Ex Parte COLLINS et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 31, 2018

12426039 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/426,039 04/17/2009 Dean COLLINS
12880 7590 11/02/2018
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP
180 Maiden Lane
New York, NY 10038
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
002891/0029 3969
EXAMINER
SEREBOFF, NEAL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/02/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
bripple@travelers.com
docketing@cpaglobal.com
uspatents@stroock.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEAN COLLINS, ERIN MACK NAIR,
JARED KRECHKO, ADAM KAPROVE,
and HENRY EDINGER
Appeal2017-007562
Application 12/426,039 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final decision rejecting claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-58,
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is The Travelers
Indemnity Company. App. Br. 3.
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60-64, 66-83, 85, 86, and 88-95. Claims 4, 7, 8, 12, 15-55, 59, 65, 84, and
87 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellants 'Invention
Appellants' invention relates to automated property inspection in the
context of processing a property insurance claim. Spec. ,r,r 2-3. In an
embodiment, an adjuster can control a robotic inspection vehicle for
gathering video images of insured property, such as the roof of a house.
Spec. ,r 71. The robotic inspection vehicle communicates with an inspection
control system that in tum communicates with an insurance claim processing
system over a network. Id. Data collected in the course of an automated
property inspection can be used to make reimbursement payments to a
policy holder. See Spec. ,r 73.
Representative Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A computer-implemented method for processing a
property insurance claim for an insured property comprising:
receiving, from a policy holder, a claim for damage to the
insured property;
detecting, by a remotely controllable robotic inspection
vehicle, comprising an unmanned aerial vehicle (UA V)
including at least one electronic sensor, electronic information
relevant to the damage to the insured property associated with
the claim using the at least one electronic sensor by flying at an
elevation above the insured property and activating the at least
one electronic sensor to detect the damage;
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receiving, by an inspection control system, the electronic
information detected by the remotely controllable robotic
inspection vehicle using the at least one electronic sensor;
generating, by the inspection control system, electronic
property inspection data for the insured property, wherein the
electronic property inspection data comprises the electronic
information detected by the remotely controllable robotic
inspection vehicle using the at least one electronic sensor;
receiving, by the inspection control system, from a claim
adjuster computer device, a cost estimate for the damage based
on the electronic property inspection data;
transmitting, by the inspection control system, to a claims
processing computer server executed by an insurance claims
processing computer system, the electronic property inspection
data and the cost estimate; and
transmitting to the policy holder, by a customer service
computer server executed by the insurance claims processing
computer system, payment information based on the cost
estimate, the electronic property inspection data, and insurance
policy information.
Rejections on Appeal2
Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-58, 60-64, 66-83, 85, 86, and 88-
95 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.
Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-58, 60-64, 66, 67, 69, 72-83, 85,
86, 88, 89, 92, 94, and 95 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Gandee (US 2005/0038682 Al; Feb. 17, 2005) and
Admitted Prior Art ("AP A").
2 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Ans. 2.
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Claims 68 and 71 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Gandee, APA, and Menendez (US 2004/0148204 Al; July
29, 2004).
Claim 70 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Gandee, APA, and Morin (US 2006/0106551 Al; May 18,
2006).
Claims 90 and 91 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Gandee.
Claim 93 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Gandee, APA, and King (US 5,600,775; Feb. 4, 1997).
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellants present arguments for claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-
58, 60-64, 66-83, 85, 86, and 88-95 together as one group. See App. Br.
14--19. We select independent claim 1 as representative of all claims in our
analysis below. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim
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laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355.
Assuming that a claim nominally falls within one of the statutory categories
of machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the first step in
the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id. For example, abstract ideas
include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of
organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or
relationships. Id. at 2355-57. If the claim is directed to a judicial exception,
such as an abstract idea, the second step is to determine whether additional
elements in the claim "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-
eligible application." Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78). This
second step is described as "a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ' ... significantly more than ...
the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id. at 2355 (alteration in original) ( quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
Alice Step One
"The first step in the Alice inquiry ... asks whether the focus of the
claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities ...
or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which
computers are invoked merely as a tool." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36.
"The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where 'it matters not
by what process or machinery the result is accomplished."' McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)). "We
therefore look to whether the claims ... focus on a specific means or method
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that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery." McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314.
Appellants contend the claims do not recite a concept similar to an
abstract idea previously identified by the courts. App. Br. 16. We disagree.
The Examiner cites TL! Communications LLC v. AV Automotive, L.L.C., 823
F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in finding the claims are directed to an abstract
idea. See Final Act. 5. In TL!, the representative claim recited:
recording images ... ,
storing the images recorded ... ,
transmitting data including at least the digital images and
classification information to a server ... ,
receiving the data by the server,
extracting classification information ... from the received
data, and
storing the digital images in the server . . . taking into
consideration the classification information.
823 F.3d at 610. The Federal Circuit found the concept of classifying an
image and storing the image based on its classification to be an abstract idea.
Id. at 611.
Claim 1 is similar to the representative claim in TL! in that it recites:
detecting . . . electronic information relevant to the
damage to the insured property associated with the claim ... ;
receiving ... the electronic information,
generating ... electronic property inspection data for the
insured property, wherein the electronic property inspection
data comprises the electronic information ... ;
receiving ... a cost estimate for the damage based on the
electronic property inspection data;
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transmitting . . . the electronic property inspection data
and the cost estimate ... .
transmitting ... payment information based on the cost
estimate, the electronic property inspection data, and insurance
policy information.
As can be seen, claim 1 is directed to the concept of gathering data, for
example, images related to property damage associated with an insurance
claim (see Spec. ,r 45), adding other data in the form of a cost estimate, and
transmitting the data for determination of payment information based on the
cost estimate. This concept is similar to the abstract idea of classifying an
image and storing the image based on its classification found in TL!. That
is, both the representative claim in TL! and claim 1 in this case focus on
gathering data and processing the data based on other related data.
Moreover, in many other cases our reviewing court has found that the
concepts of data collection and data manipulation are abstract ideas. See,
e.g., Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2016) ("gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then
displaying the results"), OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (offer-based price optimization),
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (tailoring information presented to a user based on
particular information), Versata Development Group v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("determining a price, using organizational
and product group hierarchies"), Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v.
Electronics For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
( employing "mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to
generate additional information"), and Accenture Global Services, GmbH v.
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Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344--46 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(generating tasks based on rules in response to events).
Claim 1 merely combines abstract concepts that are similar to those in
the cases noted above-i.e., data collection and data manipulation-and is
therefore directed to an abstract idea. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Adding one abstract idea ... to
another abstract idea ... does not render the claim non-abstract."); see also
FairWarning IP, LLC v. latric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094 (Fed. Cir.
2016) ( determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of
abstract ideas).
Appellants contend the claims are
"necessarily rooted in computer technology" (DDR at 1257}-
e.g., robots-in order to overcome the problem of assessing
damage to insured property in locations that are
dangerous/inaccessible to humans, and "focus on a specific
means or method that improves the relevant technology" (McRo
at * 13}-e.g., using a remotely controllable robotic device
configured in a specific manner with additional computer
systems and servers over a network.
App. Br. 16.
We disagree. The focus of claim 1 is not on how the UA V operates,
but rather the process of gathering data for processing a property insurance
claim. The UA V serves merely as a way of automating human tasks, as
revealed by the Specification's description of the problem with the prior
insurance claim process, which "can be slow as it requires that a claim
adjuster ... travel to the property location to perform the physical
inspection, which can be time consuming and tedious." Spec. ,r 5. The
Specification frames a desired solution to the identified problem as one that
"is a safer, faster way to generate damage estimates which provide estimates
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that are at least as accurate as the current methods, especially those for roofs
or other areas of an insured property that may be difficult or dangerous to
inspect." Spec. ,r 8. This disclosure shows that the heart of Appellants'
invention is the replacement of human effort with machinery in a way that is
safer, faster, and potentially more accurate. The mere use of machines to
perform the same tasks as humans, however, remains in the realm of the
abstract. See OIP Technologies, 788 F.3d at 1363 ("[R]elying on a computer
to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to
render a claim patent eligible.").
Further, the Specification provides that there are many ways of
gathering the data necessary for processing an insurance claim, such as
images of property damage, and that using a UA Vis simply one way to
gather the data. To wit, the Specification introduces "various imaging
inspection embodiments," including imaging inspection "performed by a
flying object, such as a plane 210, a helicopter, 212, a satellite 214, or any
other flying object, device or vehicle" where "the flying device is equipped
with an imagine device or video inspection equipment 225." Spec. ,r 45.
The Specification also provides "the imaging device 225 may be attached to
a streetlight 217" or "other objects or structures capable of providing a view
of the roof, such as trees 218, telephone poles, flag poles, nearby
structure/homes, or any other object or structure." Id.
It is thus clear that the "remotely controllable robotic inspection
vehicle, comprising an unmanned aerial vehicle (UA V)" recited in claim 1 is
not the subject of Appellants' invention, nor the focus of claim 1, but is
rather a tool used in service of the method of processing a property insurance
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claim. Accordingly, the use of a UA Vin claim 1 does not shift the focus
away from the patent-ineligible abstract idea to which the claim is directed.
Alice Step Two
The second step in the Alice analysis requires a search for an
"inventive concept" that "must be significantly more than the abstract idea
itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract
idea on a computer." Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (2016). There must be more than
"computer functions [that] are 'well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies]' previously known to the industry." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359
(second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
Appellants contend "it is the functions performed in combination by
the systems/methods as a whole, rather than the pieces of hardware taken
individually per se, that provide an inventive step." App. Br. 17. We
disagree. This case is unlike Bascom, where "a non-conventional and non-
generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces" resulted in patent-
eligible claims. Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350. Claim I merely substitutes a
UA V for performing a data gathering step in a conventional method for
processing an insurance property claim. This substitution results in the
UA V operating as expected by making the prior human task of taking photos
of property damage more efficient. But the increased efficiency of the data
gathering step in claim 1 does not, by itself, evince a non-conventional
arrangement where the remainder of the claim recites a purely conventional
arrangement for processing an insurance claim, namely, receiving property
damage data and a cost estimate, and notifying a policy holder of payment
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information based on the property damage data, the cost estimate, and
insurance policy information.
Appellants also contend the claims cover "technically improved
systems/methods for electronic property inspections, in the claimed
combinations with the remaining limitations, [and] do not merely describe
generic computer components performing generic computer
functions/routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry." App. Br. 18. We disagree. When read in light of the
Specification, the "remotely controllable robotic inspection vehicle,
comprising an unmanned aerial vehicle (UA V)" recited in claim 1 can be
any one of a number of off-the-shelf-i.e., conventional-UAVs. See Spec.
,r,r 50-55. Further, nothing in claim 1 indicates that the other components
recited in claim 1 are more than conventional components. For example, the
"inspection control system" is described in the Specification as "a computer
system, such as a laptop." Spec. ,r 71. And in general, the Specification
describes the computer systems used in the invention in purely conventional
terms. See Spec. ,r 141. Accordingly, the "claim adjuster computer device"
and the "claims processing computer server" and "customer service
computer server" that are executed on "an insurance claims processing
computer system" can be based on conventional computer hardware and
software. The communications between the claimed components are also
purely conventional. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("That a computer receives and sends the information
over a network-with no further specification-is not even arguably
inventive.").
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We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting as
patent-ineligible claim 1, and claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 9--11, 13, 14, 56-58, 60-64,
66-83, 85, 86, and 88-95 which we group therewith as mentioned above.
Obviousness
We address below the obviousness rejections grouped according to
Appellants' arguments in the Appeal Brief.
Gandee and the Admitted Prior Art ("AP A")
Claims 1-3, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-58, 60-64, 66, 67,
69, 72-79, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 94, and 95
Appellants contend Gandee fails to teach a "remotely controllable
inspection device" as recited in independent claims 69 and 76. App. Br. 26-
27. Specifically, Appellants argue that the "DCR TRV80 MiniDV
Handycam Camcorder by Sony" Gandee discloses does not include a remote
control feature. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument.
The Specification provides that "the robotic inspection vehicle or
device may also be portable video inspection equipment attached to the
claim adjuster or to another person or laborer ( or trained animal) capable of
responding to commands or directions from a remote claim adjuster or other
commander." Spec. ,r 56. We find Gandee's camera, when employed by the
virtual adjuster in Gandee' s system for capturing images of damaged
property, is a "remotely controllable inspection device" as claimed when that
language is given its broadest reasonable interpretation, in light of the
Specification as quoted above. In particular, Gandee discloses that "a virtual
adjuster arrives at a property which has suffered a casualty loss. The virtual
adjuster brings a ... camera 112 .... " Gandee, ,r 10. "An exemplary video
camera is the DCR TRV80 MiniDV Handycam Camcorder by Sony which
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can provide both still images, and video images .... " Gandee, ,r 16. "[T]he
insurance adjuster can request video of the damaged area . . . . The virtual
adjuster can capture and transmit these images using camera 112." Gandee,
,r 23. In other words, Gandee's virtual adjuster employs the camera 112 as
directed by a remote insurance adjuster, thus teaching a "remotely
controllable inspection device."
In any case, we note that the obviousness rejection of independent
claims 69 and 7 6 is over Gandee and the AP A, where the AP A discloses
using a UA V, as discussed in detail below. Appellants do not argue that a
UA Vis not a "remotely controllable inspection device" as recited in
independent claims 69 and 76.
Appellants contend it would not have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art to combine a UA V, as disclosed in the APA, 3 with Gandee by
substituting a UAV for Gandee's camera. App. Br. 29-32. We are not
persuaded by Appellants' argument.
The APA shows that many UAVs were known and available. See
Spec. ,r,r 52-55 ("Epson FR-II from Seiko Epson"; "DraganFlyer X6 made
by Draganfly Innovations, Inc."; "DraganFly Tango UA V also made by
Draganfly Innovations"; "X-UFO made by SilverLit Electronics";
"Dragonfly, made by Wowwee"; "MicroDrone MD4-200 and MD4-1000 by
Microdrone, GmbH"). Further, the AP A specifically provides that certain of
3 The Examiner relies on the AP A for disclosing "a remotely controllable
robotic inspection vehicle, comprising an unmanned aerial vehicle (UA V),"
as recited in independent claims 1 and 9, and "a remotely controllable
inspection device, comprising an unmanned aerial vehicle (UA V)" as recited
in independent claim 69 and similarly recited in claim 89, which depends
from independent claim 76. See Ans. 16, 18, 26, 33.
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these UA Vs were capable of and even well-suited for image capture: "This
device [(the DraganFlyer X6)] is particularly well-suited to the application
because of its ability to self-stabilize and carry a payload of a still or video
camera" (Spec. ,r 53); "DraganFly Tango UA V ... is an unmanned aerial
vehicle capable of autonomous flight and can capture aerial video and
pictures of large areas." Id.
We agree with the Examiner that the use of an existing UA V, for
example, those disclosed by the AP A, for capturing images in Gandee' s
virtual insurance adjusting system would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art because it would have been a simple substitution that
yielded predictable results. See Final Act. 16; Ans. 8-9. That is, given the
knowledge that UA Vs were capable of capturing images from an aerial
perspective, one would have immediately recognized the potential
improvement to Gandee's system by using a UA V with image capturing
capability in place of the camera in Gandee's system, due to the inherent
advantages of a UA V to capture images from many different perspectives in
space around a subject of interest, such as damaged property.
Appellants contend it would not have been obvious to combine a cost
estimate as disclosed in the AP A with Gandee because the cost estimate
described in Appellants' Specification is determined by a claim adjuster who
travels to a property to physically assess damage, in contrast to Gandee' s
verification of damage without visiting the property. App. Br. 32-35. We
disagree with Appellants because Gandee' s system also includes personnel
at the property site-the virtual adjuster. Accordingly, Gandee's system is
not incompatible with submitting a cost estimate at the property site. In fact,
as the Examiner finds, Gandee discloses the virtual adjuster inputting an
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electronic work order into the computer 108 for sending over the
communication link to the insurance company. See Gandee, ,r 14. We find
Gandee' s work order suggests the claimed "cost estimate" (see Final Act.
39--40, where the Examiner makes a similar finding with respect to
independent claim 90), and thus the Examiner's reliance on the APA for this
feature is merely cumulative.
Appellants contend Gandee fails to disclose a "claims processing
computer server" and a "customer service computer server." App. Br. 35-
40. Specifically, regarding the claimed "claims processing computer
server," Appellants argue Gandee's computer 128 is not a server at which a
cost estimate is received. App. Br. 37-38. Regarding the claimed
"customer service computer server," Appellants argue that to the extent the
Examiner relies on Gandee's computer 108, computer 108 is not a server
and, in any case, computer 108 belongs to the third party virtual adjuster and
is thus not a server "executed by the insurance claims processing computer
system." App. Br. 38--40. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments.
We note that independent claims 1, 9, 69 (together with dependent
claim 7 5), and 7 6 recite that the "claims processing computer server" and
"customer service computer server" are executed by the same "claims
processing computer system." We further note that the claimed servers do
no more than receive, process, and send data. That is, there are no
particularly recited functions that require the claimed servers to be any more
than generic servers, where Appellants admit a server can be "a computer
program." App. Br. 40. Accordingly, we broadly, but reasonably, interpret
the claimed servers as software running on one or more computers that can
receive, process, and send data.
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Gandee discloses "the computer 108 ... allows the virtual adjuster to
fill out an electronic work order for the initial mitigation work which can be
provided to the insurance company over the communication link." Gandee,
,r 14. We find this at least suggests sending a work order-i.e., a "cost
estimate"-to computer 128 at the insurance company. See Gandee, Fig. 1.
Further, we find Gandee at least suggests sending payment information from
computer 128 to computer 108 by disclosing "a check to the insured can be
printed locally via an attached or wireless printer 109." Gandee, ,r 14. That
is, the check would be provided on behalf of the insurance company, and the
check itself or payment information for completing a check would need to
be issued by the insurance company. One of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood Gandee as suggesting computer 128 can send this payment
information to computer 108. See Gandee, ,r 14; Fig. 1. Accordingly,
Gandee at least suggests that computer 128 has the functionality to receive a
cost estimate and send payment information.
We find it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
to have different pieces of software perform the different functions of
receiving a cost estimate and sending payment information at Gandee' s
computer 128-that is, a "claims processing computer server" and a
"customer service computer server." We also agree with the Examiner (see
Final Act. 31) and find it would have been obvious to have multiple
computers employ the server functions as in independent claim 7 6. That is,
having multiple systems performing the same functions as a single system,
either for redundancy or parallelism, is an obvious variation of the system
Gandee suggests.
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We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting as
obvious claims 1-3, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-58, 60-64, 66, 67, 69, 72-79, 82,
83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 92, 94, and 95.
Claim 5
Appellants contend the AP A only describes materials that may be
used as "smart skins" or "smart coatings," and does not describe using these
materials to form a "smart roof' as claimed. App. Br. 52. We are not
persuaded by Appellants' argument.
The patents incorporated by reference in Appellants' Specification
include, for example, US Patent 6,564,640 B 1 to Allaei. Spec. ,r 41. Allaei
describes a smart skin structure that "can be used to managing vibrations in
the skin or shell of a system, subcomponent, device, or structure," where the
structures on which the smart skin can be used include "buildings." Allaei,
Abstract. Further, in providing a motivation to combine the AP A's
disclosure of a smart skin with Gandee, the Examiner cites US Patent
5,648,724 to Yankielun. Final Act. 18. Yankielun describes moisture
sensors for detecting the location and extent of leaks in a roof. Y ankielun,
col. 2, 11. 14--28. Yankielun thus would have suggested to one of ordinary
skill in the art to use sensors, such as those included in the smart skin of
Allaei, not only on buildings, but specifically as part of a "smart roof," as
recited in claim 5.
We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
5 as obvious.
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Claims 80 and 81
Appellants contend that Gandee, in view of the AP A, fails to disclose
a claims processing computer server performing the functions recited in
claims 80 and 81. App. Br. 53. The Examiner makes no findings regarding
the specific limitations in claims 80 and 81, for example, "performing an
automatic comparison with electronic inspection information from one or
more non-damaged properties," as recited in claim 80, and "performing an
automatic comparison with electronic inspection information from one or
more fraudulent claims," as recited in claim 81. See Final Act. 32; Ans. 18.
Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to find the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 80 and 81 as obvious.
Gandee, the AP A, and Menendez
Claims 68 and 71
Appellants contend it would not have been obvious to combine
Menendez with Gandee because Menendez excludes using an insurance
adjuster, whereas Gandee describes real-time audio and visual
communications with an insurance adjuster. App. Br. 42. Appellants also
contend Menendez fails to disclose detecting electronic information relevant
to the damage to the insured property. Id. We are not persuaded by
Appellants' arguments.
We note the Examiner relies on Gandee and the AP A, not Menendez,
for the "detecting" step in claim 1, from which claim 68 depends. See Final
Act. 13-17. Accordingly, Appellants' argument that Menendez fails to
disclose detecting electronic information is unavailing.
As for the combination of Menendez with Gandee and the AP A, we
find it would have been obvious, in view of Menendez, to provide a policy
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holder access over a network to electronic information regarding an
insurance claim, as recited in claim 68, in the combination of Gandee and
the APA. As the Examiner finds (Final Act. 37), Menendez provides the
motivation modify Gandee and the AP A, namely, to allow a policy holder
the ability to "access the same claim file at a later time to enter additional
information ( e.g., repair estimates from contractors, salvage value estimates
from experts, etc.). Menendez, ,r 29. This modification would have been
obvious despite Menendez's avoidance of assigning an adjuster to a claim in
certain cases (see Menendez, i-f24), because the presence or absence of a
claim adjuster does not bear on the benefit of providing a policy holder
access to electronic information relating to a claim.
We also find it would have been obvious, in view on Menendez, to
automatically compare electronic property inspection data with
predetermined template data, as recited in claim 71, in the combination of
Gandee and the APA. As the Examiner finds (Final Act. 37-38), Menendez
provides the motivation to modify Gandee and the AP A, namely, that using
a word comparator program for comparing words describing the claim with
a list of key words can help determine that certain property is not covered by
an insurance policy. See Menendez, ,r 53. This modification would have
been obvious even though Menendez describes not assigning a claim
adjuster to a claim that the word comparator program reveals is not covered.
See Menendez, ,r 52. That is, although Gandee describes using an insurance
adjuster to assess damage (see Gandee, ,r 23), one of ordinary skill in the art
would have seen the benefit for Gandee's insurance adjuster to not become
involved in a claim until after Menendez's word comparator program
showed the claim might be covered.
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We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 68 and 71 as obvious.
Gandee, the AP A, and Morin
Claim 70
Appellants contend one of ordinary skill in the art would not have
been motivated to modify Gandee in view of Morin. App. Br. 46. We are
persuaded by Appellants' argument.
Morin describes monitoring the structural health of a structure by
using sensors distributed across the structure. See Morin, ,r 7. A damage
measurement can be calculated and then compared with a predetermined
baseline measurement to determine a changed damage measurement. Morin,
,r 8. The Examiner cites Morin, paragraph 5 as providing the motivation to
combine Morin with Gandee and the AP A, namely, "to allow multiple self-
referential inspections of an area over an extended period of time, enabling
correlation, trending and other sophisticated analysis of the inspection data
over time." Final Act. 38. We find the Examiner's rationale does not
sufficiently explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would have
combined Morin's measurements with the insurance claim processing
performed by the combination of Gandee and the AP A. That is, the fact that
Morin describes monitoring inspection data over time (Morin, ,r 5) does not
in and of itself provide a reason to apply Morin's measurements in an
insurance claim processing context.
We are, therefore, constrained by the record to find the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 7 0.
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Gandee, the AP A, and King
Claim 93
Appellants contend King fails to disclose "electronically modifying
the at least one of the recorded video and sensor data with annotations"
because King describes annotating digital video without modifying the
original video information. App. Br. 51. We are not persuaded by
Appellants' argument.
We begin by construing the claim 93 language "electronically
modifying the at least one of the recorded video and sensor data with
annotations." The Specification neither requires changing video or sensor
data to annotate the data, nor excludes adding annotations to video or sensor
data to annotate the data. In fact, the Specification does not define how to
annotate data, but rather gives only examples of the use of annotations. For
example, the Specification provides: "Also, annotations can be made to the
recorded video or sensor data to form part or all of the inspection report"
(Spec. ,r 72); "In this way, the remote claim adjuster 1504 can remotely
inspect the property, and have the video (or other sensor information)
recorded for later annotation and archiving" (Spec. ,r 88); "Alerts can be sent
by any known methods ... and may include the images (which may be
annotated to show the issues) obtained of the property." Spec. ,r 96.
Accordingly, under the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of
the Specification, we find the language "electronically modifying the at least
one of the recorded video and sensor data with annotations" does not require
changing video or sensor data itself, but rather encompasses adding
annotations to the data. This interpretation is supported by the additional
claim 93 limitations that recite "storing ... the at least one of the recorded
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video and sensor data and the annotations" and "transmitting ... the at least
one of the recorded video and sensor data and the annotations." That is,
claim 93 identifies the video or sensor data and the annotations as separate
items to store and transmit.
King describes annotating digital video "with text, graphics, and
digital audio without modifications to the original video information." King,
Abstract. Although "video and annotations are stored separately," upon
playback "the annotations are displayed on the originally annotated frames."
Id. Here, we find King discloses "electronically modifying" video data with
annotations, as recited in claim 93, by adding annotations to the video data
that can be displayed with the video data upon playback. In other words,
King's video data is modified in that it is shown with annotations, despite
the fact that the video data itself is not changed.
We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
93 as obvious.
Gandee
Claim 90
Appellants present arguments for claim 90 that are similar to those
discussed above regarding independent claims 1, 9, 69, and 76. See App. Br.
47-50. We are not persuaded by these arguments for similar reasons to
those discussed above. In addition, Appellants argue that, to the extent
Gandee's work order is relied upon to disclose the claimed "cost estimate,"
Gandee does not disclose that the work order is received "from a claim
adjuster computer device, by the inspection control computer system." App.
Br. 48--49. We are not persuaded by this argument.
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The Specification neither includes a definition for the "claim adjuster
computer device," nor provides examples of such device. The Specification
does, however, describe an input device 612 used by an adjuster, where
device 612 can be a keyboard. Spec. ,r 71; Fig. 6A. Absent any showing by
Appellants that the Specification requires a specific type of device for
providing a cost estimate to the inspection control computer system, we find
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the "claim adjuster computer
device" includes a keyboard. One of ordinary skill would have understood
that Gandee's disclosure that a virtual adjuster may "fill out an electronic
work order" at computer 108 suggests using a keyboard, as was known in
the art. See Gandee, ,r 14.
We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 90 as obvious.
Claim 91
Appellants contend "Gandee does not disclose a camera capable of
transmitting video inspection information in real time." App. Br. 50.
However, Gandee describes "video conference equipment 110 for providing
real-time audio and visual communication between the users of the computer
108 and computer 128," where "camera 112 can be a component of video
conference equipment 110." Gandee, ,r,r 15, 16. Moreover, Appellants
admit Gandee "describes a method/system for real-time audio and visual
communications with an insurance adjuster" in arguing other claims. App.
Br. 42.
We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim
91 as obvious.
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CONCLUSIONS
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims
1-3,5,6,9--11, 13, 14,56-58,60-64,66-83,85, 86,and88-95.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 70,
80, and 81, but did not err in rejecting claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9-11, 13, 14, 56-58,
60-64, 66-69, 71-79, 82, 83, 85, 86, and 88-95.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9--11,
13, 14, 56-58, 60-64, 66-83, 85, 86, and 88-95. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.50(a)(l) ("The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any of the
grounds specified constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of the
examiner on that claim, except as to any ground specifically reversed.").
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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