Ex Parte Chiang

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 25, 2010

09812634 (B.P.A.I. May. 25, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte HIANG-SWEE CHIANG
____________

Appeal 2009-001206
Application 09/812,634
Technology Center 2400
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Decided: May 25, 2010
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Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, HOWARD B. BLANKSHIP, and
JEAN R. HOMERE, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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The Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final
Rejection of claims 1-78. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
The invention at issue on appeal relates to a method and apparatus for
utilizing a single identifier for all user requests to establish a computer to
computer session (Spec. 4).

The Illustrative Claim
Claim 1, an illustrative claim, reads as follows:
1. A method for performing user and session management over
a computer network, comprising:

receiving a first request from a user for an application instance,
the request including a single identifier used to identify both a
session and a user for all user requests without further user and
session application variables; and

transmitting an application instance response to the user based
on stored user and session system information.

The References
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence:
Zhao US 6,035,404 Mar. 7, 2000
Gupta US 6,226,752 B1 May 1, 2001
(filed May 11, 1999)
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Wood US 6,668,322 B1 Dec. 23, 2003
(filed Aug. 5, 1999)
The Rejections
The following rejections are before us for review:
Claims 1, 3-10, 12-20, 22-29, 31-38, 40-49, 51-59, 61-69, and 71-
78 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
the combination of Wood and Zhao.
Claims 2, 11, 21, 30, 39, 50, 60 and 79 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Wood,
Zhao and Gupta.
Only those arguments actually made by the Appellant have been
considered in this decision. Arguments which the Appellant could have
made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are
deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(1)(vii) (2008).

II. ISSUE
Has the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Wood and
Zhao teaches or fairly suggests “the request including a single identifier used
to identify both a session and a user for all user requests without further user
and session application variables,” as recited in claim 1?

III. PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Scope of Claim
During prosecution before the USPTO, claims are to be given their
broadest reasonable interpretation, and the scope of a claim cannot be
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narrowed by reading disclosed limitations into the claim. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1053-1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Office must apply the
broadest reasonable meaning to the claim language, taking into account any
definitions presented in the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.,
367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 577
(Fed. Cir. 2002)).
“Giving claims their broadest reasonable construction ‘serves the
public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will
be given broader scope than is justified.’” Id. (quoting In re Yamamoto, 740
F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (internal citation omitted). “Construing
claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant . . . because
the applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise
claim coverage.” Id.

Obviousness
“Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying findings of
fact.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The underlying
factual inquiries are: (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) the
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and (4) secondary considerations of
nonobviousness. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007)
(citation omitted).

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IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
The following findings of fact (FFs) are supported by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Specification
1. Specification describes that
Next, at step 405, if authentication is successful, the runtime
environment returns a redirection response to the original
request URL together with a single cookie (also referred to
herein as the JLVSession cookie, which may contain a static,
unchanging value) that includes a random number generated by
the central server 18 via random number generator 21 for
uniquely identifying the user and the session (step 407), after
which the process 400 continues as described further below.
(Spec. 13) (emphasis added).
Wood
2. Wood discloses that an incoming request of session includes a
single session token (Col. 10, ll. 30-36).
3. Wood also discloses that the session token representation 430
as a cookie or a session credential structure 421 (Col. 9, ll. 7-15) includes a
principal id for identifying a principal such as John Doe, and a session id for
identifying current session (Col. 8, ll. 9-24, Fig. 4).
4. Wood further teaches in certain configuration such that “session
tokens are employed to facilitate session continuity and to allow the security
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architecture to associate prior authentication of login credentials with an
incoming access request.” (Col. 10, ll. 48-61). Thus, one token can be used
for multiple user requests without changing user and session application
variables.

V. ANALYSIS
The Appellant has the opportunity on appeal to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s
position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re
Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). The Examiner sets forth a
detailed explanation of a reasoned conclusion of unpatentability in the
Examiner’s Answer. Therefore, we look to the Appellant’s Brief to show
error in the proffered reasoned conclusion. Id.

Grouping of Claims
The Appellant has elected to argue claims 1, 3-10, 12-20, 22-39, 31-
38, 40-49, 51-59, 61-69, and 71-78 together as a group (App. Br. 17-21).
Therefore, we select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for
this group, and we will address the Appellant’s arguments with respect
thereto. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(1)(vii). See In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections
We start our analysis with claim construction. We broadly, yet
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reasonably, construe the claim limitation “single identifier” in light of the
Specification (FF 1) as a single word, token, cookie, or code because we find
that the form of the single identifier is defined neither in the claims nor in
the Specification.
With respect to claim 1, the Appellant contends that “neither Zhao nor
Wood teach or suggest ‘receiving . . . [a] request including a single identifier
used to identify both a session and a user.” (App. Br. 19). According to the
Appellant, “Zhao teaches that the session ID, which is relied upon to support
the rejection, is not received in a user request. Rather Zhao teaches that the
session ID is generated and maintained internally in the state lookup
table.” (Reply Br. 7).
We agree with the Appellant’s contention that Zhao does not teach the
argued limitation. However, we find Wood teaches that a request for a
session can include a single session token (single identifier) (FF 2). We also
find Wood teaches that the single identifier in the request would have a field
“principal id” for identifying a principal (user) and a field “session id” for
identifying a session (FF 3). We further find Wood teaches that the session
token (single identifier) is used for maintaining the continuity of the session
for all user requests without changing the user or session variables (FF 4).
Therefore, Wood clearly teaches the argued limitations.
The Appellant also contends that “Wood actually teaches away from
combining to form the recited combination” because Wood teaches using
two separate identifiers to identify the session and the user (App. Br. 20,
Reply Br. 8).
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We disagree with the Appellant’s reading of the Wood reference.
First, we find that the argued limitations read on the teachings of Wood that
a single session token (single identifier) contains a principal id and session
id for identifying the session and the user (FF 3). In addition, there is no
limitation in the claim or the Specification for the form of the single
identifier that have multiple fields to identify a user and a session under our
claim construction. Furthermore, the Appellant only provides a subjective
and incorrect view that Wood teaches two identifiers to identify a user and a
session. However, as noted before, “single identifier” does not preclude that
the single identifier contains several fields in which two fields can be used
for identifying a user and a session as taught by Wood (FF 3). Finally, we
do not find and the Appellant has not identified any express or implied
teachings in the disclosures of Wood and Zhao for criticizing, discrediting or
otherwise discouraging the solution claimed and the Appellant has not
presented any evidence that the session creation scheme of Zhao cannot be
used in the environment of Wood, which is also for creating sessions.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
representative claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of independent claims 7-10, 17-20, 26-29, 35-38, 44-47, 55-58,
65-68, 75, and 77, for which the Appellant presents similar arguments.
We further sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 2-6, 11-16, 21-25, 30-34, 39-43, 48-54, 59-64, 69-74, 76, and 78,
which have not been separately argued, and therefore fall with their base
claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(1)(vii). See Nielson, 816 F.2d at 1572.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on our consideration of the totality of the record
before us, we have weighed the evidence of obviousness found in the
combined teachings of the applied references, with Appellant’s
countervailing evidence and arguments for nonobviousness and conclude
that the claimed invention encompassed by appealed claims 1-78 would
have been obvious as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

VII. ORDER
We affirm the obviousness rejections of claim 1-78 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 (a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

erc

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