Ex Parte Chen et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 12, 201511967606 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/967,606 12/31/2007 David De-Hui Chen YOR920070195US1 7311 59144 7590 02/13/2015 CAHN & SAMUELS, LLP 1100 17th STREET, NW SUITE 401 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 EXAMINER HENDERSON, ESTHER BENOIT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2453 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/13/2015 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte DAVID DE-HUI CHEN, ELIO J. ROMERO, RICHARD E. SALZ, and LANCE A. WALKER ____________________ Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., and DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20–22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 13 and 19 have been canceled. We AFFIRM.2 1 The Appeal Brief identifies International Business Machines Corp. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 4. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed March 9, 2012 (“App. Br.”); Appellants’ Reply Brief filed August 1, 2012 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed June 6, 2012 (“Ans.”); and Final Office Action mailed November 1, 2011 (“Final Act.”). Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Claims on Appeal Claims 1, 14, 20, and 22 are independent claims. Claim 1 is reproduced below: 1. A system for transmitting secure message traffic encapsulating a MQ network comprising: a plurality of MQ clients coupled to a MQ queue via at least one MQ queue manager; and at least one MQ proxy server coupled to said plurality of MQ clients; wherein said at least one MQ proxy server retrieves a message from a first MQ client coupled thereto, evaluates content of the message and forwards the message to said MQ queue via a designated MQ queue manager, retrieves the message from said MQ queue thru [sic] said designated MQ queue manager, and evaluates the content of the message and forwards the message to a second MQ client, said at least one MQ proxy server emulates said MQ queue manager when delivering message traffic to said MQ clients. The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal: Feldbaum US 6,446,206 Sept. 3, 2002 Shah et al. US 2003/0105821 A1 June 5, 2003 (hereinafter “Shah”) Lambert US 2004/0049775 A1 Mar. 11, 2004 Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 3 Shedrinsky US 2005/0021772 A1 Jan. 27, 2005 Srinivasan et al. US 2006/0168052 A1 July 27, 2006 (hereinafter “Srinivasan”) Kersey et al. US 7,506,368 B1 Mar. 17, 2009 (hereinafter “Kersey”) Examiner’s Rejections Claims 1–3 and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert and Shedrinsky. Final Act. 3–6. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert, Shedrinsky, and Srinivasan. Final Act. 6–7. Claims 4–7, 14, 15, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert, Shedrinsky, and Feldbaum. Final Act. 8– 11. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert, Shedrinsky, and Kersey. Final Act. 11–12. Claims 10, 11, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert, Shedrinsky, and Shah. Final Act. 12–13. Claims 16, 17, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lambert, Shedrinsky, Feldman, and Shah. Final Act. 13–15. ANALYSIS We adopt the findings of fact made by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and Examiner’s Answer as our own (Final Act. 2–15; Ans. 4– 18), and we agree with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We have Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 4 considered Appellants’ arguments, but we are not persuaded of Examiner error. We highlight the following for emphasis. Rejection of Claim 1 Appellants argue Shedrinsky’s proxy 29 does not receive the message back from the server and, therefore, Shedrinsky does not teach the limitation of claim 1 reciting “wherein said at least one MQ proxy server . . . retrieves the message from said MQ queue thru [sic] said designated MQ queue manager . . . and forwards the message to a second MQ client.” App. Br. 12–13. In response, the Examiner found Shedrinsky teaches agent 42 retrieves the message from the message queue. Ans. 5 (citing Shedrinsky ¶¶ 11, 29, 47, and 48). In reply, Appellants argue that claim 1 requires a proxy server to perform this message retrieval and forwarding and, because the Examiner found Shedrinsky’s proxy 29 teaches the claimed proxy server, the Examiner erred in relying on agent 42 to teach this message retrieval and forwarding. Reply Br. 2–3. We are not persuaded of Examiner error. Claim 1 recites “at least one MQ proxy server . . . wherein said at least one MQ proxy server . . . retrieves the message from said MQ queue thru [sic] said designated MQ queue manager.” The broadest reasonable interpretation of the “at least one MQ proxy server” claim limitation includes two proxy servers. As the Examiner noted, Shedrinsky teaches that “[p]roxy 29 and agent 42 perform essentially the same functions.” Shedrinsky ¶ 29 (cited at Ans. 5). The Examiner found Shedrinsky teaches “[t]he agent (equivalent to the reference’s proxy 29) polls the server for the message that is to be sent to a server application (equivalent to applicant(s) second MQ queue client) and retrieves the Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 5 message from the message queue. The agent then passes the message to the server application.” Ans. 5. Shedrinsky teaches: Both proxy 29 and agent 42 execute a software thread to poll (71, 72) for data on their respective sockets, and also to poll for data from server 44. . . . Agent 42 polls for data from server 44, meaning that it searches for data from server 44 that is stored in message queues for agent 42. If there is data present, agent 42 retrieves the data, identifies the communication session using the sessionID string associated with the data, and passes the data to server application 39 via the established socket. Shedrinsky ¶ 47 (cited at Ans. 5). Therefore, the evidence supports the Examiner’s findings that Shedrinsky teaches “at least one proxy server” performing message retrieval and forwarding, namely proxy 29 and agent 42. Based on the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Rejection of Claim 14 Claim 14 is a method claim that recites, inter alia, “receiving a MQ message with an MQ proxy server,” “retrieving the MQ message with the MQ proxy server,” and “forwarding the MQ message to the recipient MQ client with the MQ proxy server.” Similar to claim 1, Appellants argue claim 14 is also allowable because the Examiner found the agent, not the proxy, of Shedrinsky retrieves and forwards the message. Reply Br. 4–6. Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us the Examiner erred in concluding claim 14 is obvious. The Examiner found Shedrinsky teaches the steps of claim 14 that are disputed by Appellants (i.e., receiving, retrieving, and forwarding). See Ans. 7–8 (citing Shedrinsky ¶¶ 11, 29, 47, and 48); see also discussion of claim 1 above. Claim 14 recites “an MQ proxy server” Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 6 performing these steps while the prior art teaches two proxy servers (proxy 29 and agent 42, which “perform essentially the same functions” (Shedrinsky ¶ 29)) performing the steps. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007) (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results”). As such, we sustain the rejection of claim 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Rejections of Claims 20 and 22 Appellants argue independent claims 20 and 22 are allowable for reasons similar to those for claim 1. See App. Br. 22–24 (claim 22) and 25– 28 (claim 20); Reply Br. 6–8 (claim 20). For the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 1, we are not persuaded of error, and, therefore, we sustain the rejections of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We further note that claim 22 does not require the “at least one proxy server” to perform any of the steps of the method, and, as such, Appellants’ arguments are also unpersuasive because they are not commensurate with the scope of claim 22. Rejections of Claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 15–18, and 21 Appellants argue dependent claims 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 15–18, and 21 are allowable because the prior art combinations applied in the rejections of these claims do not teach or suggest the limitations discussed above with respect to the independent claims. See App. Br. 13 (claims 2, 3, and 12), 14 (claims 8 and 9), 20–21 (claims 15 and 18), 21–22 (claim 21), and 28–29 (claims 16 and 17). For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 7 of error, and, therefore, we sustain the rejections of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Rejections of Claims 4–7, 10, and 11 Appellants’ arguments with respect to dependent claims 4–7 (App. Br. 17–20) and dependent claims 10 and 11 (App. Br. 24–25) are not persuasive because they fail to address the combined teachings of the references and, instead, argue the references individually. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck &Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For example, with respect to claims 4 and 6, Appellants argue Feldbaum teaches authentication using a receiving computer 72 and not a proxy server. App. Br. 17–19. However, the Examiner concluded it would have been obvious to modify the proxy of Shedrinsky with Feldbaum’s teaching of authentication. Ans. 8–10. Appellants’ arguments with respect to claims 5 and 7 regarding the evaluation of security threats are unpersuasive for the same reason. App. Br. 18–20. Similarly, with respect to claims 10 and 11, Appellants argue Shah does not teach a proxy server. App. Br. 24–25. However, the Examiner concluded it would have been obvious to modify the proxy of Shedrinsky with Shah’s teaching of reformatting a message. Ans. 14–15. Based on the foregoing, we sustain the rejections of claims 4–7, 10, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2012-011399 Application 11/967,606 8 DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–12, 14–18, and 20– 22. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED kme Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation