Ex Parte Cheng et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesSep 30, 201110969489 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 30, 2011) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/969,489 10/20/2004 Chia Yong Cheng 2003B123A 3036 23455 7590 09/30/2011 EXXONMOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY 5200 BAYWAY DRIVE P.O. BOX 2149 BAYTOWN, TX 77522-2149 EXAMINER TORRES VELAZQUEZ, NORCA LIZ ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1786 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/30/2011 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _______________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES _______________ Ex parte CHIA YONG CHENG, SRIVATSAN SRINIVAS, and SUDHIN DATTA ______________ Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 Technology Center 1700 _______________ Before CHUNG K. PAK, CHARLES F. WARREN, and PETER F. KRATZ, Administrative Patent Judges. WARREN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Applicants appeal to the Board from the decisions of the Primary Examiner finally rejecting claims 1-12, 15-19, 36-38, and 41 in the Office Action mailed July 8, 2008, and refusing to allow these claims as amended in the Amendment filed September 5, 2008, which was entered in the advisory action mailed October 17, 2008. 35 U.S.C. §§ 6 and 134(a) (2002); 37 C.F.R. § 41.31(a) (2008). We affirm the decision of the Primary Examiner. Claim 1 illustrates Appellants’ invention of a non-woven fabric made Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 2 from a blend comprising propylene homopolymers and copolymers, and at least one free radical initiator, and is representative of the claims on appeal: 1. A nonwoven fabric made from a blend comprising: a first component comprising from 5% to 99% by weight based on the total weight of the composition of a propylene polymer comprising 72 wt% to 92 wt% propylene derived units and 8 wt% to 28 wt% at least one comonomer selected from the group consisting of ethylene, C4-C12 α-olefins and combinations thereof, the propylene polymer having a heat of fusion as determined by DSC of less than 50 J/g and stereoregular propylene crystallinity; a second component comprising from 95% to 1% by weight based on the total weight of the composition of a propylene polymer or blends of propylene polymers; and at least one free radical initiator in an amount of about 0.03 wt% to about 3.00 wt%, based on the weight of the first polymer component; wherein the blend has a MFR of greater than 50 dg/min at 230ºC, and wherein the nonwoven fabric has a permanent set of from less than 60%, and wherein the blend has a melting point between 80ºC and 100ºC. Appellants request review of the ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) advanced on appeal by the Examiner: claims 1-12, 15-19, 36-38, and 41 over Cheng (US 6,342,565 B1) in view of Pekrul (US 6,583,076 B1). App. Br. 9; Ans. 3. Appellants argue the ground of rejection based on the claims as a group. Thus, we decide this appeal based on claims 1 and 17. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2008). Opinion We are of the opinion Appellants’ arguments do not establish that the evidence in the totality of the record weighs in favor of the nonobviousness of the claimed nonwoven fabric encompassed by independent claim 1. In this respect, we are in agreement with the Examiner’s analysis of the Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 3 evidence in the references and the findings of fact and conclusions of law stated in the Answer, to which we add the following for emphasis with respect to Appellants’ arguments. Ans. 3-8; App. Br. 10-13; Reply Br. 2-4. Appellants submit that the Examiner erred in determining that a blend of Cheng’s first and second polymer components, corresponding to the first and second polymer components in claim 1, and Pekrul’s free radical initiator, as specified in claim 1, “inherently” would have a first polymer component with a heat of fusion falling within the range in claim 1, and a melting point falling within the range in claim 1, and a nonwoven fabric prepared with the blend “inherently” would have a permanent set within the range in claim 1. App. Br. 10-12; Reply Br. 2-4. Appellants do not dispute that Cheng would have disclosed a blend which has first and second polymer components falling within the claimed first and second polymer components of claim 1, as the Examiner contends. Appellants also do not dispute the Examiner’s finding that Cheng would have disclosed that a first polymer component can be a propylene polymer having a heat of fusion less than 45 J/g. Ans. 3. We find that in the context of the ground of rejection, Cheng’s first component propylene polymers would have the disclosed heat of fusion before Cheng’s first component propylene polymer undergoes chain scission because of Pekrul’s free radical initiator in a blend of Cheng’s first and second polymer components and Pekrul’s free radical initiators. Ans. 4-6 and 7. See Spec. ¶ 00142 (“Chain scission”); Pekrul, e.g., col. 1, ll. 18-20 (“It has long been known to partially degrade or ‘visbreak’ propylene homopolymers and copolymers to narrow the molecular weight distributions.”). However, we fail to find in independent claims 1 and 17 a limitation which specifies that the claimed Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 4 “heat of fusion” of the first component propylene polymer is “post chain scission” as there is with the first polymer component “MFR” limitation in claim 17. Thus, Cheng’s disclosed heat of fusion for first component propylene polymers meets the heat of fusion limitation in claims 1 and 17. Similarly, we determine that the limitation in claims 1 and 17 specifying that the “blend” has the specified melting point1 applies to the claimed blend both before chain scission and after chain scission of the propylene polymers with the free radical initiator. Thus, Chung’s blends which have the same first and second polymer components as claimed, would be reasonably expected to have the same or similar melting point range as claimed. As the Examiner points out, the melting point of the blend containing a free radical initiator post chain scission is not disclosed by the combination of Cheng and Pekrul. Ans. 6. We determine that the requirement that the nonwoven fabric prepared from the claimed blend has a specified permanent set within the range claimed in claims 1 and 17 is based on the fabric prepared with the post chain scission blend. As the Examiner points out, the combination of Cheng and Pekrul does not disclose the claimed permanent range. We agree with the Examiner’s findings that Cheng would have disclosed that the blends therein produce fibers which have excellent elastic recovery. Ans. 3, citing Cheng col. 19, ll. 9-13. In this respect, we further find that Cheng discloses that the blends produce fibers with increased 1 Appellants amended claims 1 and 17 to have the same “melting point” limitation in the entered Amendment filed September 5, 2008. See above p. 1. However, this limitation does not appear in claim 17 in the Claim Appendix. App. Br. 16. Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 5 tensile strength and improved resistance to elastic deformation. Cheng, e.g., abstract, col. 1, ll. 12-14, col. 3, ll. 12-19, and col. 5, ll. 1-8. We also agree with the Examiner’s findings that Pekrul would have disclosed fibers and nonwoven fabrics made therewith, wherein the fibers are prepared with chain scission of propylene polymers which thus exhibit reduced average molecular weight. Ans. 5. We find that Pekrul would have disclosed that such fibers are fine fibers with reduced filament tension and acceptable strength for a variety of nonwoven fabric applications. Pekrul, e.g., abstract, col. 1, ll. 9-11, col. 1, l. 63, to col. 2, l. 20, col. 5, ll. 40-41, and col. 8, ll. 28-42. On this record, we cannot subscribe to Appellants’ position that the Examiner erred in finding that the claimed blend and nonwoven fabric made therewith was prima facie obvious over the combined teachings of Cheng and Pekrul. We are of the opinion that the Examiner has established that one of ordinary skill in the art routinely following the combined teachings of Cheng and Pekrul would have been led to use Pekrul’s free radical initiators in Cheng’s blends of first and second propylene polymer components with the reasonable expectation of obtaining blends with visbroken propylene polymers which produce fibers and thus nonwoven fabrics that have the properties taught in the references. We further agree with the Examiner’s determination that in view of the similarity of propylene polymer components and the free radical initiator between the claimed blends and nonwoven fabrics made therewith and the blends and nonwoven fabrics made therewith as taught by the combination of Cheng and Pekrul, it reasonably appears that the claimed blends and fabrics made therewith and those of the combination of references are identical or substantially identical, Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 6 even though the melting point range of the claimed blend and the permanent set range of the claimed nonwoven fabric are not specifically disclosed by the combination of Cheng and Pekrul. Thus, the burden shifted to Appellants to patentably distinguish the claimed nonwoven fabric from the nonwoven fabric of the combination of Cheng and Pekrul by objective evidence and/or argument even though the ground of rejection is based on § 103(a). “[W]hen the PTO shows sound basis for believing that the products of the applicant and the prior art are the same, the applicant has the burden of showing that they are not.” In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The Board held that the compositions claimed by Spada ‘appear to be identical’ to those described by Smith. While Spada criticizes the usage of the word ‘appear’, we think that it was reasonable for the PTO to infer that the polymerization by both Smith and Spada of identical monomers, employing the same or similar polymerization techniques, would produce polymers having the identical composition.”); see also, e.g., In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254-56 (CCPA 1977)2; In re Skoner, 517 F.2d 947, 950 (CCPA 1975) (“Appellants have chosen to describe their invention in terms of certain physical characteristics . . . . Merely choosing to describe 2 Where, as here, the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product. Whether the rejection is based on “inherency” under 35 U.S.C. § 102, on “prima facie obviousness” under 35 U.S.C. § 103, jointly or alternatively, the burden of proof is the same, and its fairness is evidenced by the PTO’s inability to manufacture products or to obtain and compare prior art products. Best, 562 F.2d at 1255 (footnote and citations omitted). Appeal 2010-004864 Application 10/969,489 7 their invention in this manner does not render patentable their method which is clearly obvious in view of [the reference].” (citation omitted)). We are of the view that Appellants have not carried this burden. Indeed, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ contentions that neither Cheng nor Pekrul disclosed a blend as claimed, and that neither reference discloses a melting point for a blend, and that one of ordinary skill in the art routinely following the combined teachings of Cheng and Pekrul would not have reasonably arrived at blends and nonwoven fabrics made therewith falling within claims 1 and 17. App. Br. 10-12; Reply Br. 2-3. Accordingly, based on our consideration of the totality of the record before us, we have weighed the evidence of obviousness found in the combined teachings of Cheng and Pekrul with Appellants’ countervailing evidence of and argument for nonobviousness and conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence and weight of argument, that the claimed invention encompassed by appealed claims 1-12, 15-19, 36-38, and 41 would have been obvious as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The Primary Examiner’s decision is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED ssl Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation