Ex Parte ContiDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 8, 201711557298 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 8, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/557,298 11/07/2006 Gregory R. Conti TIF-39615 1225 23494 7590 02/10/2017 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INCORPORATED P O BOX 655474, M/S 3999 DALLAS, TX 75265 EXAMINER PARK, ILWOO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2184 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/10/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@ti.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GREGORY R. CONTI Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 Technology Center 2100 Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and DAVID C. McKONE, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This application returns to us after we affirmed-in-part the Examiner’s decision to reject then-pending claims 1—24. Ex parte Conti, No. 2010- 008615 (PTAB Apr. 10, 2013) (“Bd. Dec.”). Prosecution reopened after that decision, and Appellant now appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s subsequent decision to reject claims 1, 2, 7—24, and 26—30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention restricts using a Direct Memory Access (DMA) channel based on security rules. See generally Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative: Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 1. A system, comprising: a processor; a direct memory access (DMA) subsystem coupled to the processor; a component coupled to the DMA subsystem via an interconnect employing security rules, wherein, if the component requests a DMA channel, the DMA subsystem determines whether the request to access the DMA channel is a public access or a secure access; wherein if the request is a secure access the DMA subsystem allows the DMA channel to be configured as either a secure channel or a public channel; and wherein if the request is a public access the DMA subsystem allows the DMA channel to be configured as a public channel but not a secure channel. THE REJECTION The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 7—24, and 26—301 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Moyer (US 2004/0243823 Al; Dec. 2, 2004) and Strongin (US 6,854,039 Bl; Feb. 8, 2005). Ans. 3—45.2 CONTENTIONS The Examiner finds that Moyer discloses every recited element of independent claim 1 including (1) a “processor” (e.g., master 12); (2) a 1 Although the Examiner includes cancelled claim 25 in the statement of this rejection, we nonetheless present the correct claim listing here for clarity. 2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief filed December 31, 2014 (“App. Br.”); (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed September 10, 2015 (“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed November 6, 2015 (“Reply Br.”). 2 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 DMA subsystem (e.g., memory controller 32) coupled to the processor; and (3) a “component” (e.g., one master or “various places” sending state information) coupled to the DMA subsystem via an “interconnect” which is said to correspond to (a) access protection control register 38; (b) conductors 62, 64 with state information 60; and/or (c) system interconnect 22. Ans. 3— 5. According to the Examiner, this “interconnect” employs “security rules” (e.g., access protection fields 72, 74,. . ., 80 and state information) such that if the “component” requests a “DMA channel” (e.g., the DMA operation path to access non-volatile memory 36 through the memory controller), the DMA subsystem (1) determines whether the request to access the DMA channel is a public channel or secure channel, and (2) configures the DMA channel accordingly based on that determination. Ans. 4. The Examiner acknowledges that Moyer does not teach the elements recited in claim 1 ’s two “wherein” clauses, namely the particular recited DMA channel configurations depending on whether the DMA channel request is a secure or public access. Ans. 5. The Examiner, however, cites Strongin’s Table 1 in column 13, line 55 to column 14, line 42 as teaching this feature in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Id. Appellant argues, among other things, that the Examiner’s reliance on Strongin for teaching the particular DMA channel configurations in claim 1 ’s two “wherein” clauses is misplaced. App. Br. 13—21; Reply Br. 1—12. According to Appellant, not only does Strongin’s DMA subsystem fail to allow the DMA channel to be configured as a secure channel, but Strongin’s hardware-initiated accesses cannot generate the secure page (SP=1) bit, and these accesses are always at a user level such that the current privilege (CP) value cannot be changed. Id. Appellant adds that Strongin is also deficient 3 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 because Strongin’s Table 2 shows that the DMA can access only non-secure pages in a read/write mode. Id. ISSUE Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by finding that Moyer and Strongin collectively would have taught or suggested allowing a DMA subsystem to be configured with particular recited DMA channel configurations depending on whether the DMA channel request is a secure or public access? ANALYSIS Claims 1, 2, and 7—10 In our earlier decision, we affirmed the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of then-pending claim 1 over Moyer—a reference that is also cited in the obviousness rejection at issue here. As in the earlier appeal, the Examiner cites Moyer for teaching the recited processor, DMA subsystem, and component. See Ans. 7—A. We see no error in these findings for the reasons indicated on pages 3 to 6 of our earlier decision, for our findings and conclusions regarding Moyer in our earlier decision are not only applicable here, they are binding in this appeal. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 706.07(h)(XI)(A) (9th ed. Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015) (noting that the Board’s decision becomes the “law of the case” in that it is controlling on the application under appeal and later related applications). After prosecution reopened following our decision, claim 1 was amended to replace the limitation calling for restricting using the DMA channel based on the security rules with limitations reciting (1) determining 4 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 whether the request to access the DMA channel is a public or secure access, and (2) allowing the DMA channel to be configured with the particular recited DMA channel configurations depending on whether the request is a secure or public access as recited in claim 1 ’s two “wherein” clauses. Compare Bd. Dec. 1—2 (reproducing then-pending claim 1 lacking these amended limitations). As noted previously, the Examiner cites Strongin for teaching the amended limitations in the “wherein” clauses (Ans. 5, 48), and it is this reliance that we find problematic on this record. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the states “Secure Page (SP) bit = 0” and “Current Privilege Level (CPL) = 0, 3” in Strongin’s Table 1 determine whether a request is a public access. Ans. 5, 48 (citing Strongin, col. 13,11. 60-65; col. 14,11. 25^42). The Examiner also finds that states SP=1 and CPL=0, 3 in Strongin’s Table 1 determine whether a request is a secure access. Ans. 5, 48. According to the Examiner, when SP=1, full access is granted regardless of a selected memory page’s SP bit, and when SP=0, standard protection mechanisms apply for only selected memory pages. Ans. 5, 48. Strongin’s Table 1 specifies various rules for software-initiated memory accesses. Strongin, col. 13,11. 55—56. Although the functionality associated with this table grants, among other things, (1) full access (with read/write (R/W) capability), and (2) read-only access for SP=1 and CPL=0 states (Strongin, col. 13,1. 60 — col. 14,1. 24), we cannot say—nor has the Examiner shown—that these states allow a DMA channel to be configured as a secure or public channel as claimed. To be sure, full access is granted when the instruction’s SP=1 regardless of the selected memory page’s SP bit as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 5) due to the “X” entry in the third column 5 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 of the first row of Strongin’s Table 1. Nevertheless, the Examiner does not explain sufficiently how or why this state (or any other state in Table 1) allows a DMA channel to be configured as a secure or public channel for secure access requests, let alone that this state also allows a DMA channel to be configured as a public channel, but not a secure channel for public access requests as claimed. In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that claim 1 recites conditional limitations. That is, not only does claim 1 recite that if the component requests a DMA channel, the DMA subsystem determines whether the request is a public or secure access, both “wherein” clauses of claim 1 also contain conditional limitations, namely allowing particular DMA channel configurations if the request is a secure access and public access, respectively. Notably, these conditions need not be satisfied to meet a method claim reciting these conditions. See Ex parte Schulhauser, No. 2013-007847, slip op. at 9-10 (PTAB Apr. 28, 2016) (precedential).3 But here, these limitations are recited as part of system claim 1 and, as such, the claim requires structure for performing the functions should the conditions occur. Id. at 14—15. As explained previously, the Examiner fails to show this structure and, therefore, the rejection is deficient for that reason alone. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1, and dependent claims 2 and 7—10 for similar reasons. Because this issue is dispositive regarding our reversing the Examiner’s 3 This decision is available at the Board’s web site at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent- decisions/decisions-and-opinions/precedential. 6 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 rejection of these claims, we need not address Appellant’s other associated arguments.4 Claims 26—30 For reasons similar to those indicated for claim 1, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 26—30 that were added after our earlier decision. These claims recite, in pertinent part, systems that each include multiple “wherein” clauses specifying particular DMA channel configurations and usage if the recited conditions are satisfied. Despite the Examiner’s findings and conclusions to the contrary (Ans. 32-45, 76—90), the Examiner does not explain sufficiently how or why the relied-upon subject matter from Strongin, including the states in Strongin’s Table 1, allows a DMA channel to be so configured or used, let alone show that Strongin discloses structure for performing the recited 4 We note that claim 1 also recites that if the component requests a DMA channel, the DMA subsystem determines whether the request is public or secure access, and if either condition is satisfied, the subsystem allows a particular DMA channel configuration. Our emphasis underscores the fact that the claim does not recite that these elements are configured to perform these functions, but that they actually perform the functions. But apparatus claims reciting active method steps have been held indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for such claims raise the question of whether they are infringed by devices that are merely capable of performing the recited function, or that they must actually perform that function. See IP XL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v. AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (data transmitting device held indefinite for reciting transmitting method step). Nevertheless, the Examiner did not reject claim 1 on this basis, nor will we speculate in that regard here in the first instance on appeal. Rather, we leave this question to the Examiner to consider after this decision. 7 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 functions should the claimed conditions occur. See Schulhauser, at 14—15. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence on this record favors Appellant’s position. See App. Br. 35—54; Reply Br. 55—94. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 26—30. Claims 15—22 and 24 We will, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15—22 and 24. Ans. 3—5, 28—35. Notably, independent claim 15 recites, in pertinent part, accessing a DMA subsystem, and determining if the access is public or secure: the remaining limitations are performed only if the recited conditions are satisfied. Dependent claims 16—22 and 24 are likewise replete with conditional limitations that need not be satisfied to meet the claims.5 See Schulhauser, at 9-10. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments pertaining to the alleged shortcomings of the cited prior art in connection with the recited conditional limitations of claims 16—22 and 246 (see 5 Although claim 24 recites generating a qualifier when a DMA is started, this generation is nevertheless conditioned on starting a DMA channel—a condition that need not occur to satisfy the claim. Nevertheless, despite the claim’s breadth in light of this condition and Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 35; Reply Br. 54—55), we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of this claim (Ans. 32, 75) for the reasons indicated by the Examiner and on page 17 of our earlier decision. 6 Although Appellant does not argue independent claim 15 separately to show error in the Examiner’s rejection of that claim apart from the arguments similar to those made in connection with claim 1 (see App. Br. 15—21; Reply Br. 1—12), our analysis nonetheless applies to the conditional limitations of that claim as well. 8 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 App. Br. 28—35; Reply Br. 30—55) are not commensurate with the scope of the method claims in light of these conditional limitations. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 15—22 and 24. Claim 23 We will not, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23 reciting (1) locking a DMA channel’s use of qualifiers during a DMA channel operation, and (2) unlocking a DMA channel’s use of qualifiers after the operation is completed. Notably, these steps are not conditional, unlike those of independent claim 15 from which claim 23 depends. As we noted on page 17 of our earlier decision, even assuming that Moyer’s Figure 3 shows receiving one DMA channel operation and receiving/using qualifiers once at blocks 84 and 88 as the Examiner contends (Ans. 32, 75), we cannot say—nor has the Examiner shown—that this sequence (1) locks the channel’s use qualifiers during a DMA channel operation, and (2) unlocks that use after completing that operation. Nor has the Examiner shown that Strongin cures this deficiency. Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23. Claims 11 and 13 We will, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 11 reciting, in pertinent part, a configuration firewall and a violation handler coupled thereto. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 25—27), Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s 9 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 reliance on the collective teachings of Moyer and Strongin in connection with the recited configuration firewall, its registers and associated functionality, and the violation handler coupled to the firewall. See Ans. 16— 19, 59-61. Appellant’s arguments regarding Moyer’s alleged shortcomings in this regard do not address—let alone persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s additional findings in the Answer’s Response to Arguments section pertaining to the recited firewall and its functionality. See Ans. 60-61. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence on this record favors the Examiner’s position. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11, and claim 13 not argued separately with particularity. Claim 12 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12 reciting configuration registers that selectively enable a DMA channel for use of one of read/write operations and read operations based on the DMA channel configuration request and security rules. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 27; Reply Br. 26—28), Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on the collective teachings of Moyer and Strongin in connection with the recited configuration registers and their functionality. Ans. 19—20, 61—63. Accordingly, the weight of the evidence on this record favors the Examiner’s position. Claim 14 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 14 reciting that interconnect qualifier bits comprise at least one bit selected from the group 10 Appeal 2016-001320 Application 11/557,298 consisting of (1) a secure qualifier bit associated with secure mode access; (2) a debug qualifier bit associated with debug mode access; and (3) a privilege qualifier bit associated with a privilege mode access. As emphasized above and as the Examiner indicates (Ans. 63), the claim merely requires that the qualifier bits are at least one type of bit selected from the recited group which does not require selecting all bit types. Therefore, Appellant’s argument that Moyer does not teach or suggest both a secure qualifier bit and a privilege qualifier bit (App. Br. 28) is not commensurate with the scope of the claim which does not require both types of bits. Despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 28; Reply Br. 28—30), Appellant does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on the collective teachings of Moyer and Strongin in connection with the recited secure and privilege qualifier bits (Ans. 20—21, 63—64)—either one of which satisfies claim 14 given the scope and breadth of the claim. CONCLUSION Under § 103, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 11—22 and 24, but erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 7—10, 23, and 26—30. DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 7—24, and 26—30 is affirmed-in-part. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation