Ex Parte CloranDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 3, 201814136003 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/136,003 12/20/2013 758 7590 08/07/2018 FENWICK & WEST LLP SILICON VALLEY CENTER 801 CALIFORNIA STREET MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94041 UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Michael Eric Cloran UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 28151-25248/US 7065 EXAMINER MCCORMICK, GABRIELLE A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3629 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/07/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTOC@Fenwick.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MICHAEL ERIC CLORAN Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 Technology Center 3600 Before ANTON W. PETTING, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. PETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 Michael Eric Cloran (Appellant) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a non-final rejection of claims 1-12, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant's Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed December 14, 2015) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed June 21, 2016), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed April 22, 2016), and Non-Final Action ("Non-Final Act.," mailed April 17, 2015). Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 The Appellant invented an interactive response communications system that uses human interpretation of customer intent as input to a workflow on a computer. Specification para. 2. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added). 1. A computer-implemented method for operating an interactive response system comprising: [ 1] receiving audio from a person; [2] processing the audio via an automated subsystem; [3] determining a portion of the audio to provide to a human analyst; [ 4] responsive to the determination, providing the determined portion of the audio to the human analyst, said processing, determining, and providing causing a response delay; and [ 5] selectively accelerating a rate of presentation of the determined portion of the audio to the human analyst to compensate for the response delay. The Examiner relies upon the following prior art: Henja US 2002/0013949 Al Bahl US 6,377,921 B 1 Shpiro US 2002/0086269 Al Ehrlich US 6,442,269 B 1 Chan US 6,470,077 B 1 2 Jan. 31, 2002 Apr. 23, 2002 July 4, 2002 Aug. 27, 2002 Oct. 22, 2002 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 Claims 1-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non- statutory subject matter. Claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, and Henja. Claims 2, 4, 6, and 8 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, Henja, and Shpiro. Claims 10 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, Henja, and Bahl. ISSUES The issues of eligible subject matter tum primarily on whether the claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of what a computer is to provide without implementation details. The issues of obviousness tum primarily on whether the art describes the claim limitations. FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 Facts Related to the Prior Art Chan 01. Chan is directed to call handling systems for use in call centers. Chan 1:7-9. 02. Chan stores audible signals received during a call (e.g., a called party's voice samples) while a call classifier processes such audible signals. If the call classifier determines that a live party has been reached, control of the call is switched to an agent and the stored voice samples are played to the agent at an accelerated rate, so that information provided by the called party during the call classification process is provided to the agent. Chan 1 : 60- 2: 3. 03. A call processing unit manages placement and processing of calls and the recording of responses within the call center. When the call processing unit determines that a call needs to be placed to a predetermined party, it dials a telephone number associated with the party to establish a communications connection with the party. At the same time, or slightly thereafter, the call processing unit assigns a call classifier from the call classifier pool to the call for use in classifying audible signals received from the called party location during the call. The call classifier detects when the call has been answered and then waits for audible signals from the called party location. When audible signals are detected, the call classifier processes the signals to determine whether the signals have originated from a live party or from a machine, such as an 4 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 automated telephone answering machine. When the call classifier has completed processing of the audible signals, it delivers the results of the processing to the call processing unit. If the call classifier indicates that the call was answered by a live party, the call processing unit immediately patches a waiting agent from the agent pool into the connection to handle the call. Chan 2:35---60. 04. The processing performed by the call classifier includes some inherent processing delay to ensure accurate call classification. Thus, after the call classifier has received audible signals from the called party location, there is typically a period of time before the call processing unit knows whether a live party has answered. If no measures were taken to store the audible signals used to classify the call, the information included in the audible signals would be lost and the agent from the agent pool would not have the benefit of such information. Therefore, in accordance with the present invention, the call processing unit forwards the audible signals to the recording/playback unit as the call classifier is making its determination. If the call classifier indicates that a live party has answered the call, the call processing unit signals the recording/message playback unit to playback the recorded audible signals to the agent. Subsequently, the call processing unit connects the agent to the call. Chan 2:61-3:11. 05. The process of recording and playing back voice samples at an accelerated rate may continue even after the call classification process. Preferably, the voice samples are placed in a queue in the 5 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 recording/playback unit. The voice samples would continue to be recorded and played back at an accelerated rate until no further voice samples remained in the queue. In other words, the agent would be switched over to realtime speech of the called party after the recording/message playback unit has allowed the agent to "catch up" with the called party. Chan 3:31--40. Ehrlich 06. Ehrlich is directed to tracking and storing information about individual transactions for report generation. Ehrlich 1 :7-11. 07. A "call" is typically defined in a limited way that prevents complete records about a call from being collected. For example, in the case of a call that is transferred at least once after being initially received by the system, the call is typically defined as occurring between connection and disconnection, or hang up. Henja This definition is not very accurate or useful, because the call may have included several segments during which different resources were connected, and involved several different agents and several different periods during which a calling customer was required to "hold." It would be extremely useful to be able to identify each segment of a call and what happened during each segment in order to in order to better analyze customer needs and agent performance. Ehrlich 2:45---60. 08. Henja is directed to multi-media broadcast and presentation of broadcast multi-media. Henja para. 1. 6 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 ANALYSIS Claims 1-12 rejected under 35 US.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter Method claim 1 recites receiving, processing, and determining a portion of audio data, providing that portion of data, which causes a delay, and changing the rate of data presentation to compensate for the delay. Thus, claim 1 recites receiving, processing, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. None of the limitations recites implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite functional results to be achieved by any and all possible means. Data reception, processing, analysis, modification, and transmission are all generic, conventional data processing operations to the point they are themselves concepts awaiting implementation details. The sequence of data reception-processing-analysis-modification-transmission is equally generic and conventional. The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. The remaining claims merely describe process parameters, with no implementation details. The Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, [] determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. [] If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat else is there in the claims before us? [] To answer that question, [] consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent- eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an 7 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to compensating for a delay by accelerating audio presentation, which is a method of organizing human activity and an abstract idea. Final Act. 3. Although the Court in Alice made a determination as to what the claims were directed to, we find that this case's claims themselves and the Specification provide enough information to inform one as to what they are directed to. The preamble to claim 1 recites that it is a method for operating an interactive response system. The steps in claim 1 result in adjusting a presentation rate absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so. The Specification at paragraph 2 recites that the invention relates to an interactive response communications system that uses human interpretation of customer intent as input to a workflow on a computer. Thus, all this evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to using human interpretation of data to adjust the rate of a presentation, i.e., modifying a presentation. This is consistent with the Examiner's determination. 8 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Bilski (Bilski v Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)) in particular, that the claims at issue here are directed to an abstract idea. The concept of modifying a presentation is a fundamental social practice long prevalent in our system of communication. The use of modifying a presentation is also a building block of ingenuity in communicating ideas and concepts. Thus, modifying a presentation, like hedging, is an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2356. As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of modifying a presentation at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas" as the Court has used that term. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Further, claims involving data collection, analysis, and display are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims 'directed to' a patent ineligible concept"); see also In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to perform data reception, processing, analysis, modification, and transmission and does not recite an improvement to a 9 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314--15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they "focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation"). As such, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of receiving, processing, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. The remaining claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis at Mayo step two. the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."' Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to "implement[t]" an abstract idea "on ... a computer," that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of "additional feature[ e ]" that provides any "practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract idea] itself." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted). 10 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 "[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic computer." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer for receiving, processing, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval----one of the most basic functions of a computer. The limitation of said processing, determining, and providing causing a response delay is not a step, but a recitation of an inherent characteristic of data processing, viz. a delay. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., supra. See also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms 'processing,' 'receiving,' and 'storing,' ... those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming"). In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, "even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is 'limited to particular content' or a particular 'source,' that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract." SAP America Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant's method add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-processing- 11 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 analysis-modification-transmission is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F .3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission); Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional. Viewed as a whole, Appellant's method claims simply recite the concept of modifying a presentation as performed by a generic computer. To be sure, the claims recite doing so by advising one to modify the rate to compensate for an inherent delay. But this is no more than abstract conceptual advice on the parameters for such modifying a presentation and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and does not recite any particular implementation. The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The 18 pages of Specification spell out different generic equipment2 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would 2 The Specification describes using a general purpose computer. Spec. para. 54. 12 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 entail based on the concept of modifying a presentation under different scenarios. They do not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of modifying a presentation using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2360. As to the structural claims, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long "warn[ ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art.' Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2360. We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the rejection "does not identify how the present claims are similar to the methods of organizing human activity identified by the courts as abstract ideas." Appeal Br. 7. As we determine supra, the claims are directed to no more than receiving, processing, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data absent any technological implementation details. This was found to be an abstract idea in Electric Power, supra. Also, accelerating a presentation as such is no more than abstract conceptual advice to do something by any and all possible means without reciting how to do so. 13 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that "[a]ccelerating audio presentation is therefore not merely an abstract idea being performed by a computer, but rather is inextricable from a computing environment" (Appeal Br. 8) for similar reasons. Again, reciting a functional result without any technological means for doing so is abstract conceptual advice. At that level of generality, the claims do no more than describe a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem. The purely functional nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea, not to a concrete embodiment of that idea. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellant further argues that the asserted claims are akin to the claims found patent-eligible in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appeal Br. 8-9. In DDR Holdings, the court evaluated the eligibility of claims "address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host's website after 'clicking' on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink." Id. at 1257. There, the court found that the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem that had no "pre-Internet analog." Id. at 1258. The court cautioned, however, "that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent." Id. For example, in DDR Holdings the Court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue from claims found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See id. at 1258-59 (citing 14 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715-16). As noted there, the Ultramercial claims were "' directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before."' Id. at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715- 16). Nevertheless, those claims were patent ineligible because they "merely recite[d] the abstract idea of 'offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,' along with 'routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet."' Id. Appellant's asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible in Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings. The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited "providing [a] media product for sale at an Internet website"; "restricting general public access to said media product"; "receiving from the consumer a request to view [a] sponsor message"; and "if the sponsor message is an interactive message, presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one query." 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant's asserted claims recite receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. This is precisely the type of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial. We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that "the need to selectively accelerate the audio is created precisely because of the delay caused by distributing the audio over a computer network and processing the audio by computer systems." Reply Br. 6. The delay caused by transmitting information predates computers in the forms of radio and television 15 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 transmission, and even mail and oral presentation before that. The solution to use accelerating techniques to overcome such delays is as old as the use of shorthand. Claims 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, and Henja Chan describes a call handling system that receives audio over a phone and processes it via a call classifier. A portion of the audio data is entered into a queue. The amount of data in the queue is the amount determined to be provided to the agent, and when the queue is empty, the call is switched over to live play. The audio data in the queue is accelerated to compensate for the delay caused by the classifier processing. FF 01---05. Although Chan's agent receives all the audio data, he receives it in two portions, one of which is sized by the data in a queue and accelerated in transmission. The remainder is directly fed to the agent. The claim does not preclude the agent receiving all the data, but only requires that some portion be determined and accelerated. The Examiner applies Ehrlich for the background use of the concept of call segments and Henja for an additional example of providing data to a person. Thus, Chan anticipates claim 1. "Anticipation is the epitome of obviousness." Structural Rubber Products Co. v Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1984). We are persuaded by Appellant's argument that the art fails to describe claim 9 not providing a portion to the analyst. Appeal Br. 13. The 16 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 Examiner presents no separate determinations as to claim 9. The remaining claims are not argued separately. Claims 2, 4, 6, and 8 rejected under 35 USC§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, Henja, and Shpiro These claims are not separately argued. Claims 10 and 12 rejected under 35 USC§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, Henja, and Bahl These claims are not separately argued. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The rejection of claims 1-12 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non- statutory subject matter is proper. The rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 7, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, and Henja is proper. The rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, and Henja is improper. The rejection of claims 2, 4, 6, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, Henja, and Shpiro is proper. The rejection of claims 10 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Chan, Ehrlich, Henja, and Bahl is proper. 17 Appeal 2016-006704 Application 14/136,003 DECISION The rejection of claims 1-12 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation