Ex Parte Chernetski et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 23, 201712113425 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/113,425 05/01/2008 Fredrick E. Chernetski US20070066 1000 173 7590 02/27/2017 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION - MD 3601 2000 NORTH M63 BENTON HARBOR, MI 49022 EXAMINER LU, JIPING ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3743 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/27/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): whirlpool_patents_co@whirlpool.com mike_lafrenz @ whirlpool .com deborah_tomaszewski@whirlpool.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FREDRICK E. CHERNETSKI, MICHAEL T. DALTON, and KARL D. MCALLISTER Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 Technology Center 3700 Before ANNETTE R. REIMERS, LISA M. GUIJT, and PAUL J. KORNICZKY, Administrative Patent Judges. KORNICZKY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants, Fredrick E. Chemetski et al.,1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 28, 29, and 31.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants identify Whirlpool Corporation as the real party in interest. Br. 1. 2 Claims 2, 6, 19-27, 30, 32, and 33 are cancelled. Br. 2. Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to “an intelligent dispensing system for a clothes dryer and more particularly to the efficient dispensing of water and other chemistries onto fabric articles during the drying cycle.” Spec. 11. Claims 1,11, and 28 are the independent claims. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An apparatus for drying fabric articles comprising: opposing front and rear bulkheads; a drum rotatably mounted between the front and rear bulkheads for moving fabric articles, the drum having a peripheral wall with an inner surface at least partially defining a chamber for containing the fabric articles; at least one dispenser for dispensing a chemistry into the chamber and configured to direct the chemistry upwards onto an upper inner surface of the drum; a reservoir coupled with the dispenser; a delivery apparatus coupled with the reservoir and the dispenser for delivering the chemistry from the reservoir to the dispenser; and a controller operably coupled with the delivery apparatus and configured to vary a duty cycle of the delivery apparatus, which varies “on” times and “off’ times of the dispenser to create a pulsing condition of the dispenser, wherein the pulsing condition creates a variety of droplet sizes of the chemistry. 2 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 REFERENCES In rejecting the claims on appeal, the Examiner relied upon the following prior art: Schwadike US 4,236,320 Dec. 2, 1980 Spendel US 4,555,019 Nov. 26, 1985 Felzer US 5,307,651 May 3, 1994 Barron US 7,146,749 B2 Dec. 12, 2006 Marshall US Reg. No. H176 Sept. 2,1997 Tisone US 2002/0001675 A1 Jan. 3, 2002 Scheper US 2005/0183208 A1 Aug. 25, 2005 Schramm US 2006/0175426 A1 Aug. 10, 2006 Carow US 2006/0288608 A1 Dec. 28, 2006 Bruce US 2007/0151312 A1 July 5, 2007 Kim WO 2007/055510 A1 May 18,2007 REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: 1. Claims 1, 3—5, 7, 11—13, 15, 28, 29, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone. 2. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Scheper. 3. Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Marshall. 4. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Carow. 5. Claims 16 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Barron. 3 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 6. Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Bruce. 7. Claims 1, 3—5, 7, 11—13, 15, 28, 29, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone. 8. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Scheper. 9. Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Marshall. 10. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Carow. 11. Claims 16 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Barron. 12. Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, Bruce, and Felzer. Appellants seek our review of these rejections. ANALYSIS The Rejections of Claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 28, 29, and 31 as Unpatentable Over Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Other Art Claims L 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 Appellants argue claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 as a group. Br. 5— 17, 19, 20. We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 3—5, 7— 18, 29, and 31 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants’ arguments regarding claim 28 are addressed below. 4 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 The Examiner finds that Kim discloses all of the limitations of independent claim 1 except for: (a) a delivery apparatus coupled with the reservoir and controlled to vary a selected dispensing mode/pattem of the chemistry and a controller operably coupled with the delivery apparatus and configured to vary a duty cycle of the delivery apparatus, (b) which varies “on” times and “off’ times of the dispenser to create a pulsing condition of the dispenser, and (c) wherein the pulsing condition creates a variety of droplet sizes of the chemistry. Final Act. 3. For these missing limitations, the Examiner finds that Schwadike discloses a controller operably coupled with a delivery apparatus so that “intermittent impingement is caused by the pulses of substances being supplied, e.g. on and off times of dispensing” and the “impingement of the chemistry within the drum is varied due to the varying of the dispensing mode of the chemistry, e.g. on and off pulses.” Final Act. 16; see also id. at 3. The Examiner also finds that Schramm discloses that “controller 50 is operabl[y] coupled with the dispensers (i.e. delivery apparatus) and is configured to vary a duty cycle of the delivery apparatus, e.g. frequency of on or off pulses.” Final Act. 17 (citing Schramm | 58); see also id. at 4, 18. The Examiner further finds that Tisone