Ex Parte Cherwinka et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 21, 201814022656 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/022,656 09/10/2013 27488 7590 08/23/2018 MERCHANT & GOULD (MICROSOFT) P.O. BOX 2903 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-0903 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Jennifer Marie Cherwinka UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14917.2364US01/339328.0l 1550 EXAMINER STEVENS, ROBERT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2164 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/23/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPT027 488@merchantgould.com usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JENNIFER MARIE CHER WINKA, NEHA CHANDRASHEKHAR WAIKAR, KERRY YOUNG, JULIANNE M. BRYANT, JEFFREYS. BERG, and JEFFREY JON WEIR Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 1 Technology Center 2100 Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's final decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4--9, 11-20, 22, and 23, which are all the claims pending in the application. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC ("Appellant") is the applicant, as provided for under 37 C.F.R. § 1.46, and is also identified in the Brief as the real party in interest. See Appeal Br. 2. 2 Claims 3, 10, and 21 are cancelled. See Appeal Br. 30, 32, 35. Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Invention Appellant's invention relates to parsing one or more facts from an electronic document, searching for a graphic ( e.g., an icon) based on the one or more facts, and generating a data visualization including the one or more facts and the graphic. See Spec. ,r 4. 3 Exemplary Claim Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent. Claims 1, 8, and 15 are exemplary and are reproduced below with limitations at issue emphasized. 1. A method comprising: parsing, by a computing device, one or more facts from an electronic document; searching, by the computing device, for a graphic based on the one or more facts, wherein the graphic is a chart; generating, by the computing device, a data visualization comprising the one or more facts and the graphic, wherein generating the data visualization comprises: generating a temporary data set by a spreadsheet application, utilizing the temporary data set to populate the chart,and editing the graphic by inserting additional text into the graphic, wherein the additional text is from the one or more facts; and 3 Throughout this Decision, we refer to: (1) Appellant's Specification, filed September 10, 2013 ("Spec."); (2) the Final Office Action ("Final Act."), mailed January 6, 2017; (3) the Appeal Brief filed June 21, 2017 ("Appeal Br."); and (4) the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed September 22, 2017. 2 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 displaying the data visualization in the electronic document. 8. A computing device comprising: a memory for storing executable program code; and a processor, functionally coupled to the memory, the processor being responsive to computer-executable instructions contained in the program code and operative to: parse one or more facts from an electronic document to determine an associated abstract concept; search for an icon that corresponds to the abstract concept of the one or more facts; generate a data visualization comprising the one or more facts and the icon, wherein generating the data visualization comprises: editing the icon by inserting additional text into the icon, wherein the additional text is a fact parsed from the electronic document; and display the data visualization in the electronic document. 15. A computer-readable storage medium storing computer executable instructions which, when executed by a computing device, will cause the computing device to perform a method comprising: parsing a first human readable fact from a sentence in an electronic document; parsing a second human readable fact from the sentence in the electronic document; parsing a third human readable fact from the sentence in the electronic document; 3 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 searching an icon service for a first graphic based on the first human readable fact; searching the icon service for a second graphic based on the second human readable fact; generating an infographic comprising the first graphic, the second graphic, and the third human readable fact, wherein generating the info graphic comprises: combining the first graphic with the second graphic to form a combined graphic, and editing the combined graphic by inserting additional text into the graphic based on the third human readable fact; and displaying the infographic in the electronic document. Appeal Br. 30-34. REFERENCES The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the claims on appeal: Ghislain Bossut et al. ("Bossut") Silverstein et al. ("Silverstein") Jones et al. ("Jones") US 6,195,101 Bl US 2014/0143252 Al US 2015/0178257 Al Feb.27,2001 May 22, 2014 June 25, 2015 Dhiraj Joshi et al., The Story Picturing Engine-A System for Automatic Text Illustration, ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications and Applications Vol. 2, No. 11, Pages 68-89 (2006) ("Joshi"). 4 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4--9, 11-14, 22, and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Joshi, Silverstein, and Jones. Final Act. 4--11. Claims 15-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Joshi, Silverstein, Jones, and Bossut. Final Act. 11-16. Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and the issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See Manual of Patenting Examining Procedure§ 1205.02 (9th ed., Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018)); 37 C.F.R. §§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) and 4I.39(a)(l). ANALYSIS Rejection of Claim 1 Under § 103 Issue 1: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "parsing, by a computing device, one or more facts from an electronic document," as recited in claim 1? The Examiner finds Joshi teaches the first limitation at issue in claim 1. Final Act. 5 (citing Joshi Fig. 2). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Joshi. Namely, Appellant argues Joshi does not teach parsing facts because Joshi parses keywords and "words and/ or proper nouns are not facts." Appeal Br. 15. Rather, a "specific combination of more than just words and/or proper nouns" is required to create a fact. Id. The Examiner, in tum, finds Joshi's exemplary "Keywords" such as "17th century," "towns," "villages," "churches," (Joshi, Fig. 2) "can reasonably be construed as a 'fact', under any interpretation of that claim term" and 5 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 nowhere in the as-filed Specification is there support for Appellants' remark that 'words and/or proper nouns are not facts'." Ans. 3--4. We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive. Appellant, in essence, argues the Examiner's interpretation of the term "fact" is unreasonably broad and urges that we instead use Appellant's proffered interpretation. Appellant, however, fails to establish the Examiner's interpretation is unreasonably broad when read in light of Appellant's Specification. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the words of the claim must be given their ordinary and customary meaning unless the meaning is inconsistent with the specification. Id. at 1365. The presumption that a term is given its ordinary and customary meaning may be rebutted by Appellant clearly setting forth a different definition of the term in the specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, Appellant does not argue that "fact" is explicitly defined by the Specification, but instead submits their own definition to support Appellant's proffered meaning. Appeal Br. 15. We are unpersuaded because Appellant has provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Examiner's interpretation is inconsistent with the Specification. To the contrary, the Specification discloses extracting facts such as "2 TO 2.5 FEET LONG" and "8 TO 17 POUNDS." Spec., Fig. 2. These facts are inconsistent with Appellant's assertion that a fact requires a "specific combination of more than just words and/ or proper nouns." Appeal Br. 15. Also, the dictionary definition of the term does not support Appellant's argument. Merriam-Webster defines a fact as "something that has actual existence," which includes a word or proper noun such as "villages." 6 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 415 (10th ed. 2002) ("fact"). Moreover, even assuming Appellant's narrower definition is reasonable, "[ a ]bsent an express definition in their specification, the fact that [Appellant] can point to definitions or usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO' s definition unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its interpretation." Morris, 127 F.3d at 1056. Accordingly, because no express definition is provided from the Specification, and because Appellant fails to establish the Examiner's interpretation of "fact" is inconsistent with the Specification (Am. A cad. Sci., 367 F.3d at 1363---64), or otherwise unreasonable, we find unpersuasive Appellant's argument that the Examiner's definition is unreasonably broad. In view of the Examiner's interpretation of the term "fact," we agree with the Examiner's finding that Joshi's parsing of keywords from an electronic document teaches parsing "one or more facts," as recited in claim 1. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 3--4. Issue 2: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "generating a temporary data set by a spreadsheet application," as recited in claim 1? The Examiner finds Silverstein teaches the second limitation at issue. Final Act. 5 (citing Silverstein ,r,r 90, 135, Fig. 13). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Silverstein. Namely, Appellant argues "Silverstein does not teach or disclose generating a temporary data set by a spreadsheet application to create the infographic. In contrast, Silverstein discloses 'an info graphic representation of a given set of data is selected."' Appeal Br. 1 7. 7 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 The Examiner, in tum, finds Silverstein "teaches generation of a data template, such as a spreadsheet, that may be used [as] a data source." Ans. 5. ( citing Silverstein ,r 135). Additionally, the Examiner finds Silverstein "discusses that such spreadsheets may be used as templates, which suggests a 'temporary' aspect, as templates are subject to change for each use" and "whether one chose to store data permanently or temporarily was merely an obvious variant well within the grasp of one skilled in the art at the time of Appellants' subject matter." Id. Appellant, however, fails to persuasively address the Examiner's additional findings. For the reasons discussed, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner's factual findings or conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent claim 1. Dependent claims 2, 4--7, and 23 are not argued separately and so the rejection of these claims is sustained for the same reasons given for independent claim 1. See Appeal Br. 19. Rejection of Claim 8 Under § 103 Issue 1: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "editing the icon by inserting additional text into the icon," as recited in claim 8? The Examiner finds Jones teaches the first limitation at issue in claim 8. Final Act. 9--10 (citing Jones ,r,r 50, 51, 58, 62, and Figs. 2, 3, 5, 6). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Jones, arguing Jones does not teach editing the icon by inserting text because Jones' street level imagery is not an icon. Appeal Br. 22. 8 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 The Examiner responds "there is no requirement that street level imagery be 'equivalent' to an icon" because "the Office is indicating that street level imagery and icons are obvious variants" because "both are images or graphical elements." Ans. 10. Appellant, in tum, fails to persuasively address the Examiner's additional findings. Issue 2: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "wherein the additional text is a fact parsed from the electronic document," as recited in claim 8? The Examiner finds Jones teaches the second limitation at issue in claim 8. Final Act. 9--10 (citing Jones ,r,r 50, 51, 58, 62, and Figs. 2, 3, 5, 6). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Jones, arguing "Jones does not teach or disclose that the annotations are based on facts parsed from an electronic document" and so Jones' annotations do not teach additional text, as claimed. Appeal Br. 22. Such a conclusory statement, however, amounting to little more than a paraphrasing of the claim language and a general denial, is unpersuasive to rebut the prima facie case produced by the Examiner. Cf 37 C.F.R. § 41.3 7 ( c )( 1 )(iv) (2007) ("A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim."); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.3 7 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art."). 9 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 Issue 3: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "parse one or more facts from an electronic document to determine an associated abstract concept; [and] search for an icon that corresponds to the abstract concept of the one or more facts," as recited in claim 8? The Examiner finds the combination of Joshi and Jones teaches the third limitations at issue in claim 8. Final Act. 8-10 (citing Joshi, Fig. 2 and Jones ,r,r 50, 51, 58, 62, and Figs. 2, 3, 5, 6). Specifically, the Examiner finds Joshi "teaches parsing text/facts from electronic documents" (Final Act. 8), Jones teaches searching/editing an icon that corresponds to the facts (Final Act. 10), and "where the source of this labelling text/fact originates was merely an obvious variant" (Ans. 10). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Jones, arguing "Jones does not teach or disclose that the street level imagery is displayed in the same electronic document from which the facts were parsed." Appeal Br. 22. We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive because Appellant argues Jones alone when the Examiner relies on the combination of Joshi and Jones to teach the limitation at issue. See Final Act. 8-10. In addition, Appellant's argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim 8 because the claim does not require searching for an icon in any electronic document let alone the electronic document from which the one or more facts are parsed. For the reasons discussed, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner's factual findings or conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent claim 8. Dependent claims 9, 11-14, and 22 are not argued separately and thus the 10 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 rejection of these claims is sustained for the same reasons given for independent claim 8. See Appeal Br. 23. Rejection of Claim 15 Under § 103 Issue 1: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "parsing a first human readable fact from a sentence in an electronic document," as recited in claim 15? The Examiner finds Joshi teaches the first limitation at issue in claim 1. Final Act. 5 (citing Joshi Fig. 2). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Joshi arguing Joshi does not teach parsing human readable facts because Joshi parses keywords and "words and/or proper nouns are not facts" Appeal Br. 25. We find this argument unpersuasive for the same reasons as discussed above with respect to claim 1. Issue 2: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "generating an infographic comprising the first graphic, the second graphic, and the third human readable fact," as recited in claim 15? The Examiner finds Bossut teaches the second limitation at issue in claim 15. Final Act. 14 (citing Bossut Fig. 3). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Bossut, arguing Bossut requires a user to input an image and so does not teach a computing device that automatically combines first and second graphics as claimed. Appeal Br. 28. In response, the Examiner finds Bossut "shows the combining of multiple graphic and text elements" and "teach[ es] that it was well known in the art at the time of Appellants' subject matter that multiple graphic and 11 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 text elements can exist together (i.e., be combined)." Ans. 12-13 (citing Bossut 9:40-49, Figs. 1, 3). Appellant, however, fails to persuasively address the Examiner's additional findings. Issue 3: Does the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art teaches or suggests "combining the first graphic with the second graphic to form a combined graphic," as recited in claim 15? The Examiner finds Bossut teaches the third limitation at issue in claim 15. Final Act. 14 (citing Bossut Fig. 3). Appellant disputes the Examiner's factual findings with respect to Bossut, arguing Bossut requires a user to input an image and so does not teach a computing device that automatically combines first and second graphics as claimed. Appeal Br. 28. In response, the Examiner finds "Bossut does explicitly state in the 'Field Of The Invention' section ... that the Bossut invention relates to 'electronic' editing (i.e., that the activity is 'automatic' at some level)" and "[s]uch language is strongly suggestive of the use of a computing device." Ans. 13 (citing Bossut 1:3-7). Here also, Appellant fails to persuasively address the Examiner's additional findings. For the reasons discussed, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner's factual findings or conclusion of obviousness. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of independent claim 15. Dependent claims 16-20 are not argued separately and thus the rejection of these claims is sustained for the same reasons given for independent claim 15. See Appeal Br. 29. 12 Appeal 2018-001871 Application 14/022,656 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 2, 4--9, 11-20, 22, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 13 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation