Ex Parte Clement

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 1, 2017

14095029 (P.T.A.B. May. 1, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/095,029 12/03/2013 JASON CLEMENT 201304923.01 3758
36738 7590 05/03/2017
ROrTTT7 fr ASSOPTATRS
EXAMINER
750 B STREET BECHTEL, KEVIN M
SUITE 3120
SAN DIEGO, CA 92101 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Noelle@rogitz.com
eofficeaction @ appcoll.com
John@rogitz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JASON CLEMENT1
Appeal 2016-008227
Application 14/095,029
Technology Center 2400
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
KEVIN C. TROCK, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 The real party in interest is Sony Corp. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-008227
Application 14/095,029
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Representative Claim
Representative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows (emphasis
added):
1. A device comprising:
at least one non-transitory computer memory comprising
instructions that when executed by at least one processor cause
the processor to:
allocate, to an original user of content requiring
credentials to view on a device associated with the original
user, transfer credits to facilitate transferring rights in the
content to a friend;
responsive to a transfer signal from the device associated
with the original user, transfer at least rights to view the content
to a device of the friend designated by the original user;
render the content unavailable to a device of the original
user;
change a transfer credit amount in an account of the
original user to account for the transferring;
present on a video display at least a refund selector
selectable to refund a transfer fee, if any, that was previously
paid when the content was purchased by the original user, a
maintain selector selectable to maintain the transfer credits in
an account of the original user for use in transferring other
titles, and a purchase selector selectable to purchase additional
transfer credits necessary to both maintain originally purchased
content and to transfer the content to the device of the friend.
2
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Application 14/095,029
References
Fontijn
Siddique et al.
Reedy
Toh et al.
US 2006/0229989 Al October 12, 2006
US 2010/0030578 Al February 4, 2010
US 2013/0042169 Al February 14, 2013
US 2015/0006383 Al January 1, 2015
Rejections
1. The Examiner rejected claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
2. The Examiner rejected claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
3. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite.2
4. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 5, 21, and 23 are under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Toh and
Siddique.3
5. The Examiner rejected claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Toh, Siddique, and Fontijn.4
2 Because separate patentability is not argued for claims 2, 5, 7, and 21—23,
we select claim 1 as representative. Except for our ultimate decision, the
Examiner’s § 112, second paragraph, rejection of the remaining claims is not
discussed further herein.
3 Separate patentability is argued for claim 1. Separate patentability is not
argued for claims 2, 5, 21, and 23. Thus, the rejection of these claims turns
on our decision as to claim 1. Except for our ultimate decision, this rejection
of these claims is not discussed further herein.
4 Separate patentability is not argued for claim 7. Thus, the rejection of this
claim turns on our decision as to claim 1. Except for our ultimate decision,
this rejection is not discussed further herein.
3
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Application 14/095,029
6. The Examiner rejected claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Toh, Siddique, and Reedy.5
7. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory
subject matter.6
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
as failing to comply with the enablement requirement?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
as failing to comply with the written description requirement?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments (Appeal Brief and Reply Brief) that the Examiner has erred.
5 Separate patentability is not argued for claim 22. Thus, the rejection of this
claim turns on our decision as to claim 1. Except for our ultimate decision,
this rejection is not discussed further herein.
6 We select claim 1 as representative. Separate patentability is not argued
for claims 2, 5, 7, and 21—23. Except for our ultimate decision, the § 101
rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 is not discussed further herein.
4
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1. Written Description
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the written description
requirement because:
With respect to written description, in the description of
Figure 4 Applicant has described the claim language at issue
verbatim.
App. Br. 4. Appellant’s assertion does little to inform this Panel as to
Appellant’s particular concerns with the Examiner’s written description
rejection. Rather, the assertion is essentially a statement that, on its face, the
mere repetition of the claim language within the Specification provides
written description support. We disagree. However, that does not end our
analysis. We also look to whether the written description rejection is
adequately supported, or is insufficient, on its face.
In support of the rejection, the Examiner cites to MPEP § 2161.01.
The guidance provided in MPEP § 2161.011. states:
When examining computer-implemented functional
claims, examiners should determine whether the specification
discloses the computer and the algorithm (e.g., the necessary
steps and/or flowcharts) that perform the claimed function in
sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art can
reasonably conclude that the inventor invented the claimed
subject matter. Specifically, if one skilled in the art would know
how to program the disclosed computer to perform the necessary
steps described in the specification to achieve the claimed
function and the inventor was in possession of that knowledge,
the written description requirement would be satisfied. If the
specification does not provide a disclosure of the computer and
algorithm in sufficient detail to demonstrate to one of ordinary
skill in the art that the inventor possessed the invention including
how to program the disclosed computer to perform the claimed
function, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35
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U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, for lack of written description must
be made.
MPEP § 2161.01. We do not find where the rejection provides articulated
reasoning as to the skill in the art, as directed to the algorithm, needed for
this particular claim. Rather, the rejection merely concludes:
Since the claim merely broadly recites providing network
addresses of friends without describing in the specification the
particular steps, i.e., algorithm, necessary to perform the claimed
function, the scope of the claim limitation is not adequately
supported by the Specification and thus fails to satisfy the written
description requirement.
Final Act. 16. This reasoning is insufficient to support a written description
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
2. Enablement
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement because the Examiner’s Wands factor analysis is insufficient.
App. Br. 5—6 (referencing/^? re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
We agree. “The test of enablement is not whether any
experimentation is necessary, but whether, if experimentation is necessary, it
is undue.” MPEP § 2164.01. “Before any analysis of enablement can occur,
it is necessary for the examiner to construe the claims.” MPEP § 2164.04.
Further, lack of enablement may be shown:
[B]y making specific findings of fact, supported by the evidence,
and then drawing conclusions based on these findings of fact.
For example, doubt may arise about enablement because
information is missing about one or more essential parts or
relationships between parts which one skilled in the art could not
develop without undue experimentation.
6
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Id. Although we conclude that the Examiner’s articulated reasoning is
sufficient to show that experimentation is required, we further conclude that
the articulated reasoning is not sufficient to show that the required
experimentation is undue.7
3. Indefiniteness
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as being indefinite because:
Nowhere does the rejection mention Nautilus much less apply
the correct test. For this reason, no prima facie case of
indefmiteness has been established.
App. Br. 7. The Examiner rejected claim 1 stating
Claim 1 recites a “device” that comprises only a single hardware
element, “at least one computer memory”, and the recitations
render unclear which statutory category the claim is directed
towards; particularly, it’s unclear whether the claim is directed
towards a machine or a manufacture. The term “device” in the
preamble implies that the claims are directed towards a
“machine”. However, for a machine to be patent-eligible, the
machine must be a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of
certain devices and combination of devices — that is, a machine
must have plural elements.
Final Act. 17. We find both Appellant’s argument and the Examiner’s
rejection wanting. First, contrary to Appellant’s argument, Nautilus is not
the test for indefmiteness during prosecution. See MPEP § 2172.02 I.
Second, the essential linchpin of both the argument and the rejection
is: What is the meaning of “device”? Yet, neither Examiner nor Appellant
7 Should there be further prosecution, we direct the Examiner’s attention to
MPEP § 2164.08(a). All the appealed claims before us appear to cover
every conceivable structure (means) for achieving the stated property (result)
while the Specification discloses, at most, only those known to the inventor.
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turns to a dictionary to see the normal meaning of the term. A “device” is
defined as “a thing made for a particular purpose.”8 Contrary to the
Examiner’s implied meaning of the term, we find no requirement that a
device be a machine.
4. Obviousness
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[A] general teaching of a menu that can be used for “activities”
related to “refunds” can mean a great many things, and it is
hardly a specific teaching of a refund selector selectable to refund
a transfer fee. Likewise, a general teaching about amorphous
“activities” related to receipts and refunds contains no cognizable
hint of a maintain selector that is selectable to do something
specific that Siddique does not mention, namely, maintain
transfer credits in an account of the original user for use in
transferring other titles.