discloses that “varying the duty cycle frequency (i.e. pulsing) of the delivery apparatus varies [the] droplet size.” Final Act. 18 (citing Tisone ^fl[ 45—47 and claim 8); see also id. at 4. Appellants do not contest these findings regarding Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone. Appellants present several arguments asserting that the Examiner’s rejections are wrong. First, Appellants repeatedly argue that “none of Kim ‘510, Schwadike et al., Schramm et al. or Tisone individually disclose [a] a controller operably coupled with a delivery apparatus and configured to vary 5 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 a duty cycle of the delivery apparatus, which [b] varies ‘on’ times and ‘off times of the dispenser to create a pulsing condition of the dispenser, wherein [c] the pulsing condition creates a variety of droplet sizes of the chemistry.” Br. 11 (emphasis added); see also id. at 15 (“several entire elements of claims 1 and 11 ... are not disclosed in any of the cited references forming the combination . . .”), 16 (“none of Kim ‘510 nor Schwadike ‘320, Schramm ‘426, and Tisone ‘675 recognize the problem Appellants’ invention is addressing, nor the claimed solution, . . .”). “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone. Appellants, for example, argue that Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone individually do not disclose “a duty cycle that is varied to create a pulsing condition of the dispenser, wherein the pulsing condition creates a variety of droplet sizes of the chemistry.” Br. 11—12. The Examiner, however, finds that Schramm, not Schwadike or Tisone, discloses that “controller 50 is operably coupled with the dispensers (i.e. delivery apparatus) and is configured to vary a duty cycle of the delivery apparatus, e.g. frequency of on or off pulses.” Final Act. 4; see also id. at 18. The Examiner also finds that Tisone, not Schwadike, discloses “that the varying of the duty cycle frequency of the delivery apparatus varies the droplet size.” Final Act. 4; see also id. at 18. Appellants do not address these findings and the rejection as articulated by the Examiner, and, thus, do not show error by the Examiner. 6 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 Second, Appellants argue that “the Examiner has failed to ascertain the differences between the claimed invention and the cited prior art.” Br. 11.3 Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner discussed the differences between claim 1 and the cited prior art references. As discussed above, for example, the Examiner finds that Kim discloses all of the limitations of claim 1 except for three limitations which are disclosed by Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone. Final Act. 2—3, 16—17. Other than the limitations in claim 1, Appellants do not identify any limitations in the remaining claims 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31, which were not addressed by the Examiner’s findings. Appellants’ argument does not identify any error by the Examiner, and is not persuasive. Third, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s reason to modify Kim in view of the teachings of Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone is improper because the “rejection fails to provide any logical reasoning supported in fact drawn from the references themselves for combining the disclosures of Kim ‘510, Schwadike ‘320, Schramm ‘426, and Tisone ‘675” (Br. 12—13 (emphasis added)), and the “rejection fails to identify a reason, found in the references themselves, as to why one of ordinary skill in the art would want to modify the references” as suggested by the Examiner {Id. at 13 (emphasis modified)).4 Appellants offer no legal authority for its argument. Indeed, 3 Appellants make the same argument with respect to claim 28. See, e.g., Br. 18 (“Because the Examiner has failed to properly ascertain the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue as a whole, the Examiner has failed to meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness and therefore the rejection must fail.”). 4 Appellants make the same argument in response to the Examiner’s reason to modify Spendel in view of the teaching s of Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone in Rejection 7. Br. 23. 7 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 this argument is foreclosed by KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), in which the Supreme Court rejected the rigid requirement of a teaching or suggestion or motivation to combine know elements in order to show obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. The Court noted that an obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. In addition, the key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a clear “articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Here, the Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to modify Kim with the teachings of Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone “in order to facilitate the control and delivery of the fabric-conditioning substance from the reservoir to the dispenser and to uniformly dispense the fabric-conditioning substance onto the laundry.” Final Act. 4. Moreover, contrary to Appellants’ argument that the Examiner’s articulated reasoning is not supported by the prior art, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s reasoning is redundant to Kim, which already discloses the importance of "efficiently injection the steam into the drum with optimum injection an angle and distribution.” Br. 14 (citing to Kim | 61). We also note that, in addition to Kim, the other cited art discloses the importance of controlled delivery of substances into a drying apparatus, including, for example, Schwadike which discloses the importance of “simultaneously conditioning and drying laundry whereby the conditioning preparation are uniformly dispersed” (Schwadike 2:53—56), and Barron which discloses an apparatus for dispensing “‘benefit compositions’ 8 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 through a nozzle that directs the benefit composition as droplets or particles into a chamber (e.g., a moving or stationery drum) of the fabric drying appliance” (Barron 1:17—21). The Examiner’s articulated reasoning has rational underpinning, and Appellants’ argument does not identify Examiner error. Fourth, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s articulated reasoning is based on “impermissible hindsight.” Br. 14. However, as discussed above, the Examiner’s articulated reasoning is supported by explicit teachings in the cited prior art (e.g., Kim | 61, Schwadike 2:53—56, and Barron 1:17—21). Appellants do not identify any knowledge relied upon by the Examiner that was gleaned only from Appellants’ disclosure and that was not otherwise within the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention, thereby obviating Appellants’ assertion of hindsight. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). Thus, Appellants do not apprise us of error. Fifth, Appellants argue that Schwadike “teach[es] away from applicants!”] claimed invention that requires at least one nozzle or dispenser (20) for dispensing a chemistry into the chamber and configured to direct the chemistry upwards onto an upper inner surface (19) of the peripheral wall of the drum (14).” Br. 15. We initially note that the Examiner also finds that Kim discloses directing the chemistry upwards onto an upper inner surface. Final Act. 3 (citing Kim, Fig. 10). Appellants do not address this teaching in Kim, and, thus, do not show error by the Examiner. Appellants also do not establish that the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention because Appellants do not demonstrate that “a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was 9 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of [the disclosed] alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed . . . .”). Appellants’ argument is not persuasive. Sixth, Appellants argue that “[bjecause none of Kim ‘510 nor Schwadike ‘320, Schramm ‘426, and Tisone ‘675 recognize the problem Appellants’ invention is addressing, nor the claimed solution, the claimed invention cannot be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art based on the combination of Kim ‘510, Schwadike ‘320, Schramm ‘426, and Tisone ‘675.” Br. 16. Appellants do not identify any legal authority for their argument. To the extent Appellants are arguing that Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone are non-analogous art that do not qualify as prior art for an obviousness analysis, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive because it does not show that (1) the references are not from the same field of the inventors’ endeavor; or that (2) the references are not be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. See, e.g., K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Appellants also do not address the Examiner’s finding that the references are “directed to the same field of endeavor, e.g. chemistry dispensing” and, thus, do not show error by the Examiner. Ans. 11. 10 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 For the reasons above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Appellants do not identify any patentable distinctions in claims 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31. Claims 3—5, 7—10, 12—18, 29, and 31 fall with claim l.5 Claim 28 In response to the rejection of claim 28, Appellants present several arguments asserting that the rejection is wrong. First, Appellants “incorporate by reference” the same arguments presented above for claim 1. For the reasons presented above, Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. Second, Appellants argue that the Examiner’s findings regarding Schwardike are wrong for three reasons. Br. 17—18. First, Appellants argue that, contrary to the Examiner’s finding that “the fabric conditioning substance intermittently impinges upon an inner surface of the drum to distribute the fabric-conditioning substantially axially within the drum” (Final Act. 3^4 (citing to Schwadike 3:15 40, Fig. 2)), the cited portion of Schwadike ‘320 talks about spraying during the standing phases to provide a weak or strong conditioning effect and there is no discussion of “impinging on the inner surface of 5 Appellants make the catch-all argument that the rejections of claim 1, 3—5, 7—10, 12—18, 29, and 31 (and claim 28 discussed below) “fail[] to properly communicate the basis for the rejection of [the] claims” because the rejections are “set forth in a single paragraph with no indication of what portion of the paragraph relates to what portions of the independent and dependent claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 28, 29, and 31, respectively.” Br. 19-20. As discussed above, the Examiner reasonably explains the bases for the rejections’ findings and reasoning, and the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. Because Appellants do not allege any patentable distinctions for claims 3—5, 7—10, 12—18, 28, 29, and 31, which are missing from the Examiner’s findings and reasoning, the Examiner’s rejections of these claims also are sustained. 11 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 the drum.”[] In fact, Schwadike ‘320 actually says that the nozzle is located at the highest point in the drum and directed toward the center so that the conditioner sprays down and hits the laundry below. Br. 18. Whether Schwadike’s conditioner will impinge on the walls, the laundry, or both, is dependent on the amount of laundry in the drum and the size of the nozzle’s spray. Moreover, Appellants’ argument is unclear as to what limitation in claim 28 is affected by the Examiner’s finding. If Appellants are arguing that the cited prior art does not disclose a dispenser to “direct the chemistry upwards onto an upper inner surface of the drum” as recited in claim 28, than Appellants’ argument is not persuasive. Appellants do not address and, thus, do not show error in the Examiner’s finding that Kim discloses dispenser 230, 250 to “direct the fabric-conditioning substance/chemistry upwards onto an upper inner surface of the drum” as recited in claim 28. Final Act. 3 (citing Kim Fig. 10). For their second reason that the Examiner’s findings regarding Schwadike is wrong, Appellants argue that Schwadike does not disclose “that the duty cycle is dependent on the fabric conditioning substance,” and “merely discloses spraying conditioning liquid for a period of time where the amount sprayed and the number of times sprayed may be adjusted depending on the desired conditioning effect.” Br. 18. Claim 28 does not recite that the duty cycle is dependent on the fabric conditioning substance (i.e., chemistry). Thus, Appellants argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claims, and is not persuasive. For their third reason that the Examiner’s finding regarding Schwadike is wrong, Appellants argue that Schwadike does not disclose a “duty cycle” because “the term duty cycle is found nowhere in” Schwadike 12 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 is not persuasive. Br. 18. Schwadike’s use of different terminology for the duty cycle does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s finding that Schwadike discloses a duty cycle. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining there is no ipsisimis verbis test for determining whether a reference discloses a claim element, i.e., identity of terminology is not required). Finally, Appellants argue that the rejection of claim 28 is wrong because the combination of the cited prior art (Kim, Schwadike, Schramm, and Tisone) does not disclose “a pulsing condition where the pulsing condition distributes the chemistry axially within the drum from a back side of the drum to a front side of the drum.” Br. 19. Contrary to Appellants’ argument, Figure 10 of Kim cited by the Examiner discloses dispenser 230, 250 that distributes the chemistry (i.e., steam) axially within drum 20 from rear side 40 of drum 20 to front side 16 of drum 20, as recited in claim 28. See Final Act. 3; see also Kim 174 (“the injection angle and distribution of the steam injected into the drum 20 can be adjusted more precisely, and the objects to be dried can be dampened more effectively. ... the steam injected into the drum 20 is mixed with hot air passing through opening 42”). For this reason, and for the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive. For the reasons above, the rejection of claim 28 is sustained. 13 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 The Rejections of Claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 28, 29, and 31 as Unpatentable Over Spendel, Schwadike, Schramm, Tisone, and Other Art Claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 Appellants argue claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 as a group. Br. 20— 25, 27. We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and claims 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants’ arguments regarding claim 28 are addressed below. In response to the rejection of claim 1 based on Spendel (rather than Kim), Appellants present several arguments asserting that the rejection is wrong. First, Appellants “incorporate by reference” the same arguments presented above in the rejection of claim 1 based upon Kim. Br. 23. Second, Appellants argue that the teachings of Spendel “do[] not remedy the short comings of Schwadike ’320, Schramm ’426, and Tisone ’675, which were discussed above”. Br. 24. For the reasons presented above with respect to the rejection of claim 1 based on Kim, Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. For the reasons above, the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. Appellants do not identify any patentable distinctions in claims 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31. Claims 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 fall with claim 1,6 * * * * * * * 14 6 Appellants make the catch-all argument that the rejections of claim 1, 3—5, 7—10, 12—18, 29, and 31 (and claim 28 discussed below) “fail[] to properly communicate the basis for the rejection of [the] claims.” Br. 27. As discussed above, the Examiner reasonably explains the bases for the rejections’ findings and reasoning, and the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. Because Appellants do not allege any patentable distinctions for claims 3—5, 7—10, 12—18, 28, 29, and 31, which are missing from the Examiner’s findings, the Examiner’s rejections of these claims are sustained. 14 Appeal 2015-002482 Application 12/113,425 Claim 28 Appellants argue that Spendel and the other cited art do not disclose a “pulsing condition distributes the chemistry axially within the drum from a back side of the drum to a front side of the drum,” as recited in claim 28. Br. 26. The Examiner’s only finding that appears relevant to this limitation is the Examiner’s reference to Figure 2 of Spendel. Final Act. 9. Because Figure 2 discloses a dispenser distributing chemistry from the front of the drum to the rear of the drum (see, e.g., Spendel 11:14—23), not from the back of the drum to the front of the drum,7 as recited in claim 28, this rejection of claim 28 is not sustained. DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3—5, 7— 18, 28, 29, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kim and other cited art are AFFIRMED. The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3—5, 7—18, 29, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Spendel and other cited art are AFFIRMED. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Spendel and other cited art is REVERSED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 7 We note that Spendel discloses that “multiple nozzles may be positioned so they will effectively increase the area of the drum that would be sprayed by the nozzles and, therefore, ensure a more complete application of the wash liquor onto the textiles.” Spendel 18:35—39. 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation