Ex Parte Chien

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 7, 2019

13523101 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/523, 101 06/14/2012
23628 7590 01/09/2019
WOLF GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C.
600 ATLANTIC A VENUE
BOSTON, MA 02210-2206
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Yu-Tsun Chien
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
G0766.70098USOO 9857
EXAMINER
ZHONG,XINY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2856
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Patents_eOfficeAction@WolfGreenfield.com
WGS_eOfficeAction@WolfGreenfield.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YU-TSUN CHIEN
Appeal2018-006012
Application 13/523,101
Technology Center 2800
Before JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, JEFFREY R. SNAY, and
MICHAEL G. MCMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.
ROBERTSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6-12, 14--20, and 23. (Appeal Br. 6-18.)
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 This Decision includes citations to the following documents:
Specification filed June 14, 2012 as amended August 27, 2012 ("Spec.");
Final Office Action dated November 2, 2016 ("Final Act."); Appeal Brief
filed April 3, 2017 ("Appeal Br."); Examiner's Answer dated March 21,
2018 ("Ans."); and Reply Brief filed May 21, 2018 ("Reply Br.").
2 Appellant identifies Analog Devices, Inc. as the real party in interest.
(Appeal Br. 2.)
Appeal2018-006012
Application 13/523,101
THE INVENTION
Appellant states that the invention relates to a teeter-totter type Micro
Electro Mechanical System (MEMS) accelerometer with top electrodes on a
circuit wafer bonded to the MEMS device wafer. (Spec. 1, 11. 6-24.)
Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below from the Claims
Appendix to the Appeal Brief:
1. A MEMS accelerometer comprising:
a device wafer having a well, a teeter-totter proof mass
disposed in the well, and a first plurality of electrodes in a first
electrode plane underlying the teeter-totter proof mass; and
a circuit wafer bonded to the device wafer and including:
( 1) a planar layer of metal patterned on a planar surface
of the circuit wafer overlying the teeter-totter proof mass to
define a second plurality of electrodes in-plane with a bond pad
in a second electrode plane, wherein at least one of the second
plurality of electrodes has an uncovered surface facing the
teeter-totter proof mass; and
(2) circuitry coupled to the teeter-totter proof mass, the
first plurality of electrodes, and the second plurality of
electrodes, the circuitry configured to sense rotational
movement of the proof mass via changes in capacitance
between the proof mass and an electrode of the first plurality of
electrodes or the second plurality of electrodes.
(Appeal Br., Appendix A.)
Claim 11, the only other independent claim on appeal, is directed to a
circuit wafer for a MEMS accelerometer. (Appeal Br., Appendix A.)
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REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected the claims as follows:
1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 6-10, and 18 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA) as failing to comply with
the written description requirement;
2. Claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph (pre-AIA) as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement;
3. Claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph (pre-AIA) as being indefinite;
4. Claims 1, 4, and 6-10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Eskridge et al. (US 2005/0109109 Al, published on May 26, 2005,
"Eskridge"), Murari et al. (US 6,405,592 Bl, issued on June 18,
2002, "Murari"), and Offenberg et al. (US 2010/0011860 Al,
published on January 21, 2010, "Offenberg");
5. Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari,
Offenberg, and MacGugan (US 2007/0164378 Al, published on
July 19, 2007);
6. Claims 11 and 14--20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over
Eskridge and Murari;
7. Claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari,
and MacGugan;
3 The Examiner withdrew the application of this rejection to claim 15. (Ans.
3.)
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8. Claim 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari,
Offenberg, and McNeil et al. (US 2008/0173091 Al, published on
July 24, 2008, "McNeil"); and
9. Claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph (pre-AIA) as being indefinite.
(Final Act. 6-18; Ans. 3--4.)
Appellant relies on certain portions of the following as evidence of
non-obviousness:
Declaration of Yu-Tsun Chien executed on October 6, 2015 (Deel. 1 );
Declaration of Yu-Tsun Chien executed on October 3, 2016 (Deel. 2).
Appellant does not present arguments with respect to Rejection 3, the
Rejection of claim 4 as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (pre-AIA). Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 4 as being indefinite under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (pre-AIA).
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues claims 1, 8, 11, 15, and 18. (Appeal Br. 6-18.)
Accordingly, we select claims 1, 8, 11, 15, and 18 as representative for
disposition of this appeal. 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Rejection 1- Written Description
Claim 1
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner found that the limitation "a planar
layer of metal" is new matter, because the Specification fails to disclose the
metal/metallization layer is a planar layer. (Final Act. 7, Ans. 5.) In
particular, the Examiner found that Figures 2 and 6 only show electrodes
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(210 and 211) and electrical bond pads ( 604) and do not illustrate "a planar
layer of metal" or "an upper metallization layer" from which the electrodes
and electrical bond pads are formed. (Ans. 5.)
Appellant contends that the recitation in claim 1 of "a planar layer of
metal" is supported by the Specification, pointing to the discussion in the
Specification of the "upper metallization layer" from which the electrodes
210 and 211 as well as electrical bond pads 604 are formed. (Appeal Br. 7,
citing Figs. 2, 6, Spec. 6, 11. 8-9.)
The issue is: Does the Specification provide sufficient support for the
recitation "a planar layer of metal patterned on a planar surface" in claim 1?
To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent applicant must
"convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention." Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563---64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted).
Initially, we observe that claim 1 recites "a planar layer of material
patterned on a planar surface of the circuit wafer." In addition, there does
not appear to be a dispute that the "upper metallization layer" referred to in
the Specification is the "layer of metal" recited in claim 1. (Final Act. 7;
Appeal Br. 7.)
The Specification discloses that the electrodes and bond pad may be
formed from an upper metallization layer on the circuit wafer. (Spec. 4, 11.
7-11, 8, 11. 13-17; Fig. 6, 602.) Figure 6 is reproduced below:
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Application 13/523,101
602
(
I
I
L--------
211
Orcuitry
.J?TG. 6
I
I ________ J
-- ··-502
- ·····402
Figure 6 is a schematic, which according to the Specification, "shows
the finalized circuit wafer including an upper metallization layer [602] from
which is formed the top set of electrodes [210 and 211] and electrical bond
pads [ 604] through which the electrical connections are extended to the
device wafer." (Spec. 5, 11. 9--11.) It is clear from Figure 6 that the top set
of electrodes 210 and 211 and the electrical bond pads 604 are patterned
surfaces formed from the upper metallization layer 602 in a planar
arrangement as recited in claim 1. We also observe that the Specification
states that
"[ fJor convenience, many fabrication details are omitted
from the figures and description. For example, formation of a
particular electrical or mechanical component may involve one
or more steps of depositing or otherwise forming one or more
materials layers, patterning one or more material layers, etching
one or more material layers, and/or other fabrication processes
( e.g., annealing)."
(Spec. 8, 11. 21-25.) Thus, in view of Figure 6 as well as the disclosure in
the Specification, we are persuaded by Appellant's argument that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the inventor was in
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possession of a layer of metal that is "planar" as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, and
6-10 as lacking written description.
Claim 18
The Examiner found that the limitation "at least one sense electrode
and the bond pad are electrically coupled to the circuitry in a differential
configuration" is new matter, because the Examiner was not able to locate
this limitation in the original Specification, claims or drawings. (Final Act.
7.) The Examiner further explains that there is no description of using only
a single sense electrode and the bond pad in a differential configuration,
presumably because the claim recites "at least one sense electrode," and
because the Specification has to have at least two sense electrodes for the
differential configuration. (See Ans. 7.) The Examiner found also that the
bond pads only provide various electrical and/or mechanical connections
between the device wafer and the circuit wafer, and there is no description of
making the bond pad electrically coupled to the circuitry in a differential
configuration. (Ans. 7 .)
Appellant contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have appreciated that the inventor was in possession of the claim language
"wherein the at least one sense electrode and the bond pad are electrically
coupled to the circuitry in a differential configuration." ( Appeal Br. 9-11,
citing Figs. 2, 6, 7, Spec. 6, 11. 18-23, 8, 11. 13-16, 28-29, 9, 11. 4--8.)
We agree with Appellant. In particular, the Specification describes
forming electrical connections for electrically coupling the electrodes, the
device wafer, and circuit wafer involving electrical bond pads, as well as
details of providing a differential configuration. (Spec. 6, 11. 18-23, 7, 11. 4--
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28; Figs. 2, 6, 7 .) Regarding the "at least one" sense electrode recitation in
claim 18, we observe that claim 18, depends from claim 1 7, which recites
"wherein the at least one sense electrode is an electrode of the first plurality
of electrodes." Claim 17, depends from claim 11, where claim 11 recites
a first plurality of electrodes ... and circuitry electrically coupled
to the first plurality of electrodes and electrically coup lab le to the
second plurality of electrodes and to the teeter-totter proof mass,
the circuitry configured to sense rotational movement of the
proof mass caused by Z-axis accelerations via changes in
capacitance between the proof mass and at least one sense
electrode.
