Ex Parte Chebiyyam et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 13, 2017

14289859 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/289,859 05/29/2014 Gopi Chebiyyam P52444C (920-0117USC) 1040
13205 7590 11/15/2017
Rlank Rome. T T P - MoAfee
EXAMINER
717 Texas Avenue TRUVAN, LEYNNA THANH
Suite 1400
Houston, TX 77002 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2435
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/15/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
hou stonpatents @ blankrome .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GOPI CHEBIYYAM and
PRASANNA BASAVAPATNA
Appeal 2017-002476
Application 14/289,8591
Technology Center 2400
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, KEVIN C. TROCK, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING
1 Appellants’ Brief (“App. Br.”) identifies McAfee, Inc. as the real party
interest. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2017-002476
Application 14/289,859
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a decision on Appellants’ Request for Rehearing. Appellants’
Request for Rehearing is filed under 37 C.F.R. § 41.52,2 requesting that we
reconsider our Decision of July 19, 2017, wherein we affirmed-in-part the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20, and we entered new grounds of
rejection as to claims 1 and 14. We have reconsidered our Decision in light
of Appellants’ comments in the request. We are persuaded of error with
respect to the new ground of rejection of claim 1 as set forth in our decision.
We, therefore, change the result of the Decision as discussed below. We
decline to otherwise change the result of the Decision.
Exemplary Claims
The claims are directed to a system, method, and computer program
product for preventing access to data with respect to a data access attempt
associated with a remote data sharing session. Spec. Abstract. Claims 1, 7,
and 14 are independent claims, and they are reproduced below.
1. A non-transitory machine-readable medium, on
which are stored instructions, comprising instructions that when
executed cause a machine to:
detect an attempt to access a remote location;
determine whether the remote location is associated with
a remote desktop sharing application; and
prevent access to the remote location responsive to the
determination.
2 “The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points believed
to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board.” 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.52(a)(1).
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7. A non-transitory machine-readable medium, on
which are stored instructions, comprising instructions that when
executed cause a machine to:
detect a request to access data;
determine whether the data has a predetermined
fingerprint associated with one or more applications;
identify an application associated with the request; and
determine whether to allow the request based on the
predetermined fingerprint and the identified application.
14. A non-transitory machine- readable medium, on
which are stored instructions, comprising instructions that when
executed cause a machine to:
determine whether remote desktop sharing is currently
enabled;
identify a fingerprint of data to which access is requested;
and
determine whether to allow access to the data responsive
to a match of the fingerprint with a predetermined fingerprint.
App. Br. 15—18 (Claims Appendix).
Appellants ’ Contentions
1. Appellants contend the Board erred in the Decision because
Nothing in Azeez makes a determination whether to permit
access based on a determination that the remote location is
associated with a remote desktop sharing application. Instead,
Azeez (as the Board notes) recites a router 130 that “queries a
desktop permission manager 135 to determine if the requested
office computer is allowed remote access.” Azeez recites the
router 130 as querying the desktop permission manager 135.
Unlike claim 1, however, the decision to allow or permit access
by the desktop permission manager 135 is not based on whether
the office computer to which remote access is desired is
associated with a remote desktop sharing application. Instead,
“[t]he desktop permission management [sic] 135 may be as
simple as a list of office computers allowed remote access or may
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Appeal 2017-002476
Application 14/289,859
be an interface to the previously described asset database that
may provide authentication and authorization.” (Azeez and
[0024].) Azeez appears to assume that the office desktop
computer 150 allows remote desktop sharing through a server
display module such as the Windows XP Remote Desktop
Protocol (RDP) module (Azeez at [0025]), but the presence or
absence of such a module is not part of the decision on whether
to allow remote access.
(Request 2.)
2. Appellants further contend:
The Board rejected the Examiner’s only disclosure of the use of
a fingerprint reader as “insufficient to anticipate claim 7,” but
then found a completely new rationale for arguing that Dixon
anticipates claim 7, arguing in this new way that Dixon
“discloses determining whether the data has a predetermined
fingerprint associate with one or more applications,” and thus
sustaining the rejection of claim 7. This completely new
rationale, even though based on the same references used by the
Examiner, should have been designated a new ground of
rejection, and Applicant respectfully requests the Board so
designate the rejection.
(Request 5 (internal citation omitted).)
3. Appellants further contend:
Although Dixon recites using the fingerprint of a website to
determine whether the website is a clone of another website, a
decision on whether to allow access to a candidate clone website
appears in Dixon to be based solely on the reputation of the
website to which access is requested. Nothing in Dixon attempts
to identify the application associated with the request. The
Board’s reasoning appears to be that the data on the website may
include executable applications. However, those applications are
not applications that are separately identified as associated with
the request and the identity of the application used as part of a
decision on whether to grant access to the website. Rather, even
where applications found in the website content are considered,
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Application 14/289,859
Dixon only recites using that as part of the reputation of the
website. The fingerprint constructed by extracting phrases of the
website has nothing to do with the identity of any application
found in the website.
(Request 5—6.)
ANALYSIS
First Contention
We are persuaded by Appellants’ first contention. Although Azeez
discloses allowing or permitting access by the desktop permission manager
135 based on whether a workstation is on list of office computers allowed
remote access, the fact that a workstation is on the list is not dispositive of
whether the workstation is associated with a remote desktop sharing
application as required by the claims. Anticipation requires strict identity,
and while Azeez discloses a system very similar to Appellants’ invention, it
does not disclose the invention in an identical way. Accordingly, we are
persuaded of error in the new ground of rejection of claim 1, and we hereby
withdraw that rejection.
Second Contention
We are not persuaded by Appellants second contention. Appellants
argue the rationale relied upon in affirming the rejection of claim 7 should
have been designated a new ground of rejection. We disagree. Although we
rejected the Examiner’s finding that Dixon’s use of a fingerprint reader is
sufficient to establish anticipation, this was not the only basis on which the
Examiner rejected the claim. The Examiner also rejected claim 7 based on
Dixon’s disclosure of clone websites, described in paragraphs 160—161. See,
e.g., Ans. 14—15 (“Thus, Dixon teaches another form of a ‘fingerprint’ per se
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Application 14/289,859
that is associated to a website.”) Our decision addressed this additional
rationale provided by the Examiner. We do not find persuasive Appellants’
claim of unfair surprise, as Appellants addressed this same finding made by
the Examiner regarding website clones in the Reply Brief. See Reply Br. 9—
10. Therefore, we are not persuaded our affirmance of the rejection of claim
7 should have been designated a new ground of rejection, and we decline to
change the decision in that respect.
Third Contention
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ third contention. The crux
of Appellants’ argument is that the “fingerprint constructed by extracting
phrases of the website has nothing to do with the identity of any application
found in the website.” (Request 6.) This argument is not commensurate
with the scope of the claim. The claim does not require the fingerprint be
associated with the identity of an application found in the website. Rather, it
merely requires the fingerprint be “associated with one or more
applications.” The word “associated” has a broad meaning. For example,
one dictionary defines associated to mean “connected with something else.”
Oxford American Dictionary, 3d. Ed., p. 96 (2010). As we explained in our
decision, web content assigned a reputation may include an executable
application. Dixon 17. Dixon’s reputation service implements the clone
detection facility by creating a fingerprint of web content assigned a bad
reputation. The web content assigned a bad reputation can include an
executable application. As such, the fingerprint is associated with, i.e.,
connected with, an executable application. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded of error in our decision to affirm the rejection of claim 7, and we
decline to change its result.
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DECISION
In view of the foregoing discussion, we grant Appellants’ Request for
Rehearing and reconsider our decision. We decline to change the result with
respect to the rejection of claim 7 as request by Appellants. Nor do we
designate the rejection of claim 7 as a new ground as requested.
However, we are persuaded by Appellants’ contentions with respect to
the new ground of rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we hereby withdraw
the rejection of claim 1 as being anticipated by Azeez.
Although Appellants assert the new ground of rejection for claim 14 is
flawed (Request 6), Appellants present no argument or explanation of why
the new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is improper. On a
request for rehearing, the burden falls on the Appellant to “state with
particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked
by the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1). Because Appellants have not
discussed with particularity any perceived error in our new ground of
rejection of claim 14, we decline to withdraw the new ground of rejection
issued with respect thereto.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
REQUEST FOR REHEARING GRANTED-IN-PART
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