App. Br. 15 (emphasis added).
The user of Siddique can view transactions, pay bills, and
manage receipts and refunds without ever having a clue about
maintaining transfer credits much less in the specific way
claimed. Likewise, the Siddique user can perform the
enumerated features in Siddique without having any cognizance
of a purchase selector that is selectable to purchase additional
transfer credits necessary to both maintain originally purchased
content and to transfer the content to the device of the friend, a
concept.
App. Br. 19 (emphasis added).
We conclude, consistent with Appellant’s argument, there is
insufficient articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s findings that
8 device. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random House, Inc.
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/device (accessed: April 21, 2017).
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Siddique discloses “a maintain selector selectable to maintain the transfer
credits” and “a purchase selector selectable to purchase additional transfer
credits necessary to both maintain originally purchased content and to
transfer the content.” Therefore, we conclude that there is insufficient
articulated reasoning to support the Examiner’s final conclusion that claim 1
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
Appellant’s invention.
5. Non-Statutory Subject Matter
A
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because:
Current PTO policy with respect to abstract idea rejections
is in line with current law (Enfish, LLC, v. Microsoft Corp., 2015-
1244, May 2016). Specifically, current policy is reflected in the
Deputy Commissioner's Memorandum of May 4, 2016
(“Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection and
Evaluating the Applicant's Response to A Subject Matter
Eligibility Rejection”, hereinafter “the Memorandum”), which is
consistent with Enfish.
App. Br. 8.
Appellant mischaracterizes the purpose of the Memorandum as
“current policy.” Rather, the Memorandum at page 1 is explicit in stating
“[t]he purpose of this memorandum is to provide examination instructions
to the Patent Examining Corps relating to subject matter eligibility of claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Emphasis added.
Appellant further contends:
First, according to the Memorandum, to satisfy the first
Mayo step the examiner must identify the abstract idea as it is
recited and explain why it corresponds to a concept that the
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courts have identified as an abstract idea. This emphasis on not
straying beyond specific examples held by courts to be abstract
permeates the Memorandum: the rejection must identify the
specific claim limitations and explain why those claim
limitations set forth an abstract idea corresponding to a concept
that the courts have identified as an abstract idea. The rejection
must avoid relying upon language taken out of context and must
not “go beyond those concepts that are similar to what the courts
have identified as abstract ideas.” Thus, both the analytically lax
habit of reformulating claims into pithy phrases and then
creating, from those pithy phrases, a new class of “abstract idea”
is explicitly rejected by the Memorandum.
App. Br. 8—9 (Appellant’s emphasis omitted, Panel emphasis added).
[T]he claims are directed to presenting data (as opposed to
merely collecting or organizing it) in a specifically recited way,
namely, a specifically recited user interface on yet another
machine, a display. . . . Furthermore, the rejection violates the
precepts of the Memorandum because no Supreme Court case
ever has held that a machine presenting a user interface on a
computer display is “abstract”. No lower court case, to the best
of Applicant’s knowledge, has held that user interfaces are
“abstract”. . . [Njowhere does the “abstract idea” announced in
the rejection account for the specific [user interface] UI required
by the claims.
App. Br. 9—10 (emphasis added).
Again, Appellant mischaracterizes the Memorandum. The actual
language of the Memorandum is that “the Examiner should” not “the
Examiner must” follow the Director’s guidance. Further, any Examiner’s
failure to follow the Director’s guidance is appealable only to the extent that
the Examiner has failed to follow the statutes or case law. That is, to the
extent the Director’s guidance goes beyond the case law and is more
restrictive on the Examiner than the case law, failure of the Examiner to
follow those added restrictions is a matter for petition to the Director. We
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review Appellant’s particular arguments against the case law and find no
requirement in the law that restricts “abstract ideas” to only those particular
concepts that the courts have already particularly identified explicitly as an
abstract idea.
Further, even if we found merit to Appellant’s argued user interface
restrictions, Appellant’s argument has not withstood the test of time. Our
reviewing court has explicitly spoken to a graphical user interface being a
purely conventional feature that does not meaningfully limit the scope of a
claim. Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1265
(Fed. Cir. 2016). The court also stated, “[t]he claim simply recites the use of
generic features of cellular telephones, such as a storage medium and a
graphical user interface, as well as routine functions, such as transmitting
and receiving signals, to implement the underlying idea.” Id., 838 F.3d at
1262.
B
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because:
Claim 1 for example recites concrete patent-eligible subject
matter, namely, a computer memory with instructions on it that
can be executed by another machine, namely, a processor. A
machine is an “important clue” that the claim is patentable, Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)).
App. Br. 9.
Appellant mischaracterizes the Court’s Bilski discussion of the
machine-or-transformation test. Rather than stating that “a machine” is an
important clue, the Court states “the machine-or-transformation test is a
useful and important clue.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604. Further, the machine-
or-transformation test looks not to merely “a machine,” but rather to
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“aparticular machine or apparatus.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 602 (emphasis
added).
Additionally, Appellant’s argument overlooks the Court’s explicit
guidance:
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’ ” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “to a particular technological environment.”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
“on ... a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
C
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because:
The rejection first alleges that the claims can be boiled down to
“managing the transfer of content license between people”. But
the claims do not recite “managing” or “license” at all. The
putative “abstract idea” thus has been taken out of context of the
language of the claims. The rejection therefore fails the
requirement of identifying the abstract idea as it is recited.
App. Br. 9.
The examiner attempts to draw a parallel between the claims and
a putative “abstract idea” of “creating contractual relationships”
but nowhere do the claims recite creating contractual
relationships.
App. Br. 9-10.
[T]he examiner alleges that the claims are “tantamount to
creation and enforcement of an End-User License Agreement”,
except that they are not. There is nothing “tantamount” to the
creation and enforcement of a license in the claims. The claims
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require no license at all to be in effect. They may be practiced
entirely in the absence of an express or implied license.
App. Br. 10.
Essentially, Appellant is arguing it is unreasonable to expect
Appellant’s representative to understand the relevance to the claim
limitations of the legal concepts used by the Examiner in his explanation.
We disagree. First, Appellant attacks the Examiner’s choice of the term
“managing” to describe the claimed invention. We see no error as Appellant
chooses the phrase “rights management” (Appellants’ Title) to describe the
disclosed invention.
Second, as to the Examiner’s use of the terms “license” and “contract”
to explain the “rights” being transferred in the claim, claim 1 uses the term
“rights” and the Specification describes the “rights” as “entitlements to a
piece of content” which are entitlements owned by a user (Spec. 2). The
claim also recites a function “to purchase additional transfer credits
necessary to both maintain originally purchased content and to transfer the
content.” As above, we see no error in the Examiner using the terms
“license” and “contract” to describe what the claim is directed to. Our
reviewing court has, when supported by the Specification and claim
language, similarly explained claims related to financial transactions using
terms not explicitly found in the claim being explained. See In re Chorna,
656 Fed. Appx. 1016, 1021 (Fed Cir 2016) (“[T]he claims at issue amount to
nothing significantly more than the terms of a contract”).
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D
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 because:
The May 12 precedential CAFC case of Enfish is in accord
with Appellant. As is the case with the Memorandum, the CAFC
disapproves of the tactic of “describing the claims at such a high
level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the
claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the
rule.” But “overgeneralizing the claims to an extreme” lies at the
heart of this rejection.
App. Br. 10 (citation omitted).
We disagree as we do not find the Examiner’s reasoning to be
overgeneralized. Rather, as Appellant’s above “license” and “contract”
arguments show, if anything the Examiner’s reasoning is overly specific.
Appellant further contends:
Enfish . . . observes] that claims directed to an
improvement to computer functionality are patent-eligible, an
observation sanctioning the patent-eligibility of the present
claims, which improve computer functionality by providing
specifically enumerated useful displays. . . .
Thus, as in Enfish, the present claims are not directed to
fundamental economic practices or mathematical equations or
well-known business practices.
App. Br. 11 (emphasis added).
Managing content licenses is a relatively recent phenomenon
which is not a fundamental economic activity and which is
intimately tied to computers. A claim that addresses a business
challenge that is particular to computers is patent-eligible
because it “is necessarily rooted in computer technology in
order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks”, DDR Holdings, supra.
App. Br. 14—15 (emphasis added).
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We disagree. Contrary to Appellant’s position, we conclude that
managing content rights is a fundamental economic principle (see the
Examiner’s discussion of Gamestop; Final Act. 23), and rights transferring is
a mental concept that is simply not necessarily rooted in computer
technology, as argued by Appellant.
Appellant further contends:
[T]he claims contain detailed computer-centric recitations.
Consider Claim 1, which involves credentials for content
viewing on a device associated with the original user. Claim 1
requires the transfer of credits to facilitate transferring rights in
the content to a friend and responsive to a transfer signal from
the device associated with the original user, transferring rights to
view the content to a device of the friend designated by the
original user. This all necessarily is computer-centric.
App. Br. 13.
Essentially, Appellant is arguing that the device limitations
“associated with the original user” and “of the friend” are sufficient to
render the invention “computer-centric.” We disagree. The Specification at
pages 7—8 indicates that a consumer electronics (CE) device may be, for
example:
a computerized Internet enabled (“smart”) telephone, a tablet
computer, a notebook computer, a wearable computerized device
such as e.g. computerized Internet-enabled watch, a
computerized Internet-enabled bracelet, other computerized
Internet-enabled devices, a computerized Internet-enabled music
player,... a computerized Internet-enabled television (TV).
That is, Appellant’s Specification states that the claimed device may be just
about anything. Further, the Specification at page 11 states that a CE device
can be associated with an original, purchasing user. This language, and our
further review of Appellant’s Specification, leads us to conclude that the
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device limitations “associated with the original user” and “of the friend” do
not change either the structure or function of the device. Rather, these
limitations merely are labels setting forth the ownership of the particular
device. Such labels do not limit the two devices (or their functions) any
more than labelling the devices as a first device and a second device.
Additionally, Appellant again overlooks the Court’s Alice guidance.
134 S. Ct. at 2358. A mere instruction to implement an abstract idea on a
computer cannot impart patent eligibility. Adding a specific limitation as to
the ownership of the computer does not further limit the computer in any
meaningful way.
E
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35U.S.C. § 101 because, as to Mayo step 2:
Examples of court-defined well understood, routine,
conventional claim limitations include the use of a computer to
create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue
simultaneous instructions as purely conventional computer
functions. If a claim recites more functions than these, evidence
should be required that skilled artisans regard such functions as
routine and conventional.
Thus, it is not enough to merely allege that additional steps
alone and in combination are routine and conventional; it must
also be demonstrated, either by pointing to Applicant’s own
admissions or by referencing the limited number of specific
court-defined routine functions, that such functions are routine
and conventional.
The present rejection fails this test.
App. Br. 12 (emphasis added).
We do not reach whether the Examiner’s rejection fails this new
restrictive notice requirement proposed by Appellant. This newly proposed
test is simply not relevant to whether the Examiner has given Appellant a
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reasonable notice as to the basis of the § 101 rejection. The notice
requirement is set forth by 35 U.S.C. § 132.
[T]he PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima
facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in
“notifying] the applicant . . . [by] stating the reasons for [its]
rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” 35
U.S.C. § 132. That section “is violated when a rejection is so
uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing and
seeking to counter the grounds for rejection.” Chester v. Miller,
906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1990).
In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 22 as failing to comply with the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§112, first paragraph.
(2) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 22 as failing to comply with the written description requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
(3) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
being indefinite.
(4) Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(5) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
(6) Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 are not patentable.
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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 22, as failing to comply with the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 22, as failing to comply with the
written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23, as being
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 7, and 21—23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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