Given the arrangement of electrodes and circuitry recited in the claims and
the corresponding description in the Specification of configuring the
electrodes and circuitry in a differential configuration, we are of the view
that when reading the claims in light of the Specification, one of ordinary
skill in the art would have understood the arrangement of the sense electrode
recited in claim 18 would be in relation to the circuit wafer as whole when
the circuit wafer is bonded to the device wafer with the differential
configuration in place. Such a configuration includes electrodes from the
first plurality of electrodes and/or the second plurality of electrodes in the
device wafer.
In view of the claim language and the disclosure in the Specification,
the Examiner has not provided sufficient explanation as why one of ordinary
skill in the art would have been insufficiently informed that the inventor was
in possession of the recitation in claim 18. Therefore, we reverse the
Examiner's rejection of claim 18 as well.
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Rejection 2-Enablement
Claim 18
Regarding claim 18, the Examiner determined that one of ordinary
skill in the art would not have been able to couple the bond pad to circuitry
in a differential configuration without undue experimentation. (Final Act.
7-8; Ans. 6-7.)
Appellant argues that Figures 6 and 7 in combination illustrate how to
make the claimed circuit wafer. ( Appeal Br. 11.)
We agree with Appellant. The Examiner does not provide sufficient
explanation in view of the disclosures of the Specification discussed above
with respect to providing a differential configuration. (Figs. 2, 6, 7, Spec. 6,
11. 18-23, 8, 11. 13-16, 2 8-29, 9, 11. 4--8, see also Spec. 8, 11. 21-25.)
Thus, we reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 18 as lacking
enablement.
Rejection 9-Indefiniteness
The Examiner determined that claim 15 is indefinite because the
recitation "the circuitry is disposed beneath the first plurality of electrodes in
the circuit wafer" conflicts with the language of claim 11, from which claim
15 depends, that recites "the first plurality of electrodes arranged such that
they will overlie the teeter-totter proof mass of a device wafer when the
circuit wafer is bonded to the device wafer having a second plurality of
electrodes underlying the teeter-totter proof mass." (Ans. 4.)
Appellant contends that the Examiner has ignored the situational
requirement of claim 11, and in particular, that when the circuit wafer is by
itself, the circuitry is disposed beneath the first plurality of electrodes, but
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Application 13/523,101
when bonded to the device wafer, the first plurality of electrodes overlie the
teeter-totter proof mass of the device wafer. (Reply Br. 4--5.)
Thus, the issue with respect to this rejection is did the Appellant
demonstrate reversible error in the Examiner's position that claim 15 is
indefinite as contradicting limitations in claim 11?
During examination, "[a] claim is indefinite when it contains words or
phrases whose meaning is unclear." In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307,
1310, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure§ 2173.05).
We agree with Appellant that the arrangement of the circuitry and first
plurality of electrodes in the circuit wafer claimed in claim 15 does not
contradict the arrangement recited in claim 11. That is, both claims 15 and
11 are directed to the circuit wafer. Therefore, the arrangement of the first
plurality of electrodes recited in claim 15 is with respect to the circuit wafer
itself, and reflects the arrangement depicted in Figure 6. In claim 11, the
recitation with respect to the arrangement of the first plurality of electrodes
overlying the teeter-totter proof mass when the circuit wafer is bonded to the
device wafer reflects the arrangement as depicted in Figure 2. Thus, we
agree with Appellant, that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
appreciated the metes and bounds of claims 11 and 15, as understood in light
of the Specification.
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 15 as being
indefinite.
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Rejection 4-0bviousness
Claim 1
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner found, inter alia, that Eskridge
discloses a MEMS accelerometer including a device wafer having a teeter-
totter proof mass, a first plurality of electrodes, and a second plurality of
electrodes as recited in the claim. (Final Act. 9--10, citing Eskridge, Figs. 2,
3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10; ,r,r 4, 12, and 47.) The Examiner found that Eskridge is
silent as to the device wafer having a well with the teeter-totter proof mass
disposed therein, and the wafer is a circuit wafer including circuitry. (Final
Act. 10.) The Examiner found that Murari discloses a circuit wafer
including circuitry, where the circuit wafer is bonded to the device wafer and
a bond pad in a second electrode plane. (Final Act. 10, citing Murari, Fig. 1,
col. 3, 11. 18-26, col. 4, 11. 43-56.) The Examiner determined that it would
have been obvious to have modified the top substrate of Eskridge to include
circuitry to reduce the size of the sensor. (Final Act. 10.) The Examiner
found that Offenberg teaches a device wafer having a well, with a teeter-
totter proof mass disposed in the well. (Final Act. 11, citing Offenberg Fig.
1, ,r 21.) The Examiner determined that it would have been obvious to form
the teeter-totter proof mass in a well of the device wafer because it would be
protected by the device wafer. (Final Act. 11.)
Appellant argues that modifying the prior art as suggested by the
Examiner would have been a complex matter and that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would not have believed the modification could have been
made with a reasonable expectation of success. (Appeal. Br. 12.) In
particular, Appellant argues that modifying the substrate of Eskridge to
include circuitry would not have been a simple matter, because Eskridge
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includes electrodes, which are needed to operate as excitation and receiving
electrodes for controlling and detecting acceleration of the sensing element,
whereas Murari, which discloses only a high level concept of a circuit wafer,
does not contain such electrodes. (Id.) Appellant argues that including
circuitry in a substrate such as disclosed in Eskridge introduces stresses that
can lead to substrate warping. (Id., citing Deel. 2, ,r 19, Offenburg ,r,r 15,
16.) Appellant argues that Eskridge discloses including "reverse mesas" in
the substrate to provide gas damping and there is nothing on the record
informing one of ordinary skill in the art how to incorporate circuitry into
the substrate and at the same time retaining the reverse mesas, accounting
for complexities of substrate stresses and warping. ( Appeal Br. 12-13.)
Appellant argues that the Examiner did not provide a sufficient basis to
support the position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have modified
Eskridge to place the sensing element 7 in a well in order to provide
protection. (Appeal Br. 14.) Appellant contends that Offenberg does not
provide any disclosure that using a well would provide protection for the
proof mass. (Id.) Appellant argues that one of ordinary skill in the art
would not have found it obvious to have omitted the reverse mesas disclosed
in Eskridge, because the presence of reverse mesas is a focus of Eskridge' s
disclosure and one of ordinary skill in the art would not have ignored the
importance of gas damping provided by the reverse mesas. (Appeal Br. 15.)
Thus, Appellant argues that Eskridge teaches away from modifications
thereof that would have omitted the reverse mesas. (Appeal Br. 15-16.)
The issue with respect to this rejection is that considering the prior art
as a whole, did Appellant demonstrate reversible error in the Examiner's
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determination that claim 1 would have been obvious in view of the
combination of Eskridge, Murari, and Offenberg?
DISCUSSION
We are unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments that the Examiner
erred in determining that the MEMS accelerometer claimed in claim 1 would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of Eskridge,
Murari, and Offenberg. That is, we are unpersuaded Appellant's arguments
that the modifications proposed by the Examiner would be to a level of
complexity such that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have believed
that the modifications could have been made with a reasonable expectation
of success as discussed in detail infra.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that Murari only
discloses a high level concept of a circuit wafer and that one of ordinary skill
in the art would not have incorporated the circuitry in Murari into the
substrate of Eskridge because of the possible introduction of stresses leading
to substrate warping. (Appeal Br. 12, citing Deel. 2, ,r 19.) Murari expressly
discloses that the sensitive element may be a MEMS and that the sensor may
be an accelerometer. (Murari, col. 2, 11. 44--57.) One of ordinary skill in the
art would have understood the disclosure of Murari would have been
applicable to Eskridge, which also discloses MEMS and accelerometers.
(Eskridge, ,r,r 7, 8.) Appellant does not provide sufficient explanation as to
what stresses the inclusion of circuitry in the wafer of Eskridge would lead
to and why such levels would have led one of ordinary skill in the art to have
not expected the combination to have been successful. (Deel. 2, ,r 19, see
Ans. 9.) Thus, we are not persuaded that a potential issue of substrate
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warping would have dissuaded one of ordinary skill in the art from applying
the teachings of Murari to Eskridge, where Murari expressly identifies the
MEMS devices (such as those of Eskridge) as applications for its sensor
arrangement.
As to Appellant's arguments that the reverse mesas disclosed in
Eskridge would have led to uncertainty in incorporating the well of
Offenberg and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led away
from omitting the reverse mesas of Eskridge ( Appeal Br. 12-13, 15-16), we
are also not persuaded. That is, Appellant's arguments do not consider the
rejection as a whole, and focus on the teachings of Eskridge. Appellant has
not provided sufficient argument to explain the effect of incorporating the
teeter-totter proof mass into a well on the gas damping effect that was
addressed in Eskridge, which relates to the size of certain gaps between the
teeter-totter proof mass and wafers. (Eskridge ,r,r 12, 15, Fig. 3; Deel. 2,
,r,r 20, 23.) Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that in view of the
combination, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to
have removed the reverse mesas of Eskridge, either for the reason that they
would no longer be required, or for the reason that removing the gas mesas
would not render Eskridge's accelerometer inoperable. (Ans. 11.)
Last, Appellant's argument that the Examiner's rationale for
incorporating the teeter-totter proof mass into a well for protection is entirely
unsupported on the record is also not persuasive. Offenberg expressly
discloses a "housing" for the MSEM device disclosed therein to
"particularly advantageously protect[] against external environmental
influences." ( Offenberg, ,r,r 14, 21, Fig. 1.) Thus, we agree with the
Examiner that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that
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such an arrangement would have afforded more protection from the outside
environment than the existing structure of Eskridge. (Ans. 13.)
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 as obvious
over the combination of Eskridge, Murari, and Offenberg.
Claim 8
The Examiner stated that Appellant has not defined the term
"differential configuration" in the Specification, such that the Examiner
interpreted the term "as any configuration that uses differential capacitance
to sense acceleration." (Ans. 16.) Thus, the Examiner found that Eskridge's
disclosure of sense electrodes electrically coupled to circuitry is in a
differential configuration. (Ans. 16, citing Eskridge ,r,r 4, 47; Final Act. 12.)
Appellant argues that although Eskridge discloses the presence of
different sets of capacitors, Eskridge contains no disclosure that the
capacitors or any electrodes are electrically coupled in a differential
configuration. (Appeal Br. 16, citing Eskridge ,r 4.)
We agree with Appellant. Initially, we observe that Eskridge, in
paragraphs 4 and 4 7, does not expressly disclose a "differential
configuration." Even if we accept the Examiner's definition of differential
configuration discussed above, the Examiner does not sufficiently explain
how the disclosure the "change in pick-off capacitance is indicative of
acceleration" in paragraph 4 of Eskridge "uses differential capacitance to
sense acceleration." (Ans. 16.)
Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claim 8.
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Rejections 5 and 8-0bviousness
Appellant does not present separate arguments with respect to claims
2 and 23, the subject of Rejections 5 and 8, respectively. Accordingly, we
affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 2 and 23 for the same reasons as
discussed above with respect to claim 1.
Rejections 6 and 7-0bviousness
Regarding the rejections of independent claim 11, and dependent
claims 14--17, 19, and 20, the subject of Rejection 6, and claim 12, the
subject of Rejection 7, Appellant relies on similar arguments as discussed
above with respect to claim 1. (Appeal Br. 17-18.) We are not persuaded
by Appellant's arguments for similar reasons as discussed above.
Claim 18, which is similar to claim 8, recites a differential
configuration. Accordingly, we reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 18
for similar reasons as discussed above for claim 8. (See Appeal Br. 18.)
SUMMARY
We summarily affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claim 4 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (pre-AIA) as being
indefinite.
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, and
10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari, and Offenberg.
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claim 2 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari, Offenberg, and MacGugan.
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 11, 14--17, 19, and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge and Murari.
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We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claims 12 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari, and MacGugan.
We affirm the Examiner's decision to reject claim 23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari, Offenberg, and McNeil.
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claim 8 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Eskridge, Murari, and Offenberg.
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claim 18 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Eskridge and Murari.
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 6-10, and
18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA) as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claim 18 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph (pre-AIA) as failing to
comply with the enablement requirement.
We reverse the Examiner's decision to reject claim 15 under 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (pre-AIA) as being
indefinite.
DECISION
The Examiner's decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14--17,
19, 20, and 23 is affirmed.
The Examiner's decision to reject claims 8 and 18 is reversed.
TIME PERIOD
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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