Ex Parte Charlson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 13, 201811695374 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 11/695,374 04/02/2007 46169 7590 08/15/2018 SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P. (Cerner Corporation) Intellectual Property Department 2555 GRAND BOULEVARD KANSAS CITY, MO 64108-2613 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Sara J. Charlson UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. CRNI.134461 2541 EXAMINER PAULS, JOHN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3626 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/15/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): IPDOCKET@SHB.COM IPRCDKT@SHB.COM BPARKERSON@SHB.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SARA J. CHARLSON, MATTHEW R. HUFFMAN, KAREN E. BERISLA VICH, JACQUELINE S. LESTER, AARON L. HENTON, and JENNIFER L. BESCH Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 Technology Center 3600 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, NABEEL U. KHAN, and AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10-12, which are all of the pending claims. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify Cemer Innovation as the real party in interest. (Br. 3.) 2 Claims 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 have been canceled. (Final Act 2; Br. 3.) Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction By way of background in the Specification, Appellants state: Healthcare information systems are traditionally institutionally customized and require a tremendous amount of time and effort to configure and/or implement from ground level or convert from a different system. This is primarily because such systems are manually built which is a tedious process at best, generally taking several months and multiple in-person consultant visits to accomplish. Accordingly, a method for configuring, implementing and/or maintaining a healthcare information system that diminishes the time and effort required would be desirable. Additionally, an automated system that utilizes existing sources of information for configuration, implementation and/or maintenance to alleviate some of the tedious nature of the process would be advantageous. (Spec. ,r,r 2--4.) Further according to Appellants, the claims are directed to an apparatus and method "for selectively associating content items with pre- configured alternatives based upon directed user input." (Abs.) Exemplary Claim Claims 1 and 5 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the claimed subject matter: 1. One or more computer storage devices having computer-executable instructions embodied thereon that, when executed, perform a method in a clinical environment for building a customized healthcare information system based on an existing healthcare information system by selectively associating, through directed user input, content items from the existing healthcare information system with pre-configured alternatives, the pre-configured alternatives configured for use in the customized healthcare information system and configured to 2 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 be options to represent one or more content items from the existing healthcare information system, the method comprising: receiving, at a survey component, a first content item from an existing healthcare information system for building a customized healthcare information system, wherein the first content item comprises a first clinical laboratory orderable item; determining, via the survey component, that the first content item is an exact name match with a pre-configured content item for use in the customized healthcare information system; presenting, via the survey component, a representation of the exact name match between the first content item and the pre- configured content item for verification, from a user, of the exact name match, the user being a healthcare facility or at least one of a healthcare facility personnel, wherein the survey component is configured to present a plurality of screen displays from which the user may input information to build the customized healthcare information system; receiving verification from the user of the exact name match between the first content item and the pre-configured content item for use in the customized healthcare information system; receiving, at a survey component, a second content item from an existing healthcare information system for building a customized healthcare information system, wherein the second content item comprises a second clinical laboratory orderable item; determining, via the survey component, a plurality of pre- configured alternatives for user selection to reconcile the second content item from the existing healthcare information system with one or more pre-configured alternatives of the plurality of pre-configured alternatives, the plurality of preconfigured alternatives configured for use in the customized healthcare information system and configured to be options to represent the second content item in the customized healthcare information system, wherein each of the plurality of pre-configured alternatives is determined utilizing pre-configured content that 3 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 comprises survey-specific tables that contain options for configuring, implementing, or maintaining the customized healthcare information system, facility- and personnel-specific content derived from the existing healthcare information system, and a facility and personnel profile; presenting, via the survey component, the plurality of pre- configured alternatives for user selection; directing the user through the process of selecting one pre- configured alternative of the plurality of pre-configured alternatives to reconcile the second content item from the ex1stmg healthcare information system with the one preconfigured alternative of the plurality of pre-configured alternatives for use in the customized healthcare information system; and receiving, at the survey component, user selection of the one preconfigured alternative of the plurality of pre-configured alternatives for association with the second content item in order to reconcile the second content item from the existing healthcare information system with the one pre-configured alternative of the plurality of pre-configured alternatives. REJECTION Claims 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (judicial exception/ abstract idea). 3 3 Although Appellants purport to argue independent claims 1 and 5 separately, the arguments presented for both claims are substantively the same in all material respects. (Br. 14--25.) Appellants argue the dependent claims collectively with their respective independent claims. (Id. at 12, 21.) We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). 4 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 ANALYSIS The Supreme Court has set forth an analytical "framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice Corp. v. CLS Bankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71-73 (2012)). In the first step of the analysis, we determine whether the claims at issue are "directed to" a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If not, the inquiry ends. Thales Visionix Inc. v. US., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are determined to be directed to an abstract idea, then we consider under step two whether the claims contain an "inventive concept" sufficient to "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 ( citation omitted). Noting that the two stages involve "overlapping scrutiny of the content of the claims," the Federal Circuit has described "the first-stage inquiry" as "looking at the 'focus' of the claims, their 'character as a whole,"' and "the second-stage inquiry (where reached)" as "looking more precisely at what the claim elements add-specifically, whether, in the Supreme Court's terms, they identify an 'inventive concept' in the application of the ineligible matter to which (by assumption at stage two) the claim is directed." Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In considering whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we acknowledge-as did the Court in Mayo----that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 5 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that is itself the abstract idea and whether the claims merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336. Step One: Whether the Claims Are Directed to a Patent-Ineligible Concept (Abstract Idea) In applying the framework set out in Alice, and as the first step of that analysis, the Examiner concludes the claims are directed to "the abstract idea of determining an exact name match between a first content item and a preconfigured content item and determining a plurality of alternatives for a second content item (i.e. based on a matching algorithm)." (Final Act. 5 ( emphasis omitted).) The Examiner further determines "[ t ]his concept is similar in scope to those found to be abstract ideas by the Courts," such as "comparing new and stored information." (Id.) Appellants maintain that the § 101 rejection cannot be sustained because "the Examiner has not provided any evidence, explanation, or reasoning beyond conclusory statements to support a finding that independent claim 1 includes the abstract ideas of 'comparing new and stored information' and 'organizing human activity' .... " (Br. 15.) As an initial matter, we disagree that the Office must provide "evidence" to support a determination that a claim is directed to an abstract idea. As the Federal Circuit has held, the Office carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, "together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." See In 6 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner analyzed the claims using the Mayo/Alice two-step framework. (Final Act. 4--6.) In so doing, the Examiner notified Appellants of the reasons for the rejection "together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). We find, therefore, that the Examiner set forth a prima facie case of patent- ineligibility such that the burden then shifted to Appellants to demonstrate that the claims are patent-eligible. Appellants further argue the claims "improve an existing technological process" and, thus, are not directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. (Br. 14.) In particular, Appellants argue their claims are not abstract because they are directed to "computerized building of a customized healthcare information system based on an existing healthcare information system." (J d.) We are not persuaded of error. As the Examiner concludes, and we agree, the claims here are ineligible because they are directed to data selection, comparison of data by application of rules (matching first and second content items with pre-configured content items), and presentation of the results. (Final Act. 4--5; Ans. 3--4.) Our reviewing court has repeatedly determined such data manipulation and presentation is abstract. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims 'directed to' a patent-ineligible concept"); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (computer- 7 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 implemented system for "verifying the validity of a credit card transaction[] over the Internet" was patent-ineligible); Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344--45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (patent- ineligible claims recited "generalized software components arranged to implement an abstract concept [ of generating insurance-policy-related tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a computer"). In characterizing the claimed subject matter as directed to an abstract idea, however, we do not discount Appellants' argument that the claimed invention may provide many benefits. (See Br. 14.) But such an argument is grounded in the notion that the particular selection of data, and the results of matching one set of data to another set, are useful in the claimed context (building a customized healthcare information system), which is not exclusive of patent-ineligible subject matter. As many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is "limited to particular content" or a particular "source," that limitation does not remove the collection and analysis from the realm of the abstract. See SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, No. 2017-2081, 2018 WL 3656048 at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2, 2018); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353, 1355 (citing cases). The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have also repeatedly made clear that "merely limiting the field of use of the abstract idea to a particular existing technological environment does not render the claims any less abstract." Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We are also not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claimed invention "improv[es] an existing technological process." (Br. 8.) 8 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 Appellants have not persuasively argued that the claims are directed to a technological problem. As the Examiner finds, and we agree, "[t]he problem in the present application is the time and resource[-]intensive process of building a customized healthcare information system. This is not a technological problem, even if the claimed invention recites a computerized solution." (Ans. 15 ( emphasis omitted).) That is, the claims are directed to a business problem of alleviating the "tedious nature" of the process of manually building a healthcare information system (Spec. ,r,r 2- 3), and they provide the business solution of automating the matching of content items from an existing system to pre-configured content items for use in a customized system (id. ,r 44). Thus, the focus of the claims is not on any improved computer, but rather on automating the matching of content items in an existing system to pre-configured content items in a new system. Appellants' Specification also makes clear that off-the-shelf computer technology (such as "well-known computing systems, environments, and/or configurations" such as "personal computers," without technological restriction) is usable to carry out the claimed invention. (Spec. ,r,r 46, 64.) The claims, therefore, fit into the familiar class of claims that do not "focus ... on ... an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools." Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. (See also Ans. 15: "The problem of 'manually built systems (being) a tedious process at best, generally taking several months and multiple in-person consultant visits to accomplish', is not caused by the conventional way that the Internet operates, nor is it caused by the way that any other technology or device conventionally operates.") In addition, as our reviewing court has made clear, "relying on a computer to perform 9 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible." OIP Techs. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015). (See Ans. 13-14.) In short, we have considered all of Appellants' arguments challenging the characterization of the pending claims as being directed to abstract ideas, but we do not find them to be persuasive of error. (Br. 11-15, 21-23.) Rather, we agree with the Examiner, at step one of the Alice analysis, that the claims are directed to one or more abstract ideas. Accordingly, we tum to the second step of the Alice analysis, in which we determine whether the additional elements of the claims transform them into patent-eligible subject matter. Step Two: Whether Additional Elements Transform the Idea into Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Having determined that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the Examiner also determines that the additional elements or combinations of elements beyond the abstract idea do not amount to "significantly more" than the abstract idea itself because: the additional elements or combination of elements in the claims, other than the abstract idea per se, amount to no more than a recitation of A) generic computer structure that serves to perform generic computer functions that serve to merely link the abstract idea to a particular technological environment (i.e. storage devices having computer-executable instructions, computing devices); and B) functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry (i.e. receiving data, comparing data to stored information, displaying data, receiving user selections of options). (Final Act. 5-6.) 10 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 Appellants argue the Examiner's determination is in error because "the claimed embodiments are rooted in technology since the claimed embodiments address a problem arising from the use or modem technologies, including the computerized building of a customized healthcare information system." (Br. 17.) In essence, Appellants' argument distills down to the notion that automating the matching of existing content items ("first" and "second" content items) to "pre-configured alternatives" is patentable. As the Supreme Court has explained, however, "the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358. Thus, automating the matching of "content items from [an] existing healthcare information system with pre-configured alternatives" ( even based on the selection of particular data and analysis of that data according to particular rules) does not transform Appellants' claims into patent-eligible subject matter. (See also Ans. 15.) Unlike the situation addressed in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), for example, Appellants do not claim to change how the underlying technology operates. Claim 1 calls for"[ o ]ne or more computer storage devices having computer executable constructions embodied thereon that, when executed, perform a method .... " As also noted above, the Specification describes only generic technology for executing the programs. (Spec. ,r,r 46-54, 64.) Moreover, the Examiner finds the tasks recited in claim I-such as receiving data, comparing data to stored information, displaying data, receiving user selections of options-are common computer functions. (See Final Act. 6.) Appellants do not challenge this finding. Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the 11 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 Examiner's finding that the solution here is rooted in routine use of conventional computer technology to carry out the claimed abstract idea. (See id. at 5---6; see also Ans. 13-17.) In that regard, we note that there is a fundamental difference between computer functionality improvements, on the one hand, and uses of existing computers as tools to perform a particular task, on the other. Indeed, the Federal Circuit applied this distinction in Enfish in rejecting a§ 101 challenge because the claims at issue focused on a specific type of data structure, i.e., a self-referential table for a computer database, designed to improve the way a computer carries out its basic functions of storing and retrieving data, and not merely on asserted advances in uses to which existing computer capabilities could be put. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. We find no parallel here between the claims before us and the claims in Enfzsh nor any comparable aspect in the claims before us that represents "an improvement to computer functionality," i.e., an improvement in the way a computer carries out its basic functions. Id. The alleged advantages that Appellants tout do not concern an improvement to computer capabilities, but instead relate to an alleged improvement in building a customized healthcare system by associating content items from an existing healthcare system with pre-configured alternatives, for which a computer is used as a tool in its ordinary capacity-that is, providing processing technology to execute computer programs that, in tum, receive and manipulate the selected data. (See also Ans. 13-16.) In short, Appellants' claims are properly characterized, as noted above, as ones in which generic computer technology is used merely as a tool to implement the claimed abstract ideas. Thus, the Examiner finding of 12 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 the generic nature of the component parts recited in the claims, coupled with the Specification's characterization of such components as "well-known," provides sufficient evidence of a generic computer system used to implement the abstraction. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Significantly, the claims do not provide details as to any non-conventional software for enhancing the financing process."). See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (explaining that "[o]ur law demands more" than claim language that "provides only a result-oriented solution, with insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it"). Appellants do not expressly challenge the Examiner's finding that the recited computer structure is "well-understood, routine, and conventional." Appellants argue, however, that the claimed feature of "using input from a number of information sources prior to initiation of the configuration, implementation, and/or converting process allows for a more resource efficient (improved) computerized process," and is not well-understood, routine and conventional as evidenced by the "lack of prior-art rejections." (Br. 18.) We find no support for the assertion that "using input from a number of sources" before building the customized healthcare information system is somehow unconventional, and, as noted above, even unconventional abstract ideas are not patent-eligible. See SAP Am., 2018 WL 3656048 at* 1. Relatedly, to the extent Appellants maintain that the limitations of the claims necessarily amount to "significantly more" than an abstract idea because the claimed method is allegedly patentable over the prior art ( an issue that is not before us), Appellants misapprehend the controlling precedent. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo 13 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 framework is termed a search for an "inventive concept," "the concept of inventiveness [ under § 101] is distinct from that of novelty" and "[ t ]he inventiveness inquiry of§ 101 should therefore not be confused with the separate novelty inquiry of§ 102 or the obviousness inquiry of§ 103." See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, the analysis is based on a search for "'an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304. We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellants' argument that "these claims pose no risk of preemption." (Br. 19.) We agree the Supreme Court has described "the concern that drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre- emption." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354. But characterizing pre-emption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. As our reviewing court has explained, "[ t ]he Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability" and "[ f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). And although "preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility." Id. Moreover, "[ w ]here a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent 14 Appeal2017-003696 Application 11/695,374 ineligible subject matter under the [Alice/Mayo] framework ... , preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot." Id.; see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362---63 ("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the ecommerce setting do not make them any less abstract."). For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent- ineligible subject matter, or in rejecting on the same basis independent claim 5, for which Appellants present the same substantive arguments as for claim 1. (Br. 21-25.) We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 3, 7, and 10-12, which Appellants do not argue separately. (Id. at 12, 21.) DECISION The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 7, and 10- 12 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation