Ex Parte Cole

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 19, 2019

13368947 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 19, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/368,947 02/08/2012 James Cole
30636 7590 06/19/2019
FAY KAPLUN & MARCIN, LLP
150 BROADWAY, SUITE 702
NEW YORK, NY 10038
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
40125/05602 5274
EXAMINER
WEEKS, MARTIN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3668
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/19/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES COLE
Appeal 2018-001710
Application 13/368,947
Technology Center 3600
Before SCOTT C. MOORE, AMEE A. SHAH, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
The Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
final decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, 6-11, 13-15, 17, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Throughout this Decision, we refer to the Appellant's Appeal Brief
("Appeal Br.," filed Aug. 29, 2017), Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Dec. 6,
2017), and Specification ("Spec.," filed Feb. 8, 2012), and to the Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Oct. 6, 2017) and Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Mar. 29, 2017).
2 According to the Appellant, the real party in interest is Passur Aerospace,
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2018-001710
Application 13/368,947
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant's invention relates to "[a] method for receiving an
estimated ON time for an aircraft, determining an estimated ON to IN time
for the aircraft[,] and determining an estimated gate arrival time for the
aircraft based on the estimated ON time and the estimated ON to IN time."
Spec. ,r 2.
Claims 1, 7, and 14 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1
(Appeal Br. 17) (Claims App.) is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal
and is reproduced below (with added bracketing for reference):
1. A method, comprising:
[(a)] receiving an estimated ON time for an inbound
aircraft;
[(b )] receiving current variables specific to the inbound
aircraft, wherein the current variables are used to determine an
estimated ON to IN time for the inbound aircraft;
[ ( c)] matching the current variables for the inbound
aircraft to previous variables for a previous inbound aircraft,
wherein the previous variables were used to
determine the estimated ON to IN time for the previous
inbound aircraft,
wherein the matching of variables includes
grouping the variables according to an order of
importance;
[ ( d)] determining the estimated ON to IN time for the
inbound aircraft based on the ON to IN time for the previous
inbound aircraft, wherein the determining the estimated ON to
IN time for the inbound aircraft is further based on the
matching of the current variables to the previous variables; and
[sic]
[ ( e)] determining, using a processor, an estimated gate
arrival time for the inbound aircraft based on the estimated ON
time and the estimated ON to IN time;
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[(f)] receiving an actual gate arrival time for the inbound
aircraft;
[(g)] determining, using a processor, whether the
estimated gate arrival time was accurate within a predetermined
threshold;
[(h)] when the estimated gate arrival time is not accurate
within the predetermined threshold, grouping the variables
according to a different order of importance; and
[(i)] repeating the method until the grouping yields an
estimated gate arrival time accuracy within the predetermined
threshold.
ANALYSIS
The Appellant argues the claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 4, 15.
We select claim 1 from the group, with the remaining claims standing or
falling therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas" are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217-18 ( citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
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settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219--20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267---68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 ("We
view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted).
"A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
"[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 Revised Guidance"). Under the 2019
Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF p ATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Revised Guidance.
Failure to Follow USPTO Guidelines
We first address the Appellant's contention that the Examiner's
rejection is in error because "the Examiner has failed to satisfy the
requirements of the USPTO May 2016 Update." Appeal Br. 7 (citing MAY
2016 SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY UPDATE, 81 Fed. Reg. 27381 (May 6,
2016) ("May 2016 Update"); see also id. at 5, 6, and 8-11; Reply Br. 2-6.
We disagree.
We first note that the 2019 Revised Guidance "applies to all
applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on,
or after January 7, 2019." 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. The USPTO has been clear
that any guidance issued "does not constitute substantive rulemaking and
does not have the force and effect of law." Id. at 51; see also May 2016
Update, 81 Fed. Reg. at 27382. In particular, the guidance "does not create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party
against the USPTO," and although USPTO personnel are "expected to
follow the guidance," failure to do so "is not, in itself, a proper basis for
either an appeal or a petition." 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51;
see also May 2016 Update, 81 Fed. Reg. at 27382. Thus, to the extent the
Appellant contends that there is "an error" in the Decision because the
Examiner failed to follow the guidelines (see Appeal Br. 5-11 ), we disagree.
The Examiner applies the Supreme Court's two-step framework,
described in Mayo and Alice, and considers Office guidelines in that
application. See Final Act. 4--5. Specifically, the Examiner notifies the
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Appellant that the claims are "directed to a method for determining gate
arrival times for aircraft" (Final Act. 4) and cites to judicial precedent in
determining that the claims recite an abstract idea (id. at 4--5). The
Examiner further notifies the Appellant that "[ n Jone of the additional
features of the recited claims amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea of claim 1" (Final Act. 5) and considers the elements "individually
[and] in combination with other elements of the claims" (Ans. 3). We note
that the guidelines do not "require" that the Examiner "must" write the
rejection a certain way (cf Appeal Br. 6); rather, the guidelines clearly state
that the Examiner "should" make certain determinations (see, e.g., May
2016 Update, Memorandum 2--4; 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 53-56). The Examiner has notified the Appellant of the reasons for the
rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the
notice requirement of§ 132. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2011 ). Furthermore, any alleged failure to follow the guidelines is not a
proper basis for an appeal. The Appellant's recourse for addressing such an
alleged impropriety in the examination procedure would be to either
(1) request the Examiner's SPE to exercise supervisory oversight or (2) file a
petition to the Director to invoke supervisory authority under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.181(a)(3).
Step One of the Mayol Alice Framework
Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework, the Examiner
determines that claim 1 is "directed to a method for determining gate arrival
times for aircraft" (Final Act. 4), that "[t]he advance the method purports to
make is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified
content and there is no particular inventive technology required to perform
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these processes" (id. at 5), and thus, claim 1 is "directed to an abstract idea"
(id.). The Examiner notes that the Federal Circuit "has treated analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds or my [sic]
mathematical algorithms as essentially mental processes within the abstract
idea category." Id. When viewed through the lens of the 2019 Revised
Guidance, the Examiner's analysis depicts the claimed subject matter as a
mathematical concept and a "mental process" of a "concept[] performed in
the human mind ... including ... evaluation" and a mathematical concept
under Prong One of Revised Step 2A. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
The Appellant characterizes the claim as "directed to a method of
producing an estimated gate arrival time and further, determining whether a
particular grouping of variables yields a sufficiently accurate estimated gate
arrival time" (Appeal Br. 13), and contends that the claim is "directed to a
patentable, technological improvement over existing methods of producing
an estimated gate arrival time and determining whether a particular grouping
of variables yields sufficiently accurate gate arrival estimations" (id. at 14).
Before determining whether the claims at issue are directed to an
abstract idea, we first determine to what the claims are directed.
[T]he "directed to" inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether "their
character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter."
Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.,
818 F.3d 1369, 1375, 2016 WL 1393573, at *5 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(inquiring into "the focus of the claimed advance over the prior
art").
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Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The
question is whether the claims as a whole "focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology" or are "directed to a result or
effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
An examination of claim 1 shows that the claim recites "[a] method
comprising": (a) "receiving an estimated ON time for an inbound aircraft";
(b) receiving inbound aircraft-specific variables that "are used to determine
an estimated ON to IN time for the inbound aircraft"; ( c) matching the
received variables to previous variables used to determine estimated times
for a previous inbound aircraft by "grouping the variables according to an
order of importance"; ( d) "determining the estimated ON to IN time for the
inbound aircraft based on the ON to IN time for the previous inbound
aircraft" that is "based on the matching of the current variables to the
previous variables"; ( e) "determining, using a processor, an estimated gate
arrival time for the inbound aircraft based on the estimated ON time and the
estimated ON to IN time"; (f) "receiving an actual gate arrival time for the
inbound aircraft"; (g) "determining, using a processor, whether the estimated
gate arrival time was accurate within a predetermined threshold"; (h) when
the estimated gate arrival time is not accurate within the predetermined
threshold, grouping the variables according to a different order of
importance"; and (i) "repeating the method until the grouping yields an
estimated gate arrival time accuracy within the predetermined threshold."
Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). Only steps (e) and (g) of determining an
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estimated gate arrival time and the accuracy of that time are claimed as
being performed by a processor.
The Specification provides for "[a] method for receiving an estimated
ON time for an aircraft, determining an estimated ON to IN time for the
aircraft and determining an estimated gate arrival time for the aircraft based
on the estimated ON time and the estimated ON to IN time." Spec. ,r 2. The
problem with which the claimed invention is concerned is that "the actual
time the aircraft arrives at its assigned gate may vary significantly from the
ON time," i.e., the estimated arrival time, because of a number of factors.
Id. ,r 1. Thus, the claimed invention aims to determine "the estimated ON
time and the estimated time from ON to IN" in order "to provide an accurate
estimated time of arrival ("ET A")." J d.; see also id. ,r 2.
Although there is no requirement that claim construction be
performed before a § 101 analysis, in some cases, claim construction can be
desirable and helpful. See Bancorp Servs., L.L. C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Can. (US.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Here, the steps of
determining, i.e., steps ( d), ( e ), and (g), are recited without any details as to
how the determinations are made, i.e., in what way(s) technologically or by
what algorithm. The Appellant cites to paragraphs 13, 14, 19-21, 24 and 25
of the Specification as support for these limitations. Appeal Br. 2-3. These
paragraphs provide that previous ETA calculations are stored (Spec. ,r 13), a
processor or personal computer can perform calculations (id. ,r 14), matching
variables or other methods such as averaging data may be used (id. ,r 19), an
average is determined by grouping data (id. ,r,r 20, 21 ), the system or an
operator may determine a variance between times (id. ,r 20), accuracy can be
determined "based on any known type of statistical accuracy determination"
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(id. ,r 24), and estimates are determined based on data groupings (id. ,r 25).
As such, the determining steps comprise calculating or analyzing data by
standard algorithms.
When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation of the claim limitations, we agree with the Examiner that the
limitations recite a method for estimating an aircraft's gate arrival time.
Limitations (a), (b ), and ( f) of receiving data are pre-solution steps and are
ordinarily performed in estimating data such as an arrival time. Limitation
( c) of matching variables and limitations ( d), ( e ), and (g) of determining data
are simply data analyses and calculating steps that can be performed
mentally and are ordinarily performed in analyzing and estimating data.
Limitation (h) of conditionally grouping variable according to an order of
importance is a data organization and sorting step that can be performed
mentally. Limitation (i) of conditionally repeating the process until a
criterion, i.e., threshold, is met is a repeat of pre-solution and mental process
steps and ordinarily performed in estimating times.
Estimating an aircraft's gate arrival time is similar to the concepts of
"selecting certain information, analyzing it using mathematical techniques,
and reporting or displaying the results of the analysis" in SAP America, Inc.
v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018), of collecting,
analyzing, manipulating, and processing data and displaying the results of
the analysis, manipulation, and processing in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and of
calculating alarm limit values for a specific purpose in Flook, 437 U.S. at
594--95. Accordingly, we conclude the claim recites a way of evaluating
information, a concept performed in the human mind, which is one of the
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mental processes identified in the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
To the extent the Appellant argues that the claim does not recite an
abstract idea because it "recite[ s] new techniques for analyzing information"
(Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 3--4), we disagree. As noted above, none of the
determining steps provide implementation details; the claim recites the
results without the how. The claim "provides only a result-oriented
solution[] with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our
law demands more." Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1342. Moreover,
an abstract idea does not transform into an inventive concept just because
the prior art does not disclose or suggest it. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 89--90.
"Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself
satisfy the§ 101 inquiry." Ass 'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013). Indeed, "[t]he 'novelty' of any
element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance
in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-
89; see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 91 (rejecting "the Government's invitation to
substitute§§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry
under § 101 ").
To the extent the Appellant argues that the claim does not recite an
abstract idea because it "avoid[ s] monopolizing every solution to estimating
gate arrival times" and "avoid[ s] the preemption concerns that were inherent
in the EPG [Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)] claims" (Appeal Br. 10; see also id. at 13; Reply Br. 5---6), we
note that although the Supreme Court has described "the concern that drives
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this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent
eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption," see Alice, 573 U.S. at 216,
characterizing pre-emption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not
the same as characterizing pre-emption as the sole test for patent eligibility.
"The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the
basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability" and "[ f]or this reason,
questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis."
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015) ( citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216). Although "preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility." Id. The aforementioned concept is not
sufficiently limiting so as to fall clearly on the side of patent-eligibility.
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54, we look to whether the claims "apply, rely on, or use the judicial
exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception," i.e., "integrates a judicial exception into
a practical application." Here, the Appellant contends that "claim 1 is
directed to a patentable, technological improvement over existing methods
of producing an estimated gate arrival time and determining whether a
particular grouping of variables yields sufficiently accurate gate arrival
estimations" (Appeal Br. 14), similar to McRO (see Appeal Br. 11-14;
Reply Br. 7-8). The Appellant also contends that "the unconventional
arrangement of grouping variables in consideration of the accuracy of a prior
grouping, rather than based on theoretical considerations, is a technical
improvement to airport management" (Appeal Br. 15), similar to BASCOM
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Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (see id. at 14--15; Reply Br. 8-9). 3 When viewed through
the lens of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the Appellant contends that the
judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application because
"[a]n additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field." 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
In McRO, the claims were directed to a specific improvement in
computer animation and used rules to automate a subjective task of humans
to create a sequence of synchronized, animated characters. See McRO,
837 F.3d at 1314--15. Unlike Flook, Bilski, and Alice, it was not the use of
the computer but the incorporation of the rules that improved an existing
technological process. Id. at 1314. Here, there is no such improvement to a
technological process. In McRO, "[t]he claimed improvement was to how
the physical display operated ( to produce better quality images), unlike
( what is present here) a claimed improvement in a mathematical technique
with no improved display mechanism." SAP America, 898 F.3d at 1167.
The process of estimating an arrival time is not a technological process, but
a mathematical one. See id. The Appellant also does not direct our attention
to anything in the Specification to indicate that the invention provides a
technical improvement in estimating gate arrival times. As discussed above,
the claimed invention aims to provide more accurate estimates. See Spec.
3 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of Office guidance). Solely for
purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate
them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of Office guidance). See 2019 Revised
Guidance at 55.
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,r,r 1, 2. This benefit is not a technical or technological improvement, but
rather, any benefit lies in the calculation/mathematical formula (not claimed)
to determine an arrival time. The steps of the method do not require
technology or a computer, and even those that do can be performed
mentally, unlike the lip syncing and facial expression animation technology
in the eligible claims of McRO.
In BASCOM, the court determined that "an inventive concept can be
found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
conventional pieces." BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. In that case, the
installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user,
provided an inventive concept in that it gave the filtering tool both the
benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP
server. Id. We find no analogous non-conventional, non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional pieces within a network or an
achievement of a technical improvement. The claim does not disclose a
particular, unconventional processor; rather, the Specification provides for a
calculation engine that may be a conventional processor in a conventional
computer. See Spec. ,r 14. The Appellant's contention that "the
unconventional arrangement of grouping variables in consideration of the
accuracy of a prior grouping, rather than based on theoretical considerations,
is a technical improvement to airport management" (Appeal Br. 15) is
unsupported attorney argument. The claim does not recite how the grouping
of variables, i.e., data, is performed technologically or is a technical
improvement, and the Specification does not discuss any technological or
technical improvements. Moreover, airport management is not a
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technological or technical field, but a business area. Thus, we see no
technological improvements or improvements to a technological area. Any
alleged improvement lies in the abstract idea itself, not to any technological
improvement. See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281,
1287-88 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's determination
that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
The Second Step
Under the second step in the Alice framework ( corresponding to Step
2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance), we find supported the Examiner's
determination that the claim limitations, taken individually or as an ordered
combination, do not amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 3.
The Appellant does not off er additional reasoning or argument why
the claim "[ a ]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are
not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may be present." 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. We agree with the Examiner that "there is no
particular inventive technology required to perform" the claimed process.
Final Act. 5. The claimed processor operates in its ordinary and
conventional capacity to perform the well-understood, routine, and
conventional functions of making determinations. See Spec. ,r 14
(describing a generic processor in a generic, available computer); see also
Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354--55 (gathering, sending, monitoring,
analyzing, selecting, and presenting information does not transform the
abstract process into a patent-eligible invention); SAP America, 898 F.3d
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at 1170 ("[ A ]n invocation of already-available computers that are not
themselves plausibly asserted to be an advance, for use in carrying out
improved mathematical calculations, amounts to a recitation of what is
'well-understood, routine, [and] conventional."') (alteration in original)
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). The steps of receiving and grouping data
and repeating the process can be performed manually without a computer.
Moreover, the claim simply recites the functional results to be achieved of
receiving data, matching data, determining data, and grouping data. As
stated above, the claim "provides only a result-oriented solution[] with
insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it." Intellectual
Ventures, 850 F.3d at 1342.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's determination
that the limitations of claim 1 do not transform the claim into significantly
more than the abstract idea.
For at least the reasons above, we sustain the Examiner's rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 1 and of claims 2, 4, 6-11, 13-
15, 1 7, and 19, which fall with claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6-11, 13-15, 17, and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
17