may have integrated the uudicial] exception into a practical application." 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 & nn.25-29 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure§§ 2106.05(a}-(c), 2106.05(e)). As the above analysis indicates, we have evaluated Appellants' arguments in light of those exemplary considerations. For the reasons discussed above, however, we determine that each independent claim as a whole does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. Thus, each claim is directed to a judicial exception and does not satisfy§ 101 under Mayo/Alice step one. MAYO/ALICE STEP Two: PTO STEP 2B Because we determine that each independent claim is directed to a judicial exception, we "consider the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the 15 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 additional elements" add enough to transform the "nature of the claim" into "significantly more" than the judicial exception. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18, 221-22 ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). Under Mayo/Alice step two, we "look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to determine 'whether they identify an "inventive concept" in the application of the ineligible subject matter' to which the claim is directed." Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). An "inventive concept" requires more than "well-understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in" by the relevant community. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79-80). But a "non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces" may provide an "inventive concept" satisfying step two. BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. As discussed above, claim 1 recites computer-system components, i.e., a "user device," an "account server," a "merchant server," and a "billing server," while claim 21 recites a "billing server" with certain hardware components, i.e., a "processor," a "computer-readable medium," and a "network interface device." Br. 31-32, 33-34. The Examiner correctly finds that those additional elements operate in a "routine[] and conventional[]" manner and "undertake their roles in performance of their activities according to their generic functionalities which are well- understood, routine and conventional." Final Act. 6; see Ans. 4. Further, the Examiner correctly finds that those additional elements "carry out well- 16 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 known functionalit[ies]," i.e., collecting, manipulating, and communicating data. Ans. 4, 7-8. Consistent with the Examiner's findings, the Specification describes the required computer-system and hardware components generically and evidences their conventional nature. See, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 22-30, 44--50, 55-61, 62---66. As an example, the Specification describes "a machine in the exemplary form of a computer system" that may "operate[] as a standalone device or may be connected ( e.g., networked) to other machines" and "may operate in the capacity of a server or a client machine" or "as a peer machine." Id. ,r 62. According to the Specification, a "machine" includes "a personal computer (PC), a tablet PC, a set-top box (STB), a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a cellular telephone, a web appliance, a network router, switch or bridge, or any machine capable of executing a set of instructions" and "any collection of machines that individually or jointly execute a set ( or multiple sets) of instructions to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein." Id. As another example, the Specification describes several types of computer-readable media, including "read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, dynamic random access memory (DRAM) such as synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) or Rambus DRAM (RDRAM), etc.)" and "flash memory, static random access memory (SRAM, etc.)." Id. ,r 63. In addition, court decisions have recognized that generic computer- system and hardware components operating to collect, manipulate, and communicate data are well understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 226-27; SAP Am., 898 F.3d at 1164--65 & n.1, 1170; Apple, 842 F.3d at 1234, 1241--42; Intellectual Ventures I LLC 17 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316-20 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App'x 988, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2014). For example, the system claims in Alice recited a "data processing system" ( e.g., a "processor") with a "communications controller" ( e.g., a "network interface device") and a "data storage unit" (e.g., a "computer- readable medium"). Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. The Supreme Court decided that the system claims failed to satisfy § 101 because "[ n ]early every computer" includes those generic components for performing "basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions" and the system claims simply implemented the same abstract idea as the method claims. Id. at 226-27. The Supreme Court reasoned that (1) "the system claims are no different from the method claims in substance"; (2) "[t]he method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer"; and (3) "the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea." Id. at 226. Here, the claimed "user device," "account server," "merchant server," "billing server," "processor," "computer-readable medium," and "network interface device" perform "basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions" that nearly every computer performs. Br. 31-32, 33-34; see Final Act. 4--6; Ans. 4. For instance, nearly every computer includes a "processor" to manipulate data, a "computer-readable medium" to store data, and a "network interface device" to communicate data. Hence, the claimed 18 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 generic computer-system and hardware components do not satisfy the "inventive concept" requirement. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324--25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "generic computer components such as an 'interface,' 'network,' and 'database"' did not satisfy the "inventive concept" requirement); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095-96 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ( describing the claimed "microprocessor" and "user interface" as "generic computer elements"); Prism Techs. LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 696 F. App'x 1014, 1016-17 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (describing the claimed "authentication server," "access server," "Internet Protocol network," "client computer device," and "database" as "indisputably generic computer components"). "Whether a combination of claim limitations supplies an inventive concept that renders a claim 'significantly more' than an abstract idea to which it is directed is a question of law." BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Given the claimed generic computer-system and hardware components that perform generic computer functions, we conclude that the combination of limitations in each independent claim does not supply an "inventive concept" that renders the claim "significantly more" than an abstract idea. Thus, each claim does not satisfy§ 101 under Mayo/Alice step two. SUMMARY FOR PATENT ELIGIBILITY For the reasons discussed above, Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of any error in the Examiner's findings or conclusions under Mayo/Alice step one or step two. Hence, we sustain the§ 101 rejection of the independent claims. We also sustain the § 101 rejection of the 19 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 dependent claims because Appellants do not argue eligibility separately for them. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). The§ 103 Rejection of Claims 1--4 and 21 INDEPENDENT CLAIMS 1 AND 21 As noted above, the § 103 rejection of claims 1 and 21 rests on Hirson, Quirk, and Foth. See Final Act. 9-16. Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1 and 21 because the combination of Hirson, Quirk, and Foth does not teach or suggest the following limitations in claim 1 and similar limitations in claim 21 : transmitting, with the billing server, a request for the code to the merchant server wherein the billing server is configured to transmit the request for the code in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged ... the merchant server marking a selected one of the codes stored by the merchant server as reserved, the merchant server transmitting the code that is marked as reserved to the billing server. See Br. 27-29. Specifically, Appellants assert that the sections of the references cited do not teach that "the billing server is configured to transmit the request for the code in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged." Br. 29. Appellants also assert that Quirk does not teach a billing server "located 'between' the user mobile phone 12 and the merchant server 16," as claimed, and instead teaches a code server "located between the user device and the financial management system." Id. at 27. According to Appellants, Quirk's arrangement differs from the claimed arrangement because Quirk "fails to teach or suggest the sequence of steps wherein the billing server 14 is 20 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 configured to wait for the confirmation 32 before doing the code 34 and the merchant server 16 then marks the code as reserved." Id. Appellants further assert that Foth's use of a broker computer does not teach "that there is a request for a code in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server." Id. at 29. The Examiner finds that Quirk teaches using a content-specific code for a media item and retrieving the code after determining that the media item has been purchased. Final Act. 12 ( citing Quirk ,r 49). The Examiner also finds that Foth teaches ( 1) a merchant server generating a unique code Kprod representing a digital-content item and (2) a broker server receiving a request from a purchaser and confirming that "the Kprod is correct." Ans. 10. The Examiner reasons that the code Kprod "is generated by the merchant and saved on the website (i.e. server)" and "is unique to each product as is equivalent to marking a code reserved." Final Act. 15; see id. at 14--15 (citing Foth col. 5, 11. 9-67, col. 6, 11. 1-13, 56-67, col. 7, 11. 26-58, col. 9, 11. 43---67, col. 11, 11. 11-32). According to the Examiner, it "would not be a reasonable interpretation of [Foth] to think that the customer would receive the Kprod (i.e., code) prior to paying for" the digital-content item. Ans. 10. Based on the record before us, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited portions of Hirson, Quirk, and Foth teach or suggest that the billing server transmits "a request for the code to the merchant server ... in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged," as required by claims 1 and 21. 21 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Quirk discloses awaiting a determination that a purchase has been made before retrieving the purchased media item. See Quirk ,r 49. But the cited portions of Quirk do not discuss acquiring a media item by "transmitting, with the billing server, a request for the code to the merchant server ... in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged." See, e.g., Quirk ,r,r 47--49. Foth discloses a merchant computer encrypting a digital-content item for sale by first calculating a unique product key Kprod for the item. See Foth col. 5, 11. 14--17. But Foth also discloses a broker computer "generat[ing] the product key." See Foth col. 7, 11. 40-67. Further, the cited portions of Foth do not discuss acquiring a digital-content item by "transmitting, with the billing server, a request for the code to the merchant server ... in response to receiving the confirmation from the account server indicating that the account has been charged." Hence, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of claims 1 and 21. DEPENDENT CLAIMS 2--4 Claims 2--4 depend directly from claim 1. For the reasons discussed for claim 1, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection of claims 2--4. Because our determination resolves the obviousness issue for claims 1--4 and 21, we need not address Appellants' other arguments regarding Examiner error. See, e.g., Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an administrative agency may render a decision based on "a single dispositive issue"). DECISION We affirm the rejection of claims 1--4 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We reverse the rejection of claims 1--4 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 22 Appeal2018-004507 Application 14/010,369 Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject all of the claims on appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(f). AFFIRMED 23 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation